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VOORWOORD
Ook al zijn de gedachten van deze Erwin uit hun verband gerukt, het mag
duidelijk zijn dat de consciëntieuze lezer een hele verhandeling over een betrekke-
lijk technisch volkenrechtelijk probleem wacht. Dit boek gaat over de werkzaam-
heid van conventies, en het is een overbrenging van mijn, misschien zelfs wel
intellectuele, reflectie over het materiaal. Toch blijft het waarschijnlijk /IOCMS
pocMS voor veel lezers en is het passend me, bij de aanvang van dit proefschrift
te verontschuldigen voor de lengte ervan, en het feit dat de hoofdstukken over
de vier te behandelen VN mensenrechtenverdragen in hoge mate uit taaie kost
bestaan. Ter verontschuldiging aan de toegewijde lezer die oprecht van plan is
deze hoofdstukken door te worstelen, moge dienen dat deze saaie kost minimaal
even lastig was om te bestuderen. Sterker nog, VN documenten zijn in het
algemeen weinig leuk, en zeker niet in deze hoeveelheden.
Een proefschrift schrijven is leuk en lastig. Beide indrukken strijden om de
voorrang. Lastig, omdat dit proefschrift over een betrekkelijk ongrijpbaar pro-
bleem gaat. Ik heb soms gedacht me aan dit onderwerp te vertillen, welke indruk
werd bevestigd door de geringe hoeveelheid literatuur op dit terrein. Er waren
worstelingen met het begrip van het probleem, en met de structuur van dit
verhaal. Soms had ik het liefst het begrip "object and purpose" uit mijn gedachten
gebannen en het manuscript in de Maas gegooid.
Hoe lastig ook, het is tegelijkertijd een leerzame ervaring geweest: merken
dat het niet slechts om het verzamelen van feitenkennis en het systematisch
ordenen daarvan draait, maar dat ook creativiteit een belangrijke rol speelt. Het
staat niet vaak in voorwoorden, maar zulke puzzels hebben hun eigen
aantrekkingskracht: of je het wilt of niet, er gaat een zekere verslaving uit van
een verzameling losse eindjes die in een systeem zouden moeten passen. Met
losse eindjes duid ik hier voor het gemak het soms ondoorgrondelijke handelen
van staten, in combinatie met ondoorzichtige regels van verdragenrecht als de
"doel en strekking" regel aan. Er zou toch een systeem moeten zijn, een manier
om het probleem van de voorbehouden bij mensenrechtenverdragen te begrijpen,
leek mij. Na een fase van twijfel, een période van het herschikken van materiaal
in elke denkbare volgorde, ontstaat opeens (onder de douche, tijdens het
boodschappen doen) inzicht over de juiste ordening. Nadat anderen kritiek hebben
geleverd kan het verhaal aangescherpt worden, maar blijkt de kern intact te
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blijven. Er blijkt iets van de studeerkamerwijsheid te kloppen als anderen die
aan een kritische toets onderwerpen. Het leerzame van zulke ervaringen staat
ten onrechte nauwelijks in de belangstelling als er gesproken wordt over het
ploeteren aan proefschriften, maar wat mij betreft is dat buitengewoon waardevol
geweest. Ondanks de kwijtgeraakte documenten of in de computer zoekgeraakte
stukken tekst die als laatste loodjes het afronden van een proefschrift tot een
tergende bezigheid maken.
Het voorwoord is de plaats om familie en vrienden te bedanken voor hun steun
bij het tot stand komen van een boek waar zij meestal niet veel leesplezier aan
zullen beleven. Dat wil niet zeggen dat deze bedankingen daarom minder oprecht
zijn, natuurlijk wil ik dierbaren, geliefden en andere vertrouwelingen op deze
plek van mijn waardering laten blijken. ' *>'-«•
In de eerste plaats wil ik mijn ouders bedanken: zij wisten zeker dat er
uiteindelijk een boek tot stand zou komen, ook al twijfelde ik daar soms aan.
Voorzover ze daar prijs op stellen delen mijn broers en schoonzussen in diezelfde
dank. •**»"
Een bijzonder woord van dank wil ik richten tot mijn paranimfen Liesbeth
van Woerden en Malva Driessen. Liesbeth, omdat ze al zolang ik mij kan
herinneren mijn beste vriendin en paranimf is. Toen we rondeleidsters waren;
en nu we zogezegd volwassenen zijn. Malva, omdat het een genoegen is een
kamergenote te hebben gehad waarmee even makkelijk over vrijers als over
verdragen te praten is. Jullie beider vriendschap lijkt vanzelfsprekend, maar dit
is nu eens een mooie plek om te zeggen hoezeer ik aan jullie beiden gehecht ben.
Daarnaast moeten mijn vroegere collega's in de vakgrœp Internationaal en
Europees Recht in Maastricht genoemd worden. Mijn promotoren Theo van
Boven en Kees Flinterman wisten mij met hun grote kermis en ervaring op het
gebied van de rechten van de mens af te houden van een al te positivistische
benadering van het onderwerp van mijn proefschrift. Als buitengewoon libérale
promotoren lieten ze mij een grote vrijheid in het bepalen van de reikwijdte en
omvang van mijn onderzoek. Soms was dat lastig, bijvoorbeeld toen ik meende
dat een vergelijking tussen dertien verdragen haalbaar was. Het heeft er in elk
geval toe geleid dat ik ervarenderwijs zicht kreeg op de structuur en samenhang
van het verhaal. **- '^
Het was een plezier samen te werken met Fons Coomans, Fred Griinfeld,
Ingrid Westendorp en Harmen van der Wilt die elk op zijn of haar eigen wijze
mijn wijsneuzige zekerheden ter discussie stelden. Tegenspraak vind ik altijd
leuk. De sfeer in de projectgroep Mensenrechten maakte het mogelijk expertise
op te bouwen op het onontgonnen terrein van internationaal recht en vrouwen.
Het feministisch-juridisch discours stelt fundamentele uitgangspunten van het
volkenrecht ter discussie, en ik heb het proefschrift regelmatig terzijde gelegd
om aan die discussie deel te nemen. Ook de leden van de kerngroep Vrouw en
Recht, en in het bijzonder Joyce Hes en Lucy Willems met wie ik het genoegen
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deel contractonderzoek te doen over zoiets belangwekkends als de
conceptualisering van zachte boter wil ik bedanken voor de goede samenwerking.
Aan de opeenvolgende student-assistenten van de vakgrœp, met name Annette
Brouwer en Judith Goossens, ben ik dank verschuldigd voor de nauwgezetheid
waarmee ze lastige vragen voor me uitzochten. Kortom, Maastricht bleek een
aangename omgeving om te wonen en te werken, niet in de laaste plaats door
de informele sfeer aan de rechtenfaculteit.
Bert Vierdag heeft aan de wieg gestaan van mijn belangstelling voor het verdra-
genrecht. Ik herinner me met plezier zijn colleges verdragenrecht op vrijdagoch-
tenden in de VN bibliotheek aan de Herengracht in Amsterdam, begin jaren
tachtig. Wat op het eerste gezicht erg saai leek, bleek onder zijn leiding een
fascinerend onderdeel van het volkenrecht. Ik ben blij dat zijn enthousiasme voor
de bronnen van het volkenrecht, en het verdragenrecht in het bijzonder, zo
aanstekelijk is geweest.
Tenslotte, een van de eerste schrijfsters over het probleem van voorbehouden
bij het Vrouwenverdrag, Edith Oeser, heeft al gewaarschuwd voor de valkuilen
op dit terrein. In 1988 schreef ze: "Every tnter/ia/Zona/ favv exper/ fcnows //iaf
réserverions /o m«/ / i t e r a / /rea/zes, nctfab/y ftwmûH ng/wï co/zvenft'o/zs', are very
/m±y. "' Als ik, ondanks haar waarschuwing, in die valkuilen terecht ben
gekomen, is dat gelukkig vooral mijn eigen fout.
. . - ^ • • - ,.•:••• - ^ ' V - > : • • ? . . . • . • • • 3 $ .
Maastricht, oktober 1994
, .. Liesbeth Lijnzaad
. i . " . i .
1. E.Oeser, Legal questions in the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
women, in: 14 Bull. GDR Cttee. Human Rts. 1988, 86-98, at 93.
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PART I
INTRODUCTION

1. RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES IN THE AFTER-
MATH OF THE GENOCIDE CASE
1. THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY
When embarking on a study of reservations to human rights treaties, one could
be tempted to consider it a hopeless puzzle. By making reservations, States
frequently undermine essential rules, and indeed essential human rights
guarantees. On reading the Bangladeshi reservation to the Women's Conven-
tion', indicating that it will implement this convention in accordance with
Islamic Sharia law, the advocates of women's rights cannot but be extremely
sceptical about the possible contribution of the Convention (as amended by the
reservation) to the improvement of the situation of women in Bangladesh.
Similarly, the reservation made by the Yemen Arab Republic excluding articles
5.c (political rights), 5.d.iv (right to marriage), 5.d.vi (right to inherit) and
5.d.vii (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion) on acceding to the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination* seems to destroy the
aim of the Convention, that is the elimination of racial discrimination with
respect to the entitlement to human rights.
These are two examples, but going through the lists of reservations many more
appear. The impression is that many States, when ratifying, at the same time
ruin the treaty. Reservations restrict the potential domestic effect of a human
rights treaty, and a large number of reservations made by a great many States
will turn a human rights instrument into a moth-eaten guarantee. Reservations
to human rights instruments are questionable, they instantly create a feeling of
unease. It does not seem proper to exclude provisions from a treaty obviously
meant to protect people, as human rights treaties are'.
Yet, this is a black-and-white picture. It is too simple to consider all reserva-
tions suspect, and to take all reserving states to be acting in bad faith. Though
the "bad guys" in the following will be the reserving States Parties with their
incomplete and fragmented implementation of human rights instruments, their
attitude is not necessarily worse than that of States that ratify and fail to
implement the obligations. Through a reservation partial implementation is
explicit, and usually legitimate. Ratifying the complete treaty and failing to
implement it, which constitutes a breach of treaty, may go largely unnoticed.
The effects may not be significantly different for the beneficiaries, however.
Reservations are a relatively new issue in the law of treaties. It was only during
the interbellum that the number of reservations increased, and the interna-
1. New York, 18 December 1979. '* "*"' •'"'" •
2. New York. 21 December 1965.
3. M.Coccia, Reservations to multilateral treaties on human rights, in: 15 CalWILJ 1985, 1-
51, at 16:"..the terms 'reservation' and 'human right' appear to contradict one another."
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tional community felt the need to reflect on their legal effects. At the time, the
law of treaties was relatively simple and straight-forward, the number of
participating States was relatively small and the number of issues dealt with in
international law was relatively limited. In such a situation it was possible to
cope with the odd State that wanted to opt out of particular provision in a
treaty.
Human rights law developed after the Second World War; and the Genocide
case of the International Court of Justice was to focus the attention on the
intricacies of the relationship between the option provided by the law of
treaties to make reservations, and the protection of human rights through
treaties. The majority opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention,
indicating that "object and purpose of the treaty" would be the future yardstick
for dealing with reservations, provided a rule that seemed adequate at first
sight. More than thirty years after the Advisory Opinion, the question of
reservations to human rights instruments reappeared when the reservations to
the Women's Convention seemed to fundamentally restrict the potential impact
of this convention. >
Reservations can be made, and indeed are frequently made where it concerns
human rights treaties. Thus, it is necessary to study the rules of the law of
treaties on reservations, in order to see if and how these general rules can be
applied to reservations to human rights treaties, and to see how reservations
have been dealt with in practice under a number of human rights instruments.
At first sight the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties' rule on the
"object and purpose of the treaty", reflecting the Genocide Opinion, seems to
provide a clear yardstick for dealing with the issue of reservations to human
rights treaties. However, the rule is transparent and opaque at the same time,
and proves to be distinctly confusing when applied in practice.
The book's preoccupation (that is, the author's preoccupation) with the law of
treaties as a framework for reference must be mentioned. Whether or not the
author is a self-confessed prisoner of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties will be for the reader to decide. Focusing on the law of treaties'
aspects of the problem was prompted by the fact that the subject of this
research lies at the intersection of the law of treaties and human rights law. If
one were to follow the dogmas and theories in either field, this would lead to
the conclusion that reservations are the necessary consequence of the structure
of the present day law of treaties, even if an unpleasant consequence; or
alternatively, that reservations are a sign of the superficial interest states take
in the international protection of human rights. Be this as it may, to stop at
either conclusion would be very simplistic, and could not lead to any improve-
ments in the present situation.
The initial object of this study was the problem of reservations to the Women's
Convention. Reservations seem to have turned this Convention into a weak
instrument, seemingly unable to contribute to the goals it was designed for: the
elimination of discrimination against women. Reservations to the Women's
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Convention worried my colleague the late Loes Briinott, who suggested a study
of these reservations be undertaken. Although the question of the validity and
legality of reservations poses itself forcefully with respect to the Women's
Convention, it was thought useful to widen the scope and include other human
rights instruments as well*. A comparison of the practice under other instru-
ments could lead to an exchange of strategies. The concept of international
human rights law as a coherent and interdependent set of rules has contributed
to this choice, as well as the issue of the universality of human rights law,
which is a focal point in the research conducted by the Centre for Human
Rights at the University of Limburg.
There has always been an implicit suggestion', also in the Genocide Opinion",
that allowing reservations contributes to increasingly universal acceptance of
human rights instruments. Yet, this depends on the sacrifices in terms of
substance, necessary to attain the goal of universality. The question that should
be asked is whether the emphasis on universality is at the expense of the
integrity of the treaty, and thus of the protection of the substantive rights
therein. To rephrase LeBlanc's remark: "//as f/;e >vf7///t,gnew 0/ f/ie //joy'on'fy [in
the Genocide Opinion, EL] /o COM/WÏM?».»? //ie //ifegmy 0/ a co/ive/ifto/i //1 //ie
/iop<? 0/ ac/i/ew/ig H/in'OTfl//(y bee/i to /10 avo//r'.
Little has been written about reservations to human rights instruments con-
cluded within the United Nations. The issue has primarily arisen with respect
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms*, obviously prompted by the imaginative case-law of Euro-
pean Commission and European Court in recent years. The differences
between regional and world-wide systems of human rights protection need not
be elaborated upon here. It may suffice to say that the non-comparability of
the supervisory mechanisms would have made it complicated to present an
overview of the ways to deal with reservations. I therefore chose to discuss the
impact of reservations to human rights treaties concluded within the United
Nations. Universality as a guiding principle also pointed to the study of
instruments concluded under the aegis of the United Nations.
Originally this study focused on the legality of far-reaching reservations and the
exact scope of the obligation not to make reservations contrary to "the object
¥ ! • • •
4. As H.Charlesworth, C.Chinkin and S.Wright, Feminist approaches to international law,
in 85 AJIL 1991: 613-645 at 634 wrote:"No single approach can deal with the complexity
of international legal organizations, processes and rules, or with the diversity of women's
experiences within and outside those structures."
5. J.K.Oamble, Reservations to multilateral treaties: a macroscopic view of state practice,
in: 74 AJIL 1980, 372-394 at 372; C. Logan Piper, Reservations to multilateral treaties:
the goal of universality, in: 71 lowaLR 1985, 295-322 at 298.
6. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. 28 May 1951, ICJ Rep. 1951 15-55, at 21-22. 23-24.
7. LJ.LeBlanc, The United States and the Genocide Convention. Durham 1991 (hereafter:
LeBlanc. Genocide Conventionj, at 218.
8. Rome, 4 November 1950.
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and purpose of the treaty". As research progressed, other issues emerged. A
question that became increasingly important was simply whose problem
reservations are. If related to foreseeable impact, one would assume that it was
the problem of the individuals in the reserving States. However, the public at
large has little knowledge of these intricate legalistic questions. Reservations
lead to the unilateral exclusion, or restriction of provisions of a human rights
instrument, that might be of a very fundamental nature. In spite of this
unilateral action, the law of treaties views reservations, at least theoretically, as
consensual agreements to modify or restrict the obligations under a treaty.
States use the possibility to make reservations, yet only a few states react
explicitly to reservations incompatible with the object and purpose. This being
the case, it is interesting to see if and how the relations between the States
Parties to a treaty could influence the occurrence and impact of reservations. If
reservations are basically consensual, the other States Parties have a role to
play. But it was not only the inertia of States that has led to the detrimental
impact of reservations. As will become apparent in the discussion of the
supervisory practice under four major UN human rights treaties, it also took a
long time before the supervisory Committees developed a way of treating
reservations.
Thus, the aim of this study has been to analyze the reservations to four human
rights treaties, concluded within the United Nations, in the light of the rules on
reservations in the contemporary law of treaties. I have tried to see reserva-
tions within the dynamic framework of contemporary human rights law,
keeping in mind the rather static rules of the law of treaties. Merely indicating
the intricacies of the lack of correlation between the law of treaties and human
rights law is a descriptive activity; the challenge is to find solutions within, and
possibly outside of, the existing system. This necessarily leads to compromises
of sorts, and the choices made are based upon the goals of human rights law,
as well as on the understanding of treaty law as a set of instrumental rules. It
has been my intention to look for patterns in the way the reservations are dealt
with under these treaties, with the aim of finding useful tools to improve the
monitoring. I have sought for theoretical and practical possibilities to reduce
the impact of reservations. This necessarily implies taking a stand on matters of
substance, even if a point of view is indeed personal.
In spite of the understandable wish to be able to present a complete theory on
reservations to human rights treaties, this will not be possible. Rather than
pretending to strive for an all-embracing theory, this study will highlight a
number of problems, and indicate solutions for such problems. Yet, approaches
overlap, and in view of the intricacies of the issue this could not be prevented.
To my mind, these overlaps are not necessarily a disadvantage. In a number of
cases a variety of solutions has been presented. By doing this, I have not only
tried to indicate the complexity of the problem, but also to suggest solutions
based on different points of view. In particular this approach can be seen with
the discussion of the question what the "object and purpose" of a human rights
instrument might be, and when discussing possible ways to reduce the detri-
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mental impact of so-called sharia'h reservations to the Women's Convention*.
A sketchy overview of theory and practice has merits of its own, it might be a
starting point for some further study into the matter.
A quotation frequently used when writing about reservations, is the phrase by
Ruda in his Cours'°:"77i<? ^uesf/o/i o/ /rcervaf/o/u /IOJ bee/i o/ic 0/ f/ie mosf
co/jfrovm/u/ sMb/ec/i 0/ co/ifcm/?ora/y inte/nttf/ona/ /aw." This study does not
pretend to solve the fundamental questions in this field. This book about
reservations to human rights treaties emphasizes that there may be more
controversies than available solutions. However, the uncertainty as to the rules
applicable to reservations to human rights treaties, and the way in which such
reservations have been dealt with in practice has proved to be a challenging
and rewarding subject for research.
The relevance of this study also depends to a large extent on its usefulness for
international practice. Consequently, while an analytical overview may provide
insight into the mechanisms that play a role with respect to reservations, some
further steps should be taken and suggestions might be made that could
influence the practice. Keeping this in mind, the ideas presented in the final
chapter of this book are fairly pragmatic. At any rate, they are decidedly
influenced by my perception of the exigencies of international human rights
practice. An attempt will be made to point out how a more strict policy with
regard to reservations and interpretative declarations could be followed. In
particular this will lead to suggestions as to how States Parties, in their capacity
as reserving States as well as objecting states, could reduce the detrimental
impact of reservations. The focus should however probably be on the supervis-
ory Committees and their possibilities, as the States Parties themselves caused
the problem in the first place. An important question dealt with, is whether the
supervisory organs of the human rights instruments have any influence in the
matter of reservations and if so, how they could use this in a diligent way.
As a final remark, it should be kept in mind that this study is necessarily
incomplete because of the focus on international practice. It goes without
saying that, as the major goal of human rights protection is the improvement of
the position of individuals under the jurisdiction of the States Parties to human
rights instruments, it would be equally, if not more, interesting to look at the
impact of reservations on the protection at domestic level. For various reasons
it is not possible to lift the veil of the international obligation; largely of course
because it would be almost impossible to study all the systems of domestic
implementation. Yet with an overview of the international position, detailed
studies on the domestic relevance of reservations might be facilitated. ' =«*
• . •. • , i ; t . * ' t ; ? . t ;
.£5
9. See Chapter 6. par.1.3.1-1.3.3 infra.
10. J.M.Ruda. Reservations to treaties, in: 146 RdC 1975 HI. 95-218 at 101; also quoted by
R.W.Edwards. Reservations to treaties, in: 10 MichJIL 1989, 362-405 at 362.
1 ; ' • ' . ' . - ' - ' '
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2. THE STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY -.--- •»•• •
It is necessary to clarify the choices that have been made to present the
findings of my research. The first part deals with the theoretical aspects of the
problem. Discussing the general rules on reservations was a necessary starting
point. The second chapter thus deals with the Genocide case, which is the basis
for the present day rules on reservations. Though the Genocide case is dis-
cussed in depth, an overview of the ensuing discussions in the General Assem-
bly" and the International Law Commission'^ has been omitted. A number
of books dealing specifically with the developments in the law on reservations
since the Genocide case has been published'"*, and re-examining such develop-
ments would not have led to new insights. An analysis of the system of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties turns attention to the present day
situation of dealing with the existing reservations under contemporary law. The
chapter also deals with a number of related issues concerning the concept of
reservations in the general law of treaties and the meaning of the "object and
purpose" rule. The third chapter focuses on the specific issue of reservations to
human rights treaties, the ideas appearing in human rights literature, as well as
a number of prevalent assumptions. An attempt is made to indicate the
substantive content of the "object and purpose" rule when applied to human
rights treaties. The way in which reservations are dealt with under the Euro-
pean Convention and the American Convention'"" is indicated briefly in order
to sketch the approaches under regional instruments.
The second part of this study consists of an inquiry into the rules on reserva-
tions in four UN human rights instruments, and their application in practice.
These are the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Convention
against Torture. Thus, two general human rights instruments and two non-
discrimination conventions are dealt with.
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a general instrument, a backbone
of the UN human rights system. The Convention against Racial Discrimination
and the Women's Convention are in many respects a /or i/>ec/flfc to the
aa«>£<sws'.a.'«IWi^' *b •*$! no 'rriSrsrrft.-y» 'V; fcji-jjjii
11. Leading to GA Res.598 (VI), 2 January 1952; and OA Res.1452 A and B, 7 December
•'.»*<'' ' 1959.
12. First report by Lauterpacht. A/CN.4/63 (1953);
Second report by Lauterpacht. A/CN.4/87 (1954);
First report by Fitzmaurice, A/ CN.4/101 (1956); !r a : •••
First report by Waldock, A/CN.4/144, A/CN.4/144/Add.l (1962);
Fourth report by Waldock, A/CN.4/175 (1965).
13. Most notably F.Horn, Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral
Treaties. Amsterdam 1988; P.H.Imbert, Les reserves aux traités multilatéraux, Paris 1979
(hereafter: Les réserves); R.Kiihner, Vorbehalte zu multilateralen vôlkerrechtlichen
Vertrage, Berlin 1986.
14. San José. 22 November 1979. ;« «•; :,-., . .-. i ,-!..-• i . . : - n ; * * i . » -i
INTRODUCTION ;>f
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; from a practical point of view it will be
useful to see if and how the practice under a general instrument can be
relevant to more specific instruments dealing with non-discrimination. The
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has similarities with
the Women's Convention, and has been extensively used for reference during
the drafting of the latter instrument. Thus the practice concerning reservations
under the CERD could provide for useful and comparable information on the
way in which reservations were dealt with under the Women's Convention.
Moreover the CERD contains a reservations' clause, and suggestions are
frequently made that this clause might be included into the Women's Conven-
tion". ii/f% "JJ4 ',; j-i -..••;.VÏ -ï.i•..«•
In studying the Genocide Case, my impression was that the simplicity of the
questions asked in the request for this Advisory Opinion, has produced rules
on reservations that may be easily applicable to single-purpose treaties, but are
hard to apply to multifarious instruments. This has led to the inclusion of the
Convention against Torture in this study. It is interesting to find out whether
the "object and purpose" rule developed with respect to the Genocide Conven-
tion could also be a useful yardstick with respect to another single-purpose
treaty, such as the Convention against Torture. In relation to this Convention,
reservations aiming at the operation of the supervisory procedures have
highlighted other problems with respect to the general interest, as opposed to
the reciprocal interest, with regard to human rights instruments.
It is necessary to explain why other UN human rights instruments have not
been dealt with. Reservations to the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights are not discussed. This is because reservations to this instru-
ment, which is in general based upon a gradual implementation of the rights
mentioned, are in general of a different nature. The Vienna Convention rules
focus on exclusion or modification of the legal effect of a provision, but do not
seem to have taken into account the legal effect of provisions with an inherent
flexibility such as provisions with respect to gradual implementation. Though
the legal effect of reservations to the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights raises interesting questions, it is a separate issue that will not
be dealt with here. Another reason for not discussing reservations to the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights lies in the over-all size of
this book. Adding the practice under another treaty would have made this book
too bulky, and the work too long. Yet the choice, it must be admitted, is
debatable as the implementation of "classical" human rights can also depend on
the availability of financial means. Moreover, a number of provisions in the
Women's Convention are clearly social rights rather than civil or political
rights.
15. Sweden in the Secretary General's survey on reservations to the Women's Convention,
A/41/608: and B.Clark, The Vienna Convention regime and the convention on discrimi-
nation against women. 85 AJIL 1991. 281-321 at 298.
*K> I N T R O D U C T I O N
The Convention on the Rights of the Child has not been dealt with because of
the fact that it had not been finalized at the time this study began'".
The four conventions that are dealt with all provide for a supervisory mechan-
ism which is largely comparable, with periodic reporting to an independent
Committee of experts. Obviously there are differences with respect to the
substantive rights, and to a lesser extent also with respect to the supervisory
procedures. The inclusion of the individual complaints procedure under the
Optional Protocol to the Covenant may provide useful information on the
impact of reservations for individuals. Reference to the way in which reserva-
tions are dealt with under the Optional Protocol may be useful for similar
procedures under article 14 C E R D and article 22 CAT, or a possible future
individual complaints procedure under the Women's Convention. The informa-
tion gathered has led to some overall conclusions that will be presented in the
final chapter. In fact, insight into the practice suggests that an exchange of
strategies in dealing with reservations between the supervisory Committees
might improve their success in reducing the impact of reservations. s,
In order to facilitate comparison, these four treaties are dealt with on the basis
of a unified scheme, in which information is grouped under standardized
headings. In each case the particular law on reservations applicable to the
instrument is dealt with after an introduction to the instrument. The following
section deals with the actions undertaken by the States Parties. Firstly the
reservations are dealt with, grouped per article, which provides insight into the
acceptance (or lack of acceptance) of substantive provisions. Then the objec-
tions and the withdrawals are described. The following section analyses the way
in which reservations have been treated under the instrument's supervisory
system. First, an overview is given of the way in which reservations have been
discussed in the reporting procedure, this information is grouped per state.
This enables the reader to see the consistency (or lack of consistency) with
which the supervisory Committees have dealt with the reservations made by a
reporting State over the years. As no state complaints have been made, a
discussion of this procedure has been omitted. In the chapter on the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights the cases under the Optional Protocol in which
reservations and interpretative declarations were discussed are then dealt with.
This is followed by conclusions with respect to the applicable rules on reserva-
tions, the actions of States Parties, of the supervisory organs, as well as a
tentative outlook on future developments. j
This scheme has the advantage on focusing on the interplay between reserving
States, other States Parties and the respective Committees in the matter of
reservations. Though it is possible to look at reservations as static statements
with respect to the law applicable to the reserving State, I would venture to
suggest that the supervisory mechanism has stimulated a dynamic approach to
human rights, in which a reduction of the impact of reservations should be
, 1 6 , New York. 20 November 1989. .&; ù \ ; K A - i s .;. j,->..-t i-,
INTRODUCTION 11
included. While the protection of human rights is expanding and becoming an
increasingly interrelated system, this should also encompass the issue of
reservations. Another obvious reason for looking at the dynamic side of treaty-
based human rights protection is the fact that States Parties and the Commit-
tees share a responsibility for reducing the impact of reservations. While it is
clear that from a purely formal point of view this responsibility lies with the
States Parties, one may by now safely submit that the Committees have to play
a vital role in the issue. •«««(:>
However, no scheme is perfect and the scheme used in the discussion of
reservations to four major UN human rights treaties also has its flaws. I chose
to discuss the role of the treaty bodies, omitting the work of the political
organs of the UN. Thus, while the scheme focuses on the steps taken by States
and Committees as the main actors in this Held, it is at the same time largely
incapable of illustrating the interplay when other actors take an interest in the
issue of reservations. This is most obvious with respect to the way in which the
ongoing discussion in the United Nations with respect to reservations to the
Women's Convention is presented. This discussion moved back and forth
between a number of organs (most notably the meeting of States Parties and
the Third Committee of the General Assembly), and this dynamic element
seems to be absent in the presentation of the information. This study focuses
on the work of the treaty bodies, and does not deal in detail with the work of
political organs of the United Nations.
The section on the practice with respect to the four human rights treaties
covers all material available for public use", since the beginning of the super-
visory procedures up until 1992'*. On the other hand, I have sometimes not
stuck to this final date, in case new information was of particular importance to
this study. An example is the reaction by the Human Rights Committee to the
questions raised by Austria, which had to be included, because of the import-
ance of an explicit statement by the Committee on the issue of reservations.
The attitudes of the States Parties, the primary actors in this field, have only
been considered through their identifiable acts. Motives to act, and more
importantly, motives not to act have not been considered in depth. Though this
is by no means impossible, it might be more within the field of political science
than within that of law. However, the acts that never take place, in this case all
the times that a detrimental reservation was made without any apparent
reaction from the other States parties, remain the most intriguing. Especially so
when the law attaches legal effect to such cases of inertia.
17. It should be noticed that initially the periodic reports to the Committee on the Elimin-
ation of Racial Discrimination were not published for general use. nor were their
summary records. General publication began with the seventeenth session.
18. In particular, the information sent to the General Assembly by the different Committees
in 1992 (A/47/..) has been used as the final list. This in general covers the sessions in
early 1992 and related material.
S IWRODUCTION
The concluding chapter presents pragmatic solutions for the problem of
reservations to human rights treaties. In particular some suggestions are given
as to how the notion of "object and purpose" could be made operational with
respect to human rights. On the basis of a comparative analysis of the four
treaties, a number of strategies the supervisory Committees could use in order
to reduce the detrimental impact of reservations is presented. And Finally, as
the problem is largely due to the absence of good reservations clauses in
human rights treaties, a draft clause is presented. Thus I hope to have indi-
cated that possibilities to restore the ruins caused by incompatible reservations
to human rights treaties do indeed exist.
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2. THE LAW APPLICABLE TO RESERVATIONS
fc. / rj^THE GENOCIDE CASE
The Genocide Case stands at the beginning of the development of the contem-
porary theory on reservations. It was only when a difference of opinion arose
about reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide' (hereafter: the Genocide Convention), that the intricacies
of the question of reservations to human rights treaties became apparent. This
is why a book on reservations to human rights treaties must necessarily begin
with a discussion of the Genocide case. The case sketches the problem of
combining universality and integrity in the field of human rights law, which will
be one of the focal points of this thesis.
Yet, as this study focuses on the contemporary law and practice, the historical
discussion will accordingly not be a lengthy one. After a short overview of the
events that led to the request for an Advisory Opinion, the Opinion as well as
the Dissenting Opinions will be discussed followed by a presentation of the
reception of the Opinion by legal scholars. Consequently a thorough discussion
of the then contemporary law of treaties in respect of reservations has been
omitted, as this is not the main issue of this study. Neither will the reception of
the Opinion as such be dealt with. The goal of this presentation is to highlight
the questions that arose in the Genocide case in majority and dissenting
opinions, as these issues will recur in the discussions about reservations to
human rights treaties.
The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of May 1951
concerning Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide* was epoch-making, and has been of decisive
importance for the development of the rules on reservations in the law of
treaties in general, as well as specifically the law applicable to reservations to
human rights treaties. Yet, the novelty of the legal problem at the time of its
occurrence may have prevented a thorough analysis of the consequences the
Advisory Opinion would have. With hindsight there is reason to seriously doubt
the merits of this Opinion, in fact it may even be a very unfortunate dictum.
1. G A Res.260A (HI); 9 December 1948.
2. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. 28 May 1951. ICI Rep. 1951 15-3(1; dissenting opinion Guerrero, McNair,
Read and Hsu Mo idem at 31-48; and dissenting opinion Alvarez idem at 49-55.
1§ THE LAW APPLICABLE TO RESERVATIONS
1.1. The problem of reservations to the Genocide Convention ' c
Reservations to human rights treaties are a relatively new problem in interna-
tional law. In general one might say that the issue arose with the emergence of
treaties that are not mutually and reciprocally advantageous for States. While it
had been possible to find solutions to the question of reservations in the
customary law of treaties, the issue of reservations to human rights treaties
only appeared when international law turned its attention to the protection of
the individual*. The specific nature of human rights treaties does not easily fit
in with straight-forward contractual law, which is what the law of treaties
basically was. Fundamental differences are that these are law-creating treaties
(as opposed to contractual treaties), and that the primary beneficiaries of the
treaty are the individuals under the jurisdiction of the State. In the following,
the matter of reservations to human rights treaties will prove to be one of an
overriding incompatibility between the basic premises of two distinct fields of
international law.
This being the direct cause for the Advisory Opinion on reservations to the
Genocide Convention, it is necessary to consider the state of international law
on reservations at the time. In the early nineteen fifties various rules existed
side by side. When the question of reservations to the Genocide Convention
arose, the parallel existence of the above mentioned systems created great
confusion.
In traditional international law the integrity of the treaty was of decisive
importance. Reservations had to be accepted unanimously by all States parties
to the treaty before a reserving State could be considered a party to the treaty.
An accepted reservation would thus lead to a modification of the treaty binding
on all States parties. In this system the integrity of the treaty prevailed and
emphasis was put on acceptance and objection as expressions of consent or
refusal to be bound.
The practice of the Pan-American Union (and its successor the Organization of
American States) was a very different one. On the basis of article 6.3 of the
1928 Havana Convention, the rule applied that each single State Party to a
treaty had to decide for itself whether or not to accept a reservation. Maximum
participation to a treaty was the major aim. States could become Parties to a
treaty in spite of objections raised against their reservations. The treaty would
however only enter into force between reserving and accepting States, as treaty
relations are established on the basis of reciprocity*.
In the information supplied to the International Court yet another rule appea-
red. The Eastern European states claimed that the right to make reservations
was vested in the sovereignty of states, and reservations would consequently not
3. With the exception of earlier conventions against slavery, and conventions for the
protection of minorities. >|i, •><?>< . x î - i ' ;^  n i b ' '.-V i;-i: V
4 . Ruda. op.cit. at 115-133.
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require acceptance. This theory did not seem to be supported by extensive
practice, contrary to the integrity system and the universality system mentioned
before.
Drafting the Genocide Convention was one of the first projects undertaken by
the United Nations, and it was clearly a reaction to the atrocities that took
place during the second world war. In GA Resolution 96(1)*, it was stated that
the United Nations intended to condemn and punish Genocide as a crime
under international law. The Convention was adopted unanimously by the
General Assembly in 1948*", and entered into force in January 1951.
The Convention consists of nineteen articles, articles I-VH contain substantive
provisions dealing with the incrimination of genocide, the obligation to legislate
in order to implement the Convention and rules on prosecution either before a
domestic tribunal or before an international tribunal, as well as rules on the
extradition of persons charged with genocide. The latter part of the convention
contains rules on the involvement of the United Nations with the suppression
and prevention of Genocide, as well as a dispute settlement procedure (article
IX) and final clauses.
According to article XIII, the Convention would enter into force ninety days
after the receipt of the twentieth ratification or accession. However, a number
of the first twenty states to ratify had made reservations to article IX of the
Convention', and other States objected to these reservations*. It should be
noted that article IX of the Genocide Convention met with a great number of
reservations, twenty-three states'* made a reservation in respect of this provi-
sion'", and twelve States objected to reservations excluding article IX". The
different views on article IX would trigger the changes in the law on reserva-
5. Dd. 11 December 1946. j. , .
6. GA Res. 206A(III), dd.9 December 1948. '
7. Bulgaria (accession 21 July 1950). the Philippines (ratification 7 July 1950) and Ukraini-
an SSR (accession on 31 July 1950) all made reservations concerning article IX prior to
the entry into force of the Convention.
8. Prior to the entry into force Australia objected to the reservation of Bulgaria and the
Ukrainian SSR; Ecuador objected to the reservations of Bulgaria and the Ukrainian
SSR, and Norway objected to the reservation by the Philippines.
9. Albania, Algeria, Argentina. Bulgaria. Byelorussian SSR, China, Czechoslovakia,
Democratic Yemen, German Democratic Republic. Hungary, India , Mongolia,
Morocco. Philippines, Poland. Rumania, Rwanda, Spain, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United
States, Venezuela and Viet Nam.
10. In 1989 Hungary, Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR and the USSR withdrew their
reservations to article IX of the Genocide Convention.
11. Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Sri
Lanka, United Kingdom; Cuba withdrew its objections in 1982.
Reservations and Understandings issued by the United States on ratification of the
Genocide Convention will not be discussed, although the compatibility of these with the
object and purpose of the Convention is highly questionable. The United States ratified
the Convention in 1988, some 37 years after its entry into force.
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tions, as the reservations to this provision led to the Advisory Opinion on the
Genocide Convention.
The Convention does not contain a reservations clause and when reservations
were made, the depository circulated the reservations asking for the views of
the States Parties to the Convention. In the traditional unanimity system this
was a logical procedure, however the Soviet Union questioned this, as it went
beyond the authority of the depository in article XVII of the Convention. The
reservations were objected to, but Guatemala and Ecuador indicated that they
intended to apply the Latin-American system, in which a State may be a party
to a treaty without establishing treaty-relations with States Parties that had
objected to its reservation. The Secretary General then asked the General
Assembly how to proceed, in particular with respect to establishing whether
enough States had ratified for the Convention to enter into force.
After discussions in the General Assembly, it was decided to take action
consisting of three different steps'*. First of all, an Advisory Opinion of the
International Court of Justice was requested, consisting of three related
questions. Secondly, the International Law Commission was invited to study the
matter of reservations in its work on the law of treaties, both from the point of
codification as well as the point of view of progressive development of interna-
tional law. The request to give priority to this study did not prevent the whole
project, that would become the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
from being concluded in 1968, some eighteen years later". Third step in the
General Assembly Resolution was to instruct the Secretary General to continue
his practice as a depository without prejudice to the legal effect of objections to
reservations received pending decisions by the International Court, the Interna-
tional Law Commission or the General Assembly.
1.2. The Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention
1.2.1. The (majority) Opinion
A number of States had raised preliminary objections to the Court dealing with
the question of reservations to the Genocide Convention. Certain States had
indicated that a difference of opinion on the matter of reservations was a
dispute and should not be the subject matter of an Advisory Opinion". After
mentioning this, the Court set out to emphasize that the request for an
Opinion should in principle not be refused. It indicates that in this case both
the General Assembly which drafted the Convention and the Secretary-General
who is the depositary of the Convention have an interest in knowing the legal
12. GA Res.478 (V). 16 November 1950.
13. The General Assembly referred the question of reservations to treaties in general to the
International Law Commission. The ILC upheld the unanimity rule. Due to the
influence of the Advisory Opinion, the views of the ILC! rapidly slid into oblivion.
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1951-11, 130.
4 4 . ICI Rep. 1951 at 19-20.
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effects of reservations, and of objections to reservations to the Genocide
Convention.
Other objections to the Court dealing with this request for an Advisory
Opinion are that the General Assembly is interfering with the Convention, as
interpretation is a right pertaining to the States Parties. The Court indicates
that the General Assembly not only drafted the Convention but also that
express provisions of the Convention associate the General Assembly with the
Convention". These are rights parallel to the General Assembly's rights under
the Charter. Another objection has been that the Advisory Opinion would be
bypassing article IX of the Genocide Convention, the dispute settlement
procedure. The Court rejects this objection on the grounds that the procedure
in article IX is only available for Contracting Parties, and the matter of
reservations and objections is a preliminary issue to the right in article IX.
The Court explicitly indicates that its opinion is limited to the Genocide
Convention, stressing that the General Assembly had referred the general
question of reservations to the International Law Commission'". The Court
then goes on to note that the questions put to it are purely abstract, and do not
refer to reservations or objections made to the Convention.
The questions before the Court were the following:
I. Can the reserving Stale he regarded as being a party to the Convention while still
maintaining its reservation if (he reservation is objected to by one or more of the
parties to the Convention but not by others?
II. If the answer to Question I is in the affirmative, what is the effect of the reservations
as between the reserving State and:
a) The parties which object to the reservation'.'
b) Those which accept it?
III. What should be the legal effect as regards the answer to Question I if an objection
to a reservation is made:
a) By a signatory which has not yet ratified?
b) By a State entitled to sign or accede but which has not yet done so?
The first question put to the Court raises an apparently general issue. The
Court states two guiding principles at the beginning of its discussion. First of
all "[I]t is well established that in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound
without its consent, and that consequently no reservations can be effective
against a State without its agreement thereto". This is merely a repetition of
the general /racfa nt/if se/va/ida rule. Then the Court goes on to say that a
"multilateral convention is the result of an agreement freely concluded upon its
clauses and consequently none of the contracting parties is entitled to frustrate
and impair, by means of unilateral decision or particular agreements, the
15. Cf. article XIII Genocide Convention.
16. ICI Rep. 1951 at 20:The questions thus having a clearly defined object, the replies
which the Courts called upon to give to them are necessarily and strictly limited to that
of the Convention".
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purpose and ro/so/i rf'ê're of the convention." This is directly related to the
notion of the integrity of the convention, "a notion which in its traditional
concept involved the proposition that no reservation was valid unless it was
accepted by all the contracting parties without exception, as would have been
the case if it had been stated during the negotiations"'^. It should be noted
that the Court points at the fact that the notion of the integrity of the treaty is
a notion of traditional law of treaties, indicating that it is directly inspired by
the contractual concept of treaties'*.
However, there may be reasons for a more flexible application of the principle
of integrity, such as the universal character of the United Nations under whose
auspices the Convention was drafted; and the fact that the Convention itself
envisages a wide degree of participation in article XI'"'. Extensive participation
has always lead to flexibility is what the Court says. This is reinforced by the
fact that the Convention itself was the product of a number of majority votes in
the General Assembly. The Court states that "[T]he character of a multilateral
convention, its purpose, provisions, mode of preparation and adoption, are
factors which must be considered in determining, in the absence of any express
provision on the subject, the possibility of making reservations, as well as their
validity and effect."* This is the guiding principle in case the treaty itself does
not indicate how to deal with reservations.
Then the Court looks at the discussions during the drafting and concludes that
making reservation was considered to be possible, and moves on to determine
which reservations may be made and what kind of objections may be made.
The solution to this question is within the Convention itself, it requires univer-
sal participation. From the General Assembly's determination to condemn and
punish Genocide, it follows that the Convention was intended to be universal in
scope. Moreover the Convention was adopted for a purely humanitarian and
civilizing purpose. It is a convention in which the states have no interests of
their own, there is no perfect contractual balance between the rights and duties
of states.
This leads to the conclusion that it has been the intention of the General
Assembly that as many States as possible should participate in the Convention.
The complete exclusion of a particular state would not only restrict the scope
of application of the convention but also detract from the authority of the
principles laid down in the Genocide Convention. And, it is inconceivable that
the contracting States had in mind that an objection to a minor reservation
would have such a result. On the other hand it is equally inconceivable that the
Contracting states would sacrifice the very object of the treaty in order to
secure as many participants as possible. This leads to the central phrase in the
Advisory Opinion "The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit the
>b/ - « a u is';;-*; -^ri:.r. .£V-
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freedom of making reservations and that of objecting to them". These are the
relevant paragraphs of the Advisory Opinion:
.{_5 The object and purpose of the Genocide Convention imply that it was the intention of
the General Assembly and of the States which adopted it that as many Stales as
possible should participate. The complete exclusion from the Convention of one or
more States would not only restrict the scope of its application, but would detract from
':-'. the authority of the moral and humanitarian principles which are its basis. It is incon-
ceivable that the contracting parties readily contemplated that an objection to a minor
reservation should produce such a result. But even less could the contracting parties
have intended to sacrifice the very object of the Convention in favour of a vain desire to
secure as many participants as possible. The object and purpose of the Convention thus
limit both the freedom of making reservations and that of objecting to them. It follows
that it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Conven-
tion that must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation
, on accession as well as the appraisal by a state in objecting to the reservation. Such a
* " rule of conduct must guide every State in the appraisal which it must make, individually
and from its own standpoint, of the admissibility of any reservation.
• • t . - . • - • • . . - , • -
Any other view would lead either to the acceptance of reservations which frustrate the
purposes which the General Assembly and the contracting parties had in mind, or to the
recognition that the parties to the convention have the power of excluding from it the
author of a reservation, even a minor one, which may be quite compatible with those
purposes''."
Finally the Court explicitly mentions that it strongly disagrees with the sugges-
tion that a State may become a party while making any reservation it chooses,
on the basis of its sovereignty, thereby criticizing the theory advanced by the
Eastern European States. Such an emphasis on sovereignty would disregard the
object and purpose of the Convention".
The International Court concludes that because of the abstract character of
question I, no answer can be given. It states:"[T]he appraisal of a reservation
and the effect of objections that might be made to it depend upon the particu-
lar circumstances of each individual case"". Consequently, the Court did not
answer the question in general, and merely indicated along which lines states
should decided about their position when confronted with reservations.
The Court then moves on to discuss the second question which reads:"If the
answer to Question I is in the affirmative, what is the effect of the reservations
as between the reserving State and a) The parties which object to the reserva-
tion?; b) Those which accept it?
21. ICJ Rep. 1951 at 24. At >t ;=-'i .;v .' - >i :<
22. ICJ Rep. 1951 at 25-26. - -->-..-.... - --»•.<.- . ,, . . . .
23. The Court's answer to the first question is:
"[A] State which has made and maintained a reservation which has been objected to by
one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others, can be regarded as
being a party to the Convention if the reservation is compatible with the object and
purpose of the Convention; otherwise, that State cannot be regarded as being a party to
the Convention." ,-..,».~;s.*.i-».,... -,-, -».,t.,, -
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The Court begins by re-emphasizing the fact that the appraisal of the validity
of reservations and the reaction thereto is a right exercised individually and
from the point of view of the individual states. It says that "[E]ach state
objecting ... will or will not, on the basis of its individual appraisal within the
limits of the criterion of the object and purpose ... consider the reserving state
to be a party to the Convention"**. This is the phrasing that created confusion
with respect to the reasons for objecting as well as the consequences of
objections.
The system drawn up by the Court in answering question II is a confusing
one^. It appears to expect a general notion of object and purpose to arise out
of the treaty, and the State Parties will consequently act in accordance with
that general notion. The Court emphasizes the good will of States in respect of
the object and purpose of the Convention*". The Court then goes on to
discuss the consequences of a divergence of view on the compatibility of a
particular reservation. The Court's answer to the second question is:
"a) [I]f a party to the Convention objects to a reservation which it considers to be
incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention, it can in fact consider that
the reserving State is not a party to the Convention.
b) [I]f, on the other hand, a party accepts the reservation as being compatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the reserving State is
a party to the Convention."
The third question put before the Court is as follows: What should be the legal
effect as regards the answer to Question I if an objection to a reservation is
made a) by a signatory which has not yet ratified?; b) by a State entitled to
sign or accede but which has not yet done so?
The third question deals with the possible impact of reservations prior to
ratification, which was an issue surrounded by confusion at the time. The Court
notes that the right to become a party to the Convention is not a very clear
notion, and elaborates on the rights of a signatory state that has not yet
ratified. The Court concludes that the signatory State is entitled to object, and
may indeed do so when ratifying.
The Court's answer to the third question is:
"a) [A]n objection to a reservation made by a signatory state which has not yet ratified
the Convention can have the legal effect indicated in the reply to Question I only upon
ratification. Until that moment it merely serves as a notice to the other State of the
eventual attitude of the signatory State:
24. ICJ Rep. 1951 at 26.
25. ICI Rep. 1951 at 26:The disadvantages which result from this possible divergence of
views - which an article concerning the making of reservations could have obviated - are
real ..."
26. ICI Rep. 1951 at 27:"It must clearly be assumed that the contracting states are desirous
of preserving intact at least what is essential to the object of the Convention; should this
desire be absent, it is quite clear that the convention itself would be impaired both in its
3»-i principle and in its application."
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b) (A]n objection to a reservation made by a State which is entitled to sign or accede
but which has not yet done so is without legal effect."
1.2.2. The Joint Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting Opinion of Judges Guerrero, McNair, Read and Hsu Mo
consists of three distinct parts in which the state of international law as regards
reservations is discussed, the majority opinion is criticized and some thoughts
concerning the universality - integrity dilemma are voiced. The joint dissent
may be characterized as a scholarly approach to the problem of reservations,
and the thoroughness of McNair can be read between the lines.
The joint dissent begins by stressing that the possibility should not be over-
looked that the Advisory Opinion might have a wider effect than merely giving
expert advice to the General Assembly on the issue of reservations to the
Genocide Convention". With hindsight this has indeed been the case.
The first part consists of a discussion of the international legal rules concerning
reservations available at the time. There is no legal vacuum, consent is the
basis for treaty obligations, and this is equally the case with respect to reserva-
tions^. Unanimous consent of all the parties to a treaty is necessary before
the reservation can be effective and the reserving State will become a state
party.
The four judges elaborate in a scholarly way, in order to establish the custom-
ary law with respect to reservations, and point to the opinion of learned
authors as well as the practice both within the League of Nations and the
United Nations". It could be suggested that this was just administrative
practice, but it is indicated that exceptions to the rule of unanimous consent
were formulated by parties to a treaty in express provisions. This is followed by
an overview of specific rules on reservations, such as the Pan-American Union
practice and article 64 ECHR. These are all examples of an a priori agreement
between States Parties that particular rules, other than the unanimity rule,
would be applicable. The judges conclude that:
"The fact that there is a recognized method of ear-marking in advance and by agree-
ment those provisions against which a reservations will be permitted is the strongest
possible evidence that the governments negotiating the Genocide Convention did not
contemplate giving to intending parties a unilateral right of making reservations deemed
by them to be incompatible with the purpose of the Convention.""
Then the judges turn their attention to the way in which the issue of reserva-
tions was dealt with during the drafting of the Genocide Convention. Although
the matter was considered, it was decided not to include a reservations clause,
27. ICJ Rep. 1951 at 31.
28. I a Rep. 1951 at 32.
29. ICJ Rep. 1951 at 32-36.
30. ICJ Rep. 1951 at 39.
3Sl THE LAW APPLICABLE TO RESERVATIONS
on the assumption that the unanimity rule, which was the applicable law at the
lime, would apply in case reservations were made'".
The second part of the Joint dissenting Opinion consists of a thorough critique
of the rule formulated by the majority. For those rereading the dissent from
the perspective of reservations to human rights instruments, it is striking that
the majority of problems that were to arise in the application of the Court's
"object and purpose" rule are already mentioned by the four judges.
The judges doubt if there is any reason to assume that the drafting States
agreed with "object and purpose" as a yardstick for the acceptance of reserva-
tions. In fact the criterion itself would in all likelihood lead to problems. The
judges note that r
- -v v -
"[T]his attempt to classify reservations into "compatible" and "incompatible" would
involve a corresponding classification of the provisions of the Convention into two
categories - of minor and major importance; when a particular provision formed part of
. ( . , , , . , . . "the object and purpose of the Convention", a reservation made against it would be
.— pl. ,< regarded as "incompatible", and the reserving Stale would not be considered as a party
to the Convention; when a particular provision did not form part of "the object and
•'•""•' '• purpose", any party which considered a reservation made against it to be compatible
might regard the reserving state as a party."'"
The distinction between compatible reservations and incompatible reservations
is unacceptable for the dissenting judges, firstly because it is a new rule for
which no evidence can be found in practice or legal literature. Moreover, the
rule cannot be deduced from the intentions of the states that negotiated the
Genocide Convention. In fact it is unlikely that the General Assembly would
have accepted this new rule with respect to reservations without explicitly
mentioning it in the treaty itself".
The second argument against the rule developed by the majority is that the
"object and purpose" rule will be difficult to apply in practice. The dissenting
judges wonder about determining the exact content of "object and purpose" of
the Genocide Convention. They indicate that the individual application of the
compatibility criterion by the States Parties will lead to confusion, an objective
determination by a judicial organ would be preferable but may not be feasible.
Moreover there may be uncertainty about the date of entry into force, in sum
the new rule is not a "reliable means of solving the problems"".
The third part of the joint dissenting opinion is rather brief and consists of an
obiter dictum about the importance of integral acceptance, rather than univer-
sal acceptance. It is stated that there is no evidence that the drafting States
"desired to secure wide acceptance of the Convention even at the expense of
,.,„ ,.<...
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the integrity or uniformity of its terms, irrespective of the wishes of those states
which have accepted all the obligations under it"". In fact the four judges
conclude that the nature of the Genocide Convention should lead to an strict
application of the prevailing rules. They say:
"It is therefore not universality at any price that forms the first consideration. It is
r rather the acceptance of common obligations - keeping step with like-minded states - in
order to attain a high objective for all humanity, that is of paramount importance. Such
being the case, the conclusion is irresistible that it is necessary to apply to the Genocide
Convention with even greater exactitude than ever the existing rule which requires the
consent of all parties to any reservation to a multilateral convention."'* .,-.
1.2.3. The Individual Dissenting Opinion «n^a -jrfT \f_ f
The other dissenting opinion is by Judge Alvarez, who does not agree with the
majority view, but whose views are even more contrary to the Joint dissent.
This dissenting Opinion may be characterized as a forward-looking view on the
development of international law, in fact it is in certain respects a legal
programme.
Alvarez begins by indicating that there are no precise rules available to solve
the problem of reservations to the Genocide Convention. Important develop-
ments are taking place in international law, and these would lead to the
abandonment of traditional rules, in spite of the fact that the Court has a task
in applying rather than developing law". Since the Second World War, inter-
national law has seen the creation of treaties with a character distinct from
traditional treaties. For instance, treaties establishing international organiz-
ations, establishing new and important principles of international law, and
conventions regulating matters of social and humanitarian interest. These are
universal treaties, aiming at the general interest; formulated by the General
Assembly and adopted by a majority vote. In fact these treaties result from
legislative functions assumed by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Consequently, these conventions must be interpreted with a view to the
f u t u r e - " , - - i ' ' • • - • - t - " , - • : - • : • -'"> ? " - • ' " • ' • • - • - • " - - f " ' • • • " • » • < • ? ! - . • . . • • • • • • • • •••
Reservations must not be made to these instruments, as that would be contrary
to the general and social interest they aim at. In order to achieve a wide
acceptance of these instruments, the drafters should aim at a less ambitious
pact, rather than a more elaborate pact to which numerous reservations would
be made. The reservations made to the Genocide Convention could be
explained by the fact that the reserving States did rely on old-fashioned ideas
on multilateral conventions". Seeking a solution to the reservations problem,
as the majority did, by distinguishing between compatible and incompatible
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reservations would not lead to a satisfactory solution. The best solution would
be to explicitly state that reservations were not allowed. As this was not the
case, three possibilities arose:
- if the reservations were not accepted by at least one state, the reserving State
would not be a party to the Convention;
- if the majority of states accepted the reservation, the Convention would be
modified accordingly; the States not accepting the reservation would not be
parties to the modified Convention;
- if the reservation was accepted by some states and objected to by other
States; there would be no Convention at all.
1.3. The Genocide Case reconsidered '*> fc wflf
After the Genocide Opinion, two different views were expressed by UN organs.
The International Law Commission suggested that the traditional unanimity
rule be maintained'"'; whereas the General Assembly instructed the Secretary
General to communicate all reservations to the States Parties to a particular
treaties so that the States Parties could decided upon their legal conse-
quences'". Decisions about the effect of reservations would henceforth be
taken by the States Parties individually. The discussion about India's reserva-
tion on acceding to the 1948 IMCO Convention^, lead to the conclusion that
the Secretary General was to apply the Genocide rule not only to treaties con-
cluded after the Genocide opinion, but to any treaty for which he performed
depository functions'".
ad V
' , J | . V ,«:,M 1,;.
i - i t f i . <<*••;* te*"i-:v.i.-jî. _.ù ;
40. I.Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd Ed. Manchester 1984 at
58-59.
41. GA Res.598 (VI), 12 January 1952. ^ , . . . . . .
42. Convention on the International Maritime Consultative Organisation, Geneva 6 March
1948
43. See A/C.6/SR.614- SR.617; A/PV.847 and GA Res.1452 A and B (XIV), 7 December
1959 indicating that the rules in GA Res.598 (VI) should be applied to all reservations.
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PHILOSOPHY OR Judge ALVAREZ
ISSUE
World order perspec-
tive
Reservations
•.?» a »«#•.
Convent ion coverage
Integrity of provisi-
ons
Judicial role
New
order
international
None permitted;
convention deals with
social issues
Universality would
occur eventually
Implied emphasis on
integrity of conven-
tion's provisions
Judicial activism
MAJORITY
Legitimacy of old or-
der but flexible rules
Permitted if compati-
ble with "object and
purpose"
Premium on univer-
sality
Compromise on inte-
grity of convention's
provisions
MINORITY
State sovereignty
Traditional unanimi-
ty rule; consent of
other parties requi-
red
Universality desired .
Priority on integrity
of convention's pro-
visions
Modified
activism
judicial Judicial self-restraint
As has been demonstrated by LeBlanc" in his very enlightening scheme, the
majority opinion lies between the joint dissent and the individual dissent, in as
much as it seeks to combine the aims of universality and integrity. The joint
dissent is clear on the importance of integrity, and the need to uphold the
traditional system in order to do this. Alvarez' dissent is equally clear on the
merits of the American system and the way in which it promotes participation.
The dissenting opinions point out easy ways to solve the reservations issue, but
they are conflicting and each solution has rather foreseeable disadvantages.
The majority tries to solve the problem by combining the opposing doctrines. It
presents "object and purpose" as an objective core within the treaty, a goal
shared by the drafting States. This notion is a yardstick to be used when
considering the acceptability of reservations, or the need to make objections
will have to be applied by each state individually. Probably Shelton is right in
emphasizing that the application of the objective rule of object and purpose by
States Parties is related to the fact that the Genocide Convention does not
contain an elaborate supervisory system, as compared to modern human rights
treaties"'.
The approach used by the Court is fairly persuasive at first sight. The system
drawn up suggests that it is possible to combine concern about the object and
purpose with the need for universal participation. The Court wants to have it
both ways, and suggests that this is feasible. However, in spite of explicitly
mentioning concern for the integrity of the instrument, little is done to follow-
44. This table is a copy of table 9.2 by L.J. LeBlanc in his book The United States and the
Genocide Convention; Durham 1991 at 215.
45. D.Shelton, State Practice on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, in: CHRY 1983,
205-234 at 229. . . , , . _ , _,_,„„
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up on that concern"". The Advisory Opinion made the balancing of universal-
ity and integrity look possible, probably as a direct result of the single-
mindedness of the Convention and the non-core nature of the dispute settle-
ment provision. Object and purpose as an objective notion applied subjectively
by the states, here one of the fundamental problems of this thesis unfolds itself.
"Object and purpose" seem the most obvious yardstick, at the same time, it is
the most impossible yardstick.
As we will see further below, the Genocide case has had a great impact on the
Law of Treaties, and in particular on the drafting of the Vienna Convention.
Looking back at the issue that was at stake in the Genocide case, the impact
may be far greater than the issue dealt with would merit.
The Genocide Convention, and thus the Advisory Opinion, are not entirely
comparable to the human rights treaties that will be dealt with below. Two
elements should be stressed in this respect. The Genocide Convention is, by
comparison with the later human rights treaties, a simple convention. It can be
considered a single-purpose treaty: the object and purpose of the convention
are to outlaw Genocide. Compared with later treaties, the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights for instance, the Genocide Convention is monolithic. The
single-mindedness of the Convention, I would like to suggest, facilitated the
I d ' s clear views on "object and purpose". With hindsight, the simplicity of the
Convention may have been deceptive.
The second remark is related to the particular reservations that were the cause
for the Advisory Opinion. The question that led to the Advisory Opinion, the
option to make reservations to the dispute settlement clause in article IX, may
be a rather peripheral question. Certainly, the Genocide Convention does not
have a specific supervisory system, dispute-settlement is the only available
procedure. One wonders whether the role of the International Court as the
supervisory organ could be an important one. It was only in 1993 that the
Convention was invoked before the Court"", and it would not seem that the
Court has a potentially important role to play. Reservations to that provision
may not undermine the Convention's raison d'être, the outlawing of genocide.
Supervisory structures such as the ones pertaining to the four treaties to be
discussed in the following were to be developed in the nineteen sixties. I
would contend that the nature of the reservations at stake, although the
46. H.Golsong, Les Réserves aux Instruments Internationaux pour la Protection des Droits
de l'Homme, In: Les Clauses Echappatoires en matière d'Instruments Internationaux
relatifs aux Droits de l'Homme, Bruxelles 1982, 23-42, writes at 28:"Malheuresement,
cette même Court n'a pas traduit ses nobles considérations au cas soumis et a appliqué
son critère de manière très terre-à-terre, en disant que le but et l'objet de la Convention
sont essentiellement le souci d'y voir participer le plus grand nombre possible d'Etats.
On en parle donc plus des fins supérieures de la convention: l'objet et le but a été
réduit â se souci de universalité."
47. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)).
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questions before the Court did not deal with the specific reservations, also
reinforced the feeling that "object and purpose" would be a practical criterion.
After this anecdotal introduction to an Advisory Opinion that was a turning
point in the development of the law on reservations, we will turn our attention
to the law itself.
2. THE DEFINITION OF "RESERVATION"
Both before and after drafting the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties** writers have discussed reservations without precisely defining
them'*''. They are dealt with in a matter of course way, and one wonders why
so little attention has been given to defining reservations. Even if reservations
were a clear and unambiguous concept in the law of treaties'", it remains
necessary to define them before embarking on a study of reservations to
human rights treaties.
The reason for bringing up the importance of a definition is the vital role it
plays in understanding a legal phenomenon and the law applicable to it.
Definitions are supposed to give an unambiguous explanation of the phenom-
enon to be explained, f/ie <fe/?/i/e/u/(</7!. It is replaced by the tfc/i/i/e/if, a set of
words that clarify the */c/7mt'/idH/n". As law does not use a formal language,
definitions will always employ ordinary language. This may give rise to uncer-
tainties, because language is often imprecise and constantly changing. Apart
from this, our knowledge may be inadequate to completely understand the
definiendum, which also leads to imprecise definitions. And finally the possibil-
ity has to be taken into account that those drafting a definition intentionally
employed vague terms, leaving room for further elaboration when using the
definition. Thus a phenomenon might be defined in ambiguous terms, or the
48. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969. entry into force 27 January
1980, henceforth: Vienna Convention or VCLT.
49. D.Rappeler, Les réserves dans les traités internationaux. Bâle 1958, at 15. suggests that
the majority of the authors present rather subjective definitions.
50. V.F. Gubin, The Soviet Union and Reservations to multilateral treaties(summary), in:
SYbIL 1959, 141-143 at 142:"Despite its more than half a century's existence, problems
arising from this conception and its legal nature remain among (hose which have been
least studied. [...] One of the reasons for this is the fact that reservation is constantly
confused with other concepts indicated by the same word.": Imbert, Les Réserves at
ll:"Les études relatives à la nature juridiques des réserves ont été extrêmement
nombreuses: mais aucune n'apporte une réponse vraiment satisfaisante;"; and Kiihner,
op.cit. at 8: "Leider wird der Terminus "Vorbehalt" in der vôlkerrechtlichen Literatur
und der Vertragspraxis haufig auch im umgangssprachlichen Sinne verwendet."
51. Horn, op.cit. at 38: "Through the standard type of definition, the word to be denned,
the Jf/'"'^'"''""- 's replaced by the <fc/7ni'ms. a combination of usually simpler words the
meaning of which is assumed to be clear."
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terms may in a later stage prove to be imprecise. In practice an imprecise
definition may however have some advantages because of its flexibility".
2.1. Definitions prior to the Vienna Convention
In the nineteen fifties and nineteen sixties, after the Advisory Opinion in the
Genocide case, a number of books dealing specifically with the law of reserva-
tions were published. These in depth studies give insight into the way in which
the nature of reservations was perceived, and give an overview of the defini-
tions used in legal doctrine up until then.
Looking at the elements authors" consider to be relevant characteristics,
there is consensus about the unilateral nature of reservations^. States act on
their own initiative, aiming at a favourable modification of the treaty regime.
Reservations are made after the authentification of the text of the treaty when
no means of changing rights and duties other than reservations are available.
Whether or not reservations are treaty clauses, the authors agree on the fact
that acceptance of reservations is necessary. This follows from the contractual
52. Hom, op.cit. at 38.
53. K.Holloway, Les réserves dans les traités internationaux. Paris 1958 (hereafter Hol-
loway. Les réserves); K.Holloway, Modem trends in treaty law. London 1967 (hereafter
Holloway: Modern trends); M.Khadjenouri. Reserves dans les traités internationaux,
Genève. 1953; Rappeler, op.cit. The focus has been on these books, as a detailed survey
'.<•»• UP of the different definitions used prior to the Vienna Convention is beyond the scope of
the present study.
Other definitions may be found in e.g:
R.L.Bindschedler, Vorbehalt, in: K.Strupp, H.J.Schlochauer (eds.), Wôrterbuch des
Volkerrechts, Vol.III. Berlin 1962 at 785-787.
G.G.Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-
1954, 33 BYIL 1957, at 272-293.
s. .^, P.Guggenheim, Traité de droit international public. Tome I, 2icme Ed.aug., Genève,
*" " ' 1967, at 166-167.
H.Kelsen, Principles of international law; 2nd Ed., New York 1966, R.W.Tucker(ed.), at
470-472.
tS>!> A.D.McNair. The Law of Treaties, Oxford, 1%1. at 158. \ SJM
L.Oppenheim, International law, a treatise: 8th Ed., Oxford. 1967. H.Lauterpacht(ed.);
par.517a at 913-916.
M.Soerensen, Manual of public international law; London 1968, CParry(ed.), par.4.18-
n • • .-••"- 4 .21 at 194-198 .
54. Holloway, Les reserves, at 103 states:" ..une reserve est considérée comme étant une
déclaration formelle par laquelle un Etat stipule la limitation unilatérale des effets du
traité à son égard, soit en excluant certaines dispositions, soit en les modifiant de façon
à diminuer ou à restreindre ses obligations en vertu du traité, dans sa forme définitive.";
Rappeler, op. cit. at 16 writes:"La réserve est une acte juridique d'un Etat qui se
' propose de participer à un traité international. Elle intervient après la conclusion du
' - traité, établit un régime spécial en faveur de l'Etat qui la propose et constitue la
condition sous laquelle il est prêt à participer à la convention.": and Rhadjenouri, op.cit.
,&*fc="'.fU at 12 states: "La réserve est une clause conventionelle émanant de l'initiative d'une ou
:tfMfcv..- de plusieurs parties (ou futures parties) et instituant un régime juridique dérogatoire au
régime normal du traité." .... . . ,,„ _ . . . . „ . . . . , .
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nature of treaty law. An accepted reservation creates a legal regime distinct
from the original treaty, which will be applicable to the reserving state.
When looking at socialist international legal theory prior to the Vienna
Convention, the definition used is strikingly different". A reservation is a
unilateral formal declaration made by a State at the signing, ratification or
acceptance of a treaty, which will bring about a change in the treaty relation
between the reserving state and the other states parties. A reservation is a
condition for becoming a party to the treaty. Its legal force lies in the unilateral
declaration by the reserving state, acceptance by other States Parties is not
necessary. This follows from the fact that the right to make reservations is
supposedly inherent in the concept of state sovereignty.
The main difference between the socialist doctrine and the traditional doctrine
concerned the appreciation of the unilateral character of reservations. Both
doctrines held different views on the contractual nature of treaty law and the
emphasis put on sovereignty as the sacred core of the state's international
existence. These views prevailed at the time the drafting of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties took place*.
2.2. The definition in the Vienna Convention ,
The VCLT contains a definition of reservations in article 2.1.d", an article
called "Use of terms", which reads: 'For the purposes of the present Conven-
tion'. The meaning of article 2 within the Convention limits the validity of the
description used in article 2.1.d**. Horn traces this restrictive approach by the
drafters of the Vienna Convention back to a mistake about the nature of
definitions, stating that definitions of the stipulativc kind (such as article 2.1 .d)
55. S.B.Filippov. Ogovorki v teorii i praktike mezdunardnych dogovorov (Reservations in
the theory and practice of international treaties) Moscow, 1958: as restated by E.Gôtt-
ling, Vorbehalte zu internationalen Vertragen in der sowjetischen Volkerrechtstheorie
und Vertragspraxis, Hamburg 1967. at 28-34 and Th.Schweisfurth. Der internationale
Vertrag in der modernen sowjetischen Volkerrechtstheorie. Kôln 1%8, at 248-251;
Gubin. op.cit. at 142. On Gubin's theory: Gôttling, op.cit. at 34-41 and Schweisfurth,
op.cit.. at 248-249.
Unfortunately none of the works mentioned has been read in the original language.
Acknowledging the difficulties of using second-hand information, the author feels that
leaving out socialist legal doctrine altogether would have constituted an omission.
56. The Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties met from 26 March to 24 May 1968.
and continued from 9 April to 22 May 1969.
57. Cf. the definitions of reservations in article 2.1J of the Vienna Convention on Suc-
cession of States in respect of Treaties. Vienna 23 August 1978. Trb.1989, 51; and article
2.1.d of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations, Vienna 21 March 1986, Trb.1987,
136.
58. Horn, op.cit. at 40:"..,the Vienna Convention does not answer the question whether
there may exist different concepts of reservation."; Ruda. op.cit. at 105 "...does not
pretend to prejudge the question or give a doctrinal definition."
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need not necessarily be universally and absolutely valid**. Article 2.1.d is an
analytical definition of the kind "per ge/ii« praxi/Hum cf d/jjfe/c/i/iam speq/7-
Cflm". This is a definition that gives general characteristics and then narrows the
definiendum down by indicating specific features.
Article 2.l.d reads: ;..ik.-ii;bai» .^ ?vnM ki^lBi ->
• "'reservation' means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a
; • State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it
jr.» * purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in
their application to that State".
Looking more closely at the definition in article 2. l.d it contains both objective
and subjective criteria which merit further analysis.
"(R)eservation means a unilateral statement.."
A reservation is a statement external to the treaty made on the initiative of the
reserving State. It will have to be a formal declaration according to article 23.1
of the Vienna Convention.
The element of unilaterality has lead to confusion. Reservations are peculiar
because of the fact that they are made unilaterally, are accepted or objected to
unilaterally (although this may hardly be noticeable in multilateral treaty prac-
tice), and ultimately function in a reciprocal way". It is the single-sided initiat-
ive of the reserving State that is meant here". As Imbert quite aptly states,
reservations may be unilateral but that does not mean that they are discretion-
ary'".
"..however phrased or named.."
This part of the definition is widely acclaimed as indicating that the substance of
the declaration is decisive. A substantive criterion will be used to decide whether
a particular statement is a reservation or not. As will be seen below, this formu-
lation is of particular relevance when the legal nature of interpretative declar-
ations is the issue".
59. Horn, op.cit. at 40:There is absolutely nothing in the notion of stipulative definitions
that would imbue them with universal and absolute validity".
60. Imbert, Les Reserves at 12: Sinclair, op.cit. at 51-52.
Cf. the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, ICI Rep.
. W ; v 1951. at 132:"although it is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act,
because only the coastal state is competent to undertake it. the validity of the determi-
'" 'i nation with regard to other States depends upon international law."
6li' -i ' As Imbert puts it, op.cit., at ll:"Acte unilatérale au moment où elle est formulée, la
* réserve semble cesser de l'être dans son exercice;(..) d'où la difficulté de trouver un
qualificatif qui puisse s'appliquer à l'ensemble de phénomène."; or Kiihner, op.cit. at 13
qualifies reservations as "einseitige, empfangbcdiirftige Willenserklarung".
62. Imbert. Les Réserves at 12. *"'* **
63. D.W.Bowett. Reservations to non-restricted multilateral treaties, in:48 BYIL 1976/77 67-
92 at 68: Kiihner, op.cit. at 15-17; Sinclair, op.cit. at 52-54: and Ruda, op.cit. at 105-106.
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"..made by a State.."
This element restricts the definition to the Vienna Convention, which only deals
with treaties between States. The condition of a State being the initiator of a
reservation has no value outside the scope of the Vienna Convention", as in
modern international law other subjects of law, such as international organiz-
ations, can also be endowed with ius contrahendi".
"..when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty,.."
The moments at which reservations might be made inserts a temporal restriction
into the definition. It raises the question as to whether the list is exclusive or
whether this only states the most common examples. Various authors have
extensively argued that the list is incomplete, and this is convincing if one
compares the moments indicated in article 2.l.d to the means of expressing
consent to be bound in article 11 VCLT**. Practice shows that making a reser-
vation at another point in time does not necessarily imply the invalidity of the
reservations".
"..whereby it purports to exclude or to modify.."
This is the crucial element in the definition. It deals with the very essence, the
aim with which States make reservations. According to article 2. l.d the intention
behind a reservation may either be to exclude or to modify, sii! î<>
The intention to exr/wrfe certain obligations from the complete package of
obligations and rights presented by a treaty, has traditionally been the stimulus
for making reservations. There is no difference of opinion on 'the intention to
exclude' as an element in the definition of reservations.
This is different where it concerns the second element, the intention to modify.
Here the opinions differ due to the fact that ww///y is a verb with a rather broad
meaning. It might imply a change by way of extension, or a change by way of
restriction. Obviously the term "modify" in its restricted sense tits into the
concept of reservations.
64. See articles 1 and 2.1.a VCLT.
65. Kiihner. op.cit at 17-18: R.Szafarz. Reservations to multilateral treaties, in: 3 PYIL 1970,
293-316, at 295.
Cf. the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and Interna-
tional Organizations or between International Organizations.
66. Horn, op.cit. at 41- 44; Kiihner. op.cit. at 18-22 and discussing the completeness of the
enumeration at 20-21; Szafarz. op.cit. at 295.
67. Edwards, op.cit. at 383: Horn, op.cit. at 41-42 presenting a rather bold example of
flexibility as concerns the temporal restrictions: G.Gaja. Unruly treaty reservations, in:
Le Droit International à l'heure de sa codification (Etudes en l'honneur de Roberto
Ago), Vol.1, Milano 1987 (hereafter: Ciaja. Unruly reservations), 305-330, at 310-313
discussing reservations made after ratification; and M.Nowak. UNO Pakt biirgerliche
und politische Rechte und Fakultativprotokoll. CCPR Kommentar. Kehl 1989 at xxv
about the Netherlands intention to withdraw from the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, in order to ratify with a reservation to article 26 immediately after withdrawal.
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Extending the modification is problematic. An extending reservation is suppos-
edly a statement through which the reserving state commits itself to obligations
going beyond the obligations following from the treaty. It would be a mistake to
take these statements to be reservations, they are merely unilateral declarations
through which a state unilaterally binds itself**. They do not bring about addi-
tional obligations for the other states parties as they can only be bound through
their consent". Extensive reservations do not function reciprocally™ and the
rules on the acceptance of reservations are a fortiori not applicable".
It seems that the term "modify" has deliberately been chosen so as to avoid
deciding on the issue of the extensive reservations". It remains to be seen
whether this has been a wise decision, as it evidently created the impression that
the Vienna Convention in fact recognized this concept". Modification should be
understood as implying restrictive modification, which is an explanation in line
with customary law'*, sdi <v asusmofr* ssft ' j"*fr;v>«'""'
"..the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty.. "
This phrase deals with the intended consequences of a reservation, and its
formulation has lead to discontent. Essentially the question is whether the
obligations following from a treaty can directly be traced back to individual
provisions of the treaty, or that in certain cases obligations may follow from the
structure of the treaty and the interplay of the provisions. Imbert has pointed to
the inadequacy of the formulation, stressing that the intention is not so much the
exclusion and restriction of provisions, but the exclusion and restriction of
obligations". Horn has argued that the argument is of lesser relevance as the
definition deals with the legal effects of certain provisions"". It goes without
saying that obligations are among the legal effects of treaty provisions.
Another aspect of the reference to "legal effects" is that the definition thus
encompasses a wide variety of declarations. The legal effect of the provisions of
any treaty is based on its entry into force between ratifying state and all other
states parties, for the whole territory of the state concerned, for all the issues
68. Horn, op.cit. at 90; and Ruda, op.cit. at 107.
69. Holloway, Les Réserves, at 104; Imhert. Les Réserves at 16; Kiihner. op.cit. at 25.
70. Horn, op.cit. at 88. .<•
7C' ; Horn, op.cit. at 88 , - •.->*
72. Kiihner. op.cit. at 23-24; and Sinclair, op.cit. at 54.
73.- .'•• Szafarz, op.cit. at 294:".. that the term "modification" contained in this description is to
be understood as covering also the possibility of "limitation"; and at 295:"(T)he term "to
,..': . modify" appearing in the conventional definition contains implicitly not only the
possibility of limitation but also of extension or any other change. Opponents of the
. .: conception of extensive reservations do not take into account a situation in which the
.,;., y;: reserving state simply widens its rights (and not its obligations), increasing by the same
- token the obligations of its partners. Reservations introducing a change other than
simple limitation or extension also appear in practice.". .-»&<f •_»>$*•-. ; ;&::">
74. Ruda. op.cit. at 107; Sinclair op.cit. at 54.
75. Imbert, Les Réserves at 14-15; Kiihner. op.cit., agreeing with Imbert at 23; and Szafarz
. expressing similar doubts, op.cit. at 296-297.
76. Horn, op.cit. at 45-46. „»'_••;<, ,-ii .•- • !>; .< .' ,
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within the scope of the treaty from the moment of entry into force onwards. The
obligation pncffl S-MH/ serwi/k/fl covers not only the substantive elements of a
treaty but includes all these elements. Unless, of course, the treaty provides
otherwise. In case a state wishes to exclude substantive provisions it stands to
reason that a reservation is in order. Any other restriction on the legal effects of
a treaty, be it ratione loci, ratione temporis or ratione personae must also be
assumed to be a reservation". There are no criteria clearly distinguishing these
restrictions from substantive restrictions™, they equally hamper the entry into
force of the treaty in its fullness. ^
"..in their application to that State"
The Final wording of the definition in article 2. l.d stresses the individualist nature
of reservations. They may lead to a change in the applicable treaty, but only in
relation to the reserving State". This has quite often been understood to mean
restriction and modification of the obligations of the reserving state only, which
is a mistake in view of the reciprocal nature of the law of treaties™. Either the
acceptance of, or the objection to a reservation can have consequences for the
other State(s). Clearly reservations do not change the content of the treaty itself,
or the treaty relations between the other states parties to the treaty as indicated in
article 21.2 VCLT.
2.3. Definitions since the Vienna Convention
Since the conclusion of the Vienna Convention, other definitions have been
advanced by legal scholars, but we shall not deal with them"'. What is perhaps
more relevant is that the Vienna Convention definition has been relied upon in a
number of cases, involving treaties anterior to the Vienna Convention, in which
77. Presenting the opposite argument. Horn op.cit. at 98-110.
78. Horn, op.cit. at 98 merely writes that a distinction is necessary without explaining what
- the distinction is based on.
Tfci.'iï*. Ruda, op.cit. at 107:"..it is to the obligations of the reserving State and not those of the
!•.;_;.' other States that the reservation must refer."
. ^ See article 21.3 VCLT. I , • -^ . :-?i,we .^
Imbert. Les Réserves, at 18:"Une reserve est une declaration unilatérale, quel que soit
*?' "wf: son libellé ou sa désignation, faite par un Etat quand il signe, ratifie, accepte ou
approuve un traité ou y adhère, ou quand il fait une notification de succession à un
traité, ou à tout autre moment prévu par le traité, par laquelle il vise à limiter ou à
restreindre le contenu ou la portée des obligations découlant pour lui du traité." Szafarz,
01 .£? op.cit. at 294:"(A) reservation is a formal declaration made unilaterally by a subject
vested with mjr comra/iem/i in the meaning of international law when initialling, signing or
depositing a document of ratification, approval, acceptance, accession, succession,
&i '•.'«? . territorial application or prolongation of a multilateral agreement, whereby it purports
outright or by way of specific interpretation to exclude, to limit, to change or to extend the
legal effect of certain provisions of the agreement as applicable to this subject or to a part
of its territory or to a territory dependent on it." And at 296 a definition of reservations
sensu largo.
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article 2.l.d VCLT was invoked as a definition with general validity, thereby
ignoring the restrictive clause "For the purposes of the present Convention".
In the case on the delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United
Kingdom and France*", the Court of Arbitration referred to article 2.l.d VCLT,
which had been accepted by both parties as a correct definition of a reserva-
tion". The Court used article 2.l.d VCLT when dealing with the British
contention that the third French reservation to article 6 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf" was in fact not a reservations but an
interpretative declaration".
Similarly, in the Temeltasch case** the European Commission on Human Rights
explicitly referred to article 2.l.d VCLT as a tool for distinguishing between
reservations and interpretative declarations; after concluding that the European
Convention itself did not contain a definition of reservations'". Using the defini-
tion in article 2.l.d VCLT as a yardstick for establishing whether or not a certain
declaration is in fact a reservation is in fact, is confirmed in the Belilos decision
of the European Commission**. In the ensuing case before the European Court
of Human Rights, article 2.l.d VCLT is briefly referred to, but is not used by
the Court as a consequence of the approach it takes to dealing with the Swiss
declaration**.
These examples from judicial practice, as well as the fact that learned authors in
general seem to agree about the application of article 2. l.d* seem to agree
about its validity. It would thus appear that article 2.l.d VCLT has been received
as the contemporary definition of "reservation".
• • - ' , ' • . . - , . • . . : • : , ? « • - : » ( « « - « • - ' • • j . , . - - . , - -,
• • •>t . : ' .<N- . , : ; •:•+•
82. First decision 30 June 1977; 54 ILR 1979. 6-10, 31-45. .... : J , - t f i » « ,
83. Award, par.55. .T^>"^ C l ï >;..i;i ;-.>'-: .JJ?
84. 499UNTS311.
85. :-. Award, par.55 reads:The Court thinks it sufficient to say that, although the third
.•*•; Ï. .i reservation doubtless has within it elements of interpretation, it also appears to
•••!• r constitute a condition imposed by the French Republic on its acceptance of the
'••••v.- delimitation regime provided for in Article 6."
86.1 Temeltasch v. Switzerland, case 9116/80, 5 May 19&2; D & R 31 (1983) at 120-153; to be
-.' Si< :• discussed Chapter 3, par.4.1.1 infra. ,.• *Uftî!J*wiW. ai ,;i- r 4 ^ , 4 .
8Ï. Par.69-73.
88. Belilos v. Switzerland, case 10328/83. 8 July 1985; D&R 44 (1985). The Belilos decision
.-.: will be discussed in Chapter 3, par.4.1.2 infra.
89. Belilos v. Switzerland, 29 april 1988, ECHR Ser.A, No.132: par.42. The Belilos case will
wo.;»— be discussed below in Chapter 3, par.4.1.3.
90. Edwards, op.cit. at 364-367; Ciaja, op.cit. at 307-309; Sinclair, op.cit. at 75.
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£ , . _ THE VIENNA CONVENTION SYSTEM ,4.1
The intention when codifying the law of treaties must have been to make the law
more easily applicable and more readily available". Whereas the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties may be clear on most parts of the law of
treaties, it certainly is not on reservations. Authors writing on the subject of
reservations explain the origins of articles 19-21, without giving much attention
to the difficulties surrounding their application in practice. The drafting history
does of course account for the peculiarities and ambiguity of the text. Yet, an
analysis of the significance of the VCLT's provisions on reservations should go
beyond anecdotal drafting history. More insight is needed in the rules the VCLT
lays down through its ambiguous and fragmented provisions.
This paragraph will especially focus on the rules relating to reservations to a
treaty which does not contain a reservations clause. Article 19.c, which is
applicable in this case, lays down the requirement of the compatibility of the
reservations with the object and purpose of the treaty, as a basis for the admissi-
bility of a reservation. This raises the question of how and by whom this rule is
safeguarded. The various forms of acceptance, described in article 20, do not
mention a link between admissibility and acceptability. One might thus wonder
what the legal value of the compatibility rule is. The VCLT does not appear to
make much difference, in article 21, between the formal legal effects of the
acceptance of a reservation, or objections to a reservation. As objections very
often produce a legal effect similar to acceptance, maintaining the distinction
between acceptance and objections in the VCLT might be questioned.
In the following the relevant provisions of the VCLT, articles 19-23, will be
dealt with. The discussion of article 19 will demonstrate the apparent inadequacy
of the compatibility rule. The changed role of both acceptance of and objections
to reservations will become clear when discussing article 20. The legal effects of
acceptance and objections, and the small distinction between them, will appear
when discussing article 21. A schematic overview of the various reactions
possible to a formulated reservation will be presented.
Further below, the remaining functions of acceptance and objections are dealt
with, as well as the relevance of the compatibility rule of article 19.c. This will
lead to the conclusion that the rules on reservations in the Vienna Convention are
not as incomplete and inoperative as is often suggested. In spite of the ambiguous
text, and though this may not have been intended when drafting the VCLT, the
rules now provide for more, and more varied reactions to reservations.
See Preamble to the Vienna Convention. 7th paragraph:"Believing that the codification
and progressive development of the law of treaties achieved in the present Convention
^,j|] promote the purposes of the United Nations set forth in the Charter,..."; S.Rosenne,
The Temporal Application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in: 4
CornelllLJ 1970, 1-24 at 18; Sinclair, op.cit at 1-4. ^ . . . « « T Y B W
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3.1. The formulation of reservations, article 19 VCLT *r -ïv-HVïg--
A reservation is a unilateral statement made by a State when expressing its
consent to be bound. Whereas the drafting of treaties tends to be an increasingly
multilateral process; the expression of consent to be bound remains a unilateral
act. This is a consequence of the consensual nature of the law of treaties. As a
matter of principle, a State cannot be bound in its treaty relations without
consenting to them. Consequently reservations can only be effective against a
State which has accepted them. When the reservation is accepted, the treaty as
modified will be binding on the reserving and the accepting State.
This consensual element in the law on reservations is hidden in the word 'formu-
late' at the opening of article 19^. The article dealing with admissibility reads:
"A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty,
.jjj. formulate a reservation unless:
a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the
reservation in question, may be made, or
iijfc ill c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs a) and b). the reservation is incompatible
•*ii*< with the object and purpose of the treaty."
.-».
'Formulate' means 'propose' in article 19.a and 19.c, which implies that the state
informed of such a proposed reservation should decide whether or not to accept
it. This is not the case with reservations within the category of 'only specified
reservations' mentioned in article 19.b. The States parties to the treaty are
supposed to have accepted the reservations within the scope of this paragraph
beforehand.
Article 19 describes the situations in which a reservation may be formulated, it
deals with the issue of admissibility. Article 19.a and article 19.b point to treaty
provisions dealing with reservations. In those cases the states parties have
developed an explicit rule on the admissibility of reservations. Article 19.c is a
residual rule, covering all the cases not dealt with by article 19.a and article 19.b.
f
Provisions on reservations should ideally be incorporated in the treaty itself". If
it is envisaged that reservations might be made, it would be best if rules about
reservations were laid down in the treaty itself rather than leaving the matter
undecided, and let the individual states decide. A reservations clause provides for
more clarity if parties state beforehand whether and on what conditions reserva-
tions may be made. The problems that may be avoided during the drafting by not
discussing a reservations clause, are likely to reappear at the time of ratification.
Frequently reservations clauses are absent, in which case the compatibility rule of
92. Sinclair, op.cit. at 51; Ruda, op.cit. at 105.
93. Cf. GA Res.546(VI), Inclusion in the draft International Covenants on Human Rights of
{• »i 2 provisions regarding reservations; GA Res.598(VI), Reservations to multilateral
"> conventions. . .
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article 19.c applies. The present paragraph will mainly deal with this provision
extensively, the other admissibility rules will only be referred to only briefly.
3.1.1. Explicit rules on reservations, articles 19.a and 19.b
Article 19 VCLT begins with the presumption that reservations may be made**.
This general acceptance of reservations is then limited by a number of cases in
which reservations may not be formulated, as mentioned in paragraphs a - c.
Though article 19.c will prove to be of overriding importance for this study, it is
useful to begin by looking at paragraphs a and b of the provision first.
Article 19.a is a straight forward rule, it refers to a rule in the treaty itself which
indicates that reservations may not be made. In case the State Parties have dealt
with the issue, there is clearly no need for an additional rule in the Vienna
Convention".
Some States Parties use an other approach to the issue of reservation, by indicat-
ing that particular reservations may be made. Article 19.b VCLT states that only
if the treaty provides that ow/y 5/«'c///rt/ /Y.wrwtf/wM.v may be made, no other
reservations are allowed. The issue here is the fact that in order to restrict the
reservations that may be made, the treaty itself will have to indicate that these are
indeed the OH/V reservations that may be made. The inclusion of the word "only"
as a result of an amendment by Poland*' did, enlarge the scope of article 19.c
which now also encompasses treaties indicating that specified reservations may be
made. It must be assumed that the reservations falling within the scope of article
19.b, the group of only specified reservations, are identical to the reservations
expressly authorized in article 20.1 VCLT".
From the point of view of the monitoring of reservations, articles 19.a and 19.b
have the advantage of being transparent rules decided upon by the future State
Parties at the time of the drafting. They are guidelines for the depository as to
which reservations may or may not be accepted and consequently which ratifica-
tions containing reservations may or may not be registered.
3.1.2. The content of article 19.c
The inclusion in article 19.b of the word 'only' (only specified reservations ...
may be made) limited the scope of this provision. At the same time it broadened
the scope of article 19.c which encompasses the following cases*:
- treaties allowing reservations in a very broad manner.
lift - treaties not prohibiting reservations other than the ones explicitly
^w' prohibited (article 19.a).
- treaties not expressly authorizing reservations other than the ones
exclusively specified (article 19.b).
94. Imbert, Les Reserves at 86-90; Ruda, op.cit. at 180.
95. Kiihner. op.cit. at 124-125.
96. Ruda. op.cit. at 181-182; Szafarz, Reservations at 299-300.
97. Kiihner. op.cit. at 148-153; and Anglo-French Continental Shelf para.39.
98. Cf. Kiihner, op.cit. at 132-134; Szafarz. op.cit. at 300. _
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- treaties not prohibiting reservations other than the ones explicitly
prohibited and not expressly authorizing reservations other than the ones
exclusively specified (articles 19.a and b).
- treaties containing no reservations clauses at all.
The rule contained in article 19.c caused confusion and disagreement. It has to be
pointed out that although article 19.c uses the same phrase as the International
Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the Genocide Convention, the rule is
not the same". The Advisory Opinion dealt with "object and purpose" as a
criterion for both the formulation of reservations and objections to reserva-
tions"*'. In the VCLT system "object and purpose" apply only to the formula-
tion of reservations'".
The contemporary differences of opinion concentrate on two things, the meaning
of "object and purpose" and the observance and monitoring of article 19.c.
Firstly, there is disagreement about the meaning of "object and purpose". Are
"object and purpose" objective criteria, and could incompatibility thus be
established objectively? Or are they mere subjective notions? The VCLT implies
that every treaty has an object and purpose'"-, and implies furthermore that this
can be determined. Some authors doubt this, saying that it is an uncertain notion
and an unworkable criterion in view of the differing intentions of the States
parties"". It might be suggested that object and purpose may point to goals
external to the treaty, for instance aims in the fields of politics, economics or
social development. In addition to that, the object and purpose of the treaty are
likely to change in the course of time"".
It must be assumed that States, when expressing consent to be bound by a treaty
do so because they wish to attain the goal at which the treaty aims. The character
of a treaty, its purpose and indeed its raison d'etre are the very reason for the
expression of consent to be bound. This does not mean that ascertaining the
object and purpose of a particular treaty is in all cases an easy task"". It should
be borne in mind that there are few treaties with an object and purpose as
obvious as the Genocide Convention, in the Advisory Opinion on which the
criterion was developed. The "object and purpose" rule leads to a necessary
99. Coccia, op.cit. at 30.
100. ICJ Rep.1951. at 24:The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit both the
freedom of making reservations and that of objecting to them." See par.1.2.1 supra.
101. Coccia, op.cit. at 9; Sinclair, op.cit. at 61.
102. There is also uncertainty as about the relation between "object" and "purpose"; see
Coccia, op.cit. at 23, and G.Teboul, Remarques sur les Reserves aux Conventions de
Codification, in: 86 RGDIP 1982, 679-717, at 695-696.
103. Teboul, op.cit. 695-701, and presenting an example at 698-701.
104. Teboul, op.cit. at 697; and see Chapter 3, par.2 infra, Object and purpose of a human
rights treaty.
105. Teboul. op.cit. at 701.
T H E LAW APPLICABLE TO RESERVATIONS 41
distinction between core and non-core obligations. In most cases this will be a
matter of thorough interpretation"".
The observance of article 19.c led to another controversy. Opinions differ as to
whether the admissibility of a reservation depends on its acceptability (to another
State party) or whether admissibility and acceptability are two distinct notions.
The source of the problem is the fact that the VCLT states that only compatible
reservations may be formulated"". Yet, the drafting conference in Vienna
deliberately omitted possible methods for determining the compatibility of a
proposed reservation"*. Thus article 19.c is a rule of law without explicit
safeguards.
The majority of writers conclude that, though compatibility is an objective
criterion, it will ultimately be the States parties who will decide upon the
acceptability of a given reservation"". Article 19.c introduces compatibility as a
basis for admissibility and leaves it at that. States do not explicitly decide on
admissibility when accepting a reservation"", but if they do, they would subjec-
tively apply a theoretically objective notion'". As ultimately acceptability alone
is relevant for the validity of a ratification containing a reservation, these authors
doubt the value of article 19.c"-. It will be clear that this line of thought easily
ignores article 19.c, or at least turns it into a phantom provision on practical
grounds.
106. Coccia, op.cit. at 24:"It is a preliminary legal issue to be solved as a matter of treaty
interpretation."
107. Imbert, Les Réserves at 93:"II convient surtout de souligner l'absence d'indication sur la
façon dont doit être appréciée la compatibilité d'une réserve". Also J.K.Koh, Reserva-
tions to Multilateral Treaties: How International Legal Doctrine Reflects World Vision,
23 HurvILJ 1982/83. 71-116, at 98.
108. Ruda, op.cit. at 182, discussing collegiate systems.
109. Coccia, op.cit. at 23-24; Imbert. Les Réserves at 140; Kiihner. op.cit. at 136; Ruda, op.cit.
at 190; Szafarz, op.cit. at 300.
110. Imbert, Les Réserves at 96.
111. Ruda, op.cit. at 182; Teboul, op.cit. at 694.
112. Imbert. Les Réserves at 136:"..revient à affirmer que l'acceptation d'une réserve est
indépendante des conditions de recevabilité: n'est-ce pas reconnaître que ces dernières
sont inutiles ou tout au moins illusoires?".
Kiihner. op.cit. at 147:"Die Unterscheidung zwischen zulàssigen und unzulà'ssigen
Vorfoehalten ist insoweit sinnlos.".
Ruda. op.cit. at 190:These simple conclusions justify our regarding Article 19,
subparagraph(c) as a mere doctrinal assertion,..".
Szafarz, op.cit. at 301:".., the rule expressed in paragraph (c) of Article 19 has (in
practice) no legal value of its own.".
Coccia, op.cit. at 30, adds that the voluntary character of art.l9.c is explained by the fact
that this rule could only be imperative if it were ius cogens.
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Others claim that this interpretation of article 19.c is a misconception. A distinc-
tion must be made between admissibility and acceptability'", which is reflected
in articles 19 and 20 VCLT. Thus a proposed reservation theoretically passes a
twofold test. Admissibility is the first requirement, and only admissible reserva-
tions may be formulated"''. Reservations within the scope of article 19.b are
per se admissible'", all other reservations are subject to the compatibility rule.
Determining the compatibility of a reservation is a matter of legal interpretation,
in which "object and purpose" are objective criteria. In the absence of provisions
concerning the determination of compatibility in the VCLT, States parties have to
rely on the treaty in question'". The second step eventually leading to a valid
reservation is that of acceptance (article 20). This involves a purely subjective
act, in which States parties may act out of political motives'". Incompatible
reservations are nullities"* and the acceptance of such a reservation would be a
breach of treaty'".
This theory is be clearly impractical, it is impossible to find out whether states
believed a reservation to be incompatible and thus unacceptable in a system in
which tacit consent is the major form of acceptance.
3.2. Acceptance of reservations, article 20 VCLT
The article opens with specific cases such as expressly authorized reservations
(article 20.1), reservations to treaties with a limited number of negotiating states
(article 20.2) and reservations to a constituent instrument of an international
organization (article 20.3). Article 20.4 comprises the basic rules concerning
reservations: namely the consequences of reservations as well as the conse-
quences of objections. It is basically this provision that lays down the pattern of
future treaty relations. Tacit consent is regulated in article 20.5, the article thus
implying the possibility of explicit consent.
Articles 20.2 and 20.3 will not be dealt with in the following, the order in which
the other paragraphs of article 20 are deal with is related to their relevance to the
present subject.
113. Bowelt, op.cit. at 80:"Not only is the test for non-acceptance quite different, but the
effect of the objection will vary according to whether the reservation is regarded as
impermissible or, in the alternative, permissible but objectionable and therefore
opposable to the objecting State." Idem Coccia op.cit. at 24; Teboul.op.cit. at 691.
114. Bowett, op.cit. at 83:The contradiction in the conduct of a Party which 'accepts' a
reservation which it acknowledges to be contrary to the object and purpose of that same
treaty is self-evident."
115. Bowett.op.cit. at 71.
116. Bowett.op.cit. at 80.
117. Bowett.op.cit. at 87.
118. Bowett.op.cit. at 82-84, Koh.op.cit. at 83.
119. Bowett.op.cit. at 83.
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3.2.1. The acceptance of a reservation, articles 20.4.a and 20.4.C
Article 20.4.a. specifies that acceptance means a reservation has the effect it aims
at. It reads:
"In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty otherwise
provides:
a) acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the reserving
State a party to the treaty in relation to that other State if or when the treaty is in force
for those States;
b) ....
c) an act expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a
reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has accepted the
reservation"
The unilateral proposal to modify treaty obligations needs to be accepted in order
to establish the desired change in treaty relations. It should be noticed that article
20.4.a does not mention the conformity of the reservation with the criteria in
article 19 VCLT as a precondition for acceptance of the reservation'^. Accept-
ance in the VCLT system is a bilateral matter. Consent to be bound on condition
of the acceptance of the reservation is effective only in relation to the accepting
state. The VCLT thus lays down a flexible system concerning reservations'-'.
The flexibility lies in the fact that the acceptance of all States parties is not
required, as the treaty enters into force between the reserving State and each
State that accepts the reservation. Theoretically the multilateral treaty breaks
down into numerous bilateral treaties, in which states are bound by the original
treaty as modified by accepted reservations and reservations objected to. As will
be seen below, on the basis of the rule of tacit acceptance (article 20.5) there will
probably always be entry into force for the reserving state'".
3.2.2. Objections to a reservation, article 20.4.b
Objections to a reservation do not preclude the entry into force of the treaty
between the reserving and the objecting State. It is only when the objecting State
definitely expresses a contrary intention that entry into force will not take place.
Article 20.4.b reads:
"(A)n objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not preclude the
entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a
contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State;"
120. Coccia. op.cit. at 23; R.Cook. Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (hereafter: Cook. Women's Convention), in:
30 VJIL 1990, 643-716, at 656.
121. Kiihner, op.cit. at 157-159; Ruda. op.cit. at 189; Szafarz, op.cit. at 310.
122. Imbert, op.cit. at 141.
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As has been discussed by various authors'^, it was a proposal of the Soviet
Union that reversed the presumption of objections implying non-entry into
force'**. It is doubtful whether this provision is a codification of customary law
preceding the Vienna Conference'^.
Bowett'^ understands the provision to be a logical rule, in his view an incom-
patible reservation is a nullity, there can thus be no problem in accepting entry
into force on the basis of a compatible reservation. A more realistic view would
be to see article 20.4.b. as an adaptation of the law of treaties to contemporary
international practice. The fact that objections do not preclude the entry into force
is a consequence of the exigencies of multilateral treaty-making. The rule
concerning objections is the complement of the VCLT's flexible system, in which
the treaty is in force in different modes between various states. The Vienna
Convention attaches the least possible weight to objections, preserving as much of
the treaty as possible'-'. It favours reservations to the absence of treaty rela-
tions. If objections would preclude entry into force, the coherence of the flexible
system of treaty relations provides would fall through. f v / ••
Practical though the system may be, it must be noticed that the flexibility, and
the favourable approach to reservations, has changed the roles of the reserving
and the objecting States. It is not the reserving State that needs to legitimize its
position, the onus is on the objecting State whose actions will be a visible step
outside of the flexible system.
Only where an objecting State explicitly expresses the intention no treaty relations
will be established. This intention has to be expressed explicitly, it has to be
incontestable'^*. Objections may be made to all reservations, as States are free
to accept or refuse the proposed modification of the treaty'^.
The objecting State decides upon entry into force. As precluding entry into force
can easily be understood as an unfriendly act, it is said that the VCLT thus
favours reservations"". On the other hand it should be kept in mind that the
same unfriendly reaction used to be expressed previously by objecting. The
123. Imbert, Les Réserves al 153-156; Kiihner, op.cit. at 179-182: Ruda. op.cit. at 193;
Sinclair, op.cit. at 62; Szafarz, op.cit. at 306-308; A.N. Talalajew. Das Rccht der interna-
. ,^.,n tionalen Vertrage, Berlin 1977 at 72-73.
124. It would appear that few participants at the Vienna Conference perceived the conse-
quences of accepting the inclusion of the word not (..does not preclude entry into
force..). The inclusion of not in article 20.4.b was part of an East West trade-off
according to a spokesman in the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
125. Coccia, op.cit. note 189 at 36; Imbert. op.cit. at 155; Kiihner. op.cit. at 180-182; Ruda,
op.cit. at 193; Szafarz, op.cit. at 306-307.
126. Bowett, op.cit. at 86. r
127. Imbert, op.cit. at 159; Koh, op.cit. at 102. '"' '*'" "'' ° ' ''
128. Kiihner, op.cit. at 183; Szafarz, op.cit. at 309.
129. Kiihner, op.cit. at 187; cf. T.O.Elias. The Modern Law of Treaties, Leiden.1974, at 28,
«?';•> saying:"..are clearly inadmissible, but also are objections to reservations which are wholly
compatible with the object of the treaty.", apparently confusing the consequences of
art.20.1 and art.20.4.b.
130. Imbert. op.cit. at 158; Kiihner, op.cit. at 182-183; Sinclair, op.cit. at 62.- .n.~..,.i ^.ti
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VCLT merely added an extra element to the reactions possible to proposed
reservations. While previously an objection implied no entry into force, the
preclusion of entry into force now has to be explicit. • • » '
A variety of opinions exist on whether States have to state their reasons for
precluding entry into force. Kûhner and Szafarz share the opinion that States are
required to provide motives'", while Bowett considers this only necessary in
case of incompatibility'". In his view the above mentioned freedom of accept-
ance does not imply a duty to motivate objections'". Coccia does not think that
reasons for objections have to be provided, or that objections should be restricted
to object and purpose"''
While article 20.4.b states that the intention not to enter into treaty relations has
to be explicit, there is a difference of opinion concerning the necessity to
explicitly exclude entry into force in case of incompatible reservations'".
Bowett says they need not be objected to as they are null and void'", while
Szafarz claims that stating that a reservation is incompatible, or contrary to /'««
co£<7w would per se prevent entry into force"'. Kùhner doubts this as concerns
compatibility"* but goes further saying that acceptance of reservations contrary
to /'UJ cogCTW is impossible"'. Objections to a reservation contrary to /'WJ
are «yo/t/or/ not needed to prevent this reservation having effect.
3.2.3. Tacit acceptance, article 20.5
Article 20.5 lays down the rule of tacit consent stating: »'
js» -i "(F)or the purposes of paragraph 2 and 4 and unless the treaty otherwise provides, a
reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no
ip î.si;v objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was
- notified, or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty.
whichever is later."
Thus tacit acceptance of reservations takes place either at the moment a State
expresses its consent to be bound without objecting to reservations previously
made; or after a period of twelve months in which no objection has been raised.
131. Kuhner. op.cit. at 183; Szafarz, op.cit. at 309.
132. Bowett, op.cit. at 87.
133. The view, it must be stressed, is intimately tied to the scheme he sets up explaining
articles 19-23 VCLT.
134. Coccia, op.cit. at 26, 33.
135. See supra, par.3.1. -~"S---
136. Bowett, op.cit. at 83. . •» ' "J¥f"
137. Szafarz, op.cit. at 309. - ' »*'
138. Kuhner. op.cit. at 183. •**'
139. K u h n e r , o p . c i t . a t 1 4 6 ; a n d cf . a r t i c l e s 5 3 , 6 4 V C L T . . - , . - . . , . . . t f c j
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Article 20.S provides a workable solution by interpreting 12 months of silence as
acceptance of the reservation'". This time limit provides certainty about the
entry into force of the treaty for the reserving State as it is very likely that at
least one State will tacitly accept the reservation (article 20.4.c)'"". It maintains
the principle of the law of treaties that States can only be bound by their con-
sent'*-. Interpreting silence as consent is a way of fitting the increasingly lax
practice into the rules of treaty law. Thus the system of inconspicuous tacit
consent in fact promotes the increase of treaty relations in a spectacular way, it
reinforces the flexible system set up under articles 20.4.a and 20.4.C. Tacit
consent is a presumption, States not accepting a reservation will have to object.
The time limit article 20.5 sets is arbitrary but dispositive. States may decide
upon another time limit in the treaty, which would render article 20.5 inapplic-
able. The time span of one year seems appropriate but it may always be too short
for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and too long for the reserving state'*'.
Tacit acceptance is more important than explicit acceptance in contemporary
practice. This is influenced by various facts such as the reluctance to overtly state
acceptance'"" or the tardiness of States in reacting to reservations'^.
3.2.4. A priori acceptance, article 20.1
Article 20.1 provides for « /jr/o/v acceptance for reservations expressly author-
ized. It reads: '
• "A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require subsequent acceptance
, : by the other contracting States unless the treaty so provides."
The article deals with specified reservations as mentioned in article 19.b'**. The
phrasing however is different''", which must be taken to be the result of
inaccurate drafting. As the link between article 19.b and article 20.1 is not very
apparent, article 20.1 caused some confusion. It has been taken to cover not only
the cases within the scope of article 19.b but also those of article 19.c. Thus
reservations compatible with object and purpose of the treaty would be «
accepted once their compatibility is established. " •••«~-<•--
140. Cf. the ninety days time limit in article 20.1 CERD: A. Cassese, A new reservations
i .'-, clause (Article 20 of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination), in: Recueil d'études de droit international en hommage à Paul
Guggenheim, Geneve 1968, 266-304 at 297.
141. Imbert.op.cit. at 142:"La seule différence est constituée précisément par le délai du
consentement tacite...c'est à dire plus par une question de temps que par la présence ou
absence d'une condition particulière à remplir."
142. i Imbert, Les Réserves at 142:Théoriquement le principe du consentement aux réserves
demeure, mais dans la pratique, on est très proche du système.... suivant lequel l'Etat
réservataire est partie au traité dès l'instant où il formule sa réserve."
143. Imbert, op.cit. at 107; in respect of CEDAW: Clark, op.cit. at 302. 312-314. »* ', . : >jr,i
144. Kiihner. op.cit. at 154. *>ys • x".'
145. Imbert. op.cit. at 104; Sinclair, op.cit. at 63. *•'>.-* >T\CO .s*«*aîs . ^- .
146. Kiihner, op.cit. at 129-130, 149. ,s- - vi
147. Cf. art.l9.b "only specified reservations", art.20.1 "expressly authorized"..;..-.".'!.,: v'-S
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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights took this point of view in an
Advisory Opinion requested by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights'''*. The question was at what time the American Convention on Human
Rights would enter into force for a State making a compatible reservation. Taking
article 20.1 literally'", the Court understood compatible reservations to be
expressly authorized, which a priori acceptance implied instant entry into force.
The Advisory Opinion is based on the wording of article 20.1'*, and the
Court's interpretation is sound in view of the interpretation rules laid down in
article 31.1 VCLT. However, in view of the drafting history it misapprehends the
relation between articles 19.c and 20.1 '" . In that line of thought, a correct
solution would have been entry into force after twelve months ex article 20.4.C
jo. article 20.5. It has to be pointed out though, that in spite of theoretical
inadequacies, this solution is a very desirable one from the point of view of
human rights protection'".
3.3. The legal effects of reservatioas, article 21 VCLT
The legal effects of reservations and objections are dealt with in article 21.
Whereas article 20 sketches the consequences of acceptance of and objections to
reservations, article 21 gives a detailed account of the treaty relations established
on the basis of accepted reservations and reservations objected to. As a basic
notion of the law of treaties, the article underlines the concept of reciprocity'".
States intending to modify their treaty relations will face the same modifications
by other States against them"''. The modification thus established will only be
valid between the States concerned, as provided in article 21.2.
148. Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into
Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (Arts.74 and 75), Advisory-
Opinion OC-2/82 of September 24. 1982; Series A No.2: discussed in Chapter 3,
•' par.4.2.1 infra.
149. The application of the Vienna Convention is based upon article 75 ACTIR.
150. Paragraph 36 of the Advisory Opinion reads:" The Court notes, in this connection, that
Articie 20.1 in speaking of "a reservation expressly authorized by a treaty," is not by its
•„.-...«. terms limited to specific reservations. A treaty may expressly authorize one or more
specific reservations or reservations in general. If it does the latter, which is what the
Court has concluded to be true of the Convention, the resultant reservations, having
been thus expressly authorized, need not be treated differently from expressly author-
ized specific reservations. The Court wishes to emphasize, in this connection, that unlike
Article I9.b, which refers to "specific reservations". Article 20.1 contains no such
restriction, ...."
151. Kuhner, op.cit. at 150-151.
152. This apparent contradiction between the law of treaties and the exigencies of human
rights law underlines the impression that the law on reservations can not be applied
strictly to human rights treaties.
Kuhner. op.cit. at 152, puts it like this:"Das Ciulachten fuszt letzendlich auf der zutref-
fenden Erkenntnis dass das Vorbehaltregime der WVK auf Vcrtrage zum Schutze der
menschenrechte nicht zugeschnilten ist."
153. See the discussion of reciprocity in par.6 infra.
154. Cf.articles 21.1.a and 21.1.b, as well as article 21.3 final phrase, «.f» i4K*fc, •J-.S* > #
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Article 21.1 deals with modifications on the basis of an accepted reservation, and
the great similarity between this provision and the one on the effects of an
objection not precluding entry into force must be noted. Article 21.1.a reads:
"A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with articles 19,
20, 23; a) modifies for the reserving State in its relations with that other party the
provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reserva-
tion;..",
while article 21.3 states:
3«Vt" "(W]hen a State objecting to a reservation has nol opposed the entry into force of the
H,*«$ treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation
f ^  • relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation."
This parallel has lead many authors to question the difference between acceptance
and objections not precluding entry into force'". The distinction between
acceptance and objections disappeared as far as the legal effects are concerned. It
has even been suggested that objections not precluding entry into force are an a-
typical form of acceptance'".
From a practical point of view this might seem convincing. An objection not
precluding entry into force may eventually be the reason the treaty will enter into
force for the reserving State, failing acceptance of its reservation by other States
parties. Thus articles 20.4.b jo. 21.3 are complementary to article 20.4.c'".
The authors are somewhat puzzled about the reasons why objections should be
made when these will have the same effects as acceptance. In the Vienna
Convention the decisive element for the establishment of treaty relations based on
reservations is the statement on entry into force. Objections no longer preclude
entry into force, only the expressed intention to preclude entry into force does so.
This does not mean, however, that objections not precluding entry into force are
without significance. States may use objections to express their disagreement with
a reservation, without precluding the establishment of treaty relations. Such
objections may be political declarations''* but it is also conceivable that States
may want to object so as to prevent the possible formation of customary law
opposable to them, on the basis of the reservation.
Apart from the question of whether the Vienna Convention rules could be applied
to an earlier treaty such as the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf", the issue of the legal effect of reservations and objections to such
155. Clark, op.cit. at 310; Coccia, op.cit. at 35; Imbert, Les Réserves at 157; Koh, op.cit.at
102-103; Kiihner, op.cit. at 184; Sinclair; op.cit. at 76; Szafarz, op.cit. at 311.
156. Clark, op.cit. at 310; Kuhner, op.cit. at 184, saying:"..lage es dann nicht sogar nahe, den
einfachen Einwand als besondere atypische Form der ausdrucklichen Annahme
anzusehen'.'"
157. Kuhner, op.cit. at 184; Szafarz, op.cit. at 310. :«K »••;;(;;-. ,X-,;.M TW3--*-.-;"i.+i*i»rn
158. Imbert. Les Reserves at 157. . ,,i^ n ,v, .£.<*>
159. See about this question par.7 infra. •;.;. e.i.}.'. fc•-.. fh.
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reservations was one of the important questions dealt with by the arbitral tribunal
in the United Kingdom - France Continental Shelf Case"". In particular the
meaning of the phrase "to the extent of the reservation" in article 21.3 was dealt
with.
It is necessary to sketch the situation with which the arbitration dealt with. The
United Kingdom had ratified the Convention in 1964; France ratified in 1965
making a declaration containing five interpretative statements, that might in part
be reservations. The fifth declaration dealt with article 6.1 and 6.2, about the
determination of boundaries on the Continental Shelf*'. It refers to "special
circumstances" in particular areas along the French Atlantic and North Sea
coasts. The goal of the reservation'" was to establish that in these areas the
boundary would not be determined using the equidistance principle laid down in
article 6. Early 1966, the United Kingdom objected to this French reservation,
stating that it was unable to accept the reservation to article 6.
The question asked what the effect of the reservations was. France contended that
the effect of reservations and objections was that the 1958 Convention was not
applicable between itself and the UK. Alternatively, the whole Convention except
for article 6 would apply. Hence pre-existing customary law would apply to fill
the legal gap. The United Kingdom argued that objections to reservations did not
preclude the entry into force of the Convention. In the alternative, the reservation
with respect to article 6 was not permissible within the system of the 1958
Convention, and thus invalid. The Convention as a whole therefore was binding
upon both States.
The Court indicates that the effect of the objection is to render the reservation
non-opposable for the United Kingdom, as much as the reservation prevented the
United Kingdom from invoking article 6 against France. This however does not
lead to total inapplicability of article 6 between France and the United Kingdom,
the Court stresses. 7/ wr /o r«/</w tfie /4r//cfe //)«/>/>//«//;/<' <iv <WHWM //je fwo
pj fo ftoc «cfcw/, £ur 0///y /o //ic ex/f/// <>/" /AP ffjcrailw;
27,
The phrase "to the extent, but only to the extent" is a clear formulation of the
principle that the scope of legal effect of reservations and objections should be
construed narrowly, and that reservations should be interpreted restrictively.
160. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the French Republic) Award 30 June 1977: in: 54 ILR 1979 at 6-10, 38-53.
161. Article 12 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf indicates that reservations
may be made to articles other than article 1 to 3.
162. The Court had established that the declaration was a reservation, see par. 54-55; also
discussed in par.2.3 supra.
163. Award, para.61. ,r.. , ; j . : >
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3.4. Withdrawal of reservations and objections, article 22 '•* -"'•-•*•<•*-•*« f
Article 22 VCLT lays down the rule that in general reservations may be with-
drawn at any time, and that the consent of the State that had earlier accepted the
reservations is not required, unless otherwise agreed. The rule in article 22.1
does favour the withdrawal of reservations by attaching no conditions to with-
drawals, which is a practical and pragmatic approach. Yet, if reservations are
considered to be additional bilateral agreements, it is rather unsystematic not to
require the consent of the accepting State for the withdrawal by the reserving
State.
Similarly, objections may be withdrawn at any time. It should be noted that the
withdrawal of objections is extremely rare, if not non-existent.
The provision contains in paragraph 3 some rules with respect to the moment at
which the withdrawal of reservations and objections becomes operative, which is
usually at the moment notification is received.
3.5. Procedural aspects, article 23 •*'•-• '/>••« i>•"--•'-•;»'
The final provision in the section on reservations in the Vienna Convention deals
with the procedural aspects of reservations. Paragraph 1 indicates that reserva-
tions, express acceptance and objections must be formulated in writing, and must
be communicated to the States Parties and the States entitled to become State
Parties. The withdrawal of a reservation, or of an objection to a reservation
should also be formulated in writing says article 23.4. Stressing that these steps
should be in writing will come as no surprise given the fact that reservations and
objections lead rules of law in the shape of fee •MTZ/JM"*'.
Paragraph 2 stresses that reservations made when signing subject to ratification,
need to be confirmed at the moment of expressing consent to be bound. Objec-
tions to, or express acceptance of reservations formulated prior to expressing
consent to be bound, do however not require confirmation according to article
23.2 VCLT. ^ . , •
3.6. Treaty relations on the basis of reservations '!" - ' >• • ' M nn<i
In view of what has been said about the provisions on reservations, it is useful to
give an overview of the treaty relations possible on the basis of reservations
falling within the scope of article 19.c. This matter might be best explained using
a diagram in which the three different aspects articles 19-21 mention (compatibil-
ity, acceptability and legal effects) are incorporated.
It must be assumed that any reservation is either compatible or incompatible
(section I). States parties have to react to any reservation, and they only have two
164. G.Gaja, Reservations to treaties and the newly independent Stales (hereafter: Gaja,
Reservations). IYIL 1975, 52-68 at 58 suggests that the withdrawal of reservations may
be implicit. We will not discuss this possibility here, as it seems to be a very limited
exception to the general practice.
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options. Either they accept the reservation or object to it (section II). Further-
more they will have to decide on the legal effects either decision on acceptability
will have. Acceptance, whether explicit or tacit, implies entry into force; whereas
objections may or may not lead to entry into force (section III).
COMPATIBILITY
- section I -
ACCEPTABILITY
- section II -
explicit acceptance
(art .20.4.a)
tacit acceptance
(art .20.5)
not precluding
entry into force
(art.20.4.b)
not precluding
entry into force
(art .20.4 .b)
LEGAL EFFECTS
- section HI -
entry into force
no entry
into force
*kgV
Using the diagram, the following situations can be described:
; - * » •
3.6.1. The acceptance of compatible reservations
This is a case which needs little explanation: once a reservation is compatible
there appears to be no reason not to accept the reservation. Acceptance can be
either explicit (article 20.4.a), which is increasingly rare, or tacit (article 20.5).
3.6.2. Objections to compatible reservations .•••••.: •«.-«..
Whether States have a duty to accept all compatible reservations, as some authors
assert"*, is a question which arises in the second combination. Acceptability, it
is recalled, is foremost a subjective matter"*. Whereas the Genocide case
stresses compatibility as a rule for reservations and objections this is not the case
in the Vienna Convention. States may have all sorts of reasons not to want to
enter into treaty relations with an other State on the basis of reservations. Here
the link between objection and entry into force needs to be stressed. In order not
S8t f.-J - ' isk-..:'•«<» -. ( -v,d< .3 '
165. Imbert, Les Réserves at 88.
166. Clark, op.cit. at 303; Coccia, op.cit. at 33; Shelton. op.cit. at 228.
- + • - • .
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to establish treaty relations with a reserving State, a State will have to object, and
state explicitly that entry into force will be precluded.
It is hard to see why a State objecting to a compatible reservation would not
oppose entry into force if it were not for laxity or lack of precision in applying
article 20.4.b. Even if the use of this possibility is not very clear, it is not
impossible.
3.6.3. Incompatible reservations can be accepted
This possibility appears to be a contradiction. It is precisely at this point that
articles 19.c and 20.4 clash. Acceptance will mostly be tacit, which implies that
no statement on compatibility needs to be made.
Reasons for accepting an inadmissible reservation will mostly be extra legal'".
Objections are frequently considered to be an unfriendly act, which might
persuade States not to object to a particular reservation. Apart from motives to
accept what is recognized as inadmissible, there are the cases of ignorance and
misconception as to the admissibility of a certain reservation. The assumption that
a treaty has an object and purpose which can be determined still leaves the
determination to the individual State. It is not inconceivable that States will hold
different opinions as to the admissibility of a particular reservation. A third
reason for the acceptance of incompatible reservations is the influence of the time
limit in article 20.5; states may, through lack of attention or neglect fail to react
in time to reservations that are inadmissible.
3.6.4. Objections to incompatible reservations
This causes few problems and may somehow seem as self-explanatory as the case
mentioned under 1. States objecting have the opportunity to choose between entry
into force and preventing entry into force. It must be assumed that the decision
on the entry into force is related to both the weight the objecting State attaches to
the incompatibility of the reservation, and to the character of the treaty the
reservation is made to.
Thus an objection not preventing entry into force will often be a statement
concerning the state of the law"*, while the objecting State has no direct
interest in thoroughly reciprocal treaty relations. This explains objections based
on inadmissibility of a reservation, not precluding entry into force of human
rights treaties'".
Objections preventing entry into force are the ultimate consequence of the
compatibility requirement in article 19.c. This reaction may be encountered if the
reservation is contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty, or is a violation of
167. Clark, op.cil. at 304. 307; Ruda. op.cil. at 190.
168. Thus preventing both confusion and the creation of customary law opposable to the
objecting state, based on an incompatible reservation.
169. See for instance objections by the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands,
Mexico and Sweden to reservations made to the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination against Women: Multilateral treaties deposited with the
Secretary-General ST\LEG\SER.E\11.
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ius cogens"". The preclusion of entry into force is also likely to appear in the
case of so-called contract-treaties'", which aim at mutually reciprocal benefits.
The objecting State then reacts to the disequilibrium caused by the reservation by
precluding entry into force.
3.7. Reconsideration of the Vienna Convention system
The provisions of the VCLT on reservations are not as unambiguous as would be
desirable. At first sight the system appears to be an incomplete and impractical
one. The law on reservations traditionally focused on acceptance and objections
as expressions of consent to be bound. The role of both acceptance and objections
has changed considerably, as a result of the distinction the VCLT makes between
acceptance and objections on the one side, and entry into force on the other. It
will be noticed that though the VCLT maintains the traditional contrast between
acceptance and objections, the important distinction between entry into force and
non-entry into force is obscure. The vital element in any reaction to a proposed
reservation is whether or not the treaty will enter into force between the reserv-
ing State and the reacting State. As has been shown in the diagram above, there
will in most cases be entry into force, except for when objections precluding
entry into force have been made. This is what is commonly known as the
VCLT's favouring entry into force. However, using the same diagram, one will
see that in fact little has changed: the decision on entry into force which used to
take place in section II, now takes place in section III. Claiming the VCLT
favours entry into force fails to perceive that it has merely extended the points on
which a State considering a reservation will have to react.
Article 20 makes a distinction between acceptance and objections on the one side
and (non)entry into force on the other. It is often said that this distinction
deprives acceptance and objections of all legal significance"-. This view
however, cannot be shared. In the VCLT's system States are required to react in
a twofold way to a reservation. Firstly they express approval or disapproval with
the reservation by accepting it or objecting to it. Explicitly stating disapproval
with a reservation may preclude the establishment of a particular interpretation of
the treaty, or the formation of customary law on the basis of a reservation
opposable to the States parties'". Then they indicate whether or not the treaty
170. States may use objections in this way to stress their disapproval of reservations contrary
to ius cogens, the reservations themselves, it must be stressed, are void ab initio;
Kiihner at 146; articles 53, 64 VCLT.
171. S.Rosenne, Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945-1986. Cambridge 1989, at 182
defining the traité-contrat:"..the treaty consists of a series of reciprocally operating
rights, duties and benefits, the treaty being more or less synallagmatic and reflecting a
do ut des adjustment of concrete interests."
172. Coccia, op.cil. at 36; Cook. Women's Convention, at 656.
173. P.H.Imbert, Reservations and human rights convenlions(hereafler: Imbert, HRR) in: 6
HRR 1981, 28-60, at 37 writes in respect of human rights treaties that "..it is possible to
offer resistance to the interpretation of a provision which might result from reservations
and, in a general way, to uphold a principle."
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will enter into force between themselves and the reserving State. Accepted
reservations and reservations objected to will lead to reciprocal modification of
the treaty between reserving and reacting State. The modifications will not take
place between the other States parties to the treaty, which leads to what Coccia
adequately calls a patchwork of different rights and obligations'".
Still, neither acceptance nor objections are irrelevant facts. They have a signifi-
cance of their own, though they no longer determine or preclude the establish-
ment of treaty relations between the reserving and the reacting State. Acceptance,
be it explicit or tacit, implies the approval of the State reacting to a reservation.
A state that accepted a theoretically incompatible reservation will be estopped
from invoking the incompatibility at a later stage. Objections, on the other hand,
voice the disapproval of a State with a reservation. This disapproval does not
necessarily preclude entry into force. The main function of objections, it is
suggested, may be that they preclude a particular interpretation of the treaty from
gaining influence. States may attempt to establish a generally accepted interpreta-
tion of the treaty by way of a reservation'". By objecting to such a reservation
the objecting State may influence the (non)acceptance of this interpretation by
other States parties, or by organs executing the treaty. The issue of preventing a
particular interpretation of the treaty, plays an even more important role when the
objections aim at precluding the creation of customary international law on the
basis of a reservation. Preventing a particular interpretation of the treaty does not
necessarily require preclusion of entry into force. Moreover, objecting on the
grounds of incompatibility allows the option of bringing up the matter of compati-
bility at a later stage, for instance as an issue in a dispute settlement procedure.
While there may not be a need to preclude entry into force, an objection may
safeguard future action with respect to the incompatibility.
This is why it might said that the Vienna Convention has in fact broadened the
scope of possible reactions to reservations. The diversity of reactions to both
compatible and incompatible reservations within the scope of the VCLT may
historically be the result of compromise solutions and imprecise drafting. Yet, the
law on reservations is not as incomplete as it seems to be at first sight. In fact it
provides a comprehensive system of reactions to a proposed reservation. The law
of treaties now gives States more, and more varied possibilities to react to
reservations than it previously did. It must be assumed that this will eventually
lead to more clarity, in particular on the practical consequences of reservations to
treaties which do not contain a reservations clause.
174. Coccia, op.cit. at 9.
175. This may be a so-called interpretative declaration which because of its characteristics
falls within the scope of art.2.1.d VCLT.
See on this issue: D.M.McRae, The legal effects of interpretative declarations, in: 50
BYIL 1978. 155-173.
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4. THE RELEVANCE OF THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE RULE
With the emphasis on the practical aspects of the law on reservations in the
previous paragraphs, the question that comes to mind is whether the lack of pro-
cedural safeguards for article 19.c, leads to its uselessness.
Compatibility appears to be an objective criterion, and if it were to coexist with
the subjective and consensual character of treaty law, reservations would be
subject to a double test. The authors have tried to explain article 19.c by either
giving it the greatest possible impact, stating that any reservation incompatible
with object and purpose would be a nullity'™; or by claiming that article 19.c is
a mere doctrinal assertion which is irrelevant in view of the system of tacit
acceptance the convention promotes'".
The occurrence of incompatible reservations might be explained by the exigencies
of international relations and national politics. The reasons for formulating
incompatible reservations are beyond the scope of this book, and are not dealt
with. Yet, one wonders whether this difference of opinion is all there is to article
19.c. The discussion has been narrowed down to the compulsory character of
article 19.c, which makes it impossible to see the value of the provision. Article
19.c is a logically necessary rule, designed to prevent States, when expressing
consent to be bound, from undermining the very raison d'etre of the treaty by
making a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of that same
treaty. What is the relevance of article 19.c and can it only be explained by
choosing sides with either of the opposing schools of thought? As will be shown
below, the value of article 19.c extends beyond both points of view in a theoreti-
cal as well as in a practical way.
4.1. Ex injuria non oritur ius
The question of the (tacit) acceptance of reservations (supposedly) contrary to the
object and purpose of a treaty might also be viewed from another angle, the
principle of ex ////i/r/a wo/i or/Vu/- /u.v. It is submitted that, without referring to it,
the theory proposed by Bowett actually relies on this maxim. The rule reflects the
basic understanding that States may not benefit from their own wrong (be it
omissions or negligences), and no profits should derive from illegal acts"".
E* i/i/w/a no/i ori/ur »Jtt rule is a notion that could be classified as a general
principle of law, and is as such a secondary source of international law under
article 38. l.c of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Moreover, the
«r //i/wr/rt rule is theoretically necessary in any legal system. Yet, in spite of the
self-evident nature of this maxim, few authors devote attention to the practical
176. Bowett. op.cit. passim; G.Triggs, Australia's ratification of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights: Endorsement or Repudiation?, in: 31 ICLQ 1982, 278-306.
177. See par.3.1.2 supra.
178. G.Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law considered from the
standpoint of the rule of law, in: 92 RdC 1957 II, 5-222 (hereafter: Fitzmaurice, General
Principles) at 117.
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consequences of the rule. Brownlie considers it to be a rule that does not provide
a safe guide to the solution of specific problems'". In discussing the question
of whether international law ever validates illegality, Fitzmaurice focuses on the
consensual nature of international law'*" by stressing that illegal acts are not
validated by the sheer fact of taking place, but because other States do not react.
As long as acts contrary to international law do not meet with objections and
protests on the part of other States, one cannot claim that it is illegality that
produces legal consequences. It is rather the lack of reaction, or acquiescence,
that legitimizes a previously illegal act'". The relevance of Fitzmaurice's point
of view is that it underlines the fact that, although states appear to act unilaterally
on the international plane, international law is an essentially consensual system.
Acquiescence replaces explicit consent, and those that acquiesce are equally
responsible for the rule that is being be created.
Transplanting this theory to the problems surrounding the enforcement of article
19.c VCLT, the position is as follows: article 19.c itself indicates that reserva-
tions contrary to object and purpose are illegal. Yet, reservations that are
formulated need to be accepted, the Vienna Convention is build upon the
traditional system. What is confusing about the Vienna Convention system is the
fact that rule stipulating the illegality (namely the "object and purpose" criterion
in article 19.c) is immediately followed by a provision formalizing the mechan-
ism of acquiescence, in fact strengthening it, the system or tacit acceptance (in
article 20.5). The rule of tacit acceptance is a mechanism that can lead to
legitimizing acts contrary to rules of international law, even stronger than the
functioning of acquiescence described by Fitzmaurice.
However, tacit acceptance is not necessary and in case an incompatible reserva-
tion is made States have the possibility to react by way of objections. It would
seem that claiming the incompatibility of a reservation after having accepted it
tacitly is a case of v<'////r «?/ifra /hcrw/w /^/•»/;WM///. Tacit acceptance leads to
estoppel with respect to the compatibility issue.
It is submitted that our understanding of article 19.c reflects the certainty with
which the object and purpose rule was proclaimed in the Advisory Opinion the
Genocide Convention. This detracts attention from the international legal mechan-
ism of acquiescence that may legitimize a previously illegal act, which is in fact
(although not very explicitly) reinforced by the system of tacit consent in article
20.5. Consequently, although the question has been raised above, the problem of
acting contrary to article 19.c, which frequently happens as we shall see further
on, is not a problem about the «t /w/wr/Vi /low «r/7wr /M.V rule. It is the problem of
inactive states, whose laxity leads to the acceptance of reservations contrary to
object and purpose. The responsibility for incompatible reservations is thus
shared by reserving and accepting States.
179. I.Brownlie, General Principles of International Law. 4th Ed., at 511-512.
180. Fitzmaurice. General Principles at 117-128.
181. The functioning of acquiescence in international law will not be discussed here.
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4.2. Good faith
Another interpretation of the rule in article 19.c would be that it is an obligation
akin to the principle of good faith"-. This is a rule emphasizing the need for
trust and confidence amongst states in international legal relations. The rule seeks
to promote foreseeability. The obligation to act in good faith is a rule of interna-
tional law, laid down amongst others in article 2.2 of the Charter of the United
Nations'". It is reinforced by the reference to this obligation, and the following
elaboration, in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning the
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States"".
The interesting point is that the obligations assumed in accordance with the
Charter must be understood to include promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms mentioned in article 1.3 of the Charter.
This stresses that States should act in good faith, especially in respect of human
rights treaties concluded under the aegis of the United Nations.
The obligation to act in good faith is a two-sided obligation. First of all it is a
rule binding upon States covering the period of negotiations of a treaty up until
the ratification"". This explains the necessity of the "object and purpose" rule
in article 19.c of the Vienna Convention, it is an elaboration of the rule that
ratifications (including the reservations attached) ought to take place in good
faith.
At this point it interesting to note that the International Court has stressed that
good faith is a rule that also applies to unilateral acts""". In the Nuclear Tests
case, the International Court concluded that States could rely on a unilateral
declaration by France, because of its binding nature being based upon good
faith'". A similar line of argument is to be found in the Nicaragua case in
respect of the withdrawal of the declaration of acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court by the United States"*. Though it has been stressed
3
182. Cook. Women's Convention at 678-679.
183.Article 2.2 reads:"[A]ll members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and
benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by
them in accordance with the present Charter."
184. GA Res.2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
185. Cf. article 18 VCLT, see about this provision Sinclair, op.cit. at 42-44.
Coccia. op.cit. at 25 speaks of an obligation to refrain in respect of article 19.c; Cook,
Women's Convention at 678.
186. Cf.Ci.Schwarzenberger, The fundamental principles of international law: in: 87 RdC 1955
1, 195-383; at 323.
187. Nuclear Tests case (Australia v. France), ICI Rep.1974. 253: par.46:"Just as the very rule
of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the
binding character of an international obligation assumed by unilateral declaration."
188. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nica-
ragua v. United States of America). ICJ Rep. 1984;
par.60 reads:"..the declarations, even though they are unilateral acts, establish a series of
bilateral engagements with the other states accepting the same obligation of compulsory
(continued...)
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that while appearing to be unilateral, reservations are actually restrictions based
on consent'**, the similarity between a reservation and the declaration under the
Optional Clause of the Statute of the International Court is remarkable. Reserva-
tions, even though they are formulated unilaterally, establish a series of bilateral
engagements with other States accepting the same obligation; reservation and
acceptance lead to a network of engagements in which, according to the ICJ, the
principle of good faith plays an important role.
The other side of the principle of good faith may prove to have more practical
importance in respect of reservations. Given the obligation described above,
states must be assumed to have acted in good faith in the exercise of their rights
under international law'*.
Good faith is a guideline as to how obligations should be executed, and places
restrictions on the State's discretion to choose between options it may have in the
fulfilment of its obligations"'. The presumption of good faith will act as a
guiding principle in the application and the interpretation of obligations"".
While the interpretation of a treaty is necessary for its application, the same holds
true for reservations. Article 19.c will be a guideline for this interpretation, states
are presumed not to have formulated reservations incompatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty because they are supposed to have acted in good faith
when formulating reservations.
It is submitted that this assumption is not only relevant for the other States
Parties, but that it is of fundamental importance for the work of the supervisory
bodies under human rights treaties. The presumption that accepted reservations
are not incompatible, will lead to an interpretation restricted by the limits of
compatibility. Thus broadly formulated, technically incompatible reservations will
not have the sweeping effect their authors intended. States will in all probability
never mention an intention to make an incompatible reservation, and are indeed
not supposed to have done so. Good faith, in the shape of article 19.c VCLT,
thus limits the influence that accepted incompatible reservations may have.
•-**••• : ' « < ' ••'•- • • • ' '• • : • ? • . - . * • • . ' . v ; K • • j V . , - y , , - . - . - . v > • • . . • ' •'• • > ? • .
188.(...continued) ^.*,h>Wrti* ^-v - - ^ ^ - ^ ^ " l ^ ^ t >..«/„&.!•.•
jurisdiction, in which the conditions, reservations and time-limit clauses are taken into
consideration. In the establishment of this network of engagements, which constitutes
the Optional Clause system, the principle of good faith plays an important role;...
par.63 reads:"[B]ut the right of immediate termination of declarations with an indefinite
- ^ duration is far from established. It appears from the requirements of good faith that
they should be treated, by analogy, according to the law of treaties,..."
189. See par.3.2, par.3.6 supra. '."•r.--. •*,*<
190. This point was stressed by the Belgian representative during the drafting of article 2.2 of
the Charter; A.Cassese, International Law in a Divided World. Oxford 1988 (hereafter:
Cassese. International Law) at 154: Cook, Women's Convention at 649-650.
191. Cassese, International Law. at 152 writes that the principle of good faith "merely
' conveys the idea that international subjects must not take advantage of their rights (or
discharge their obligations) in such a way as to thwart the purpose and object of legal
rules." This is not a particularly helpful point of view in respect of article 19.c VCLT,
but it goes to show that there is a distinct similarity in both notions.
192. Cook, Women's Convention at 649-650.
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4.3. The importance of article 19.c
The law of treaties is a set of rules regarding the formalities through which rules
become rules of international law. It is merely instrumental to the regulation of
the substance of the treaty. A reservation formulated by one State and accepted
by another will become binding on both States. The fulfilment of formalities is
not enough: article 19.c points to the substance of the treaty. The article states
what is in fact an essential element of the law of treaties: parties not only consent
to the text of a treaty but also, and foremost, to the common intention expressed
in that text. Expressing consent to be bound by a treaty, while at the same time
denying the ra/ra/i rf'êfre of the treaty by formulating a reservation incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty is, at the very least, contradictory'".
Article 19.c is both a logical necessity as well as a realistic requirement, the
formalities of the law on reservations may not be used to serve other purposes
than the ones they were designed for. Reservations incompatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty are clearly beyond the instrumental scope of the law,
and may therefore not be formulated. This is why article 19.c may be seen to
underline the instrumental character of the law of treaties.
5. THE ISSUE OF INTERPRETATIVE DECLARATIONS
Interpretative declarations seem to obstruct the rules on reservations. There is an
impression that states use the front of interpretative declarations when wanting to
make reservations. Interpretative declarations do not reveal the author's default
when applying a treaty, or are not such a sign of bad faith as reservations
are'**. Additionally there is confusion about the appropriate reaction to these
'reservations in disguise', it is not clear when to react and how to react if one
intends to preclude the declaration from obtaining binding force'*'.
One of the aims when drafting the definition of reservations as laid down in
article 2.1.d of the Vienna Convention was that it would also encompass state-
ments known as interpretative declarations, which in some case are assumed to
have the same legal effects as reservations''*. The definition in article 2.1.d
stresses the substance of reservations, namely their excluding or restricting effect,
irrespective of the name attached to the declaration.
Before dealing with the possible similarity between interpretative declarations and
reservations, the onus will be on their distinctive characteristics, and on the role
of interpretation in treaty law. Taken at face value reservations and interpretative
193. L.Lijnzaad. Paradoxale universaliteit. of de beperkingen van net verdragenrecht. in:
Universaliteit van mensenrechten, fundamenleel en coniroveisieel, Th.van Boven,
C.Flinterman (eds.), Leiden 1992; 7-17 at 10. ,.:?,, / >.
194. Kiihner, op.cit. at 15-16. *>o
195. McRae. op.cit at 158, Sinclair, op.cit at 53-54. . ?ij> • -
196. Bowett .op.ci t . at 68; H o r n , op.cit . at 236. Sinclair, op.cit. at 52-54. . -:>;
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declarations have little in common"'. Reservations restrict the legal effect of a
treaty for the reserving state, a restriction that comes into force the very moment
the reservation is accepted by other States Parties. Interpretation is another
matter, it takes place once the treaty has entered into force and it is essential for
the application of the treaty. Interpretative declarations thus unilaterally clarify
the content of (a particular provision of) a treaty.
It is necessary to recall the role of interpretation in treaty law'*. The applica-
tion of generally formulated principles requires the interpretation of the rule. This
can best be described as a process in which is sought to determine what in this
particular case would be the rule following from the general norm. Interpretation
is not an independent process, it is initiated because of the occurrence of a
particular issue. It establishes a rule which is more precise, more detailed and
more suitable than the abstractly formulated norm. Interpretation is the transition
from the text of a treaty to treaty practice. The constant recurrence of interpreta-
tion is demonstrated by the fact that often reservations and interpretative declar-
ations themselves need to be interpreted. \*te-:>V*>^fly:vssw;?"(n^>r'O^<ii&q.ibhft
The interpretation of a treaty should take place according to the general rules for
the interpretation of treaties'". The principle stated by Vattel as:"//// w'rar /MIT
/JCT7M/5 </'/MW/vpftr re <7«i « 'fl ^fty èeso/'/i rf7M/«T/>/rfri//wM" is supposedly the
leading rule-*". A number of other rules are regularly mentioned such as the
supposition that the plain meaning of the terms in a provision is used, and the
rule exprewvo wmu.v esf exc/u?;'o a/ /«mr° ' . - - • .. •
: iff»••îv.
197. Horn, op.cit. at 237:"An interpretative declaration is an interpretation, which is distin-
guished from other interpretations by its form and by the moment it is presented. A
reservation is a modification of the norm system expressed in a treaty. It is distinguished
from other forms of modification because of its formal and temporal characteristics, as
£h, >-J'?' for example, formal amendments and supercession by new treaties regulating the same
..> !^> subject-matter." and at 238:"So reservations and declarations form completely distinct
, . j.^ . . categories of acts due to their different functions. A reservation affects the norm - an
, . „ interpretative declaration operates on the norm formulation: their objects are distinct."
198. McNair, The Law of Treaties. Oxford 1961 at 365 puts it like this:"...the duty of giving
effect to the expressed intention of the parties, that is their intention as expressed in the
words used by them in the light of the surrounding circumstances.", and P.Reuter. Droit
(,{;;: . International Public, Paris 1976. 5ième ed.rcv. at 124 writcs:"Intcrpréter consiste à
_i^, retrouver la volonté du ou des auteurs d'un acte juridique. Interpréter un accord
instrumenté dans un texte consiste donc, en se soumettant d'abord au texte, à retrouver
la commune volonté de ses auteurs."
199. Questioning the existence of general rules and suggesting that choosing particular rules
of interpretation in fact influences the result of the interpretation: Brownlie. op.cit. at
626-627.
200. This may be doubted, as the conclusion that there is no need for interpretation usually
follows the interpretation of the treaty. On this point Sinclair, op.cit. at 116.
201. On the issue of the interpretation of treaties amongst others: McNair. op.cit. Chapters
XX and XXI; H. Lauterpacht. Restrictive interpretation and the principle of effective-
ness in the interpretation of treaties. 26 BYIL 1949 at 48-85: M.K.Yasseen. L'interpre-
tation des traités d'après la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités. 151 RdC 1976
111,9-114. ,-•.,,,.., . . . . . . -„ . . . - . . . . . , . , . . . . . . . - , , , , . . , . , , ^ . ^ ,
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Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention deal with the interpretation of
treaties*-. Article 31.1 reads:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.
The intentions of the states parties as laid down in the treaty are what is sought
for in article 31, which is known as the objective approach to treaty interpreta-
tion. The article indicates elements used in the process of interpretation, but does
not (and cannot) give the ultimate rule as to how interpretation should take
place*". The elements indicated (good faith, ordinary meaning, context and
object and purpose of the treaty) are together the one single general rule of
interpretation, albeit that they indicate the order in which to proceed. From a
technical point of view, articles 31-33 are applicable to treaties that have entered
into force.
It stands to reason that prior to ratification of a treaty, states study its provisions
to determine whether they can accept the treaty as it is, or would like to exclude
or restrict some of its provisions, thus wanting to make reservations. States will
interpret the treaty for domestic purposes, supposedly along the lines of articles
31-33 of the Vienna Convention.
The impact of a treaty and the way in which its provisions will work out cannot
always be estimated in advance. It may well be that there are provisions the
content of which is not clear at first sight. There may be broadly formulated
provisions, or provisions formulated in such a way as to find a compromise
solution during the drafting, thus hiding the fact that no solution had actually
been reached. Moreover, states may want to preclude unpredictable changes in
interpretation due to technical or scientific changes in the subject-matter of the
treaty, or may want to suggest a preferred interpretation to supervisory organs.
The precise obligations following from a treaty cannot always be determined
before hand. It is then that the quite understandable wish to make interpretative
declarations at the ratification of a treaty arises. States indicate the desired
interpretation of a provision. The interpretative declaration is an opinion as to
how a provision ought to be understood. It is nothing more than a unilateral
statement addressed to other states parties and to possible supervisory organs.
While the declaration itself has no direct legal effect, either for its author or the
other states parties, its aim is obviously to arouse support for the interpretation
proposed.
Yet, distinctions between reservations and interpretative declarations are not
always as clear as sketched above. Let alone the matter of the legal difference
between the effects of reservations and interpretative declarations, both could be
seen on a sliding scale from the definite exclusion of unacceptable provisions at
202. On these articles, Sinclair, op.cit. at 114-158.
203. As Sinclair, op.cit. at 118 puts it:"...interpretation being to some extent an art rather
than an exact science." ,.--^ ...-.*»,• n*. un
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the one end, to suggesting a preferred interpretation of a provision at the other
end. In between both lies a grey zone of cases in which states advocate a certain
interpretation of a provision, but if that particular interpretation is not accepted
they want to exclude the provision altogether. In such a case the need to exclude
a provision has not yet arisen, for it may well be that the interpretation proposed
will eventually turn out to be the authoritative interpretation. On the other hand
states feel impelled to be careful, for once the authoritative interpretation is
established, it will usually be too late to make a reservation. *
This is the dilemma surrounding interpretative declarations. States do make
interpretative declarations that not only purport to advance an interpretation
favoured by the declaring state, but that also condition their acceptance of the
treaty. They accept the treaty provided that their particular interpretation will be
accepted^*. These declarations have been called "qualified interpretative declar-
ation"'*', and should, according to McRae, be treated as reservations. Although
this seems to provide a distinctive criterion, one wonders who it is to decide
whether a statement is a "mere interpretative declaration" or a "qualified interpre-
tative declaration". States may be supposed to be unambiguous in their state-
ments, but quite often the intention of the declaring state will not be clear*".
Proposing a specific interpretation as a condition for the acceptance of (a
provision of) the treaty does not lead to problems once it is established that the
proposed interpretation is the same as the authoritative interpretation. With
hindsight, the interpretation given by the declaring state has been the correct one
from the start. But if it is established, on the other hand, that the authoritative
interpretation differs from the one proposed by the declaring state, the conditional
aspect of the declaration regains importance. For once it is determined how a
provision should be interpreted, the declaration turns into a reservation. A
qualified interpretative declaration has two sides to it: it gives an interpretation of
a provision, and, at the same time, it is a potential reservation once it is estab-
lished that the interpretation is not accepted*".
This possibility of transition refines the theory of interpretative declarations, and
does justice to the uncertainty that led to formulating an interpretative declar-
ation'**. Horn, in developing this theory, stresses that it should be an authentic
interpretation that plays a decisive role in the transition^*. For authentic interpre-
204. McRae. op.cit. at 160. - ,-^
205. Horn, op.cit. at 238-242. and McRae. op.cit. at 155-173. • > .fcvwïrt-f,-;
206. On the ambiguity of interpretative declarations: Ciaja. Unruly reservations at 319;
Kiihner op.cit at 31; and Szafarz op.cit. at 297.
207. Horn, op.cit. at 242.
208. Horn, op.cit at 239:"However, if some other interpretation is judged to be the correct
-a- -,.;-. one, and the declaration turns out to be a derogation from the norm system as estab-
lished it would fulfil the requirements for being considered a reservation."
209. Horn, op.cit. at 239:This is the case once the parties have agreed upon an authentic
interpretation through diplomatic negotiations; or have concluded a supplementary
agreement on interpretation; or when a dispute concerning the interpretation of the
treaty has been settled through judicial settlement or arbitration in a manner binding on
all parties, tv/u'c/i se/do/w occurs."(my italics. EL).
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tation puts an end to the uncertainty about a provision, and indicates whether or
not the potential reservation has become an actual reservation. He supposes that
after an authentic interpretation that runs contrary to an interpretative declaration,
the declaring state will express its intention-'": will the potential reservation live
on as a reservation or will the declaring state abide by the authentic interpreta-
tion. He suggests that once the authentic interpretation is established, and the
declaring state has clarified its position, the rules on acceptance of reservations
would be applicable-".
This theory has been confirmed by the European Court on Human Rights in the
Belilos-case-'-. It involved an interpretative declaration concerning article 6.1
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms made by Switzerland on ratification of the Convention?". While the
declaration maintained the interpretation of article 6.1 of the Convention as it
stood at the time of ratification-''', case-law had developed in another direction,
as indicated by the Court in the Albert and Le Compte-case-''' judgment. The
declaration clearly ran contrary to the contemporary interpretation of the Conven-
tion at the time the events in the Belilos-case occurred.
When the European Commission on Human Rights dealt with the case, it
considered the declaration a mere interpretative declaration, basically because
Switzerland had made both reservations and declarations at the time of ratifica-
tion, and the Commission assumed that the distinction made by the author state
was decisive-". The Court on the other hand seems to agree with the Swiss
contention that the declaration substantially fitted the definition of reservations in
the Vienna Convention, and should be considered a reservation-". Although the
Vienna Convention is not mentioned, the Court implicitly relied on its definition
210» Horn, op.cit. at 239:This will depend on whether the declaring slate is still willing to
:,. maintain its divergent interpretation. The declaring state will presumably in many cases
submit to the authoritative interpretation and abandon its own declaration."
H i . Horn, op.cit. at 240.
2$?. .v.\> The case is noteworthy in many respects, and will be discussed in Chapter 3. par.4.1.3
R , -s ,si infra. On this case: H.J.Bourguignon. The Bclilos Case: New Light on Reservations to
-• - .,„ Multilateral Treaties, in: 29 VJIL 1989 at 347-386; J.M. van der Vclde, Zwitserse
interpretatieve verklaring en artikel 64. Noot by Bclilos arrest, in: 13 NJCM Bull. 1988,
;*-.-,;i.5; at 464^*81; and idem. De reaktie van dc Zwitserse regering op het Bclilos arrest, in: 13
i»'»lri- NJCM Bull 1988, at 597-601.
2J3ki .. Switzerland deposited its instrument of ratification on 28 November 1974; the declar-
, ' : - • - : ation concerning art.6.1 reads:" The Swiss Federal Council considers that the guarantee
?j=!i ••;! of fair trail in Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Convention, in the determination of civil
;?<•: »-!- rights and obligations or any criminal charge against the person in question is intended
solely to ensure ultimate control by the judiciary over the acts or decisions of the public
-fcisri.-'- authorities relating to such rights or obligations or the determination of such a charge."
2tfca Ringeisen-case, 16 July 1971, ECHR Ser.A vol.13.
215. 10 February 1983, ECHR Ser.A vol.58.
216. •• The Commission furthermore indicated that, had the declaration been a reservation, it
would have been invalid for lack of compliance with article 64 of the Convention.
217. Belilos judgement, para.49. After deciding this, the Court found the declaration to be an
invalid reservation for failing to fulfil the requirements of article 64 ECHR. ^
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of reservations, mentioning the fact that states quite often make interpretative
declarations without clearly distinguishing them from reservations, and stressing
that the nomenclature is of lesser importance: "In order to establish the legal
character of such a declaration, one must look behind the title given to it and
seek to determine the substantive content. In the present case, it appears that
Switzerland meant to remove certain categories of proceedings from the ambit of
Article 6 para. 1 and to secure itself against an interpretation of that Article which
it considered too broad."-'* Thus there is an authoritative interpretation of the
interpretative declaration made by Switzerland, and it found the declaration to be
a qualified interpretative declaration.
The Swiss government even took the next step envisaged in the system designed
by Hom, and made a statement clarifying its position concerning the legal effect
of its declaration after the Belilos-case. This follow-up declaration met with
disapproval-", but it demonstrated that Horn had a point in assuming that states
might like to clarify their position once it is established that an interpretative
declaration is actually a reservation. , • ; .* . , ; • ^
Although the Belilos judgement of the European Court on Human Rights is the
perfect example for the theory of transitional interpretative declarations, its
practicality should not be over-estimated. The author feels that this theory may
have a very limited utility, for it is based on the existence of an authority
endowed with the capacity to give an authentic interpretation of the treaty. Well-
organized, solid structures of supervision are relatively rare in international law.
In the field of human rights treaties, various questions arise such as the identity
of an authority competent to given an authoritative interpretation-^", and the
form in which this interpretation should take place-'. Further below an attempt
will be made to answer these questions, based on the practice of the treaties
under consideration. . . , .,.-
• ' " ' ' • " ' . . • : ! • , . , • - < . . : • ! : • • „ • * • • . ' . , - " > ; . , • , • • . • , • • • 7 1 . : : . . • • • , : • : : , I f . • • ' • ' . • , : ' . . . , :
218. Van der Velde, Zwitserse interpretalieve verklaring at 479. holds a different view. He
thinks the Court did not give its opinion on the status of the declaration and instead
«irti argued the other way round, setting out to scrutinize the fulfilment of the requirements
applicable to reservations in article 64 ECIIR.
219. Van der Velde, De reaktie at 599-601, clearly outside the theory of interpretative
declarations and the possibility of transition, maintains that a qualified interpretative
; - • declaration that decisively is a reservation cannot be made at any other moment that
;.-);•'''• ratification. This prohibits Switzerland from making another, more specified declaration.
' ' • • •* Bourguignon, op.cit. at 383-384, has an even more black outlook, suggesting that the
impossibility of making an(other) reservation would lead to Switzerland renouncing the
treaty completely.
220. For instance, can the supervisory committees be deemed to give an authentic interpreta-
tion of the provisions of the Covenants if they are generally considered to be quasi-
judicial bodies? Or should this be up to the meeting of States Parties?
221. To name but a few questions: can this interpretation take place during discussions
between representatives of the states parties reporting and members of the Committees,
••••' in the individual complaints procedures, or do general comments by a Committee
provide interpretation with enough authority?
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Moreover it cannot be predicted when, if ever, a case involving the provisions
mentioned in a qualified interpretative declaration will be authentically inter-
preted—. Nor is it desirable that the parties should discover that an interpretive
statement is a reservation at some arbitrary moment in the future. That is, on the
assumption that whenever an authentic interpretation is given, it is clear what the
implications will be for the interpretative declaration. As mentioned above,
declarations are quite often formulated in vague and ambiguous terms. After the
authentic interpretation the declaring state would supposedly indicate whether it
intends to maintain its declaration as a reservation, which would be the starting
point for the acceptance as described in article 20.5 of the Vienna Conven-
tion^. One wonders whether this system is suitably transparent, and whether it
will establish certainty concerning the status of interpretative declarations at all.
Basically a declaration cannot exclude or restrict the legal effect of provisions of
the treaty. It should be understood that in cases where a state wishes to exclude
or restrict the legal effects of a treaty, an interpretative declaration cannot be
used. Nor can it be expected that an interpretative declaration used in such cases
will have the legal effect of a reservation. It is not subject to the procedure of
tacit acceptance"^ because it is apparently not a reservation.
6. OF UNILATERALITY AND RECIPROCITY
6 . 1 . S h a d e s o f uni lateral i ty •'•• ••«?'• • • i a ^ v .-•*•• < *• •.<-•:.-^x*J
Although the Vienna Convention is theoretically clear about ir~\ the impres-
sion of reservations being unilateral acts remains. Perhaps not so from a technical
point of view, but it appears that as reservations favour the reserving states, they
are detrimental to the interests of the other states parties. There are three stages
at which this supposed unilaterality casts its shadow: the making of a reservation,
the acceptance of a reservation and the legal effects of a reservation.
Taking the moment when reservations are made, the initiative in making a
reservation originates with the reserving state"-'. Formulating a reservation is
obviously a unilateral act, but it remains to be seen whether reservations differ in
222. Horn , op.cit at 239:"Before any authori tat ive interpretat ion is achieved a si tuation of
uncertainty will prevail and we are not able to tell whether the declaration has a
modifying effect o r not."
223. Horn , op.cit. at 240-242 passim. •*»
224. Article 20.5 VCLT, discussed in par.3.2.3 supra.
225. Discussing the unilaterality issue pr ior to the Vienna Convention: G.C.Fitzmaurice, T h e
- "-•- Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-1954. treaty interpretat ion
' ••" »'••• and o the r t reaty points , in:33 BYIL 1957, 203-293.
236/" ' - ' Imber t . Les Réserves at 12.
- • --' •' Cf. the Internat ional Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (ICJ
Repor t s 1951, at 132):"although it is t rue that the act of delimitation is necessarily a
" ' unilateral act, because only the coastal state is competent to under take it, the validity of
the determinat ion with regard to o the r States depends upon international law."
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this respect from other actions in the field of treaty law. Breach of treaty,
proposed amendments, or suspension of the treaty are all acts that originate in
one (or some) of the states parties. In this respect reservations are not unique.
As concerns the unilateral validity of reservations, socialist international law held
for a long time that the validity depended merely on the fact that the reservations
were made by a State, in whose sovereignty their validity was vested"'. The
main criticism of this theory has been that it neglects reciprocity as a cornerstone
of treaty law. The theory is outdated now, as fundamental changes have taken
placed Moreover, the Vienna Convention in article 20.4 set up a system in
which acceptance is necessary, although it greatly favours the reserving state and
turns acceptance into an implicit, if not symbolic, act.
The third issue is the unilateral impact of the reservation. The changes in treaty
relations brought about by the reservation are supposed to be advantageous for
the reserving state"'. The state would have ameliorated its position substantive-
ly. It stands to reason that the preservation or the improvement of a position is a
forceful incentive in making reservations. Yet, according to article 21.1 of the
Vienna Convention the reservation leads to mutual, reciprocal changes in treaty
relations^". Although the reservation may be prompted by particular interests
of the reserving state, it automatically implies equivalent changes in the rights
and duties of the accepting state.
The rule laid down in article 21.1 seems balanced. But looking at either the
differences in the content of the treaties or the different character of the provi-
sions, its consequences differ". In the case of f/Yi/ft'.v-co/tf/YiAy, the impact of
the mutual restriction will depend on the balance of obligations and rights laid
down in the treaty. The content of the treaty determines whether the retribution-
ary exclusion based on article 21.1 is of any significance. Reservations to /rfl/7és-
cow/ratt are likely to have repercussions on the balance of substantive reciprocity
underlying the treaty, but it does not necessarily have to be the case-". An
active interest in the reservations made, and an inclination to object are to be
expected.
227. Coccia, op.cit. at 27; and see par.2.1 supra.
228. R.A.Mullerson, Sources of international law: new tendencies in Soviet thinking, in:83
AJIL 1989, 494-512; and I.I.Lukashuk. The principle /><ir;<i AWM srrvait</a and the nature of
obligation under international law. in:83 AJIL 1989.513-518.
229. Horn, op.cit. at 91:"A reservation seems at first glance to have a self-relating quality".
230. Horn, op.cit. at 92:The distinct rule of reciprocal invocation is intended to reintroduce
a balance into the legal relations between the reserving and the confronted states."; and
at 96 asserting that "all reservations do somehow create obligations for the confronted
states".
231. E.Decaux, La réciprocité en droit international, Paris 1980 at 73 severely criticizing
article 21:"..la Convention de Vienne a neglige toutes ces difficultés, pour se contenter
de l'affirmation rassurante de la réciprocité des réserves. Comme si une solution unique
était possible, indépendamment de la diversité des traités, des réserves et des parties. La
simplicité de l'article 21 est donc trompeuse."
232. Horn, op.cit. at 92:"Reservations will in the standard case circumscribe the correlate
rights of the other parties and widen their correlate obligations".
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The question is whether the reciprocal exclusion of rights and obligation serves
any purpose in a /ra/7é-/or", and in particular in a human rights treaty. For the
objective nature of a human rights treaty makes it pointless, if not undesirable,
for a State Party to react to a reservation by way of restricting its own obligations
towards the reserving state. There is no impetus to do so, as the actual disadvan-
tages of the reservation fall within the sphere of the individual subjects of
national law in the reserving state, well beyond the influence of any balance
struck by substantive reciprocity within the treaty. Moreover, the conviction
underlying the adherence to the treaty, the fact that states decidedly undertake to
guarantee the human rights of persons under their jurisdiction is in itself almost
in contradiction to taking the option of mutual restriction that the law of treaties
offers. In sum, reciprocal reservations thus turn out to be basically unilateral
modifications. The absence of subjective rights may on the whole undermine the
interest in the reservations made, and will seriously hamper the willingness to
object.
6.2. The dialectics of reciprocity
The supposed unilateral nature of reservations dealt with above, has focused our
attention on the opposite, the issue of reciprocity. The law of treaties operates on
the basis of reciprocity. It is a common, although not necessarily correct,
assumption that the law of treaties is comparable to the law of contract^*.
Presenting the law of treaties as a set of rules, based on the necessity of regulat-
ing the way in which agreements are made-" contains a certain amount of
everyday logic. Reciprocity is a mechanism of international law, and even more
so of treaty law, that acts as a stabilizing factor. It is understood as providing a
balance between the interests of both parties. Through unilateral acts the equilib-
rium function of reciprocity is demonstrated. Each time a unilateral act disturbs
the balance, reciprocity seems to establish a new equilibrium. •-,
233. Rosenne, Developments, at 182 defining the woW-/oi:"..the treaty consists of a series of
geneialized, and not particularly reciprocal, statements of standards, norms, rules, rights,
and benefits which the contracting panics (or perhaps it might better be expressed as
'standard-creating parties') postulate."
234. A.D.McNair, The functions and differing legal character of treaties, in: 11 BYIL 1930,
100-118, at 106:"..we must be on our guard against the assumption that, merely because
treaties have borrowed from private law contracts their form and the source of their
binding force, all the rules as to formation, validity, interpretation, and discharge of
contracts are equally applicable to treaties."
Rosenne, Developments, at 187:"..it is a matter of increasing urgency to liberate
international legal theory from the restraints imposed by the historical background of a
general law of contracts as a jurisprudential notion, and especially from the experiences
of domestic private law.."
235. J.Dehaussy, Le problème de la classification des traités et le projet de convention établi
par la Commission du Droit International des Nations Unies, in: En hommage à Paul
Guggenheim, Genève 1968. 305-326 at 305:"..le traité est. en quelque sorte, un
< < moule >> juridique qui confère aux normes que les sujets du droit des gens
s'accordent pour y < <couler> >, un caractère - pour eux, au moins - obligatoire."
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The issue of reciprocity is directly related to the perception of treaties as bilateral
agreements (and in case of a multilateral treaty, a bundle of bilateral agree-
ments)^*. Pflcffl sw/jf .serva/ufo and do Kf <fcs are still the basis for bilateral
obligations. The commonplace understanding is that parties to a treaty will have
been able to Find a balance between their interests, by way of giving and taking.
Shared interests and mutual benefits are the basis for an agreement.
Legal scholars have repeatedly indicated that there is much doctrinal uncertainty
about reciprocity^". When discussing reciprocity, they commonly quote either
biblical^* or philosophical views"' on the necessity of an element of retribu-
tion in social and legal relationships.
Reciprocity is a mechanism that creates a balance of rights and duties"*".
Whether or not the balance struck is a good one from the point of view of
morality is irrelevant in this respect*'". It is the mechanism of give and take,
that plays a role in many spheres of life. It is superfluous to elaborate at length
on the provenance of the phenomenon reciprocity, but it is said to provide
stability in primitive societies-''". In law it lies at the very basis of contracts,
and indeed of treaties.
In this respect, there is a similarity between a primitive legal system and the
structure of the international legal order. Although the international legal order
has developed from its nineteenth-century preoccupation with sovereignty and the
absolute freedom to act deduced from it, it still lacks a central legislator, a
compulsory judicial system and an authority endowed with the power to enforce
the law.
236. Decaux, op.cit. at 53-56: at 54:"Le droit international étant un droit relationnel est, par
là-même, un droit réciproque". Dehaussy, op.cit. at 312:"..les conventions multilatérales
générales s'analysent comme faisant naître un réseau de relations juridiques entre les
Etats parties, pris deitv n </r</.v." M.Virally, Le principe de réciprocité en droit interna-
tional contemporain, in: 122 RdC 1967 III. 5-67. at 25: "A première vue. en effet, parce
qu'elle exprime l'idée de retour, la réciprocité paraît concerne, par nature, une relation
bilatérale. Or on voit qu'elle a aussi sa place dans les traités multilatéraux. Elle affecte
alors les rapports juridique établi entre une partie quelconque et chacune des autres
parties, prises individuellement (ou. dans certains cas. l'ensemble de ces dernières).
237. Amongst others Virally, op.cit. at 9:"Or il est assez inquiétant, à propos d'une notion si
communément utilisée dans la pratique internationale, une absence presque complète
d'études doctrinales, comme si une sorte d'instinct en avait détourné les juristes."
238. Deuteronomy 19: 21.
239. Decaux, op.cit., giving a survey of philosophical thinking on reciprocity at 2-7.
240. L.L.Fuller. The morality of law. New Haven, rev.ed. 1969. at 19-27 discusses the
relationship between reciprocity and duty; writing at 22:"lf it is true that duties generally
— can be traced to the principle of reciprocity, it is also true that the reciprocity out of
which a given duty arises can be visible, as it were, in varying degrees. At times it is
obvious to those affected by it: at others it traces a more subtle and obscure course
through the institutions and practices of society."
241. B.Simma, Das Reziprozitatselement im Zustandekommen vblkerrechtlicher Vertrage,
Berlin 1972, at 49.
242. Simma, op.cit. at 17-24.
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6.3. Reciprocity as a creative force
Historically bilateral treaties were predominant, and their conclusion clearly
demonstrated the importance parties attached to reciprocity. Signature and
ratification took place at the same moment, symbolizing the equality of parties as
sovereign states and the fact that parties were formally bound towards one
another"". As the law developed and multilateral treaties came to flourish, the
necessity of formal reciprocity remained. Every treaty is based on formal
reciprocity (albeit sometimes in a residual torm)"'". It is this formal side of
reciprocity that has been laid down in the Vienna Convention. Formal reciprocity
establishes the validity of the treaty. From that moment onwards execution is not
merely an obligation for the contracting state but also a right for its co-contrac-
tant. Yet, it is also the time at which reservations, restricting the fullness of the
consent to be bound, are made.
The rawo// rf'êrrr of any treaty is the fact that states have taken an interest in its
substance. The content of the treaty is supposedly what really matters to the
parties-"'. During the negotiations states will try to find a balance between their
interests and the interests of their co-contractants. By accepting obligations
towards another contracting state, the first state in return receives benefits in the
shape of obligations incumbent on its counterpart-*. This involves giving and
taking, bargaining, a complex process of trading concessions for benefits*". In
the interplay that leads to the formulation of the text, states have the opportunity
to weigh the profits of the treaty against its costs. In terms of reciprocity this
implies that states will search for a balance between the respective benefits on
both sides. States do not necessarily have a balanced set of rights and obligations
under the treaty-'*'. Substantive reciprocity is not mandatory, it is quite possible
for states to be bound by obligations that are not matched by reciprocal obliga-
tions incumbent on their counterparts-'". Correlativity is a logical necessity,
whereas substantive reciprocity is a possibility^".
243. Decaux, op.cit. at 56-58, and Simma op.cit. al 55-66 elaborating on ihe various aspects of
formal reciprocity.
244. Decaux, op.cit. at 58:"La réciprocité formelle des engagements reste donc essentielle,
même si matériellement aucune réciprocité n'est nécessaire."
245. M.Lachs, Some Thoughts on the Role of Good Faith in International Law, in: Declar-
ations on principles, Liber amicorum Rôling, Leyden 1977. 47-55: at 48.
246. As Virally, op.cit. at 5 puts il:"...elle (reciprocity, EL) ne joue plus comme un frein, mais
comme un moteur,..".
247. Decaux, op.cit. at 57:"La réciprocité d'un traité est inséparable de la négociation: c'est la
réciprocité des concessions qui prépare la réciprocité des obligations."
248. Simma. op.cit.at 68 and 70; Virally op.cit.at 59.
249. The supposed necessity of substantive reciprocity played a role in the discussion on so-
called "unequal treaties". On this issue: Decaux, op.cit.at 17-40: Simma. op.cit.at 68-73
and Virally, op.cit. at 58-61.
250. Horn, op.cit. at 92-93 presenting schemes of correlate rights and duties: Simma, op.cit.
at 52-54 presenting correlativity and reciprocity in a scheme.
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The balance between the wishes of the states negotiating the treaty can be found
in two different ways"'. One way of establishing reciprocity is to agree to
identical treatment"-. The treaty will then provide for identical rights and
identical obligations for all the states parties. Basically, this kind of reciprocity
leads to the equality of all states parties under the treaty regime-". On the other
hand, it should be noted that identical treatment does not necessarily imply that
all parties to the treaty will have to make the same sacrifices, or will obtain the
same benefits from the treaty-**.
Yet, equality is not always the best possible solution. It may be that differing
interests lead to a balance of differing obligations (and rights) for the various
parties. For instance, in commercial treaties one party may provide goods
whereas its counterpart will in return provide investments. Although these are
reciprocal obligations, they are not identical. Reciprocity is reached through
equivalent obligations"*.
6.4. The supervisory side of reciprocity
Apart from law-creating aspect of reciprocity, it also has a role in the observance
of treaties. States are obliged to fulfil their obligations under a treaty. In the
absence of a compulsory international judicial system, states themselves have to
take responsibility for the observance of treaties. They have the right to react to
breaches of treaty, and may do so. This assumption is however based on (the
probability of) substantial harm to the interest of a reacting state. Foreseeable
harm will prompt states to demand the fulfilment of treaty obligations. But then,
not all obligations have a direct bearing on a state's interest, not all obligations
involve benefits that may cause substantial losses when breached"*. Examples
of such obligations may either be provisions leading to obligations applicable
between a state party and persons under its jurisdiction, such as human rights, or
a treaty laying down an objective legal regime. In case of violations, states may
not notice the violation, or may not feel tempted to react. For after all, reactions
to breaches are not mandatory. Moreover, if it concerns a provision of a multilat-
eral treaty one might wonder which state should take action. An injured state
would be most likely to initiate any action but unfortunately the injured state can
often not be identified"'.
251. Virally, op.cit. at 30 questioning this distinction:"II n"y a pas vraiment, au surplus, de
choix à faire quant à la façon de réaliser la réciprocité: tout dépend de ce qui est
échangé."
252. Virally. op.cit. at 23-29.
253. Virally, op.cit. at 25.
254. Virally, op.cit. at 32 warns that reciprocity through identity may have "trompe-PoeiP
effects.
255. Virally, op.cit. at 31.
256. Cf. Barcelona Traction case, ICI Rep.1970 at 32; see Clark, op.cit. at 316-317.
257. On this issue see K.Sachariew, State responsibility for multilateral treaty violations:
identifying the "injured State" and its legal status: in 35 NILR 1988, 273-289; and
*-» M.T.Kamminga, Inter-state accountability for violations of human rights. Leiden 1990.
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Non-observance of treaty obligations endangers the balance of substantially
reciprocal rights and duties, and may stimulate action aimed at restoring observ-
ance by the defaulting state. It follows from the principle of do ur ifr.r that a party
is no longer bound towards its co-contractant if the latter does not honour its
treaty obligations. Basically states can react towards the defaulting state by either
demanding that it fulfils its obligations, or by suspending or terminating the treaty
in accordance with article 60 of the Vienna Convention. Reciprocity is thus an
element in the internal dynamics of the treaty, promoting the observance of obli-
gations^*.
Yet, an impediment for the functioning of reciprocity as a mechanism promoting
compliance with human rights treaties is the fact that article 60.5 Vienna Conven-
tion cuts off one of the traditional measures available to the injured state in case
of non-fulfilment of obligations, the termination or suspension of the treaty as a
consequence of its breach. For, and rightly so, the Vienna Conference found it to
be imperative that the breach of a treaty with a humanitarian character should not
endanger the protection of the individual. Thus, even if states would have wanted
to react on breaches of treaty by terminating a treaty, this is in some cases
impossible in view of the Vienna Convention^.
Reactions to reservations can similarly be understood as being prompted by
reciprocity. Whether states will react to a reservation (if at all) will depend on
the way in which the reservations affects the State's interest, or reduce the
substantive benefits expected from the treaty""". Expressing consent to be bound
is a moment at which the supervisory aspect of reciprocity ought to play a role.
Misunderstanding this stage as one involving merely formal reciprocity diverts
attention from a fundamental issue, namely that reservations do imply changes in
the substance of the treaty. Reservations affect the substance of the treaty and
thus involve questions of substantive reciprocity. Reciprocity might be supposed
to create an active interest in the reservations made among the states parties. By
failing to perceive the possibilities of 'preliminary' supervision, in the form of a
choice between acceptance and objections, states do not fully utilize the available
ways of safeguarding the substance of the treaty. It is submitted that misjudging
the impact of reservations on the substance of a treaty, and disregarding the tools
258. Decaux. op.cit. at 63:"A mi-chemin de la simple réciprocité formelle et de la réciprocité
matérielle, il y a donc une réciprocité juridique, un </o »// </« qui porte non sur le
contenu de l'obligation, mais sur le mécanisme de l'obligation."
259. E.Schwelb, The Law of Treaties and Human rights. In: 16 AdV 1973 1-27, at 14-27;
Sinclair, op.cit. at 190; and E.Suy, Droit de traités et droits de l'homme, in: Vôlkerrecht
als Rechtsordnung, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte, Festschrift fur
Hermann Mosler, Berlin 1983, 935-947 at 939-942.
260. Clark, op.cit. at 317 writes:"In making reservations to reciprocal rights treaties, parties
are necessarily aware of the reaction they may provoke from other slates and must
suffer the consequences of lhat reaction, such as losing the benefit of a provision, as
well as being freed from the obligations it imposes. Derogations from the norms of a
human rights instrument can be effected by a reserving state at comparatively little
cost."
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treaty law offers, are among the reasons why reservations to human rights
treaties pose problems. ...... ,. ,. .. ,,-., ,.,,. .....,,,. , ,.., ..
7 . - THE TIME ELEMENT IN THE APPLICATION OF THE VIENNA .,..
CONVENTION
The rules on reservations contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties will be considered essential guidelines in the matter of reservations to
Human Rights treaties. Before doing so it is necessary to investigate whether
these rules are actually applicable, either in general, or specifically in respect of
the Human Rights Conventions dealt with that have no specific rules on reserva-
tions*'.
So far the Vienna Convention has been ratified by seventy states, which is clearly
no universal acceptance-'-. Moreover, even if the Convention were universally
accepted, this would still not lead to the conclusion that it would be applicable to
treaties concluded prior to its entry into force, unless it is established that the
Convention is indeed nothing but a codification. And, although the Vienna
Convention was intended to be a codification of the pre-existing customary Law
of Treaties, it is doubtful whether this was the case with its provisions on
reservations-*'. Both are problems concerning the application of the Vienna
Convention with a distinct time-element.
7.1. Questions of inter-temporal law in respect of the application of the
Vienna Convention
The first question to be dealt with, is the matter of inter-temporal law proper.
Little has been written about the inter-temporal law of treaties, and it is a rather
technical issue-**. Yet, it is necessary to consider this theoretical problem,
given the important role the VCLT will play in the following. In this study the
question of the inter-temporal application of the VCLT is particularly relevant in
respect of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-", which entered into
force in 1976, that is prior to the entry into force of the Vienna Convention in
198O-". Could States, or could the Human Rights Committee, rely on the
Vienna Convention rules in respect of reservations to the Covenant?
2 6 1 . C C P R , C E D A W , C A T . ... • , : . . « s i ' , , . r
2 6 2 . S T / L E G / S E R . E / 1 1 , 3 1 D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 2 . .:• , ! , . . ' • ; .
263. E d w a r d s , op .c i t . at 365. , , . > • . , . ; '
264. A.BIeckmann, Die Nichtriickwirkung vôlkerrechtlicher Vertra'ge. in: 33 ZAôRV 1973, at
38-55: G.E. do Nascimento e Silva, Le facteur temps et les traités; 154 RdC 1977 I, 215-
298 at 265-295; Rosenne. The temporal application, passim.
265. This is on the assumption that the reservations clause in the Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination provide a complete set of applicable rules.
266. Entry into force of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 23 March 1976; entry
into force of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 27 January 1980.
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With the gradual development of international law, and the co-existence of
ancient and contemporary rules of law, there are rules concerning the application
rules dating from another period-*'. The maxim ?««/?/«• rc^/r flcr/mr** has
been refined in the Islands of Pal mas case, where the arbitrator distinguished
between the validity of the rule according to the law at the moment of its
creation, and the subsequent application of the rule"". The rule in the Islands
of Pal mas case stresses the development of international law as a dynamic, and
continuous process-™ that has an impact on the interpretation of rules in the
course of time. What is important in the Islands of Palmas case is the fact that
the interpretation of rules is subject to the law as it stands at the moment of
interpretation. This point was forcefully repeated in the Advisory Opinion on the
Legal Consequences of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, when
the Court stressed that the interpretation of obligations created within the League
of Nations, would take place taking the contemporary international legal system
into account"". The case has been disclaimed as being an example of dynamic
interpretation, and thus contrary to the general rules on the interpretation of
treaties^. However, apart from being an elaboration of the rule in the Islands
of Palmas case, it might be suggested that it is a goal-oriented, rather than
dynamic, approach that is used in the Legal Consequences of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia case. «i ,•.-.-••,=$ • .•-> : vr», »»•;-
Article 4 of the Vienna Convention explicitly indicates that it "applies only to
treaties concluded by states after the entry into force of the present Convention
267. It should be noted that most of the cases concerning intertemporal law deal with
questions of territory, which are to a great extent factual problems, whereas the
application of secondary rules such as the rules on reservations in the Vienna Conven-
tion are of quite a different nature.
268. Bleckmann. op.cit. at 40-41. , ' . - . , . :< : . : ' : . • ,„ ! . ; , .. >•. *
269. Islands of Palmas arbitration, 1928 (Netherlands v United Stales), 2 RIAA 1949, reads:
"As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at successive periods
is to be applied in a particular case (the so-called intertemporal law), a distinction must
be made between the creation of rights and the existence of rights. The same principle
which subjects the act creative of a right to the law in force at the lime the right arises,
demands that the existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall
follow the conditions required by the evolution of the law"
270. G.Schwarzenberger, International Law. 3rd Ed.London. 1957 at 21-24.
271. Legal consequences of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
!•: Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970); ICJ Rep.1971, 15.
Par.53 reads:That is why, viewing the institutions of 1919, the Court must take into
consideration the changes which have occurred in the supervening half-century, and ils
interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of law, through
the Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary law. Moreover, an interna-
tional instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire
legal system prevailing at the time of interpretation."
272. Cf. article 31 VCLT.
See A.Verdross, B.Simma: Universelles Vôlkerrecht. Théorie und Praxis; 3.Aufl. Berlin
1984; p a r . 7 8 2 at 4 9 7 - 4 9 8 . .».-m>»n;. •••?•• ç?r ^ :.-.J,T.VB2 -.<•.,• a--:- -L. - •-•/•:.; -..15;
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with regard to such States"*". This should be read as meaning that the VCLT
as a treaty will only apply to treaties concluded after its entry into force, the
Vienna Convention as a codification of customary law does obviously apply to
treaties predating the VCLT. Hence one would conclude that it is not possible to
apply the Vienna Convention to the CCPR, unless the rules on reservation were
binding under customary law.
The problem of the inter-temporal law of treaties is, to a certain extent, an
academic problem. In the Continental Shelf arbitration, the Court relied upon the
VCLT with respect to a dispute arising before the conclusion of the Convention.
The United Kingdom had ratified the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf
in 1964, France had ratified with reservations in 1965 and the United Kingdom
had objected in 1966. While stating that the case needs to be decided in the light
of the law in force at the time the dispute arose, the Court indicates that the
changes in the law were primarily related to the rules applicable when the treaty
did not contain a reservations clause (article 19.c VCLT). This issue does not
arise with respect to the Continental Shelf convention which does contain a
reservations clause in article 12-'*. Be this as it may the Court's opinion is
somewhat in contrast with its application of the definition of article 2.l.d.
VCLT-", and of article 21.3 VCLT wit respect to the scope of reservation and
objection-"'. In particular it cannot be said that article 21.3 was a codification
of pre-existing law^", applying this provision does not seem to fit in the
Court's decision to apply the law in force at the time the dispute arose.
Similarly, when the HRC and other supervisory bodies used notions from the
VCLT in dealing with reservations, no state objected. In particular it is striking
that non-parties to the VCLT did not object, as these would be the most likely
ones to do so. The reason for this, apart from the fact that there is no obligation
to react, is probably the fact that the pre-existing rules on reservations lacked
clarity and would therefore not be readily invoked by the non-parties to the
VCLT. In spite of the clarity on the "object and purpose" rule, the Genocide case
did not provide any substantial rules on how to treat reservations, the VCLT as a
set of rules thus filled the vacuum. In this respect Rosenne has pointed out that
codification has a consolidating effect on the law, irrespective of its formal
status-™.
273. Cf. article 28 VCLT. See about article 4 VCLT:Rosenne. The Temporal Application, at
5-12; Sinclair, op.cit. at 8-9.
274. Award, para.38:"According!y. the evolution of the law of reservations between 1951 and
1966 has only marginal interest in the present connection".
275. Award, para.55.
276. Award, para. 61.
277. Cf. Kuhner. op.cit. at 211-218: and Imbert. Les Réserves at 260.
278. Rosenne. The Temporal Application, at 19 writes:"..the written text usually has the
general effect of making the law more clear that it was in its unwritten state and the
positive text will take the place of usage even regardless ot its formal status as being in
force" or not. The new text has a profound influence upon the future development of
the law and upon the practice of States and of the international organizations."
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7.2. Articles 19-23 of the Vienna Convention as customary law
Secondly, the question arises as to whether there are sufficient indications to
consider the VCLT's regime on reservations as customary laV™. This question
is prompted by the fact that there are substantial difference between the states
parties to the Vienna Convention and the human rights treaties dealt with. It
would clearly be confusing to distinguish between the states that are parties to the
Vienna Convention, and those that are not, but this may be necessary unless it is
established that article 19-23 of the Vienna Convention are applicable as custom-
ary law^°. Moreover, taking into account the ICJ's decision in the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases, there has to be considerable proof for the assumption
that a convention would become binding upon a third state through customary
law, shortly after its entry into force"*'"*".
On the basis of case law following the entry into force of the Vienna Convention,
and in particular the United Kingdom-French Continental Shelf arbitration^
and the Belilos case before the European Court of Human Rights**, it may be
concluded that the VCLT's provisions on reservations are taken to be binding as
customary law"**. The relevance of these cases is the fact that they concern
treaties concluded long before the drafting of the Vienna Convention took place.
In the United Kingdom-France Continental Shelf case, a declaration made when
ratifying the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea was of crucial
importance. Not only was this convention concluded long before the VCLT was
drafted, France had consistently refused to ratify the Vienna Convention"**.
279. Edwards, op.cit. at 365; Sinclair, op.cit. at 13-14.
280. Cf. articles 34 and 38 VCLT.
281. North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal
Republic of Germany v. the Netherlands), ICI Rep. 1969. par.28 reads:
"In principle, when a number of States have drawn up a convention specifically
providing for a particular method by which the intention to become bound by the
régime of the convention is to be manifested - namely by the carrying out of certain
prescribed formalities (ratification, accession), it is not lightly to be presumed that a
state which has not carried out these formalities, though at all times able and entitled to
do so, has nevertheless somehow become bound in another way."
Rosenne. The Temporal Application at 20-21. suggests that the Continental Shelf case
only has a limited value in respect of the VCLT as the Court's reasoning focused on
one single provision of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, a provision that
was de lege ferenda rather than being lex lata or an emerging customary rule. He
suggests that the case should be read as a warning against the euphoria prompted by
successful codification conference.
282. Entry into force Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 27 January 1980; Entry into
force Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 3
November 1981; Entry into force Convention Against Torture 26 June 1987.
283. 54 ILR 1979, 6-10.
284. To be dealt with in Chapter 3, par.4.1.3 infra.
285. Coccia. op.cit. at 11-15; Edwards, op.cit. at 366.
286. O.Deleau. Les Positions Françaises à la Conference de Vienne sur le Droit des Traités,
in: 15 AFDI 1969, 7-23; Sinclair, op.cit. at 68-77.
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With respect to the Belilos case, it should be noted that the ECHR was concluded
in 1953, the Court used article 2.1.d VCLT to fill a gap in the ECHR's rules on
reservations-*". Additionally it is pointed out that non-parties and international
organizations have incorporated the Vienna Convention into their treaty practice,
thereby giving great importance to the VCLT rules^*.
This all leads to the conclusion that though these provisions were progressive
development rather than codification at the time of drafting the Vienna Conven-
tion, they have by now accepted as the law to be applied to reservations^".
• ' » • •
J^^--•} It should be noted that Switzerland ratified the Vienna Convention in 1990, some time
after relying on the VCLT rules with respect to reservations in the Temeltasch and
'«S ,;i> Belilos cases under the ECHR.
Htfc•••' - Coccia. op.cit. at 15-16; Edwards, op.cit. at 365-366.
389. Edwards, op.cit. at 365 writes that "..the rules of customary law regarding reservations
.* • were sufficiently uncertain that it was best to think of the Vienna Convention rules as <fc
/f^f JWwirfa in 1969. However, in the twenty years that have elapsed since the Vienna
Convention was opened for signature, the rules regarding reservations stated in that treaty
.*'ï.!>r>\r have come to be seen as basically wise and to have introduced desirable certainly.";
similarly Sinclair, op.cit. at 13-14.
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RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
v After discussing the general law of treaties issues that reservations tend to bring
;*K up in the previous chapter, it is now time to turn to the specific issue of reserva-
a tions to human rights treaties. In the following chapters the practice of four
| conventions will be dealt with extensively, at this point a number of theoretical
i*v issues will be dealt with, which will serve as background information for part II
;; of this thesis.
Although I would have preferred to have been able to present a complete and
systematic theory about reservations to human rights, this will not be possible.
? Consequently the paragraphs, while all discussing aspects of this issue, are not
necessarily interrelated.
1. REASONS FOR MAKING RESERVATIONS
Before embarking on the legal aspects of reservations to human rights treaties, it
is useful to look at the considerations that play a role for states when they make
reservations. There is a distinct feeling that reservations should not be possible',
which puts the onus of being a "bad guy" on the reserving State. This may be the
simplest way to see the reservations issue, but there is more to it than mere
unwillingness.
A number of considerations would be relevant in respect of the ratification of any
treaty. States may have substantive interests that they don't want to compromise
when ratifying a treaty-. Reservations may be the direct result of a failure to
bring legislation into conformity with convention standards'. Traditionally,
reservations have been expressed to the dispute settlement clauses (the so-called
Slavic reservations)'', and to provisions about the territorial application (the so-
called colonial clause)'. Political problems have also lead to reservations, such as
the unacceptability of treaty relations with a particular State''.
Looking specifically at human rights treaties, the position of developing countries
may lead to reservations, prompted by the lack of expertise in the Ministry of
1. Coccia. op.cit. at 16; Imbert, HRR at 28; vd Vcldc, Voorbehoudcn ten aanzien van de
ECRM. 354.
2. Edwards, op.cit. al 363; O.Schachter, M.Nawaz, J.Fried, Towards wider acceptance of
UN treaties, a UNITAR study, (hereafter: Schachter cs.) New York 1971 at 155.
3. Edwards, op.cit. at 363; Schachter cs., op.cit. at 155.
4. The dispute settlement clause in article IX of the Genocide Convention was the reason
for the Advisory Opinion. Cf. Edwards, op.cit. at 363; Schachter cs. op.cit. at 155.
5. Edwards, op.cit. at 363; Schachter cs. op.cit. at 155.
6. E.g. reservations excluding the recognition of Israel, objecting to the validity of the
ratification for West-Berlin (prior to the dissolution of the GDR). or (he ratification for
the Falkland Islands/ Ma'.vinas; cf. Schachter cs. at 155-156.
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Foreign Affairs' or, more seriously, by the lack of financial means that makes it
impossible to attain a particular goal set in a human rights treaty. Though it may
be assumed that these reservations will generally be made in respect of social and
economic rights, the attainment of civil and political rights often also requires
financial means*. . f > ' ^ ,i ' • - . - . .
A number of reservations are directly related to the problems foreseen at the
implementation of the human rights treaty in the domestic legal order*. This
category can be explained by the fact that by their very nature human rights
instruments intend to operate in a field in which the State used to be the sole
legislator'". In giving rules meant to govern the relationship between the state
and the individuals under its jurisdiction, it is foreseeable that a collision between
these rules and preexisting domestic rules may occur. The most obvious examples
are rules of constitutional law that are inconsistent with the treaty", other
examples relate to the division of power in the state. In this respect the federal
clause is widely used to emphasize that it is not within the power of the central
authority to legislate in the fields mentioned by the treaty'-. In general, when
legislation needs to be adapted as a consequence of ratification, reservations may
occur so as not to anticipate the legislative authority of parliament". Other
reasons for reservations dealing with legislation are the cases in which it is
perceived that treaties conflict, and states feel the need to indicate a priority'''.
In these case it may seem evident that states do not want to change their obliga-
tions under the constitution, or under other international instruments by accepting
obligations under a human rights treaty. Yet it is more of a policy decision, than
an issue of conflicting rights. If ratification of a human rights treaty is considered
to be desirable, the necessary legislative changes could be made prior to ratifica-
tion, thereby excluding the need for reservations. In fact, this should be advo-
cated, given the time it takes to withdraw reservations, if ever they are with-
7. Coccia, op.cit. at 20; similarly with respect to the reservation by Germany to article 7
ECUR: J.A.Frowcin, Reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights, in:
Protecting Human Rights: the European Dimension: F. Matscher. II. Petzold eds. Koln
usw. 1988. 193-200 at 195.
8. Coccia. op.cit. at 20.
The reservations to article 14.6 CCPR by Guyana. Malta, and Trinidad and Tobago
about compensation for miscarriages of justice, are a case in point.
9. Coccia. op.cit. at 19-22; Schachter cs., op.cit. at 30-31.
10. It has been said that human rights treaties jeopardise the sovereignty of the States
parties, but introducing the issue of sovereignty in this discussion does not lead to a
better insight. See: Imbert. HRR at 30.
11. See for instance the Mexican reservations to articles 13 and 25.b CCPR, both referring
to the Constitution.
12. For example the federal reservation by the United States in respect of the CCPR;
Edwards, op.cit. at 363.
13. Discussing reservations as a consequence of parliamentary involvement with treaty-
making; Edwards op.cit. at 363-364.
14. Examples of such an approach are for instance the reservations of Austria to articles 19.
21. 22 CCPR in relation to article 16 ECHR, or the Irish reservation to article ll.l..b,c
and d CEDAW in relation to European Community legislation.
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drawn. On the other hand it must be acknowledged that a policy to ratify without
(or with only a few) reservations may lead to very late ratifications because of
the prior legislative work".
Another reason for making reservations to a human rights treaty mentioned
frequently, has to do with the uncertainty of the obligations accepted under a
treaty. The drafting process may have led to provisions that are not completely
clear, that may be compromise solutions, hiding disagreement behind general
formula. But more important, states try to shield their domestic human rights
situation against the dynamic forces of a treaty". The practice of human rights
treaties has demonstrated in the past twenty odd years that their dynamic force,
together with the functioning of supervisory organs", is a powerful way of
improving and extending human rights protection. The existence of a supervisory
organ, and the procedures vested in it, will in the course of time lead to an
additional set of rules, interrelated to the rules formulated in the treaty itself. The
interpretation of a treaty in the discussion of the state reports, the interpretation
of a treaty by the Committees in an individual complaint procedures, and the
interpretation of a treaty through the formulation of general comments and
general recommendations'* all compose what is known as the </r<7u/.v, the system
created through the human rights convention. The legal nature of the «cr/w/.y
cannot be determined in detail. Though the application of the treaty necessarily
requires the Committee to interpret the instrument, there is a thin line between
interpretation and the creation of additional rules to fill lacunae. In a way, the
existence of a supervisory organ, and its practice, undermine the certainty about
the obligations that parties to a treaty have. Attempts to restore certainty through
reservations are therefore understandable.
Imbert" has in this respect referred to the "explanation" made by the Nether-
lands in relation to its reservations to the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights-*, in which it indicates that although a number of its reservations may
" ' • • • " " " ' • - ' ' '/"~>tf">.ti • ; ; ' • • ; ' • ; ; -Vj?-"'."•'/ ' .-?
" ! * • ' * ' ' • ' ; > • . • / 5 * • •
- ' • V ' •'..- ••" . • " I " > • Ï ' ' ! C~-7- . ' • -V ' : - • • • „ _ ! . , . : > ' . « ; * ' ' .• - . f ' V . J
15. The Dutch ratification of the Convention on Ihe Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women would seem to be a case in point. The Convention was submitted
for ratification to Parliament on 23 April 1985: the consideration were concluded with
:• the acceptance of the law of approval on 2 July 1991. The Netherlands ratified (without
reservations) on 23 July 1991, whereas the Convention had been opened for ratification
on 1 March 1980, and had entered into force on 3 September 1981.
About this lengthy process see: L.Lijnzaad, Met kussen van een kikker. in: 7 Nemesis
1991, 5-17 at 5; and J.H.J. de Wildt, Met Intcrnationaal Verdrag inzake de uitbanning
- * * - . van allé vormen van Discriminatie van Vrouwen, in: 41 Ars Aequi 1992, 259-266 at 259.
16. Coccia, op.cit. at 21-22; Cook, Women's convention at 650: Imbert. URR at 30-31;
Shelton, op.cit. at 208.
17. Cook. Women's Convention at 673.
18. General Comments in articles 9.2 CERD, 40.4 CCPR. and 19.3 CAT, General Recom-
mendations in article 21 CEDAW.
19. P.H.Imbert, Les Reserves à la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme devant
la Commission de Strasbourg (hereafter Affaire Temeltasch). in: 87 RGDIP 1983, 580-
625, note 20 at 588; and Imbert, HRR at 31.
20. To be discussed Chapters, par.3.1 infra. ; , 1 "> • • $.„''
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actually not be necessary because of the concurrence between the Netherlands
interpretation and the (authoritative) interpretation (by the Human Rights Com-
mittee), it "wishes to ensure in all cases that the relevant obligations arising out
of the Covenant will not apply to the Kingdom, or will apply in the way indi-
cated". This is a clear example of a "better safe than sorry" approach.
This is a most intriguing issue that clearly demonstrates the kind of problems that
arise because of the dynamic nature of human rights law and the static nature of
the law of treaties. After all, can the States parties be supposed to have accepted
the rtc<7«/5 as it will develop in the years following their ratification? The
Netherlands is an example of a state that seriously considered withdrawing from
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and re-ratifying with a reservation to
article 26, because of the fact that the <ir<7<//.v, in particular on article 26, ran
counter to its interests-'. Had the future interpretation of this provision been
known beforehand, a reservation would no doubt have been made-.
A further matter on the same lines, is the position of states that become parties a
long time after entry into force, and disagree with the interpretation developed by
the supervisory organ in the period preceding its own ratification. These states
may want to exclude some of the interpretations established in the course of the
treaty's existence. The position of the United States and Switzerland with respect
to article 26 CCPR is a case in point, both made reservations explicitly providing
an interpretation that the Committee does not adhere to^. This will theoretically
lead to two distinct and parallel interpretations of a provision, operative within
the one system, which is in itself not a positive development. On the other hand
the question does arise if the ratification of a human rights convention, including
the supervisory system it establishes and the roots of the development of an
flr<7w/.y that are present in the treaty, does not require a necessary submission to
the rtc<7M/j as it will develop, or will have developed. Such reservations aim at
two essential elements in human rights treaty law, namely the idea of the
progressive development of human rights, and the important role of the supervis-
ory organs in that respect.
2. THE "OBJECT AND PURPOSE" OF A HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
Given the absence of explicit rules on the admissibility of reservations in various
human rights treaties-'', and the inclusion of clauses referring to the object and
21. See M.Driessen, J.Parlevliet. Internationale Escapades (Opinie), in: 63 NJB 1988, 357;
P.Kooijmans, Preadvies voor de Emancipatieraad. 17 March 1988.
22. Cf. the Swiss declaration following the judgement in the ECHR-Belilos case see:
Bourguignon, op.cit. at 384-385; and J van der Velde. De Rcaktie van de Zwitserse
regering op het Belilos arrest, in: 13 NJCM Bull.1988 at 597-601. For a discussion see
par.4.1 infra.
23. Similarly. Frowein, op.cit. at 194, 199; and J.A.Frowein. W.Peukert, Europaische
Menschenrechtskonvention (EMRK Kommentar), Kehl 1985 at 488 about the reservati-
on of Liechtenstein on the ratification of the ECHR.
24. CCPR. CAT.
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purpose rule", the question as to what "object and purpose" are, is of great
importance. Looking at the discussions in legal literature about the object and
purpose of human rights treaties and the monitoring of compliance using that
notion, one cannot but be struck by the limited range of the ideas. It would seem
that "object and purpose" disappeared in the discussion of monitoring, in which
field greater certainty seems to be available. I would like to suggest that poor
reflection on the actual meaning and content of the notion of "object and pur-
pose" prevents any actor on the international plane (be it a State, be it a member
of a supervisory organ) from adequately reacting to blatantly incompatible
reservations. In other words, there is no point in saying that "object and purpose"
is a useless notion, without at least first trying to get a grip on the notion.
Few attempts have been made to develop a theory on the content of the object
and purpose rule in respect of human rights treaties. The absence of doctrine in
this field is understandable when one considers the problems that arise in seeking
the concrete content of the rule. To understand these problems it is necessary to
return to the Genocide case. When the Court spoke about the object and purpose
of the treaty that was to be the yardstick for both reservations and for objec-
tions^, there was not any doubt about the object and purpose of the treaty under
consideration. The aim of the Genocide Convention is the banning of genocide.
In view of the clarity of this purpose, there would be few cases in which doubts
could arise about the compatibility of a reservation to the Genocide Convention.
Reservations should be measured according to whether or not they would hamper
the banning of genocide. The rule developed in respect of this single-purpose
treaty causes serious problems when applied to subsequent human rights treaties,
that are more elaborate, more diversified and more detailed. It is submitted that
as a result of the Genocide case, the rule developed has the disadvantage of being
extremely simplistic.
In the following an attempt will be made to clarify the possible content of "object
and purpose" of a human rights treaty. Given that this key notion in the VCLT
system is renown for its inherent vagueness, it is necessary to try and detail its
content. However, little certainty can be found and the scheme presented has
therefore the character of an exploration. The second matter dealt with will be
the way in which the rules on reservations are to be monitored. After that the
possibilities of the "object and purpose" rule as an interpretation rule will be
discussed.
2.1. Defining the object and purpose of a human rights treaty
It has been suggested that the object and purpose of a human rights treaty would
be rather limited and would encompass the prohibition of reservations contrary to
25. Article 20.2 CERD, article 28.2 CEDAW. article 75 ACHR.
26. See supra Chapter 2, par.1.2.1.
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/us coge/ir\ ergfl <wi«es obligations as indicated by the International Court in
the Barcelona Traction case^, and rules that are international crimes on the
basis of the work of the International Law Commission on State responsibility".
Similarly reservations to provisions that are a mere codification of rules of
customary law do not undermine the validity of the customary rule*. Another
important suggestion is the inadmissibility of reservations contrary to provisions
of the Charter of the United Nations". Though these may seem to be a logical
translations of the object and purpose rule, one might wonder whether it does in
fact apply in these cases. To my mind, acting contrary to fiu coge/w is prohibited
per se, this does not require any additional prohibition under the guise of object
and purpose". Acting contrary to the Charter of the United Nations is a breach
of treaty for member states of the United Nations under the priority rule of
article 103 of the Charter, and here again it is hardly necessary to rely upon the
object and purpose rule of article 19.c VCLT. Consequently "object and purpose"
would still be an empty shell.
Sometimes the whole treaty is equated with its "object and purpose". If a treaty
prohibits discrimination, each and every provision contributes to the goal of the
treaty, and is thought to be part of its "object and purpose". Similarly, the
protection and promotion of human rights has been understood to be the object
and purpose of a human rights treaty. But foregoing the distinction between core
obligations and other obligations implies a complete prohibition on the making of
reservations, within the VCLT system as it stands today. Article 19.c would be a
redundant rule as the matter would be dealt with in article 19.a. That would not
only be an unrealistic approach, it would also render the "object and purpose
rule" pointless as it would lose its distinctive significance.
Both positions sketched above amount to an "object and purpose" without any
distinctive content. The claim that a particular reservation is contrary to object
27. In general: Coccia, op.cit. at 16. Shclton, op.cit at 208-209; in respect of the CCPR:
J.F.Hartman, Working paper for the Committee of Experts on the Article 4 Derogation
Provision, in: 7 HRQ 1985, 89-131 at 114: in respect of CEDAW: Cook, Women's
Convention at 655.
28. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belgium v. Spain) (second phase), ICJ
Rep. 1970, par.33-34:".. an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations
of a Stale towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis
another Stale in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are
the concern of all States, In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can
be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes."
29. Coccia, op.cil. at 17, refers to article 19 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
36. Th.Meron. Human rights and humanitarian norms, Oxford 1989 at 11-12. Me ran
suggests that such reservations do not involve questions of incompatibility as the "object
and purpose" rule focuses on the substance of the treaty.
51. In respect of the CCPR: R.Higgins, The United Nations still a force for Peace, in: 52
.jr.. MLR 1989 (hereafterHiggins, MLR), 1-21 at 14: and Shelton, op.cit. at 227; and
objections to the Indian reservation to article 1 CCPR by France. Germany and the
Netherlands.
P . Articles 53. 64 VCLT.
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and purpose is easier made than substantiated. The notion presupposes the
possibility of distinguishing between the full (text of a) treaty and its essential
goals, if "object and purpose" is to have a meaning at all. It implies a distinction
between all obligations in the treaty and the core obligations that are the treaty's
ra/so/i d'être. It is quite possible that reservations are made that do not touch
upon object and purpose, but remain on the fringe. Although they restrict the
legal effect of provisions of the treaty, they will not be as harmful as the reserva-
tions contrary to object and purpose, and consequently they are not forbidden. A
substantial number of reservations to non-core rights accumulated, can however
have an equally detrimental effect, which should be kept in mind". The value of
the prohibition of reservations contrary to object and purpose will depend on the
selection made between fringe reservations and more serious ones.
An issue overshadowing this discussion is that distinguishing between core and
non-core rights seems to reduce the authority of the non-core rights. Distin-
guishing implies a hierarchy of human rights norms. This is contrary to the view
that human rights norms are a coherent set of rules protecting the fundamental
freedoms of people, in which all component norms have the same importance*'.
The rules in the VCLT, the "object and purpose" rule in particular, presuppose
the option of distinguishing between the obligations in the treaty and the "core"
obligations, irrespective of the problems surrounding the application of this rule.
Though it must be assumed that "object and purpose" necessitates distinguishing
among the Treaty's norms, there are no rules available as to how this should be
done. Detecting the core obligations is a matter of interpretation, and it is by no
means an exercise the VCLT itself provides adequate tools for. Articles 31 and
following deal with the interpretation of the treaty, but the distinguishing process
is not dealt with.
In writing about the various international human rights instruments, authors have
indicated specific provisions that they consider to belong to the treaty's core
obligations. These will be dealt with in the chapters on the various treaties. For
the present purposes I would like to suggest that the chances of reservations
concerning the final clauses, the dispute-settlement clauses included, to be
contrary to the object and purpose of a human rights treaty are extremely small.
Such reservations will consequently not be discussed in the following chapters
dealing with four human rights treaties. This is based on the assumption that such
reservations will in general not detract from the improvements in human rights
protection aimed at in the treaty. However, it should be noted that the Genocide
case in fact dealt with the compatibility of reservations to the dispute settlement
33. Clark, op.cit. at 314-315; and compare Cook, Women's Convention at 679 about rfc
m/mniu reservations.
34. Cf.Th.Meron. On a hierarchy of International Human Rights, in: 80 AJIL 1986, 1-
23(hereafter: Meron, Hierarchy): and D.Sullivan. Gender equality and religious
freedonrTowards a framework of conflict resolution, in: 24 JILP 1992, 795-856 at 817.
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provisions in article IX of the Genocide Convention". It serves to say that this
case is not comparable to the human rights treaties that will be discussed below,
as the Genocide Convention does not contain an elaborate supervisory system*. 'K
It must be noticed that though 'object and purpose' has become a catch phrase, it
is a negative obligation. The rule is that reservations should not be contrary to
the object and purpose of a treaty, there is no obligation for them to be in
conformity with object and purpose. This may seem a twist of words but it is not
without importance. One of the consequences of object and purpose as a negative
obligation is that theoretically there is no need to determine the substantial
content of the norm, it is mainly necessary to see whether a reservation is
contrary to a but vaguely determined object and purpose.
When discussing the object and purpose of a human rights treaty, a number of
rules are mentioned in the literature that are supposedly part of the object and
purpose. As far as they are categorical claims, indicating that a particular kind of
rule will always be part of a convention" object and purpose", it is useful to
consider them in general. In the following I will present these claims, and my
views, under four categories. In spite of the systematic flaws, these four angles
may provide more insight in the kind of issues appearing under object and
purpose. The categories are merely presented as an exploration of ways to deal
with this intriguing question.
2.1.1. Object and purpose in relution to the importance of human rights
treaties
It may be suggested that "object and purpose" is not only based on an intrinsic
comparison between the various provisions of a treaty, but should also take into
account the importance of the framework of international human rights law in
general. This implies considering the relevance of improvements that a treaty
brings, in comparison to pre-existing human rights in the shape of customary law
or soft law. Relevant characteristics of human rights instruments are the fact that
the rules laid down are meant to apply in the relations between the State and the
individuals under its jurisdiction. Moreover, such instruments frequently provide
for a supervisory mechanism that will monitor the implementation of the treaty. It
is contended that the importance of the codification of human rights law as such
is an aspect to be weighed in determining the "object and purpose" quality of
particular provisions.
- domestic legislation -
An essential characteristic of human rights instruments is the obligation to
implement a human rights treaty in domestic legislation". This obligation has
led to reservations safeguarding domestic legislation that are almost stereotypes of
reservations to a human rights treaty. The question is whether it is permissible to
35. Cf.LeBlanc. Genocide Convention, at 203-204 expressing the contraiy opinion, and
emphasizing the importance of the dispute settlement provision.
36. Cf. Shclton. op.cit. at 229.
37. Article 2 CERD. article 2 CCPR, article 2 CEDAW. article 2 CAT.
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formulate reservations so as to protect existing legislation against any changes
that may become necessary as a consequence of ratification of the Covenant. The
aim of treaty-based human rights protection is clearly to achieve an improvement
in protection, rather than a stand-still through the consolidation of the national
status quo. Moreover, States do not provide certainty about their obligations
towards their co-contractants. A reference to domestic legislation in a reservation
would seem to suggest that the author state has complete liberty in changing its
legislation. Legislation is after all a matter outside of the scope of traditional
international law. Being a party to a human rights instrument (with or without
reservations) restricts the liberty to legislate from the point of view of substance.
Legislation cannot restrict human rights any further than a convention allows. In
practice it will be more complex to assess whether new domestic legislation is
more restrictive as compared to prior legislation, and this in itself is a convincing
argument for discouraging the use of generally formulated "domestic legislation"
reservations.
In practice, different forms of this approach are discernable in reservations to
human rights treaties. The first category is that of States who claim that their
/M/fO/Mt/ /eg r J>7<I//on w I'M coM/fom/i(y with the treaty. Usually such reservations
focus on a specific provision of national legislation. Such declarations do seem
somewhat superfluous as conformity is an obligation, following the expression of
consent to be bound. But rather than stressing the obvious, the intention is to
determine compatibility. Compatibility is established through a formal declar-
ation, thereby shielding the domestic situation from international interference. If
the reservation is accepted, there cannot be any doubt as to the compatibility of
national legislation with the requirements of a convention. Consequently, the
other States Parties will have to scrutinize the domestic legislation of the reserv-
ing State in order to establish whether or not they agree with the assumed
compatibility, and would intend to object to the reservation'*. It is easy to see
that this will not be an attractive approach, and may even be considered interfer-
ence with domestic affairs. Yet, one might say that these reservations are an
explicit invitation to undertake this, for if legislation were compatible, there
would not be a need to indicate compatibility by way of a reservation.
The second category of minimalist reservations is more explicit about the
intentions of the ratifying State, it merely indicates that rni/wiwl /<'jç/.v/fl//ow w///
38. Clark, op.cit. at 311 writes:"lt should be considered a dereliction of treaty obligations for
parties not to specify which conflicts between the treaty and national law they will
resolve in favour of national law". And similarly ACHR Advisory Opinion OC 3/83,
Restrictions to the Death Penalty, par.65 reads:"A contrary approach might ultimately
lead to the conclusion that the State is the sole arbiter of the extent of its international
obligations on all matters to which its reservations relates, including even all such
matters which the State might subsequently declare that it intended the reservation to
cover."
RÉSERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
over r/ie rutey in r/ie friary in the case of conflict". Two cases can be
distinguished: states may exclude a particular provision on the grounds that it is
not in accordance with domestic law. In such cases the state will usually indicate
precisely what is excluded, which is preferable. A more detrimental form of
reservation stressing the prevalence of domestic law are statements formulated
generally. Reservations emphasizing the predominance of religious law (Sharia'h,
for instance) or traditional custom belong to the same category. They leave
compliance with the treaty to the reserving State's discretion, it will depend on
the obligatory value of social or religious systems. These statements restrict the
possible impact of the treaty even further. If national legislation prevails one
might wonder why a State took the trouble of becoming a party to a human rights
treaty at all. It would appear that the promotional aspect of ratification prevails.
What stays in mind in an international context is the ratification, the fact that
implementation at national level is sloppy will go unnoticed. i;
It should be asked whether reservations giving prevalence to domestic legislation
is compatible with the object and purpose of a human rights treaty, and in
particular with the obligation to implement it in the national sphere. The general
rule in the law of treaties in this respect is article 27 VCLT, which has also been
referred to in this respect*. The provision indicates that states may not rely on
domestic law for a failure to perform a treaty, and reads: n .:>••!> ,< = .-_.•> .,-• = ••/-.
i i . "A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure
• to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46".",,. .,, ^..^.-,.,-, .., ., j .
At the drafting Conference in Vienna there has not been much discussion about
this provision, which was proposed by Pakistan and subsequently added to the
draft Convention on the Law of Treaties. The only reason why the matter had not
been dealt with in the ILC Draft was that the Commission felt that the matter
belong to the topic of State responsibility. Given the inclusion of article 27 in the
Vienna Convention the matter lies apparently at the intersection of the law of
treaties and the law of state responsibility*". The particular question that we are
facing, the relation between the VCLT provisions on reservations (and their
application to human rights treaties), and article 27 VCLT has not been dealt with
at the Conference. ~~' - -—• . - . - . . ---,., ._,_,...,_.
39. O.Schachter, The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic Law, in: L.Hen-
kin, The International Bill of Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New
York 1981, 311-331(hereafter Schachter. Obligation to implement); writes at 321:The
rî i-.i- clarity and candour of these statements may seem commendable in comparison with
questionable claims of conformity made by some governments."
40. In respect of CEDAW: Cook, Women's Convention, at 706; in respect of CCPR:
. v s O.Schachter, The obligation to give effect to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
• in 73 AJIL 1979, 402-405 at 405; Triggs, op.cit. at 284-285. 291.
41. Article 46 VCLT has no relevance in this respect, it deals with the invalidity of a treaty
concluded in manifest violation of internal law on the competence to conclude treaties.
42. About the drafting of article 27 VCLT: Sinclair, op.cit. at 84.
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The starting point must be the assumption that the Vienna Convention contains a
coherent set of rules on the law of treaties. Consequently there should not be a
conflict between articles 19-22 and article 27. It should be recalled that the
articles 19-22 are in part II of the Convention, entitled Conclusion and Entry into
Force, whereas article 27 is in the general section of Part III, entitled Observ-
ance, Application and Interpretation of Treaties. While article 19 gives rules
about which reservations are permissible and which reservations are prohibited,
article 27 gives a rule on the observance of treaties. The fact that article 27 is not
a /ex 5/w'c/rt//"* to article 19.c follows from the structure of the Vienna Conven-
tion. Chronologically, both provisions apply in a different phase of the treaty's
existence. From that point of view it would seem to be logical for article 27 not
to contain elements of a rule applicable in the earlier part of the treaty's exist-
ence. Or, to put it differently, if there is a prohibition on making minimalist
reservations safeguarding domestic legislation, that rule should be in Part II of
the Vienna Convention. It should be emphasized that though article 27 VCLT is a
mandatory rule of international law, reservations are a legitimate exception to the
rule".
The answer would seem to be that reservations giving prevalence to national
legislation are, as such, a legitimate way to indicate that the treaty will not be
implemented in full. Reservations are an international legal method for restricting
the application of a convention. A state using that method does not rely on
domestic law but on a legitimate exception to article 27 VCLT by making a
reservation safeguarding its position. Such reservations necessarily imply a
reservation to article 2 CCPR and similar provisions, even if this is not expressly
indicated.
An element to be taken into account is the fact that reservations merely indicating
which provisions are not applicable, will usually have the same background.
Although not mentioning that domestic legislation is the reason for excluding a
particular provision, this will usually be the effect it has. The fact that human
rights instruments have to be implemented in the national legal system is the
obvious reason for this. Looking at the matter of domestic legislation as a
grounds for making reservations in this way, demonstrates that the actual
question is about the relevance of an explicit or implicit reference to domestic
legislation**. &•.•*'. "•,;'.; 'S
It is contended that, as the VCLT system stresses an approach focusing on the
substance of the reservation ("however phrased or named") this would lead to a
similar approach to the "domestic legislation" reservations. Consequently, what
matters is the scope of the reservation and this is what should be clarified. The
43. Article 27 could only be relevant in respect of reservations if it were a rule of mi-
co£«is. which is not the case.
44. Underlining a different point of view: C.FIinterman, E.Rieter: Nedcrland en de
Amerikaanse voorbehouden bij net Internationaal verdrag inzake Burger- en Politieke
Rechten. in: 17 NJCM Bull. 1992, 961-970 (hereaflenFlinterman. Ricter NJCM Bull.) at
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answers and clarifications provided to the supervisory Committee by the reserv-
ing State should lead to a "translation" from a "domestic legislation" reservation
to a reservation to a particular provision of a treaty. This does show that, from a
practical point of view, these reservations are undesirable as the substance is
hidden behind the "domestic legislation" formula. They raise a smoke screen
between the supervisory organs and the domestic implementation. Uncovering the
substance of the reservation will depend on the agility of the Committee, which is
not necessarily the best way to limit the scope of reservations. A reservation
indicating what it is that is excluded, is to be preferred. a
To claim that reservations referring to domestic legislation are contrary to the
object and purpose / w se, would put undue emphasis on the formal aspects of
such a reference, whereas the Vienna Convention stresses object and purpose as a
notion related to the substance of the obligation. What is wrong about domestic
legislation reservations is their smoke screen effects, the substance of the
reservation is hidden behind formal reference to domestic legislation. Although I
do consequently not support the view that these reservations are per se contrary
to object and purpose, they may, and usually will, be incompatible under the rule
of precision, dealt with infra.
- supervision - o « "i
A distinctive characteristic of human rights treaties, at least of the ones that will
be considered in this study, is that they all create a mechanism for the supervi-
sion of the implementation of the obligations laid down in the treaty. This is
directly related to the use of the law of treaties as a method of creation of human
rights law. Through these organs a process of supervision is established that has
stimulated the progressive development of human rights law. The creation of
supervisory organs has greatly added to the improvement of domestic human
rights protection. The continuous scrutiny through periodic reporting, and also
the individual complaints procedures, have an impact that could not be achieved
without using the law of treaties as a tool for the attainment of human rights. i
The supervisory system is explicitly protected in article 20.2 CERD^ and a
similar rule was contemplated during the drafting of the Women's Convention''*.
Though the various supervisory procedures may be optional, it would appear that
the functioning of the organs, and indeed their very existence are core elements
in the human rights system protected under the "object and purpose" rule.
2.1.2. Object and purpose in relation to treaty-based human rights protec-
tion
This category of reservation is based on the obligation not to obstruct the treaty
law side of a convention. Acting in contravention of general rules of the law of
treaties is contrary to the object and purpose of any treaty.
Cassese. op.cit. at 276.
Cook. Women's Convention at 675-676.
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The group of reservations that, because of their impact on the formal aspects of a
treaty, are contrary to object and purpose, consists of two different kinds of
reservations. In fact, though theses categories of reservations are mentioned here,
similar reservations would probably be contrary to the object and purpose of any
kind of treaty, be it a fra/fé-fo/i/ra/ or a
- precision or ambiguity -
A number of reservations do not indicate the provision at which they are aimed.
General and unrestricted reservations entail much uncertainty about the extent to
which a State making such reservations will be bound by the obligations con-
tained in the treaty. They are contrary to the very idea of /ex .vcW/tfa, the
importance attached to explicit and written agreements. Apart from that, these
reservations cast doubt on the State Party's intention to comply with the treaty'".
Given the nature of human rights treaties, the impact of such vague reservations
can be very detrimental for the individuals the treaty seeks to protect. This is
why the European Court in the Belilos case'*' stressed that precision about the
scope of the reservation was an evidential factor that contributed to legal certain-
ty. Though this was said in relation to the explicit rule in article 64 ECHR, there
is no reason why this requirement should have a more limited relevance in the
absence of explicit rules on reservations. Consequently, precision about the scope
of the reservation would seem to be included in the "object and purpose" notion.
- federal reservations - ""
It has been suggested that domestic legislation reservations are in particular
necessary for federal states'", who have a internal structure that may make it
more complicated to implement a human rights treaty. The implementation of
human rights treaties touches upon issues traditionally within the power of the
component parts of the State, rather that under the authority of the central
government. The two states to have formulate such reservations in respect of the
CCPR, Australia* and the United States'", are federal States". Australia
entered a similar reservations in respect of the right to paid maternity leave in
article 11.2 CEDAW. As such, the position of federal States and their reliance on
domestic constitutional legislation could be covered by what has been said about
domestic legislation before.
General reservations stressing the prevalence of domestic law are frequently
explicitly referring to, or implicitly based upon, the domestic constitutional
47. Clark, op.cit at 310-311. ^ .
48. See for a discussion par.4.1.3 infra. ' ii
49. Triggs. op.cit. at 284-285. ?---.»•
50. About the Australian reservation see: Triggs, op.cit.
51. Schachter. Obligation to Implement; M.D.Craig. The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and United States I.aw: Department of State Proposals for
preserving the Status Quo. in: 19 MarvIU 1978. 845-886 at 845. 868-880.
52. On the other hand this may be a mere coincidence, similarly minimalist reservations in
respect of the Women's Convention have been made by predominantly Unitarian States.
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system, which is more a matter of structure than a question of substance.
Although the implementation of substantive rights lies behind these rules of
structure", it is almost impossible to track down the actual impact on the
various rights. The grounds for making these reservations are not only the
domestic division of power between the state and its component parts, but may
also be national constitutional rules about the implementation of international law
in the domestic system, as in the case of the self-executing nature of international
obligations in the United States**.
Whereas the application of the object and purpose rule in substantive matters is
quite complex, international legal theory at the moment provides little guidance
for the application of the principle to rules of structure. The only possibility
would seem to be application of the object and purpose rule on the basis of
estimated effect, which would in turn lead to an interpretation of the impact of
the reservation on the implementation of the individual substantive rules in the
domestic legal system.
Other arguments against the federal reservations are less forceful. A number of
authors suggest that federal reservations might be construed as contrary to object
and purpose because of the fact that they would lead to a situation in which non-
federal States would be bound to a higher degree than federal States having made
a federal reservation". This argument is in a way tautological, it is evident that
non-reserving States are always bound to a greater extent that reserving States.
The fact that other federal states have ratified without such reservations also
indicates that the matter is not specific for federal states.
Another reason for the suggestion of a conflict with object and purpose is that the
aim is to create a general minimum international standard of human rights, and
federal states should not be allowed to depart from that aim that easily. While
these may be reasons for disapproving of a federal reservation, it is questionable
whether this amounts to saying that the reservation is detrimental to the core
obligations. A minimum international standard is not necessarily the same as the
complete content of a human rights instrument*'.
53. Craig, op.cil. at 871.
54. In the 1978 proposal to ratify the CCPR. the transmittal message tohe t U.S.Congress
indicated that the reservations and understandings were meant to "harmonize the
treaties with existing provisions of domestic law". A similar argument can be found in
the Transmittal letter for the 1992 Ratification.
; There is a direct relation with the American constitutional system in which treaties may
be self-executing. If the reservation were not made, the content of the Covenant could
overrule the fundamental rights in the Constitution. In order to prevent that, a declar-
- ation indicating that the Covenant would not be self-executing in domestic law was
i'Jj -!-• issued, so as to be sure of a restricted influence of the Covenant.
Craig, op.cit. at 853-862; Flinterman, Rieter. NJCM Bull, at 967.
55. Craig, op.cit. at 870; Triggs. op.cit. at 291.
56. Craig, op.cit. at 870-871; Triggs. op.cit. at 291.
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2.1.3. Object and purpose in relation to the substance of a human rights
treaty
The third group of reservations are the ones contrary to the object and purpose of
the treaty in as much as its content is concerned. As stated above, given the fact
that the 'object and purpose' rule is formulated as a negative rule there is no
obligation, much less a possibility to determine object and purpose in any
objective way. Apart from an authoritative statement by the States Parties or an
interpretation by the International Court on the basis of provisions on dispute
settlement", it will be up to the Committees to indicate what is and what is not
contrary to the object and purpose.
- non-derogable rights -
There are different ways of looking at rights to which derogations are not
allowed'*. The first interpretation is that these are rights from which derogations
cannot be justified by the necessities of any conceivable situation of public
emergency. The emphasis is on public emergency, and the fact that this situation
cannot legitimize the suspension of the rights listed in article 4.2 CCPR". The
other interpretation is that these are core rights whose fundamentally is compel-
ling / w .r«\ In this view, the nature of the rights protected is stressed. This
evidently amounts to saying that these non-derogable rights belong to the Cove-
nant's object and purpose*". The gist of relying on non-derogability as an
indication of object and purpose of the Covenant is that, if derogations are not
permitted, reservations are a/orr/wr/ not permitted either.
The theory of non-derogable rights belonging to the object and purpose of a
human rights treaty has been strengthened by the Opinion of the ACHR Court in
the Death Sentences case, where it stated that "« rc'.rerwtf/ow w/?/c/i
Though the Court instantly qualified its own opinion, by stating that "the situation
would be different if the reservation sought merely to restrict certain aspects of a
non-derogable right without depriving the right as a whole of its basic pur-
pose."*', this probably just indicates that no definite rules can be given on the
issue of "object and purpose". To my mind, this statement does not seriously
hamper the understanding of non-derogable rights as core rights.
57. Article 22 CERD, article 29 CEDAW, article 30 CAT.
58. Hartman, op.cit. at 113; L.Henkin. The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in: U.S.
Ratification of the Human Rights Treaties. R.B.Lillich (ed.) Charlottesville 1981, 20-26
at 23-24; Suy, op.cit. at 943-947.
59. See for a discussion of article 4 as a core obligation Chapter 5. par.1.2.1 infra.
60. Hcnkin, op.cit. at 23; Shelton. op.cit. at 209, 227; Suy, op.cit.at 944.
61. ACHR Advisory Opinion OC 3/83, Restrictions to the Death Penally, par.61; discussed
in par.4.2.2 infra.
About this Opinion, see: Buergenthal, op.cit. at 23-25; Clark, op.cit. at 319-320.
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- non-discrimination -
It could very well be argued that the prohibition of discrimination is a core
obligation in human rights law. The fact that this prohibition appears four times
in the CCPR'- is proof of the importance of the obligation, which is stressed by
the fact that the international community also drafted two specific instruments
aimed at the elimination of discrimination, the CERD and the CEDAW.
However, it would seem that the more the prohibition of discrimination becomes
all-encompassing, the more it loses its "object and purpose" potential. The
detailed rules in the CERD and the CEDAW that seek to eliminate discrimination
in a wide variety of situations, illustrate that discrimination is a multifarious
mechanism. At the same time there is the risk of diluting the prohibition of
discrimination as a core obligation because of the non-availability of a criterion to
distinguish between the cases in which discrimination is prohibited.
To illustrate this, two examples may prove the point. At first sight the object and
purpose of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion would appear to be the banning of racial discrimination. However, looking at
the specific provisions, this interpretation of "object and purpose" proves to be
too imprecise, too indiscriminate. If a State were, for example, to exclude article
5.f CERD by way of reservation, would that reservation be incompatible? The
provision deals with the guarantee of access to places and services for use of the
general public, such as transport, hotels, restaurants, cafe's, theatres and parks.
It is beyond doubt that being refused entry to a restaurant on the basis of one's
race is discriminatory and offensive, but is protection of this right really at the
core of the prohibition of racial discrimination? Similarly, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in article 9.2 deals
with women's equal rights in respect of the nationality of their children. A
reservation excluding this provision might lead to a situation in which mother and
children would not only have different nationalities, but in which the children
would legally be strangers in her own country. This may be offensive, annoying
and painful for the mother, but could it on the other hand be assumed that article
9.2 CEDAW is a "core" right, as article 9.1 CEDAW would seem to be?"
In both cases there may be good reasons to consider the rights mentioned as non-
core rights. However, when distinguishing between the whole of the treaty
obligations and the core obligations, one easily makes a subjective choice". It
would appear that this is caused by the generality of "object and purpose" at first
sight (prohibition of racial discrimination, prohibition of discrimination against
women), that cannot be translated into a more adequate, concrete yardstick.
Consequently one could easily disagree and argue that, on the contrary, the rights
discussed above are core rights.
62. Articles 2.1, 3. 4.1 and 26 CCPR.
63. Clark, op.cit. at 320, suggests that this might be based on the fact that article 9.2
CEDAW could not be considered a non-derogable right.
64. Cf. Meron. Hierarchy at 4, 8.
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- scope of discrimination -
Given the necessity of distinguishing that is implied in "object and purpose" as a
criterion, one way of addressing the issue in respect of the non-discrimination
treaties, would be to look at the area in which the core of discrimination lies".
In this respect, it might be argued, for instance, that the position of women in the
family is an essential source of discriminatory practices in other fields. Thus it
could be concluded that reservations to articles 15 and 16 CEDAW would be
unacceptable. Yet, this might be a rather subjective choice, another evaluation of
the sources of women's discrimination might lead to another "object and pur-
pose".
If "core" is understood to point to the source of the discrimination, this might
even lead to a further conclusion in respect of CEDAW, the fact that social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women are the origin of women's
discrimination. Consequently, article 5 CEDAW should be considered to belong
to the Convention's object and purpose. At the same time it is one of the
convention's most complicated provisions with a goal that may well be beyond
what law could realistically achieve, and very few reservations have been made
to this provision.
2.1.4. Object and purpose in relation to ways and means of implementing
human rights obligations
A variety of questions follow from the issues that occur in the human rights
practice in relation to the way in which the obligations will be implemented.
- obligations of means, or obligations of result -
Another question to be answered is whether "object and purpose" refers to the
goal of the treaty, or deals with the means of achieving this goal as well**. This
is particularly relevant in cases in which states hold different views on how to
attain a certain goal, or in cases involving conflicting rights. States may make
reservations and indicate that they still intend to realize the treaty's object and
purpose albeit by other means. This demonstrates the relevance of the question.
It would seem to serve no purpose at all to condemn reservations in cases in
which states claim to achieve the same end by other means. In fact it may be that
emphasizing the obligation of result and thereby perhaps being flexible with the
explicit obligations of means (cf. the discussions about article 4 CERD or 20
CCPR between the respective Committees and the reserving States) may contrib-
ute to universality, as a difference of opinion on the ways to achieve a goal does
not necessarily conflict with the integrity of the treaty. Effective implementation
is what matters, although it must be noticed that obligations of means are more
precise and facilitate monitoring of the achievement of the goals set in a treaty,
as compared with obligations of result.
65. Cf. Cook, Women's Convention at 689.
66. See about this issue: Schachter. The obligation to give effect at 462.
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- the relevance of travaux préparatoires - - *ï?>«j,u.jsnn_-*<b : sq;>;-
One of the obvious suggestions would be to look in the mivaitr /OTéparato/re? of a
human rights instrument in order to find out more about the core of a particular
treaty. This would seem to be emphasized in that the VCLT also refers to the
rrawmx as a supplementary means that may be used in the interpretation of
treaties". Reference to the fravaur is an approach typical for a treaty-lawyer.
Yet the question arises as to whether using the /ravau* is a method that does
justice to the progressive aspirations of human rights law**. With its over-all
focus on the progressive development of human rights protection, and with the
increasing importance of the flc<7«/j developed in respect of human rights treaties
this would seem to be a rather retroactive approach. The use of rrawux as an
element in the interpretation of treaties refers to the static nature of the law of
treaties, that may not be suitable for human rights law.
- the dynamic principle -
A following question in the same train of thought would then be whether it is
conceivable that the "object and purpose" itself changes in the course of time.
This is an intriguing question because of its suggestion of flexibility. The
assumption is based on a parallel with the development of the ac</«/.v, and its
increased importance. This argument concerning object and purpose is rare, but it
is in line with obligations to progressively eliminate discrimination**. In respect
of the American reservation to article 6 CCPR on the abolition of the death
penalty it has been argued that this is contrary to the General Comments of the
Human Rights, and therefore contrary to object and purpose"'.
The disadvantages of such an approach are to be noted: if it would be accepted
that the object and purpose of a treaty could change in the course of time, a
67. Article 32 VCLT; cf. Cook. Women's Convention, at 661.
68. Raising a similar issue in respect of the 7/Ymnu; of the ECHR: R.Kuhner. Vorbehalte und
. auslcgendc Erklarungen zur Europàischen Menschenrechtskonvenlion (hereafter: MRK). in:
'*' '"'"'." 42 ZA6RV 1982. 58-92 at 72-73.
69. Cook. Women's Convention, at 661-662.
70. C.Flinterman, E.Rieter, De Verenigde Staten en het BUPO Verdrag: de roi van
>>i: ."ts'.-ji Nederland (hereafter: Flinterman, Rieter NJB), in:67 NJB 1992, 935-936 write at
935:"Dit voorbehoud bij artikel 6 BUPO-verdrag. waarin het recht op leven is neerge-
legd, druist rechtstreeks in tegen de tekst van artikel 6 BUPO-verdrag, die gebaseerd is
op de wenselijkheid van de afschaffing van de doodstraf; tegen de 'general comments'
••••<ITV.IV"-. yap ng| Mensenrechtencomité (het toezichthoudcnd orgaan onder het BUPO-verdrag)
•^  "'•:•»* waarin ondermeer wordt gesteld dat staten verplicht zijn de opicgging van de doodstraf
•• r te beperken en dat de doodstraf slechts in zeer uitzonderlijke omstandigheden kan
worden opgelegd en tegen ontwikkelingen in het internationaal recht in het algemeen,
zoals blijkl uit de totstandkoming van het Tweede Facultatief Protocol bij het BUPO-
verdrag (New York, 1989) dat voorziet in de afschaffing van de doodstraf. Wrt /4/wcri-
fcaanw voorfKViourf /j/'/t/ dcr/iaA'C in wn/rf re ziy/i ;nrt Yoonwrp r/i rfoe/ va/i Art B W O
i'crdrag."(my emphasis, EL).
The authors were probably focusing on the substantive issue of the abolition of the
death penalty, rather than the intricate question of the flexibility of "object and
p u r p o s e " . . ' 2 v r - i - " * " ' ; • " ' • ' 1 4 .-" i w ^ , : . . - a i > . T % - . M » I I •••-. • •••s- . - ' .:!,•: p • •-,-.: :>^'". . '-:•
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reservation made at the beginning of the treaty's existence might be compatible
ex /KHC whereas a similar reservation made twenty years later would not be
compatible. The problems which could arise would in a way be covered by the
acceptance of the latter reservation under the permissive rule of article 20.5
VCLT, but in the interpretation of a reservation used by a supervisory organ the
changed content of object and purpose would play a role. j
- social relativism -
A final point of view that has appeared in relation to the object and purpose of
human rights treaties is the view that compatibility is a relative notion, and that
the specific circumstances of countries will have to be weighed. In suggesting this
with respect to the Women's Convention, Cook writes that compatibility is not
only a function of the interpretation of the treaty as a whole, but also from socio-
political measurements of effects of reservations on women".
It is a line of reasoning that clearly fits into the tradition in feminist legal theory
of looking at the reality behind the rules, and as such it must be appreciated.
However it would appear that this theory is neither based on a realistic perception
of the embarrassment at international level of looking into the socio-political
structure of the reserving States, otherwise known as the internal affairs of a
State, nor of the possibilities for either States Parties or supervisory Committees
to research the background of reservations in such great depth. *»,'».,.«?•:«* ' . W o " '
2;2. Monitoring the "object and purpose" obligation rn^f */•* >***-.n-»<-. '- ;"*
The "object and purpose" rule has been of limited relevance in treaty practice, if
measured by the number of objections made to reservations to human rights
treaties^. Though, as indicated before, it is not obligatory for incompatible
reservations be objected to", or that objections necessarily imply incompatibil-
ity™, the small number of objections is striking. The vague content, and the
difficulties in substantiating the "object and purpose" notion must be one of the
major reasons for this. , n • . j ^. - . • • • » - . • . • . * . 1 • > ; : ^ ^ T - : . v . . ^
. / • ; : • ! • > . , . •:.. < • • « j i ' i - . " - : \ : - 4 i . . ; ; 1 ;.' - . -. ; ; l l • s s u : \ , i - , f i ~ . - f / T i n f < « , i : . V Î i « ? v • i > '
71. Cook, Women's Convention at 680. writes:"[T]o propose the compatibility of reservati-
ons is specific to the circumstances of individual countries, and that countries with such
features as a large differential literacy rate between men and women or with many
» .'• • •. ;» households headed by women are different from other countries, suggests that legal
w-i«".<::= determination of compatibility arises not from the Convention per se. but from specific
a4;i;!> • applications of treaty provisions to individual countries." And similarly with respect to
A'î -w religious law: Sullivan, op.cit. at 810 writing:The extent to which religious law may be
•**.«•«)•> applied without restrictions based on other human rights will vary with the substantive
•;r- ii ,v content of the law, and with the scope of its application ratione materiae and ratione
personae."
72. As Bourguignon writes with respect to Imbert' emphasis of States as the sole actors with
respect to the determination of compatibility, at 369:"..the final refutation of M.Imbert's
* insistence on the process of acceptance and objection is that it simply has not worked."
73. See Chapter 2, par.3.6.3 supra. n «
74. See Chapter 2, par.3.6.2 supra.
% RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
Coccia, emphasizing that there is no difference between general multilateral
treaties and human rights treaties, states that the object and purpose rule does not
prevent the acceptance of reservations contrary to object and purpose". Accept-
ance of an incompatible reservation precludes the invocation of incompatibility at
a later stage, objections provide an option for further discussion about the
reservation, but given the small number of objections, the incompatibility rule
must be assumed to have lost relevance".
Disappointed with the lack of reaction by states to incompatible reservations,
Shelton writes that "another mechanism for review and decision on legality must
be developed"". Supervisory organs established by the human rights treaties
would be qualified for such a task, because they are composed of independent
experts, and these organs are committed to ensuring an effective implementation.
Shelton recalls that at the time of the Genocide decision, no international super-
visory mechanisms existed, indicating that this lead to the question about com-
patibility being brought before the Court. In spite of the fact that an attempt by
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to establish broad
powers to deal with the compatibility issue failed™, she perceives more possibil-
ities in this field for the Human Rights Committee. This is based on an analysis
of the differences between the competence of the CERD Committee and the HRC
in the respective treaties, and because of the fact that unlike the CERD, the
CCPR does not contain a reservations clause".
The discussion on monitoring the "object and purpose" obligation seems to have
focused on two distinct options, namely the choice between the traditional system
in which the other States Parties play a decisive role, and the so-called institu-
tional system, in which an institution, supervisory organ or judicial organ has a
final say. Whereas the first option has not led to a limitation of incompatible
reservations, the legitimacy of the second system is questioned when a human
rights instrument does not explicitly give such authority to the supervisory organ.
Let us look at the role supervisory organs might play in this respect. An explicit
decision on compatibility would appear to be impossible with respect to the UN
human rights instruments, other than through the dispute-settlement procedure.
There are no other procedures by which incompatibility could be authoritatively
75. Coccia, op.cit. at 34 writes:"an argument may be made that the object and purpose of a
human rights treaty must be interpreted in a more rigorous manner, given the particular
obligations involved. Yet, because the incompatibility rule does not apply when States
s- accept reservations, such rigorous interpretation must, in any event, yield to the
£ acceptance of States. As a result, from a practical viewpoint the primary issue concer-
•••!"• ning treaties on human rights is not whether reservations are incompatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty, but whether States do, in fact, object to reservations
made in regard to such treaties."
76. Coccia, op.cit. at 33-34.
77;'*»*' Shelton, op.cit. at 229.
78. Shelton, op.cit. at 229, and see Chapter 4, par.1.2 infra.
79. Shelton, op.cit. at 230-231. •« iWH>-it<H ,£ - »
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established, a fact also emphasized by the Office for Legal Affairs in their advice
to both the CERD Committee and the CEDAW Committee*". It should be kept
in mind that neither the European Convention nor the American Convention are
comparable to the UN Human rights systems as far as the authority of the
Committees to discuss reservations is concerned. Clarity such as can be achieved
under the ECHR and the ACHR will clearly not be available.
However, this does not restrict the authority of a supervisory organ to discuss the
compatibility of a reservation if this comes up in the course of its work. It would
not be realistic to assume that a reservation precludes every discussion of the
reservation. Like a treaty, a reservation needs interpretation before application.
On the basis of the assumption that all reservations made are compatible with the
object and purpose, a supervisory organ is fully entitled to interpret a reservation
restrictively, as it were assuming its compatibility*'. This is an important, albeit
somewhat obscure way of getting a grip on the issue of reservations, fully in line
with the task of a supervisory organ in monitoring the compliance with the
human rights instrument. And this has indeed been taking place under the UN
human rights treaties, as we shall see below.
Imbert suggests that a choice between monitoring of the "object and purpose"
rule by the States Parties or by the supervisory organs is necessary, but fails to
indicate why this is the case"-. I do not understand why both methods could not
be employed to limit the detrimental impact of incompatible reservations. Without
doubt it is the primary responsibility for States to refrain from making a reserva-
tion contrary to object and purpose of a treaty. The mirror responsibility of the
other States Parties consists of monitoring the reservations made, and if necessary
objecting to incompatible reservations. If the traditional mechanism does not
function adequately, institutional monitoring of reservations as part of the
supervisory work may be a useful complement to the traditional rules. My
understanding of ways to monitor the compatibility of reservations would be that,"
though States have the right and indeed the obligation, to respond explicitly to
incompatibility, the supervisory organs have a parallel right following from their
role within the supervisory system**.
80. Advice to the CERD Committee in: UN Juridical Yearbook 1976 (ST/LEG/SER.C/14)
at 219-221; advice to the CEDAW Committee in: A/39/45. Vol.11, Ann.II.
81. See par. 2.3, The interpretation of reservations infra.
82. P.H.Imbert. in: Europaischer Menschenrechtsschutz, I. Maier (éd.), Heidelberg 1982; at
170 states:"Allgemein meine ich. dass man zwischen zwei Systemen der Beurtcilung von
Vorbehalte wahlen muss: zwischen der Zustimmung der Vertragsstaaten odcr dem
Eingriff der Kontrollorgane ausserhalb der fiir die stillschweigende Zustimmung
gesetzten Frist. Beide Systemen kônnen zusammen schwerlich funktionieren. denn die
Moglichtkeit einer emeuten Priifung durch die Kontrollorganen schwàcht zwangslàufig -
das ist das mindeste, was man dazu sasgen kann - die Zustimmung. die die Vertragspar-
teien vorher erteilt habe. Man muss also wâhlen."
83. Similarly van der Velde, Voorbehouden at 359 writing about the ECHR system:"Veeleer
lijkt het er op dat zij (the European Commission on Human Rights, EL) in plaats van
(continued...)
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Putting too much emphasis on the steps that supervisory organs could take with
respect to incompatible reservations, would seem to turn the whole problem into
an issue beyond the influence of states, within the field of action of supervisory
organs only. This would certainly be a misconception as it is based on the
admission that states are not the best guardians of the "object and purpose" of
treaties they themselves create. In my view the primary responsibility for dealing
with the negative impact of reservations is first of all one belonging to the states
parties to a treaty". A supervisory organ has the secondary and complementary
responsibility, the existence of a supervisory organ cannot be an excuse for not
fulfilling the obligations under article 19.c VCLT and parallel provisions of other
treaties.
2.3. The interpretation of human rights instruments: coexistence and
J > coherence
Frequently reservations need to be interpreted, in particular when the supervisory
organs discuss the periodical reports of the reserving States. They have to try and
establish the scope of the restriction or exclusion created by a reservation. States
may not always formulate their reservations in a comprehensible way; may
purposely formulate vague statements; and, like any written document, reserva-
tions may suffer from the recurring vagueness of language. Consequently
reservations will have to be interpreted, presumably in accordance with article 31
VCLT. This provision, like article 19.c VCLT, refers to the object and purpose
of the treaty as a yardstick for the interpretation of a treaty.
The interpretation of reservations may be a useful starting-point for restricting the
detrimental impact of some reservations. The prohibition of reservations contrary
to the object and purpose of a treaty is not merely a rule laid down in the Vienna
Convention, it is also a logical necessity. Not only is there be a good faith
obligation not to undermine the very essence of the treaty one is concluding, such
a policy also saps the value of the consent necessary for the conclusion of a
treaty. Sweden has elaborated on this aspect of the prohibition to undermine the
object and purpose when objecting to reservations to the CEDAW". A conse-
• - r . . r . « • ' , . - . - c * ' ; ' •••• • >•••-• . : • • • ••• . • - . ' : • ; , - ! • • T - . . v •
83.(...continued)
een exclusieve bevoegdheid van de verdragsstalen een parallèle toetsingsbevoegdheid
van zowel de verdragsorganen als dc staten aanwezig ziet."
84. - Imbert. HRR, at 46 writes: "What purpose is served by making everything depend on a
* hypothetical decision by the Commission, the Court or the Committee of Ministers, as
/Aoif£/i prior co/MiTfcrario/i co«/rf «of 6r ynvn fo a /rccrvar/o/i (7/ f/ie //me « H'<K /bmiuto-
tcd?" (my emphasis, EL).
85.- The objection reads:" .. the reason why reservations incompatible with the object and
•.'i'-•••• purpose of a treaty are not acceptable is precisely that otherwise they would render a
basic international obligation of a contractual nature meaningless. Incompatible
reservations, ... do not only cast doubt on the commitments of the reserving states to
the objects and purposes of this Convention, but moreover, contribute to undermine the
-• i.. basis of international contractual law. It is the common interest of states that treaties to
t •• ' • • ' • • - • • --.-. - - • ( c o n t i n u e d . . . )
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quence of the obligation contained in article 19.c is the presumption that States
Parties never intended to act contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty they
ratified. In international law there is a general presumption that States in their
international relations act in accordance with good faith, implying a presumption
that reservations are supposed to have been made in conformity with the existing
rules, thus not being contrary to "object and purpose"**. j ^
In a number of cases, it will be apparent that the presumption of reservations
being compatible with object and purpose is scarcely more than a legal fiction.
However, I would like to contend that it is a useful presumption. To refute the
presumption, a state will have to admit that it acted contrary to a general rule
underlying international relations, and will moreover have to indicate explicitly
that it intended to act contrary to the object and purpose of the very treaty it was
ratifying, which casts a nasty shadow on its reliability as a State Party. States will
never explicitly concede that they purposely made an incompatible reservation.
Returning to the interpretation of reservations, this will mean that a supervisory
committee may, on the basis of general international law, assume that a State
intended to make a compatible reservation, and thus interpret a reservation in a
restrictive sense, thereby limiting the detrimental scope of the reservation. ji
A second, and perhaps more daring approach would be to take into account the
whole body of human rights law as it stands today. Although specific instruments
may deal with specific fields of human rights protection, these instruments may
be seen as elements in a general body of law. Within this body of law various
rights have been articulated in different instruments. The point to be made is that
the different human rights instruments do not merely coexist, but that they are a
coherent set of rules, in spite of the diversity of sources. Human rights instru-
ments themselves point to this coherence, in the shape of the provisions stressing
the continued availability of better protection under other rules. These are
provisions such as articles 5 jo. 46 CCPR, article 23 CED AW, or article 1.2
CAT. Up until now, these provisions have been thought to be directly relevant
for the individuals under the jurisdiction of the states, and have not played a
significant role in the work of the supervisory organs. To my mind, these
provisions should be made operational, and should indeed be used by the
supervisory organs to legitimize an approach based upon the coherence of human
rights law.
Coherence implies that the obligations (including reservations) under one treaty
will have to be consistent with obligations under another treaty incumbent on the
reserving State. The majority of states have ratified more than one human rights
instrument. Although there is no explicit obligation to act in a coherent way on
an international level, the international obligations in the field of human rights
-T
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which they have chosen to become parties also are respected, as to object and purpose,
by other parties."
ST/LEG/SER.E/11. -*** , :
86. See Chapter 2, par.4, The relevance of the object and purpose rule. ;îi- -,,': »X'
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law must be interpreted on the basis of the assumed coherence of a State's
obligations. In fact, reservations to one treaty can very often be construed as
breaches of another treaty.
This line of reasoning has been proposed by Mexico when it objected to reserva-
tions to the CEDAW*'. The acceptance of general obligations would seem to
preclude the restriction of these obligations in specific cases or for specific
groups**. The advantage of this approach to reservations is that the vague notion
of object and purpose is substantiated with reference to other human rights
obligations. Obligations already accepted by the reserving state become a
yardstick for its reservations under other instruments. .*, ,»:<
In the following scheme, an attempt has been made to draw up a scheme indicat-
ing disparities in the obligations of States under the four human rights instru-
ments to be dealt with below*'. Though this scheme only refers to four conven-
tions, it might be enlarged to include obligations concluded under the aegis of
specialized agencies, such as ILO and UNESCO, or regional instruments*. ca»
States
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Egypt
CCPR
art. 12.4
art. 23.2
[art. 23.4, 24.3]
[art. 23.4, 24.3]
[art. 23.4]
CERD
[art. 5.d.ii]
[art. 5.d.iv]
CEDAW
[art. 16.1.a,
16.1.b, 16.2]
art. 9.2
art. 9.2
art. 16.1.C,
16.1.g, 16.1.h
87. The objections reads:" ... it is inconsistent with these contractual obligations (the
objection mentions the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
CCPR as well as the Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights) previously
' ' assumed by ... for its Government now to claim that it has reservations, on the same
• (.' subject, about the 1979 Convention.
•?;':•! ;i ST/LEG/SER.E/11. And similarly Lijnzaad, Het maken en breken van internationaal
recht voor vrouwen, reaclie op 'Onder Voorbehoud'(hereafter: Lijnzaad, Maken en
breken). Nemesis 1993, at 211-214.
88. This idea of coherence implies a restrictive application of general rules of contract law,
such as the /er .spcciato or /or power/or rule.
89. This table merely gives an impression of some discrepancies with respect to reservations
to various conventions. The articles in bold are reservations, the articles between
brackets are parallel provisions without reservations in other instruments.
90. Similarly Cook, Women's Convention at 682. -, ., • , _ , .^  , . ,,. , ( I IKI ' . I^- .JW
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States
FR Germany
! „ • • : • - ' . • • . " • , • : • , ,
Iceland
Iraq
}> . \ - i>> . . -.5, :<•..>? ^ H
Jamaica
Jordan
Luxemburg
Malta
Mauritius
Netherlands
New-Zealand
CCPR
art. 19
art. 21
-V.-T * >
art. 22 "
[art. 25.cjo. 26]
art. 8.3.a
[art. 2.1, 2.2,
art. 26]
[art. 23.4, 24.3]
[art. 23.4, 24.3]
[art. 23.4, 24.3]
[art. 23.4]
art. 19.2
art. 20.1 •" " '
[art. 25.c jo.
art. 26]
art. 19
[art. 23.4]
art. 12.1, 12.2
art. 12.4
art. 22
CERD
[art. S.d.viii]
[art. 5.d.ix]
[art. 5.d.ix,
*•"•* LU .
[art. 5.d.viii]
[art. 4.a, 4.b]
[art. 5.d.viii]
[art. 5.d.i,
S.d.ii]
[art. 5.d.i,
S.d.ii]
[art. 5.d.ix,
5.e.ii]
CEDAW
art. 7.b
[art. ll.l.c]
art. 2.f, 2.g
art. 9.2 ',..^,.'._
art. 9.2 !
art. 9.2
art. 16.1.C,
16.1.d, 16.1.«
art. 7 ' ' '** ^
art. 16.1.g
• - * 4 • ! • > •
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States
Republic
Korea
Trinidad
bago
Tunesia
of
v =. r
; ( - • ' • ?
and To-
! i l i t i
.- ft .
United Kingdom
CCPR
art. 22
[art. 23.4,
[art. 23.4]
art. 12.2
art. 21
[art. 23.4,
[art. 23.4]
art. 12.1 -
art. 12.4
art. 25.b.,
24.3]
24.3]
—~_
25.c
CERD
[art. 5.d.ix,
[art. 5.d.i,
5.d.ii]
[art. 5.d.ix]
[art. 5.d.i,
S.d.ii]
[art. 5.d.i,
CEDAW
art.
art.
— —
art.
art.
16.1
[art.
9 • - • • ' ' •
16.1.g
9.2 ,,.,,,.,.,-.:
16.1.C,
.g, 16.1.h
r - . • - I - ' - . •
7.b, 7.c]
Some differences exist between the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination and the Covenant. But there are really striking examples of
disparities between obligations under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
to which no reservations have been made, and identical obligations under the
Women's Convention swamped with reservations. The obvious remark would be
that the Covenant happens to be the Men's Convention. A strategical approach to
the reservations issue uses the unqualified acceptance of obligations under the
Covenant as relevant for the scope of reservations to the Women's Convention.
An overview such as this may facilitate the work of the Committees, who could
question the differences in obligations under the different treaties. The Human
Rights Committee could for instance, question Iraq on the implementation of
articles 2 and 26 CCPR (to which no reservations have been made), in view of
the Iraqi reservation to article 2.f and 2.g CEDAW and the obligation to with-
draw discriminatory penal legislation. The Women's Committee could ask the
same question, based on the expert knowledge the Committee members may have
about the Covenant. Similarly, Cook has argued that in fact the supervisory
bodies may look at relevant case law under other human rights instruments, in
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order to interpret human rights obligations'". This may have some additional
advantages in terms of access to supervisory procedures.
It will be quite obvious that in order to turn this theory into a tool for practical
use, the supervisory Committees will have to gain more insight into the coher-
ence of contemporary human rights law. But this is perhaps a small problem that
could be solved easily with expert advice, and could be facilitated by adequate
servicing of the supervisory organs. ;K«*œ''Tï:Si-. i?>-y;isir&*»<j(p; sJégj » * <-*M*
3. .-. THE QUEST FOR UNIVERSALITY
The universality of human rights law is a complex matter. Dealing with the issue,
one is struck by the confusion of tongues surrounding it. The universality of
moral, ethical and religious values is intermingled with ideas about the feasibility
of universally binding legal rules. Far from pretending to provide a solution,
attention ought to be given to the question whether the universality of human
rights law is a goal that can be attained within the realm of the law of treaties.
Do reservations affect the quest for universality, and if so, are there possibilities
of redressing this?
3.ti/'« The universality of human rights law • - * ; , • ^ , , ;
When discussing the universality of human rights law, the first matter that comes
to mind is the question whether human rights are based on a concept of human
dignity shared by all cultures^. Although human rights are embodied in treaties
drafted within the framework of the United Nations, the issue is whether their
validity is based on universal ethical, moral or religious convictions. Learned
authors have at length elaborated on this question, but it would seem to be
beyond the abilities of lawyers, as lawyers, to assess the validity of moral
judgments". -.'""*• f
91. •""'• Cook. Women's Convention at 710. * i , . « . , . . •;
92. M.Bertrand, Universality, in: Is Universality in jeopardy?. United Nations Department
of Public Information, New York 1987, 21-33 at 23:"For universality to exist, there
« ; 1*. should be a common political view of the world, in other words, universal acceptance of
the same values and of the institutions capable of guaranteeing them."; and RJ.Dupuy,
; >i;^ :'i L'universalité des droits de l'homme, in:Studi in onore di Giuseppe Sperduti, Milano.
i--»w 1984, 541-556, at 541:"..la question de savoir si le droit international donne des droits de
l'homme une vision suffisament rassemblée, suffisamment unifiée pour pouvoir convier
tous les hommes à les respecter."
93. The discussion has focused on three related issues concerning universality, namely the
existence of a shared concept of human rights, the influence of western individualism on
«in-.i human rights law, and finally the question whether the Universal Declaration as a whole
> has universal validity.
On the matter of the shared concept of human rights amongst others: Th.C. van Boven,
Politisation et droits de l'homme, in: Les organisations internationales entre l'innovation
et la stagnation, N.Jéquier,F.Muheim(eds.), Lausanne. 1985 125-138, at 126-127; Dupuy,
op.cit. at 542; H.Gros Espiell, The evolving concept of human rights, in: Human rights,
....-... ii-f-:;;n f , . , ; : • • r- -, •••' • ; . - " ".¥»»>""« .1 jflsv'i: •..".•S«i!f.'*v2 =n «V»9W it? .:; « -;•• **<•!* s ( c o n t i n u e d . . . )
104 RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
The assumption of the universality of human rights is inspired by the conviction
that these rights should be available for all. To ensure this, human rights instru-
ments should be binding at a global level. The fact that various human rights
instruments have been drafted within the framework of the United Nations and
have been widely ratified has been taken as proof for the existence of universally
shared values'". When drafting human rights instruments it may be assumed that
states use this opportunity to determine the common core of values upon which
human rights are based. Yet, it is not mandatory to lay down rights based on
shared concepts of human dignity, the substance of the treaty may very well be
the result of negotiations.
Assuming that the protection of human rights would be guaranteed once all states
have ratified every human rights treaty demonstrates the /Ki/wtf<» of lawyers. This
means interpreting formal universality as substantive universality, which need not
be the case. Behind being a party to a human rights treaty lies the question of
which provisions the state is actually bound by. Reservations obviously restrict
the rights laid down in human rights instruments. Although a large majority of
the states may be formally bound by a treaty, it will not be equally binding on all
states parties and the substantive rights will not be available for all.
The question ought to be raised as to what is exactly meant by the quest for
universality. The desire for human rights to be available for all, would seem to
stretch well beyond the simple adherence to a human rights treaty. This is merely
formal universality. An additional requirement is the integral acceptance of the
rights laid down in the treaty. Universality need not, after all, be satisfied by a
purely formalistic approach, substantive guarantees are of primordial importance.
Global adherence alone is a rather meagre form of universality.
93.(...continued)
thirty years after the Universal Declaration. B.G.Ramcharan(ed.), The Hague 1979, at
41-65; L.Kuhnhardt, Die Universalitât der Menschenrechte. Miinchen 1987 passim;
C.Tomuschat, Is Universality of Human Rights Standards an Outdated and Utopian
Concept?, in: Das Europa der Zweiten Generation, Gedàchtnisschrift fiir Chr. Sasse,
Kehl 1981, 585-609.
On the so-called "western" influence on the contemporary concept of human rights:
P.R.Baehr, Toepassing van universele mensenrechtennormen, in: 40 Internationale
Spectator 1986, 85-92 at 86; Cassese, International Law at 299.
On the validity of the Universal Declaration amongst others: The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights: its significance in 1988, SIM Special no.9 (december 1988) passim;
P.AIston, The United Nations and the elliptical notion of the universality of human
rights, in: Is Universality in jeopardy'?. United Nations Department of Public Informa-
tion. New York 1987, 51-65 at 53-56.
94. Alston, op.cit. at 59:".. a claim which, although sometimes assumed to exist, could never
reasonably made. That is that the United Nations approach to human rights represents
a common denominator of all of the world's cultural traditions and ethical values and
that the notion of rights is as deeply rooted in each of the world's major cultural
traditions as it is in Western Enlightenment culture."
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This broader approach to universality adds another perspective to the discussion.
For universality, understood as global adherence and integral acceptance faces
two different hurdles. Not only does universality require persuading all states to
become parties to human rights treaties, the integral acceptance of the treaty is an
equally important goal of human rights policy". Both requirements of the
broader concept of universality, it is contended, conflict with the basic premises
of the law of treaties, the fact that states can only be bound by what they
explicitly agree to. This is precisely were the quest for universality and the issue
of reservations meet.
3.2. The arithmetics of universality
Apart from the fact that there are a number of understandable reasons for making
reservations dealt with above, there is also a widely held view that reservations
are a necessary correlate of the wish to establish a universal protection of human
rights". In my view this is a rather limited interpretation of universality", but
the point to be discussed here is whether the assumption that reservations are the
necessary price for ratification is valid.
The argument is as follows: given the desirability of universal adherence to
human rights treaties and given the fact that the situation in the countries differs a
great deal**, reservations may provide for a mechanism to modify the obliga-
tions in the treaty. The advantage is that states that do not yet completely fulfil
the norms set by the treaty, will be within its scope. Being a party will ensure
supervision, and encourages the improvement of the domestic human rights
situation*'. This line of reasoning stresses the importance of adherence, on the
assumption that being a state party to a particular treaty will prompt the with-
drawal of reservations in the future. This view is underlined by the suggestion
that to reason otherwise, by demanding full adherence and excluding reserva-
tions, leads to an elitist treaty with only a few States Parties living up to the
treaty's standards, which is contrary to the aim of universality.
The question to be raised is whether it has indeed been true that the reservation
option has led to universal adherence. This was after all the argument for being
lenient on the reservations issue. When looking at the figures for the treaties to
be dealt with in this study, they are not very persuasive"".
95. Cook, Women's Convention at 644-645, 649; Lijnzaad, Paradoxale universaliteit, at 7.
96. Schachter cs. at 147 write that:"It is reasonable to assume that the right to make
reservations to multilateral treaties facilitates their wider acceptance."
97. Lijnzaad, Paradoxale universaliteit. at 7.
98. Schachter cs. at 147; Shelton, op.cit. at 208.
99. A.Byrnes, The "Other" Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, in: 14 YaleJIL 1989 (hereafter: Byrnes,
The work of the Committee), 1-67 at 56; Cook, Women's Convention at 686.
100. Cf. Lijnzaad, Paradoxale universaliteit, at 13-14. Schachter cs. write at 147:"It has been
said that the assumption that reservations facilitate ratifications and accessions lacks
statistical confirmation."
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By 31 December 1992, 166 States were member of the United Nations and thus
eligible to express consent to be bound by these instruments"". The following
figures indicate that in spite of the fact that rather liberal rules on reservations
applied, adherence is far from universal.""
CERD
CCPR
CEDAW
CAT
130 ratifications
100 ratifications
110 ratifications
64 ratifications
47 reservations
44 reservations
51 reservations
26 reservations
CERD
CCPR
CEDAW
CAT
130 ratifications
100 ratifications
110 ratifications
64 ratifications
The other presumption is that being a state party to a human rights treaty, under
the wings of the supervisory organs, will lead to a gradual improvement of the
implementation of the complete treaty and to the withdrawal of reservations. Let
us look at the withdrawal figures, this will be done more in depth in the follow-
ing chapters, but for now the following figures may serve as an indication that
the number of withdrawals does not substantiate this line of reasoning.""
10 withdrawals
6 withdrawals
12 withdrawals
8 withdrawals
The idea that reservations are a necessary price for universal participation has
been reinforced by publications that have suggested that the impact of reserva-
tions does not pose great problems in practice. On the basis of a so-called
macroscopic approach, Gamble indicated that the average state made less than
one reservation per treaty in recent years'**. This conclusion appears to be
reassuring. With less than one reservation per state per treaty, one is indeed
inclined to consider the reservations issue a minor problem.
Yet, there are reasons to doubt whether this approach does not suffer from the
inaccuracies of arithmetic. When looking specifically at human rights treaties the
figures are significantly different. In her article Shelton concludes that 20% of
the States ratified human rights treaties with reservations, and in fact 13% of the
States made substantive reservations as opposed to procedural reservations"".
Not only does this show that the figures can be deceptive, Shelton also stresses
101. ST/LEG/SER.E/11.
102. These figures are the number of stales that made reservations, and include reservations
to dispute settlement clauses, that arc not dealt with.
103. These figures are withdrawals per country, and could thus include the withdrawal of a
number of reservations.
104. Gamble, op.cit at 372; vd Velde, Voorbehouden at 354. Similarly Schachter cs. op.cit. at
154-155.
105. Shelton, op.cit. at 225-226.
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the importance of the substance of the reservation. Substance is what "object and
purpose" is all about, it is a rule about the quality of the reservation. This is even
more the case given the "object and purpose" of human rights law in general.
To sum up, it must be concluded that, however persuasive the argument is that
reservations facilitate ratification, it is not absolutely valid. Whereas the Court in
the Genocide case was able to combine both universality and integrity because of
the single-mindedness of the Genocide Convention"", this will probably not be
possible with respect to more recent human rights treaties. Moreover with the
law on reservations favouring universal acceptance in article 20.5 VCLT, and
with the supervisory Committees acting as the guardians of human rights instru-
ments, it can only be expected that the solution will be some kind of compro-
mise.
On the other hand it has been suggested that those States that take their human
rights obligations seriously make reservations, whereas a great many states that
ratify without reservations do not have the slightest intention of living up to their
obligations in the domestic sphere"". This should indeed be kept in mind when
criticizing reserving States. For the individual in a state, it will probably make
little difference whether a restriction of human rights is legitimized through a
reservation or not.
3.3. A problem of tools
The problem of reservations to human rights treaties is that of the choice of a
wrong tool""". From the outset, with the idea that an International Bill of Rights
should be drafted, a deliberate choice was made for tec .ycr//>/fl"". This is
understandable, as treaties have the advantage of providing accessible and
possibly detailed rules. Moreover, it will be clear which states are bound by the
rules. Using treaties for the formulation of human rights does however also have
a number of disadvantages"". The negotiations may be heavily influenced by
considerations not related to human rights, the final text suggests genuine
consensus, but may in fact be a compromise solution. By using the methods of
the law of treaties the distinctive characteristics of this set of instrumental rules
will influence the possibility of achieving universality in a broader sense.
To understand this, some reflection on the origins of the Law of Treaties is
necessary. Historically the law of treaties developed as a tool for states to
formalize their agreements. Initially it concerned only bilateral agreements,
laying down reciprocal subjective rights. It is necessary to keep this initial
orientation in mind as the number of states parties to treaties expanded. As the
106. Cf. par.2 supra.
107. Shelton, op.cit. at 226.
108. Lijnzaad, Paradoxale universaliteit. at 8-10 and 14-16.
109. Henkin. op.cit. at 9-11; Pechota, op.cit. passim.
110. Coccia, op.cit. at 2, note 4.
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international legal community grew'", states began to conclude multilateral
treaties, considering them a bundle of parallel bilateral treaties"-. Whereas the
law was able to cope with the changes involving the growing number of states
parties'" to multilateral treaties, it was much more complicated to adapt to the
changing content of the treaties"''.
The fundamental change in the content of treaties was brought about by the
emergence of both objective legal regimes and /ra/7éj-/o«. Treaties like these lay
down obligations of a general nature stemming from global considerations rather
than the states parties' subjective interests. This changing content might have
necessitated a reconsideration of the foundations of treaty law"^. However,
international law stuck to a traditional method of law creation, incorporating as
far as possible new developments in the content of the treaties"*. It is sub-
mitted that the problems arising in relation to reservations to human rights
treaties are among other things, a consequence of the fact that while the content
of treaties changed, the method of creating law through written agreements
remained the same'".
The method suitable for the creation of universally valid and integrally binding
law would be customary international law. It is basically universally binding, and
every rule of law is integrally binding on every state"*. But this is not suitable
in the case of international human rights law'". Its creation takes a relatively
1113 i.: *>• Discussing the changes in the structure of international relations; G.J.H van Hoof,
Rethinking the Sources of International Law. IJssclstein 1983, at 65-71.
112. An approach upheld in the Vienna Convention, see: Rosenne. Developments at 82-83,
and by the same author Bilateralism and Community Interest in the Codified Law of
Treaties (hereafter: Rosenne, Bilateralism), in: Transnational Law in a changing society,
W.Friedmann cs.(eds.), New York 1972, 202-227.
113. van Hoof, op.cit. at 69-71.
lf*v ,i*#. van Ho°f> op.cit. at 68-69.
115. On the attempts to classify treaties: Rosenne, Developments at 181:The underlying
assumptions seem to be, ... , either that there is no unitary law of treaties applicable in
its ensemble for every purpose to every treaty ... or that such a unitary law of treaties
does exist, but the application of its detailed rules and precepts will vary, and some of
its precepts might even disappear entirely, according to the classification into which a
given treaty falls..".
116. Rosenne, Bilateralism, at 226:"..the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, when
placed in the context of the totality of public international law as it is today, goes a long
' ^ way towards reconstituting the law of treaties in such a manner that, alongside the
bilateralism which really is the essence of contractual law and jurisprudence, the
tôi't.ftj' existence of broader interests is not only acknowledged but actually accorded a recog-
=,.|| i.^ . nized place in the law."
149, Rosenne, Developments at 83-84:"..the codification (the Vienna Convention, EL) as a
'• • whole still reflects the law as it developed in the relatively compact and relatively
homogeneous international community before the effects of self-determination 1919 and
of the massive decolonization of the 1960s could be felt."
118. With the exception of the doctrine of the "persistent objector", see Norwegian Fisheries
case, ICJ Reports 1951.
119. Van Hoof, op.cit., discussing the disadvantages of the methods of customary law at 113-
»"-"•. 116, and of treaty law at 119-130; Lijnzaad, Paradoxale universaliteit at 14-15.
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long time, and the rules that will eventually come into existence may not be
specific enough. The creation of supervisory organs, such as the various commit-
tees monitoring the implementation of human rights covenants, is certainly not
possible within the process creating international customary law. Moreover,
participants in the creative process of international customary law very often feel
that they can not influence the process.
In sum, neither method of creating international law is suitable for the achieve-
ment of both demands, the requirement of global adherence as well as the aim of
integral acceptance. Customary international law is inadequate because of its
opaque creative process and the lack of precision in the rules of law thus created.
Treaty law is unsuitable because of the liberty it traditionally leaves states and the
consequences this has for the quest for universality. This must lead to the
conclusion that the aim of universality in the broader sense, that is global
adherence and integral acceptance, will probably always be hampered by the
limited possibilities the methods of creation of international law, and treaties in
particular, offer.
Although the question of reservations to human rights treaties presents itself as a
technical legal question, there is also another reason for the contlicts between the
law of treaties and human rights law. Looking at the problem from a different
angle, it could be rephrased as one of differing morality.
The foundation of the law of treaties is basically still the plain and simple rule of
</o «/ rfw, elaborated on above. It is the morality of obligation, sticking to one's
promise and acting as agreed'"". It is the elementary morality on which any
legal system is based, a system of reciprocal restraint through bilateral agree-
ments. Human rights law is based on a different morality, the morality of aspir-
ation'*'. It is forward-looking, aimed at promoting the well-being of mankind.
It implies efforts and restraints from the actor controlling the power that might
endanger human rights, namely the state. It is the morality of a refined legal
system that seeks to attain predetermined goals.
Having sketched the differing moralities of both the law of treaties and human
rights law it becomes clear that attaining the goals of human rights law, within
the field of aspirations, will be difficult when the only tool available is one of
obligations. The traditional law of treaties is not the best possible tool but
unfortunately it is the only available one'". As the whole international legal
system is geared towards obligations the only possibility of realizing an aspiration
(such as the aspiration of universal human rights) is through redressing it as an
obligation. Hence the "treatyfication" of human rights law.
120. Fuller, op.cit. at 19-27.
121. Fuller, op.cil. at 15-19.
122. McNair, The functions and differing legal character of treaties, writes lucidly about the
defectiveness of treaties, at 101:".. the only and sadly overworked instrument with which
international society is equipped for the purpose of carrying out its multifarious
transactions.*
HO RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
Behind the formal aspect of treaty obligations lie usually materially obligatory
elements. That is the actual strength of mi/fewo/i/raw, not only are they
formally obligatory there is also a reciprocal substantive obligation. Call it Jo uf
<fes or not, it is essentially the reason the system functions. The absence of
substantive reciprocity within human rights treaties leaves them without an
internal supervisory mechanism'^.
3.4. Reciprocity in human rights treaty law ^ .<•-;.' •.;. • •< -
.«I t ' ' ? " ' <•-•>„' -,/V-fïv "•".-.. . ' V . W •-.'.'"•"•
What then, has happened to reciprocity in human rights treaties? As described
above, substantive reciprocity together with a certain amount of interest on the
part of the states involved, seem the best guarantee for monitoring the fulfilment
of treaty obligations. Seeing that reciprocity can be of such vital importance in
the various stages of a treaty, it is necessary to look at the question of whether
there is a reciprocal relationship at the basis of a human rights treaty.
These treaties differ from the 'standard' treaty as far as the content and the
beneficiaries of the norms are concerned. The question of the reciprocity of
human rights treaties has been dealt with in relation to the objective nature of the
obligation'"*. s> .
With respect to Genocide Convention, the International Court stated that:
The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing
purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might have this dual
character to a greater degree, since its object on the one hand is to safeguard the very
existence of certain human groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most
elementary principles of morality. In such a convention the contracting states do not
have an interest of their own; they merely have, one and all. a common interest, namely,
the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'être of the conven-
tion. Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of individual advan-
tages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance
between rights and duties"'"' • • - • • •
Similarly the European Commission on Human Rights, in the procedure of
Austria versus Italy'"'stated that: " «
".. the purposes of the High Contracting Parties in concluding the Convention was not
to concede to each other reciprocal rights and obligations in pursuance of their
^: - • , f i ' : ; . ; i ; f f ; - . ' • ' . . Y - , • ! - . - • • : ! : < • ' • - • . " • ' . -_••• . '
123. Fitzmaurice. The law and procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951- 1954, at
289 writing about the Genocide case: "..the Court was fully aware that the Genocide
Convention was of the normative type, and did not operate reciprocally by way of any
benefits moving between the parties i/i/or if on which an objection to a reservation
could 'bite'."
124. See T.Buergenthal, The advisory practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court
(hereafterBuergenthal, Advisory practice), in: 79 AJIL 1985, 1-27 at 20-23.
125. ICJ Rep. at 23.
126. Austria v. Italy, Application 788/60, 4 European Yearbook on Human Rights 1961, at
138.
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:.. < individual national interests but to realize the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe,."
. -^<jj "..the obligations undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the European Conven-
tion are essentially of an objective character, being designed rather to protect the
fundamental rights of individual human beings from infringements by any of the High
•'"*•**-"'-•• Cont rac t ing Parties than to create subjective and reciprocal rights for the High Con-
j-VSh ; trading Parties."- • ' ' i - w i M ; ? w ^ " s ; - ' : •> - i î »««&*<> tx?;.
In the same vein the American Court in the Effects of Reservations case'-'
e m p h a s i z e d t h a t : ,<*•, Î Y H » , ^;:- ••• ;ïf 'v- , Î * W < ^ - . ; , V --"s.-,**- •:;*» V-Jarta*
"..modern human rights treaties in general,.., are not multilateral treaties of the
traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the
mutual benefit of the contracting States. Their object and purpose is the protection of
the basic rights of individual human beings irrespective of their nationality, both against
the State of their nationality and all other contracting States."
The quotations may illustrate that the object of human rights treaties is not the
exchange of reciprocal obligations, although these are formally still underlie the
treaty, but objective obligations towards the individuals under the jurisdiction of
the states parties'^*.
Although they are the beneficiaries of a treaty, civilians are not party to the
treaty'^. The provisions are of an objective nature, suggesting a validity well
beyond the bounds of reciprocity. The substantive provisions of the treaty will
have to be fulfilled between a state and its subjects, whereas the treaty obligations
are between the different states parties. The fact that the actual beneficiaries of
the conventions are civilians rather than states, together with the objective nature
of the rights might suggest that no exchange of benefits between the ratifying
states ever took place. This is incorrect. The most essential benefit is the fact that
human rights will be regulated at international level. This a benefit to the
international community at large, which has also been the aim of the participating
states. A human rights treaty is, like any other treaty, the result of negotiations.
There are often other benefits involved in negotiating and acceding to a human
rights treaty. These will not be retributions in the shape of favourable provisions
in an international legal instrument, but may take the form of extra-legal remun-
erations, such as an improvement of the state's international standing, the proof
of being a respected member of the international community.
127. Effects of reservations, OC-2/82, para.29.
128. Dupuy, op.cit. at 551:"..le principe de la réciprocité sur lequel se fonde tout le droit
international classique, est écarté. On veut créer, par les conventions affirmant les droits
de l'homme, un ordre juridique objectif, ou comme dit la Commission Européenne des
droits de l'Homme, un ordre juridique communautaire. C'est dire que l'on ne se trouve
pas en présence d'un système de nature contractuelle. Un étal ne peut pas subordonner
le respect par lui des droits de l'homme au respect de ceux-ci par son cocontractant. On
ne marchande pas avec les droits de l'homme. Ce n'est pas le "rfo M/ (to". C'est ordre
juridique objectif qui est mis en place; c'est une légalité qui est la même pour tous."
129. Clark, op.cit at 318, points to major conceptual differences in this respect.
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As described above, formal reciprocity is vital for every treaty's existence'**.
The Vienna Convention lays down formal reciprocity, creating a formal balance
between the rights and obligations of the states parties to a treaty. At the same
time a substantive balance may be completely absent. As concerns reservations,
the Vienna Convention system is equally formalistic. When the reserving state
restricts its obligations, the recipient states are equally allowed to do so towards
the reserving state. A reservation to a human rights treaty may harm people
under the jurisdiction of the reserving state, and will only affect moral rights
appertaining to the other states. A reciprocal restriction on obligations on the
basis of article 21.1 of the Vienna Convention thus serves no purpose. When one
analyzes these aspects of reciprocity, the problem of reservations to human rights
treaties becomes clear. Although the acceptance of reservations is dealt with as a
matter of formal reciprocity (both in the Vienna Convention and in doctrine), it
has a tremendous impact on the substance of the treaty. This fact has never
provoked much attention, or action on the part of the States concerned. The
absence of directly detrimental consequences of reservations for the other States
Parties, enhanced by the tacit acceptance in article 20.5 VCLT, leads to states
accepting the reservations.
4. OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
Focus on a number of human rights treaties concluded under the aegis of the
United Nations has been a deliberate choice. The reasons for this choice have
been explained before. Nevertheless, the experience in dealing with reservations
under other human rights treaties, in particular the regional systems, may provide
useful background information. The conditions for dealing with reservations are
obviously quite different, but there is a great similarity between the substantive
rights protected at world level and at regional level. Regional practice may
provide useful insights for reducing the impact of reservations at global level. In
the following the rules and case-law on reservations to the European Convention
and the American Convention will be dealt with briefly. This is not meant to be
an exhaustive discussion, but merely an illustration of a relevant practice'^'.
4.1. European Convention Tor the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms""
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (henceforth:ECHR) is the oldest regional system for human rights
protection. It was created under the aegis of the Council of Europe, and the
130. See Chapter 2, par.6 supra.
131. Cook, Women's Convention at 645.
132. Rome, 4 November 1950: Entry into force 3 September 1953.
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rights under the Convention as well as the additional Protocols can in general be
classified as civil and political rights. The ECHR's twin, the European Social
Charter'" contains social and economic rights, and has a incomparable supervi-
sion system.
The supervisory system of the European Convention consists of a European
Commission of Human Rights'** and a European Court of Human Rights'".
Individual petitions may be received by the Commission, provided that the State
Party against whom the complaint is addressed has accepted this competence of
the Commission. Under article 24 a state party may begin proceedings against
another State Party on allegations of breach of the Convention. The State
involved and the Commission may refer a case to the Court.
During the drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights (henceforth:
ECHR) the question of reservations was discussed. It was felt to be within the
nature of the Convention that reservations would not be allowed without restric-
tions, and it was also suggested that a qualified majority should accept the
reservations formulated"*. None of these intentions materialized, and article 64
now reads:
"1. Any state may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of
ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention
to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the
provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted under this Article.
2. Any reservation made under this Article shall contain a brief statement of the law
concerned."
On the basis of this provision, the ECHR's reservations system consists of the
following rules. Reservations of a general character are prohibited in article 64.1.
The obligation to make a specific reservation appears twice in the provision: not
only are reservations of a general character prohibited in the second sentence, the
article also speaks of a reservation in respect of a particular provision of the
Convention in the first sentence. A second requirement is that the reservation is
based upon legislation in force in the reserving State the time of ratification, a
rule which is also to be found in the first paragraph of the provision. This is
reinforced by the second paragraph that indicates that the reservation should be
accompanied by a brief statement of the law concerned. The provision prohibits
the formulation of general reservations, and at the same time it provides informa-
tion on the relevant legislation to the Convention's supervisory organs as well as
the individuals under the protection of the Covenant'".
133. Turin, 18 October 1961; Entry into force 26 February 1965. .$)?•?
134. Articles 19.a. 20-37 ECHR. <**
135. Article 19.b, 38-56 ECHR.
136. Bourguignon, op.cit. at 356-360; P.van Dijk, GJ.H.van Hoof, De Europese Conventie in
Théorie en Praktijk, Nijmegen 1982, at 517-518; Golsong, op.cit. at 30-31; Imbert, HRR,
at 43-44; Imbert, Affaire Temeltasch, at 613-615; Kuhner, MRK at 70-73; J.M. van der
Velde, Voorbehouden ten aanzien van de ECRM, in: 12 NJCM Bull.1987, 353-365, at
356-357.
137. Frowein and Peukert, op.cit. at 490; Kuhner, MRK, at 80-81.
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The system laid down in the Convention itself is remarkably formal, it does not
focus on the substance of the reservation. In terms of the Vienna Convention it
must be understood as a system under article 19.a VCLT, article 64 indicates
which reservations are prohibited'^. It has however also been suggested that in
addition to this, the object and purpose rule of article 19.c VCLT would also be
applicable"'. The application of article 64 is not explicitly regulated by the
European Convention, and the question could be raised as to whom the Conven-
tion refers in the second sentence of the first paragraph of article 64, where it
reads that reservations of a general character shall not be permitted'*. Two
issues need to be raised in this respect. Does article 64 ECHR fall within the
scope of the tacit acceptance rule of article 20.5 of the Vienna Convention? If
that is the case there would, according to Imbert, not be room for scrutiny by the
Convention's supervisory organs at the end of the twelve months period''".
Golsong on the other hand stressed that the VCLT is not equipped to deal with
human rights treaties'''-. The authority of the supervisory organs is based upon
the nature of the Convention and its intention to create a European ordre /?«M/c,
and the objective obligations following from the Convention. The fact that the
Convention provides for supervision re-enforces the importance of a determina-
tion by organs within the system, rather than the States''". "*' -• ••- " "•
A further problem in this respect is the uncertainty arising if the supervisory
organs could, even after a long period of time, determine that a particular
reservation was invalid. This would be a rather haphazard determination depend-
ing on the cases brought before the Commission if and when they were sub-
mitted. It might lead to reservations being declared invalid twenty years after
being made, which is contrary to the requirement of legal certainty'**. How-
ever, van Dijk and van Hoof are quite right in stressing that the situation in
respect of reservations does not differ from other situations in which a violation
of the Convention is established years after its entry into force. Such declarations
will only have an er WMHC effect.
Questions about reservations have arisen in the individual complaints procedure.
The Commission usually decides on inadmissibility ra/Jo/M* «inter/ae when the
violation complained about is covered by a reservation. In such cases a rule is
invoked that is not binding upon a state, which leads to inadmissibility'^. If
however the scope of the reservation is unclear, and in cases in which an
138. Bourguignon, op.cil. at 355. «<fi. 1^- • _ Âf
139. Van Dijk/van Hoof, op.eit. at 518; Kiihner, MRK, at 82-87. «. .--"-V ^ . ,"«£•
M a Golsong, op.eit. at 31. . - ) * • : , ; . ' . -,-s'
141-.' Imbert. HRR, at 44; Imbert, Affaire Temeltasch, at 616.. ;;-; - , . < K : ' V
142; Golsong, op.eit. at 37-41. • ; : : . : ,
143." Frowein and Peukert , op.eit. at 490-491; Golsong, op.eit. at 33-34. -~i . ^  •
144. Van Dijk and van Hoof, op.eit. at 523; Frowein and Peukert. op.eit. at 491; Golsong
op.eit. at 34-35; Imbert, Affaire Temeltasch, at 616-617.
145. Frowein and Peukert, op.eit. at 49M92. - • • • -
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interpretative declaration is invoked, the matter will be usually be declared
admissible and decided on the merits. >
In order to implement the Convention, and the reservations made thereto,
interpretation is necessary. The initial practice with respect to the reservations
has been remarkable liberal'**. There are a great number of examples in which
the Commission interpreted the State's intention in such a way as to construct a
situation in which a state validly relied upon a reservation. This at times meant
ignoring the fact that a reservation did not refer to a specific provision, or did not
indicate the relevant legislation'"". In other cases new legislation was under-
stood to be under the scope of prior reservations, whereas the gist of this rule
seems to be that "new" legislation cannot be safeguarded by "old" reservations.
However wisely article 64 was applied by the European Commission on Human
Rights in the past, the nineteen eighties brought a dramatic change in the way in
which reservations were dealt with. This change of season was heralded in a
decision on admissibility where the Commission stated that it had "now come to
the opinion that, in view of the various questions which may be raised by the
scope of a reservation and its compatibility with Article 64 of the Convention, its
previous decisions on this matter could be usefully reconsidered."'"*.
In the following a number of recent cases will be discussed in greater detail,
especially so because of their relevance for the subject of reservations to human
rights treaties in general. A number of preliminary remarks may be useful for the
understanding of these cases. On ratification of the European Convention in
1974, Switzerland had made two interpretative declarations, both leading to
important case law on reservations and interpretative declarations to the European
Convention, with an importance possibly extending beyond the scope of the
ECHR itself. ^ , , .
Switzerland ratified in 1974, which is twenty-four years after the ECHR was
opened for ratification and twenty-one years after it entered into force.
Consequently it had had the opportunity to reflect on the dynamics of the
European convention's system, including the fact that whereas States often
favoured a restrictive interpretation of a provision, the supervisory organs might
use an extensive interpretation''". , ^ .<•.
The fact that Switzerland is a federal state in which the cantons have a high
degree of autonomy also played a role in the formulation of reservations and
declarations. It was clear that Switzerland did not want to change parts of its
domestic legislation that were within the autonomy of the cantons, as a conse-
quence of the ratification.
146. Bourguignon, op.cit. at 360; Frowein, Reservations at 196; Kiihner. MRK, at 73-74. j ; ^
147. Van Dijk. Van Hoof, op.cit. at 519-520. ,f ;.. . ;•<$•,
148. X.v.Austria, case 8180/78, 10 May 1979;. D&R 20 (1980), 23-28. at 27-28
About this decision: Imbert, HRR, note 98 at 59; Shelton, op.cit. at 232. ^-i .
149. B.Wagner. L.Wildhaber, Der Fall Temeltasch und die auslegcnden Erklârungen der
Schweiz, in: 10 EuGRZ 1983, 145-149 at 145.
116 RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
4.1.1. The Temeltasch case (Commission)'**
Switzerland had made an interpretative declaration with respect to article 6.3.C
and e, dealing with the right to free legal aid and the right to free assistance of an
interpreter. The interpretative declaration was made because in a number of
cantons, as well as under federal penal law, the costs of interpretation could be
included in the legal fees, even in the case of acquittal. Free assistance of an
interpretor was a temporary right during the procedure. The issue of interpre-
tation costs had been regulated in a different manner in the multilingual legal
system of Switzerland. Freedom to use one's own language is restricted by the
rules on the official language of the canton. When the declaration was made in
1974 there was no intention to change the system of compensation for interpre-
tation fees'". Since then, a similar German rule on translation fees had been
determined not to be "free" as required in article 6.3.d by the European Court of
Human Rights in the case of Luedicke, Belkacem and Koç in 1978'".
Temeltasch, a Dutch national, had been apprehended on charges of carrying
drugs. In the ensuing procedure he was acquitted, but had to pay legal fees
related to the interpretation. He invoked the rule in article 6.3.e ECHR, as
interpreted by the Court in the Luedicke case, but the Swiss Federal Court
pointed at the interpretative declaration made by Switzerland'". The question
before the Commission on Human Rights is thus whether the Swiss declaration
can be invoked in this case, and in particular if it is a valid reservation under
article 64 of the Convention.
First of all the Commission established its authority to interpret the declaration,
which is based on the specific nature of the European Convention"", as well as
on the existence of supervisory organs with the specific task of overseeing the
implementation of the Convention. In its determination that the declaration was a
reservation the Commission used article 2.1.d VCLT, given the fact that the
ECHR itself did not contain a definition of reservations. In order to establish the
intention of the author state, the Commission studied the discussions in the Swiss
Parliament to come to the conclusion that the intention had been to exclude the
applicability of a wider interpretation of the provision (such as would be given by
the Court in the Luedicke case a few years after the Swiss ratification). More-
150. Temeltasch v. Switzerland, case 9116/80, 5 May 1982; D&R 31 (1983) at 120-153.
151. Ignoring article 64.2 ECHR had been a deliberate choice, based on domestic political
considerations. On the backgrounds of the interpretative declaration to article 6.3.e
; * ' see:Imbert, Affaire Temeltasch. at 591-593; Kiihner. MRK, at 67-69; Van der Velde,
>*" Zwitserse interpretative verklaring en artikel 64 EVRM at 481; Wagner/Wildhaber,
op.cit. at 146-147.
152. 28 November 1978, ECHR, Ser.A, vol.29 (1978), at 20. • ••«:
153. The declaration reads:"Le conseil federal suisse déclare interpréter la garantie de la
gratuité de l'asssistance d'un avocat d'office et d'un interprète figurant à l'article 6,
'**- para.3 lettres c et e, de la convention comme ne libérant pas définitivement le bénéficia-
re du paiement des frais qui en résultent."
154. Para.62-65. •?•;•;•';.-iv^t';-: ?''»;WiE W4-î'-
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over, it is noticed that at the time, no authoritative interpretation of the provision
existed, had this been the case a formal reservation would have been made'".
Having established that the Swiss interpretative declaration should be understood
to be a reservation, the Commission briefly deals with the prohibition of a
general reservation, which is not at stake in the case itself**. The rule is
interpreted to prohibit either a reservation not indicating which provision of the
Convention it is aiming at, or in general a reservation of which the scope is
unclear'".
The second rule in article 64 ECHR, the obligation to provide a brief statement
of the legislation concerned, had not been fulfilled by Switzerland, which claimed
that its federal structure and the variety of legal rules applicable in the cantons
made it impossible to fulfil this obligation"". With respect to the absence of
information on the relevant legislation, the Commission concluded that the
absence of such information in itself would not nullify the reservation, but that
the impact of this omission depended on the scope and clarity of the provision the
reservation referred to. Consequently, as the rule in article 6.3.e is a clear rule,
with a well determined scope, the absence of information on the relevant Swiss
legislation in this particular case did not lead to the invalidity of the reservation
'**. The interpretative declaration was considered to be a valid reservation, in
spite of the non-fulfilment of the obligations under article 64.2 by Switzerland.
The Temeltasch case established the Commission's authority to deal with
reservations and interpretative declarations, on the basis of the essential charac-
teristics of the European Convention"". Using the definition of article 2.l.d
VCLT in order to determine whether the declaration is a reservation seems a
practical solution. However, the extensive use of Swiss sources on the nature of
the declaration must be criticized'".
155. Para.74-82. •
156. Para.84.
157. Frowein, Peukert, MRK Kommentar at 489-49(1; R.Kiihncr, Die "auslegende Erklarung"
der Schweiz zu Art.6 Abs.3 lit.e der Europaischen Mcnschenrechtskonvention (hereafter
Kiihner, Auslegende Erklarung), in: 43 ZAoRV 1983. 829-833 at 832.
158. Wagner/Wildhaber, op.cit. at 149; para.85 Temeltasch case.
159. Para.88-91.
160. The extensive arguments by Imbert against the authority of the Commission lo deal
with the validity of the interpretative declaration as a reservation will not be dealt with
here. See Imbert, Affaire Temeltasch, at 613-621.
Cf.Kuhner. Auslegende Erklarung, at 829.
161. We shall not discuss the issue of referring to debates in a national parliament in order
to establish the intentions behind an interpretative declaration. Though this may be
possible with the framework of the European Convention, it must be doubted whether
this would be a realistic line of action for supervisory organs at world level. Apart from
the question whether the reasons for formulating an interpretative declaration are to be
considered an internal affair of a state, and the likelihood of translation problems
restricting the use of parliamentary records, the point may be raised that the "however
phrased or named" formula in article 2.l.d VCLT should be interpreted in accordance
with article 31 VCLT.
Cf.Imbert, Affaire Temeltasch, at 593-596.
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It has been stressed by Imbert that the "however phrased or named" formula has
been written for cases of doubt. He questions whether there could be any doubt
in this case, as Switzerland had made two reservations and two interpretative
declarations, thereby clearly expressing itself on the intended legal effect'".
Indeed, one can agree with Imbert that the Commission ought to have attached
greater weight to the distinction made by Switzerland itself. "ai
Furthermore, in dealing with Temeltasch' interpretation fees, the Commission
used the opportunity to clarify its understanding of the prohibition on general
reservation, even if the case did not call for such points of view. The legal effect
of the absence of statements on the legislation falling within the scope of the
reservation, depends on the scope of the provision that the reservation aims at.
This would seem to be a rule that is more lenient than the actual wording of
article 64.2 ECHR, and it might be understood as a concession towards the
understandable problems of federal states in gathering such information. How-
ever, the suggestion that the Commission's point of view turns article 64.2 into a
mere formal requirement must be contradicted'", as would be emphasized in
the Belilos case.
Ultimately the Swiss declaration leads to a peculiar situation. An interpretative
declaration as such does not have to fulfil the criteria of article 64, that is the
prohibition of general reservations and the obligation to provide a statement of
the law concerned. But then, in the Temeltasch case the interpretative declaration
was considered to be a reservation under article 2.1 .d VCLT, as a consequence
of developments in the case law on a provision the declaration dealt with, which
in turn puts the whole declaration under the scope of article 64 ECHR including
its formal r e q u i r e m e n t s . st>j?yi.3iiKVt !•.;<?«;'•*£iH?«f5«,. ise.wM»t-:-B!rf;j.n«BBto•.-;!?:.••5ii**
This would hypothetically prompt cautious States to make interpretative declar-
ations that fulfil the requirements of article 64. But by then, the distinctions
between declarations and reservations would have become completely blurred.
4.1.2. The Belilos case (Commission)'"
An interpretative declaration had also been made by Switzerland to article 6.1
ECHR dealing with the right to a fair and public hearing on the determination of
civil rights and obligations or on criminal charges, within a reasonable time by an
(Or•
M8.VÎW* Imbert, Affaire Temeltasch, at 594 writes:"Mais les mots ("however phrased or named"
!*fiitvd' in article 2.1.d, EL) que nous avons soulignés ont été introduits pour couvrir le cas de
.-.- s n/ déclarations ambiguës; ils n'ont jamais signifié qu'un Etat pouvait, à tout moment,
s- revenir sur la qualification expresse d'une de ses déclarations ni qu'il soit toujours
:.- légitime de répondre à une telle demande Dans la présente affaire, on a en fait
permis à un Etat de transformer une déclaration interprétative en réserve".
163, Wagner/Wildhabcr, op.cit. at 149.
164. Belilos v. Switzerland, Case 10328/83; 8 July 1985; D&R 44 (1985).
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independent and impartial tribunal established by law"". The Swiss legal
system does not contain a general guarantee of access to a remedy before an
impartial and independent tribunal, and in a number of cases matters involving
civil rights or criminal charges would first be dealt with by an administrative
authority. There would be a final appeal before a judicial tribunal, but part of the
procedure might take place before administrative authorities. Moreover the
cantons were the legislative authorities responsible for these procedures, rather
than the federal government"*.
Prior to the Swiss ratification the European Court of Human Rights had given a
wider interpretation to the notion "civil rights and obligations" in article 6.1
ECHR in the Ringeisen case'", than Switzerland intended to accept, relying on
the interpretation of the provision given by Fawcett on behalf of the Commission
before the Court in the Ringeisen case. According to Switzerland two interpreta-
tions of the provision were possible, and as there was no intention to adhere to a
wider interpretation, a restrictive interpretative declaration was made.
The case concerned Mrs Belilos, a Swiss national, who took part in an unauthor-
ized demonstration in Lausanne, and was convicted and fined by the Police
Board, which is an administrative authority. Determinations on questions of fact
could not be reviewed in appeal by a judicial authority. She claimed that the
procedure before the Police Board violated her right to a fair trial under article
6.1 ECHR as the Police Board was not an impartial body, and because she could
not appeal on the determination of facts.
The question before the Commission was thus whether Switzerland could rely on
the interpretative declaration it had made in respect of article 6.1 ECHR as a
reservation. Since the Temeltasch case there was no doubt that the Commission
had authority to deal with the interpretation of the Swiss declaration.
Again the Commission used a twofold test. First the question as to whether the
declaration is a reservation is addressed. At the time of ratification Switzerland
had made two reservations and two interpretative declarations. Most remarkably,
this combination of statements is taken by the Commission to be proof of the
intention not to make a reservation. It forcefully argues: "///f « j-r
reMTWtf/0//,y n/w/ /w/crprefrt//w? rfpc7flr<tf/»M.y flf /Ac .va/ni ///we, ««
rfaimtf/o» w/7/ ow/y et«?/;//o//n//y /«' oW<? /« i f fcuartv/ ivjV
r/oM. ""*. Consequently, by distinguishing, Switzerland itself indicated that the
interpretative declarations were not to have the legal effects of reservations.
165. The declaration reads:" The Swiss Federal Council considers that the guarantee of fair
trial in article 6, paragraph 1 of the Convention, in the determination of civil rights and
obligations or any criminal charge against the person in question is intended solely to
ensure ultimate control by the judiciary over the acts or decisions of the public authori-
ties relating to such rights or obligations or the determination of such a charge."
166. Wagner, Wildhaber, op.cit. at 145-146.
167. Judgement 16 July 1971, SerA no.13. •*£*
168. Report Belilos, para. 102; apparently echoing Imbert's opinion quoted in note 162 supra.
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This could have concluded the matter, but the Commission then set out to review
the declaration as though it were a reservation, and holds it to the test of article
64 ECHR. Here the Swiss declaration fails on both criteria. First of all, it does
not fulfil the requirement in article 64.1 of not being a general reservation. The
declaration is formulated too broadly, in particular the terms "ultimate control by
the judiciary" leave a lot of uncertainty about the scope'". Moreover the
declaration did not contain a statement of the law concerned as required by article
64.2'™. Consequently the declaration as a reservation would not be a valid
reservation under article 64 of the Convention. This determination reinforces the
Commission's earlier view that the declaration was not a reservation on the basis
of the distinguishing principle'". In the absence of a reservation the Commis-
sion is of the opinion that Switzerland violated article 6.1 ECHR.
The theory of distinguishing, as proposed by the European Commission has,
surprisingly, not received much acclaim. This is probably due to the fact that it
was not upheld by the Court in its decision in the Belilos case.
The fact that the author State itself deliberately chose to distinguish and the legal
effects of such a choice have, to my mind, not received enough attention. The
argument of the Commission is based on the //>«> rf/jr/7 rule, or otherwise on the
«7>r«$/0 w/i/itt rule. Under the former one is bound by one's own words,
whereas under the latter expressing the one means excluding the other. Both are
maxims of the Law of Treaties that underscore the Commission's decision'".
Additional arguments are the fact that the rule in article 2.1.d, as recalled by
Imbert, was meant to provide solutions in cases of doubt which supposedly did
not exist in the present case'".
It has been said that applying the rule of distinguishing to declarations and other
statements made in respect of the ECHR would lead to uncertainty'**. The //we
</£r/7 argument used by the Commission is rebutted by the fact that States have
political reasons for not being explicit about the intentions underlying their
declarations. This may be the case, but this line of reasoning would seem to be
extremely permissive towards the author states. Political reasons for the nomen-
clature of a declaration are necessarily within the responsibility of the author
169. Para.108-111.
170. Para.112-118; this appears to be a striking difference with the decision in the Temeltasch
•'• case, where the absence of a statement of the relevant law was excused, because of the
' clear scope of the obligation. I understand the difference to lie in the wide field of
application of article 6.1 as opposed to article 6.3.C.
171. Para.118-119.
172. Cf.article 31.1 VCLT.
173. Imbert, Affaire Temeltasch, at 594:"La question peut être posée de savoir si, dans un
cas semblable, il convenait de rechercher, après coup, qu'elle avait pu être la véritable
" • intention de l'Etat."; and similarly about article 2.1.d VCLT Sinclair, op.cit. at 54:[I]t
seems that the declaring State's own characterization of its statement as a "declaration"
rather than a "reservation" should be accepted."
174. R.St J.Macdonald, Reservations under the European Convention of Human Rights, in:21
RBDI 1988, 429^50, at 439.
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state, and the question is whether this is so at the expense of certainty, that, as
indicated by the Commission is an important motive for the ECHR's rules on
reservations.
And more interesting, as the rule of distinguishing, used by the Commission in
the Belilos case, has solid roots in general international law, its applicability may
very well extend beyond the scope of the European Convention. It is contended
that this rule will in particular be a useful rule to deal with reservations and
interpretative declarations to other human rights instruments.
4.1.3. The Belilos case (Court)"*
The Belilos case was then brought before the Court, both by the Commission and
by Switzerland. It was the first case in which the Court pronounced on the
validity of a reservation.
The Court established its authority to deal with the Swiss declaration on the basis
of articles 45, 49 and 19 ECHR, in a rather brief paragraph"*. Switzerland
never raised the issue of competence as a preliminary objection and the Court
merely indicates that it is competent'".
An explicit determination of the nature of the statement does not take place, and
the Court proceeds to deal with the criteria in article 64 ECHR straight away.
This is a remarkable procedure if compared to the Commission's twofold
approach of first determining whether the declaration is a reservation, and after
that whether the reservation is valid under articles 64 ECHR. The fact that the
Court discusses the intention of the author State is of great importance (thereby
echoing article 2.1.d VCLT), but then sets out to discuss the declaration as
though it were a reservation.
With respect to article 64.1, it is indicated that a general reservation means a
reservation couched in terms too vague or broad for it to be possible to determine
their exact meaning and scope", which is an objective determination on the basis
of the text of the reservation. The Swiss declaration did not fulfil this crite-
rion'™.
Switzerland had not fulfilled the obligation under article 64.2 ECHR of providing
a statement of the relevant law either, and was literally reprimanded by the
Court. This requirement is both an evidential factor and contributes to legal
certainty, the provision is a condition of substance for reservations. Practical
difficulties, such as the cantonal legislation in Switzerland, cannot justify ignoring
this requirement'".
This leads to the conclusion that the Swiss interpretative declaration concerning
article 6.1 ECHR failed to meet the requirements of article 64 ECHR, and was
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
Belilos case,
Para.50.
Bourguignon
verklaring at
Par.55.
Par.59.
29 april
, op.cit.
478.
1988; ECHR Ser.A, Vol.132.
at 365-371; Macdonald, op.cit. at 442-443; van der Velde, Zwitserse
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therefore an invalid reservation. It was added that this invalidity did not touch
upon the fact that Switzerland was bound by the Convention'*.
The importance of the judgement in the Belilos case is that the Court quite
clearly indicates that it is competent to deal with the validity of reservations,
thereby excluding them from the exclusive authority of other States parties during
the twelve months period prescribed by article 20.5 VCLT. This concluded a
rather lengthy academic discussion on the question whether the Court had any
authority in this respect or whether the whole matter depended on the way in
which the states parties reacted to reservations, as had been argued forcefully by
Imbert.
The way in which the Court treats the reservation is not persuasive. One fails to
see why it was impossible to state the legal effect of the statement at the very
beginning, it would appear that Switzerland made a lot of effort to emphasize its
intention of making a reservation, or a qualified interpretative declaration falling
within the scope of article 2.1.d VCLT. In fact it is peculiar that Switzerland,
relying as it did on a minority opinion in the Commission on the Ringeisen case
prior to its ratification, did not foresee the problems'*'.
For no apparent reason the Court did not follow the Commission's line of
distinguishing, and following the distinction made by the author State itself. This
is to be regretted as distinguishing would provide a useful approach to cases in
which a State has made both reservations and interpretative declarations. The
Court's judgement confines the issue of the Swiss declaration to the ECHR-
system, thereby restricting its rule to that system.
A final point to be made deals with the theory of severance in relation to the
invalidity of reservations. In case a reservation is considered invalid, it has to be
considered what the legal effects will be. If the acceptance of the reservation was
an imperative condition for the consent to be bound of the author state, it would
be logical that the invalidity of the reservation also invalidates the consent to be
bound. It may be assumed that in such cases, states do take the precaution of
formulating reservations rather than empty statements'*-. If on the other hand
the interests in the reservation are minor, compared to the interests of being a
State Party, the invalid reservation will merely be struck off the list and the
obligations of the author state will increase accordingly. This latter solution was
chosen by the Court in saying that there is an overall willingness on the part of
Switzerland to be bound by the treaty. However, stating that the declaration is an
invalid reservation does in itself not change the legal situation in Switzerland,
180. Par.60.
181. Could not the fact that Switzerland relied upon a minority opinion in the Commission,
as expressed by Fawcett, that was not subsequently carried by the Court, be considered
a / o r m m propm/nj that it cannot rely upon in order to turn its interpretative declaration
in to a reservation?
182. Bourguignon, op.cit. at 382. ?&T*M **" !
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where cantonal legislation will have to be brought up to Convention stan-
dards'".
The ECHR practice has proved that the role of supervisory organs can be of
great importance with respect to reservations. On the other hand article 64 ECHR
is not a perfect rule. In particular the second criterion, relating to any law in
force, may lead to an undesirable situation in the long run. The provision lacks a
mechanism for the reservations to be withdrawn, it appears to be static. After all
it would seem to be reasonable for the reserving State to eventually change its
legislation in order to be able to withdraw the reservation. There is no impetus to
do so, under article 64, which is reinforced by the absence of a system of
periodical reporting to a supervisory body. There are no ways of suggesting the
withdrawal of an outdated reservation referring to a law that could easily have
been changed since the ratification. States Parties might suggest withdrawal to
other States Parties, but that could hardly be called a system.
4.2. American Convention on Human Rights
The American Convention on Human Rights was concluded under the aegis of
the Organisation of American States'**. The ACHR covers by and large civil
and political rights, an additional Protocol covering social, economic and cultural
rights was adopted in 1988'".
Reservations to the ACHR are subject to the rules laid down in the Vienna
Convention""", in accordance with article 75, which reads:
"This convention shall be subject to reservations only in conformity with the provisions
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties signed on May 23, 1969."
The supervisory organs are the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights'" and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights"*. The supervisory
system consists of individual petitions (article 44 ACHR) and if the competence
of the Commission is recognized, so are inter-state complaints (article 45). If
these procedures do not lead to a satisfactory solution, a State or the Inter-
American Commission can bring the case before the Court (article 61 ACHR).
One of the striking advantages of the ACHR's practice is the possibility of
Advisory Opinions, which has greatly contributed to shaping the doctrine on
reservations to human rights treaties. The Advisory authority makes it possible to
put legal questions before a body with considerable authority. The Inter-American
183. See supra Chapter 2, par.5 The issue of interpretative declarations.
184. San José, 22 November 1969; entry into force 18 July 1978.
185. San Salvador, 17 November 1988, the protocol has not yet entered into force.
186. The ACHR and the VCLT are contemporaries, which leads Golsong to the conclusion
that article 75 ACHR was drafted in the euphoria of the Vienna Convention. Golsong,
op.cit. at 31-32.
187. Articles 34-40 ACHR.
188. Articles 52-60 ACHR. ^ - ^ #» !*JB?<?-r./ ^ j
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Court has the authority give Advisory Opinions on the interpretation of the
ACHR or other human rights instruments (article 64.1), as well as Advisory
Opinions on the compatibility of domestic law with these instruments (article
64.2)'". .*,,
4.2.1. The Effect of Reservations case"*
The second Advisory Opinion given by the Inter-American Court, at the request
of the Commission, deals with the question of what point in time that a State
becomes a party to a treaty when it has made a reservation.
After dealing with some preliminary issues, such as the fact that the request
covers the interpretation of articles 74 and 75 of the Convention, and the fact that
these issues had traditionally been dealt with by the depository and the individual
States, the Court declares itself to be competent on the basis of article 64 jo. 33.b
ACHR. The Inter-American Commission is competent to ask for the Opinion,
based on its legitimate institutional interest to know whether or not a State is a
member to the ACHR'". . ;J >r
In answering the question before it, the Court indicates that the reference in
article 75 ACHR to the Vienna Convention, means a reference to article 19.c
VCLT'^. It is recalled that the drafting States intended to create a flexible
system on reservations'^. Then the Court turns its attention to the applicable
rule in article 20 VCLT, which is dealt with by way of deduction. Article 20.2 is
not applicable because the ACHR is not about the exchange of reciprocal rights,
nor is article 20.3 applicable. The Court indicates that article 20.4 VCLT is
equally reflecting traditional multilateral and reciprocal agreements. It then recalls
the nature of human rights instruments and their goal of creating a legal order for
the common good, thereby quoting from the case of Austria v. Italy under the
ECHR'*\ the Genocide case, the preamble of the ACHR, and stressing the
relevance of the right of individual complaint. The conclusion is that it would be
manifestly unreasonable to apply article 20.4 VCLT, which would postpone entry
into force of the ACHR until its acceptance by another State Party"'. Thus
article 20.1 is applicable, while it speaks of "expressly authorized reservations"
this is not limited to specific reservations. Reservations compatible with the
object and purpose of the convention (article 19.c VCLT) are expressly author-
ized'", and while states Parties may have a legitimate interest in barring
incompatible reservations this is not the case with compatible reservations.
189. See about article 64 ACHR: Buergenthal, Advisory Practice at 3-15.
190. Advisory Opinion 4 September 1982, OC-2/82; also published in 3 HRLJ 1982, 153-165.
191. Par.14-16.
192. Par.22.
193. Par.23-25.
194. Case 788/60, Yearbook IV (1961). _.. . . ... ^
195. Par.34. "*
196. Par.36-37. ^,,. , , i j i .j*H'.>A i » .
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As indicated earlier, there is room for some doubt as to the adequacy of applying
article 20.1 in relation to article 19.c VCLT"\ but the solution presented by
the Court is by all means adequate for a human rights instrument.
••jiJ-^'jp .,
4.2.2. Restrictions to the Death Penalty case"" *
While the previous case dealt with a purely formal aspect of the law on reserva-
tions, this Advisory Opinion dealt with substantive issues, namely a reservation to
article 4.4 (prohibition of capital punishment for political offenses or related
common crimes) which is a non-derogable right under article 27.2 of the Conven-
tion. The request for an Advisory Opinion was based upon a difference of
opinion between the Inter-American Commission and Guatemala, the reserving
State. In particular the Commission raised two issues. Firstly, it did not consider
the extension of the categories of crimes for which the death penalty could be
imposed legitimate, invoking article 4.2 ACHR. This issue will not be dealt with
in the following. The second point of contention was the fact that Guatemala had
made a reservation to article 4.4'**, and had subsequently increased the number
of cases for which the death penalty could be applied. ^ _ ,
Guatemala contended that it had not accepted the authority of the Court, as the
necessary declaration under article 62 ACHR had never been made, which lead
to a complicated procedural dispute on the admissibility of the request for an
Advisory Opinion, as well as on the question how to establish whether the
request was admissible or not. However, the Court finds that the absence of a
recognition of jurisdiction is irrelevant in respect of Advisory Opinions, and the
Court only has to establish that the author of the request is entitled to submit such
a request*"".
In order to answer the questions about article 4 ACHR it is necessary to interpret
the provision, in accordance with the Vienna Convention. The Court states that in
respect of human rights treaties objective interpretative criteria are more appro-
priate then subjective criteria relying on the intent of the Parties*". This,
together with articles 29 and 30 ACHR, leads to the conclusion that the purpose
of article 4 ACHR is the strict limitation of the death penalty. Consequently,
sus bfJstat ans fewi,'.*:
197. See about the law of treaties perspective Chapter 2, par.3.2.4 supra.
198. Restrictions to the Death Penalty (arts.4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human
Rights), OC-3/83, 8 September 1983.
199. The Guatemalan reservation reads:The Government of the Republic of Guatemala,
ratifies the American Convention on Human Right, signed in San José, Costa Rica, on
the 22nd of November 1968, making a reservation with regard to Article 4, paragraph 4
of the same, inasmuch as the Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala, in its article
54, only excludes from the application of the death penalty, political crimes but not
common crimes related to political crimes." ,-
200. Par.21-25.
201. Par.50 (p.77) reads:"In the case of human rights treaties, ... , objective criteria of
interpretation that look to the texts themselves are more appropriate than subjective
criteria that seek to ascertain only the intent of the Parties".
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article 4.2 contains an absolute prohibition on applying the death penalty for
crimes that were not previously punishable with life**.
Turning to the question about the reservation to article 4.4, the Court refers to its
earlier Opinion on the Effect of Reservations, and turns to the question of
whether the reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
This determination is directly related to article 27 ACHR, dealing with non-
derogable rights, the Opinion reads:
"Article 27 of the Convention allows the States Parties to suspend, in time of war, public
clanger, or other emergency that threatens their independence or security, the obligati-
ons they assume by ratifying the Convention, provided that in doing so they do not
suspend or derogate from certain basic rights, among them the right to life guaranteed
[/ by Article 4. It would follow therefrom that a reservation which was designed to enable
a State to suspend any of the non-derogable fundamental rights must be deemed to be
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and, consequently, not per-
mitted by it. The situation would be different if the reservation merely sought to restrict
certain aspects of a non-derogable right without depriving the right as a whole of its
• basic purpose. Since the reservation referred to by the Commission in its submission
Ç does not appear to be of a type that is designed to deny the right to life as such, the
Court concludes that to that extent it can be considered, in principle, as not being
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.""'"
The issue of non-derogability as an indication of the object and purpose of a
treaty is dealt with by the Court in a rather ambivalent manner. The initial
impression is non-derogable must mean incompatible, yet in the very next
sentence the far-reaching scope of this statement is restricted by the emphasis put
on the restriction of certain aspect of the non-derogable right*". The Opinion is
indecisive which is rather unfortunate. In fact the Opinion is contradictory, which
might be attributed to the fact that the Court may not have perceived the contra-
diction in its own Opinion.
The Court then goes on to stress that reservations should be interpreted in
accordance with the Vienna Convention, and then deals specifically with the
Guatemalan reservation. The relevant rules of articles 4.2 and 4.4 have clearly a
different meaning, article 4.2 prohibits the extension of capital punishment,
whereas article 4.4 prohibits capital punishment for political and related common
crimes. Read together, both provisions merely guarantee the continued applica-
tion of the death penalty to crimes other than political and related common
crimes. The Court firmly states that a reservation to one provision does not also
cover another provision that is not mentioned in the reservation. The reservation
202. Par.59.
203. Par.61.
204. In particular the following part of par.61 of the Advisory ()pinion:"It would follow
. v. therefrom that a racrvario/i tv/iicA tvoi designed ro c/iaWc a S/a/e w nupend any o/ f/ie
no/j-</£Ti>gaWe /ittiaVj/HWira/ rig/itt ni(«f ftc deemed w 6c //icom/xirtô/f »'i/n f/ic o6/'ec/ anrf
•'• /««pose o/f/ic Com'cn/i'o/i and, consequently, not permitted by it. The situation would be
different if r/ie renrrario/i mere/y soi/g/H w rewria crrwi/i ajpecw o /n /ion-</<T0gaWe
depriving rne rign/ as a ivno/c o / i« tojic p«/pasc."
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relates to article 4.4, and this excludes the possible modification or restriction of
article 4.2 ACHR^. Guatemala failed to manifest its rejection of article 4.2 in
order achieve its goals.
The application of the VCLT is an obligation for the Court, and it has come to
some remarkable solutions. The Inter-American Court has used its advisory
jurisdiction with great agility, in particular in distinguishing between the VCLT
rules relevant for reciprocal treaties, and the rules necessary for human rights
instruments.
This Opinion stresses the need for a restrictive interpretation of reservations,
based upon objective criteria related to the nature of human rights law. Though
the Court initially stressed the relevance of article 4 being a non-derogable right,
this element does not play an important role towards the end of the Opinion.
Moreover the latter part of par.61 would seem to qualify the initial strong stance
on non-derogability by qualifying the prohibition, referring to restrictive rather
than exclusive reservations**'.
205. Par.71-73.
206. Buergenlhal. op.cit. at 23-25.
l
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4. RESERVATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON
THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINA-
TION
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONVENTION
1.1. Content of the Convention'
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (hereafter:CERD) consists of three parts, dealing with substantive
law, the supervisory mechanism and the final clauses.
The first part lays down substantive rules. In article 1 racial discrimination is
defined as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race,
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural or any other field of public life". Sections 2 and 3 indicate that
distinctions in the sphere of citizenship and nationality are allowed, provided that
they are not discriminatory. Section 4 deals with affirmative action, which is
permitted, but should be abolished once the objectives of such a policy have been
attained.
Article 2 contains the condemnation of racial discrimination, and lists a number
of duties the States Parties undertake in the field of governmental activities, and
within society at large. Article 3 condemns segregation and apartheid, whereas
the following article specifically deals with racist propaganda, and racist organiz-
ations. The right of equality before the law is laid down in article 5 which also
contains a list of the rights which ought to be guaranteed: civil and political rights
as well as economic, social and cultural rights. As a complement to this provi-
sion, article 6 provides for effective protection within the domestic legal system.
In article 7, States Parties set themselves the task of combatting prejudices.
The second part of the Convention deals with the supervisory mechanism"; to
UNTS 660, 195; GA Res. 2106A (XX), 21 December 1965. See for the history of the
Convention:N.Lerner, The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Alphen aan den Rijn. 1980. at 1-6: Th. Meron. Human Rights Law-
making in the United Nations, Oxford 1986 at 7-9: W.M.Reisman, Responses to Crimes
of Discrimination and Genocide: An Appraisal of the Convention on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination; in:l Denver JILP. 1971. 29-64 at 43-44; and E.Schwelb, The
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in:
15 ICLO 1966, 996-1068 at 997-1000.
Schwelb, op.cit. at 1032-1044.
About the supervisory system in general:T.Buergenthal, Implementing the UN Racial
Convention, in: 12 TILJ 1977. 187-221; K.Das. Measures of implementation of the
(continued...)
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this end a Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination consisting of
impartial experts is set up under article 8. The following article provides for the
procedure in which States Parties report on the implementation of the Conven-
tion. In articles 11 to 13 the procedure of State complaints is laid down, followed
by the optional individual complaints procedure in article 14 and the advisory
function of the Committee with regard to petitions from inhabitants of the Trust
and Non-Self-Goveming Territories in article 15\
The third part contains the so-called final clauses, of which the provision on
reservations, article 20, is the most relevant within the present framework.
ÎKcThe law applicable to reservations'
As a consequence of the Advisory Opinion in the Genocide case, the General
Assembly had recommended that when drafting multilateral conventions, the
insertion of a reservations clause should explicitly be considered'. In the Third
Committee views differed on the possible content of a reservations clause.
Certain states wanted to enumerate the articles to which reservations would be
prohibited. Poland proposed articles 1 to 5', and Ghana, Mauritania and the
Philippines wanted to add articles 8 to 14'. If these proposals had been adopted
reservations to essential rules of substantive law and supervision would have been
forbidden, probably creating a very transparent system. However no agreement
could be reached, and the Convention was forwarded to the General Assembly
without a provision on reservations, at the suggestion of Canada".
In the General Assembly an amendment was proposed, which led to the insertion
of article 20'. Not all participating States were equally pleased with the provi-
sion. France felt the two-thirds rule introduced political elements, and the United
States favoured a judicial decision on the matter of compatibility'".
2.(...continued)
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination with
special reference to the provisions concerning reports from States Parties to the
Convention, in: 4 RDM 1971. at 213-263; and J.L.Gomez del Prado. United Nations
Conventions on Human Rights: The Practice of the Human Rights Committee and the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in Dealing with Reporting
Obligations of States Parties, in: 7 IIRQ 1985, at 492-513.
3. Lerner, op.cit. at 86-88; Schwelh, op.cit. at 1045-1046.
4. Lerner, op.cit. at 95-97; Schwelb, op.cit. at 1055-1057, 1058.
5. GA Res. 598 (VI), 12 January 1952 reads:
"1. Recommends that organs of the United Nations, specialized agencies and States
**««) should, in the course of preparing multilateral conventions, consider the insertion
';••' ' " therein of provisions relating to the admissibility or non-admissibility of reservations
and to the effect to be attributed to them;
2 "
6. A/C.3/L.1272; A/6181, par.191.
7. A/C.3/L.1314; A/6181, par.192.
8. A/6181, par.193-194.
9. GAOR 1965, 20th session; A/L.479; A/PV.1406, 21-12-1965.
10. Lerner, op.cit. at 96.
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Article 20 contains rules on the making of reservations, their withdrawal and the
duties of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (acting as the depository of
the Convention)" in this field, as well as rules on the admissibility of reserva-
tions. Though, at first glance, the article appears to provide a transparent system,
it does in fact rather beg the question.
Article 20 reads:
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all States
which are or may become Parties to this Convention reservations made by the States at
the time of ratification or accession. Any Stale which objects to the reservation shall,
within a period of ninety days from the date of the said communication, notify the
Secretary-General that it does not accept it.
2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of this Convention shall not
be permitted, nor shall a reservation the effect of which would inhibit the operation of
any of the bodies established by this Convention be allowed. A reservation shall be
considered incompatible or inhibitive if at least two-thirds of the States Parties to this
Convention object to it.
3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to this effect addressed to
the Secretary-General. Such notification shall take effect on the date on which it is
received.
- article 20.1 -
The first paragraph of the provision deals with the procedural aspects of making
reservations. Reservations made shall be circulated by the depository, not only to
States Parties but also to possible future States Parties'-. This last group of
addressees is somewhat surprising, as they do not seem to have a legal interest
in this particular information. Only the objections made by States Parties will be
relevant for the two-thirds rule mentioned in paragraph 2 of that same provi-
sion". Objections by other States cannot be taken into account, unless they
ratify within three months after the reservation has been made'''.
Even if the number of objections remains below two-thirds of the ratifying States,
these objections may be a valuable indication of the opinion of the other States
Parties, and might lead to the withdrawal of a reservation.
Objections to reservations are expected to reach the depository within ninety days
after the communication of the reservation. The rule in article 20.1 is unclear
about the point in time from when onwards the ninety days period starts. The
provision reads:"., the date of the said communication..". Given the fact that the
11. See article 17.2 CERD.
12. See about this policy also a memorandum by the Office of Legal Affairs to the Deputy
Director of the Division of Human Rights, /Vor/ice /o//oKfrf ftv r/ie rfr/)Oii>or>' regarding
co/wmimiaMio/ij rtc na/urc o/tv/iir/i u «/ic/cnr, m f/ic case o/awrtyiHo/iiproritfV/ig/or a
ipecz/ic proccA/rc /o £>e app/icd" in rcspca o/ rcwrva/ioftf, in: UN Juridical Yearbook 197S
(ST/LEG/SER.C/13), par.8 at 206-207.
13. A.Cassese, A new reservations clause. Article 20 of the United Nations Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: in: Recueil d'études de droit
international en hommage à Paul Guggenheim. Genève, 1968. 266-304, ai 278.
14. Cf. Cassese op.cit. at 277-279.
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period is relatively short, this must surely be understood as the date of f/je
/•«•«ytf/o/i of the said communication by the potential objectors. It should be noted
that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties allows for a period of twelve
months in article 20.5, and seems to point to the moment of reception of the
reservation, reading:"..after it was notified of the reservation."'*. In any case,
the period of ninety days presupposes an active and attentive policy on the part of
the States Parties. Although the drafters may have had this in mind, it is ques-
tionable whether this short period does justice to the time-consuming handling of
such communications in Ministries of Foreign Affairs'*. This will probably take
considerably more time.
Apart from the question of whether the period of ninety days is sufficient for the
formulation of objections, there is the intriguing matter of the difference in time-
limits in articles 19 and 20. While article 19 provides for the entry into force
after thirty days"; article 20 allows for a period of ninety days in which the
other States Parties may object to reservations. The question is at which point in
time the Convention will enter into force for the reserving State which has made
a compatible reservation. As Cassese puts it: "The problem arises because par. 1
of Art. 19 ... is ill-coordinated with art. 20, so that the application of these two
articles could lead to absurd consequences."'*
Prior to the entry into force of the Convention, the two-thirds rule of article 20.2
could not be applied for lack of States Parties able to react. The point is whether
the reserving state can be included in the list of twenty-seven States Parties
necessary for the entry into force of the Convention. Or should a substantial
number of objections from other States Parties, at the very moment of entry into
force, establish that the reservation is incompatible, thus precluding entry into
force for all the ratifying States? On the other hand, waiting for twenty-seven
ratifications without reservations could mean that the entry into force of the
CERD would have been postponed for a long time. Such an interpretation would
be contrary to the Convention's objective of protection against racial discrimina-
tion which is best served by a speedy entry into force of the Convention.
In a rather elaborate discussion of this problem Cassese" suggests three
methods of interpretation that might provide a solution for the logico-grammatical
puzzle created by both provisions. He concludes that an extensive interpretation
*
15. See Chapter 2, par.3.2.3 supra for a discussion of article 20.5 VCLT.
16. Cassese seems to think that three months is an acceptable time-span, quoting another
example of a three months period, op.cit. at 296-297.
17. Article 19 reads:
?: "1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of the
j ; deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the twenty-seventh
tt< instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.
*".•* 4 2. For each State ratifying this Convention or acceding to it after the deposit of the
*» twenty-seventh instrument of ratification or instrument of accession, the Convention
rfi> â»i4 shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit of its own instrument
of ratification or accession."
18. Cassese, op.cit. at 285. "••.-'•"•-.
19. Cassese, op.cit. at 285-298. - . T - . > V U " .» ,ji
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of the notion of States Parties in article 20.2, as meaning not only states for
which the CERD is in force, but also states that have expressed their consent to
be bound, provides a workable rule. Enlarging the group of states implies a more
rapid determination of the entry into force. However, when reservations have
been made, the delay of ninety days to establish compatibility will always occur.
In actual practice the Secretary-General took a pragmatic approach in the matter
of the entry into force of the Convention in relation to ratifications to which
reservations had been attached. When the twenty-seventh ratification was
deposited by Poland on 5 December 1968, two previous ratifications containing
reservations were still in their ninety-day period, another ratification containing
reservations had not yet been circulated and the Polish ratification itself also
contained a reservation. Thus the Secretary-General issued a statement indicating
that although twenty-seven ratifications had been received, he was not in the
position to determine whether or not the Convention had entered into force.
Three months later the Secretary-General notified the interested states that the
Convention had entered into force on 4 January 1969, according to article 19.1
CERD».
The solution is a practical one, the depository waited ninety days, according to
article 20.1, in order to establish if the number of objections to any of the
reservations would prevent a ratifying State from becoming a party to the
Convention. As this was not the case, the Convention entered into force retroac-
tively a month after the reception of the twenty-seventh ratification. Though the
entry into force of the CERD took place without problems, the issue is clearly
the consequence of imprecise drafting.
Another point that needs to be made in view of article 20.1, is that the ninety day
rule is biased towards states that become parties at a later point in time. As
objections can only be made within the ninety day period following the making of
a reservation (the provisions reads: "within a period of ninety days from the date
of the said communication,.."), states ratifying after that period of time will not
have the opportunity to formulate objections relevant to the determination of the
compatibility of a reservation. A reservation is compatible if the number of
objections falls short of the two-thirds requirement three months after it has been
made, even if at a later stage the number of objections of subsequent States
Parties would be substantially higher.
20. The statement reads:"It appears from the provisions of article 20 of the Convention that
it would not be possible to determine the legal effect of the four instruments in
question (the ratifications containing reservations for which the ninety-day period had
not yet expired, EL) pending the expiry of the respective periods of lime mentioned in
the preceding paragraph.
Having regard to the above-mentioned consideration, the Secretary-General is not at
the present time in a position to ascertain the date of entry into force of the Conven-
tion." ST/LEG/SER.E/11, 31-12-1992, at 110.
136 CONVENTION ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
- article 20.2 -
The core rule on reservations to the CERD is article 20.2. It provides for a
generic prohibition rather than prohibiting specified reservations.
Reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention are
prohibited as are reservations inhibiting the operation of any of the bodies
established by the Convention. Whether reservations belong to either category is
established on the basis of the number of objections made. Though it is not
explicitly mentioned, the gist of article 20.2 is that incompatible reservations are
not accepted, and that the reserving state is thus forced to either withdraw its
reservation, or withdraw its ratification*'. It must be stressed, on the other
hand, that even if a reservation is accepted, it is not necessarily compatible. The
two-thirds rule merely establishes acceptance on the assumption of compatibil-
ity-.
It needs to be recognized that the protective value of the two-thirds rule dimin-
ishes as more states become parties to the CERD. Though the rule remains
unchanged, the number of states necessary to establish incompatibility according
to 20.2, two-thirds of the ratifying states, necessarily increases^*. Thus the rule
has an intrinsic flexibility that implies a loss of control, proportional to the
growing number of States Parties"''.
The rule that reservations may not be incompatible with the object and purpose of
the Convention is a reflection of the Court's opinion in the Genocide case. The
notion of "object and purpose" seems self-evident, but it raises the question what
the precise object and purpose of the CERD are.
The elimination of racial discrimination is clearly the purpose of the Convention,
but does that imply that reservations to any of the substantive provisions are
prohibited? In such case, the proposal by Poland would have been a more
transparent rule. Yet, the interpretation of the notion of "object and purpose" is
left completely to the States Parties. The object and purpose rule is a guideline
for the formulation of objections, but not necessarily a touchstone. That is, apart
from the case in which a difference of opinion on the compatibility of a reserva-
tion is taken to the International Court of Justice, according to article 22
CERD^.
-2|;' This is again underlined in interpretative declarations made by Fiji, Tonga and the
: United Kingdom, which read:"In addition it interprets article 20 and the other related
;'"' provisions of Part III of the Convention as meaning that if a reservation is not accepted
the State making the reservation does not become a Party to the Convention."
22. B.Graefrath, Menschenrechte und internationale Kooperation (usw.), Berlin (DDR)
1988, at 70.
23. A particularly striking example of this problem is the number of objections necessary to
establish the incompatibility of the reservation of the Yemen Arab Republic, for a
discussion of the objections see infra section 2.1.
24. Cf. Clark, op.cit. at 298 discussing the two-thirds rule as a solution for reservations to
the Women's Convention.
25. Cassese, op.cit. at 276-277, and CERD/C/SR.553.
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What ultimately matters is the number of objections, not the reasoning behind
them. Article 20.2 is skilfully drafted, while suggesting that the content of the
CERD is of overriding importance the actual determination lies in the hands of
the States Parties who should, but need not, decide upon the basis of that
criterion.
The prohibition of reservations that would inhibit the operation of a body
established by the Convention seems to be an objective rule. Here, as with the
object and purpose criterion, the two-thirds rule applies. While this rule might be
acceptable with respect to the content of the Convention, it has quite a different
role as far as the supervisory system is concerned. Cassese disagrees with linking
the two elements, and putting both of them under the aegis of the two-thirds rule.
It might even be claimed that the creation of a supervisory system is one of the
objects of the CERD, and in that respect this second notion is superfluous*.
The issue raises two points, first of all the question which are the bodies con-
cerned, and secondly precisely which reservations are prohibited.
Article 20.2 refers to "any of the bodies established by this Convention". These
are the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (article 8 CERD)
and the ad hoc Conciliation Commission (article 12). The jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice is clearly outside of the protective scope of article
20.2, even if the Court performs a dispute settlement function related to the
CERD, according to article 22"'.
The protection deals with the operation of the bodies, and it might be a matter
for discussion if this were understood to include the whole of part II of the
Convention which contains all the available procedures within the framework of
the CERD. If this extensive interpretation is correct, then the substance of the
proposal by Ghana, Mauretania and the Philippines has in fact been realized.
Article 20.1 does not indicate that objections need to be confined to the grounds
mentioned in paragraph 2, but seems to imply it-*. Both provisions are inter-
woven and a sound interpretation takes into account the context of the provi-
sion^. The basic assumption is that states establish treaty-relations on the basis
of the Convention with every other ratifying state. The only reason to rebut this
assumption are the dangers implied in undermining the object and purpose of the
CERD, or the supervisory functions of the bodies established by the CERD.
Where the (two-thirds) majority of ratifying States feel that this danger is
imminent, the Convention shuts like an oyster. During the drafting, the reasoning
of the International Court of Justice in the Genocide case was referred to*. The
26. Cassese. op.cit. at 276.
27. Schwelb, op.cit. at 1056.
28. Schwelb. op.cit. at 1056.
29. Article 31.1 VCLT.
30. Cassese, op.cit. at 275-276.
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Court explicitly stated that States, when objecting, should do so on the basis of
the object and purpose criterion".
A related issue is whether states need to indicate the reason for their objection.
Article 20.1 merely requires the expression "that it does not accept it". The
application of article 20.2 seems to require mentioning the incompatibility, but on
the other hand the assumption might be that states only object when either of the
two interests are at stake.
States do have the liberty to formulate other objections, such as the ones based on
the non-recognition of particular states or other political considerations. Clearly
these can not be taken into account when determining if two-thirds of the
ratifying states have objected". In that respect only objections dealing with the
grounds mentioned have any relevance. „
Given the two-thirds rule, the question instantly arising is what the relevance is
of objections not amounting to a total of two-thirds of all the States Parties. The
intention of such objections is clearly to indicate discontent about reservations
made, but what is their legal significance once it is established that a particular
reservation is compatible pursuant to article 20.2?
As a consequence of the acceptance of the reservation as compatible, the reserv-
ing state becomes a party to the CERD. The issue is whether treaty relations will
be established between the reserving state and the objecting state. In discussing
this problem, Cassese presents two options".
Firstly, as the objections have been the result of considering the reservation from
the perspective of object and purpose, they must be considered sufficiently
serious. Consequently the least an objecting State might expect, is not to establish
treaty-relations with the reserving state. Yet, this seems to conflict with the
Convention's desire for universal participation and is therefore not considered an
attractive solution. On the other hand, this might be a matter of purely legalistic
significance, as the reserving state will ultimately be bound towards its citizens,
and the treaty-relations underlying the validity of a human rights convention are
to a certain extent of a minor importance.
The other line of reasoning, not shared by the present author, holds that as a
consequence of the determination that the reservation is compatible, the objec-
tions lose relevance and treaty-relations are established in spite of prior objec-
tions. The main argument is that this does justice to the notion of effective
participation**, which seems to amount to a strict monitoring of the integrity of
31. ICJ Reports 1951, at 26:"As no State can be bound by a reservation to which it has not
consented, it necessarily follows that each State objecting to it will or will not, on the
basis of its individual appraisal within the limits of the criterion of object and purpose
stated above, consider the reserving State to be a party to the Convention."
32. Cassese, op.cit. at 277.
33. Cassese, op.cit. at 280-285.
34. Cassese, op.cit. at 284:"..that is that States parties do in fact observe the provisions of
the Convention: with a view to this a complex control machinery for the Convention was
provided which States parties are moreover forbidden to evade by appending reserva-
tions."
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the Convention. The problem with this line of reasoning is that the State's
intentions as they concern the establishment of treaty relations become purely
superficial, without consent making any actual difference for the application of
the Convention.
In the course of the work of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination, some questions arose as to whether the Committee itself had a role
to play in respect of reservations". Three questions were put to the Office for
Legal Affairs, dealing with the legal effect of interpretative declarations, the
authority of the Committee to decide upon compatibility, and a last question
about reservations made after ratification. ••, :»t*îA*{^^**«^'^:*is-rfctwiMsWKj
The second question is clearly relevant for the scope of article 20.2, the Office
for Legal Affairs states that, as the Committee is not a representative organ of
the States parties it does not have the competence to decide upon compatibility.
The memorandum reads:
"When a reservation has been accepted at the conclusion of the procedure expressly
V;?* provided for by the Convention (article 20) - even a unanimous decision - by the
Committee that such a reservation is unacceptable could not have any legal effect."* • *-;,
This line of reasoning clearly follows the structure of article 20, as well as the
individualized approach to compatibility in the Genocide case. Shelton suggests
that the advice also relies on the maxim «uyj/v.y.v/» W/I/'MJ P.V/ rar/ujr/o «//«T/'MJ,
states never meant to grant this authority to the Committee". Yet, it may be
doubted whether the categorical denial of the potential role of the Committee
(cowM «or /jaw fl/ry /fga/ <$«Y), can be maintained in the future. The memo-
randum relies on a static role of the Committee, whereas future developments
will indicate that a more dynamic approach is possible. • ,<
- article 20.3 - • ----- - - ^ --- ,..'•-... - • '
Withdrawal of reservations is a simple matter, all that is needed is a communi-
cation to the Secretary General which will have immediate effect. This seems to
imply effectiveness from the moment of reception of the withdrawal onwards'*.
Apparently, no specific acceptance by other States Parties is needed, which is
similar to the rule laid down in article 22.1 of the Vienna Convention.
«i; v-
35. Lego/ e//cc« o/ 5/affracnK o/ i/ifcrprtvoHo/i o«rf o//icr </fc/ar<inofu nmi/c a/ /Ac «me o/
ran^ranon or acccuio/i, UN Juridical Yearbook 1976 (ST/LEG/SER.C/14) at 219-221;
also reflected in CERD/C/SR.286. at 216-218. «•
36. ST/LEG/SER.C/14, par.8 at 221.
37. Shelton. op.cit. at 229-230. . . . . _ - . . .-•. lui-..-;: , . ;-.".. ».«i • ..-_:.J=.-*-.
38. Cf. article 22.3.a VCLT. ^ - '
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1.3. Declarations and reservations
Declarations and reservations to the CERD can be divided into a number of
groups. Not all of them are equally important and will be dealt with". The
reservations and declarations not elaborated upon are the statements dealing with
the non-recognition of Israel*", Taiwan"' or Rhodesia"". Furthermore thir-
teen states declared their objections to participation-clauses articles 17 and 18 of
the CERD, stating that these provisions are discriminatory". Article 22 dealing
with dispute-settlement and including the option of unilaterally referring a dispute
to arbitration and eventually to the International Court of Justice, met with a
great number of reservations'".
In their acceptance of the Committee's power to receive individual communica-
tions (article 14 CERD) some of the States Parties have restricted their accept-
ance to cases not dealt with by another international body of investigation or
settlement. Though sometimes formulated as a reservation, they are in fact
qualified acceptances'", and are not dealt with below".
The other reservations and declarations deal with the CERD's substantive
provisions, or with the much discussed advisory function in respect of the right
of petition for inhabitants of Trust and Non-Self Governing Territories in article
15 of the Convention. In the following these declarations and reservations will be
39. 9 States (including the former German Democratic Republic, not mentioned in
ST/LEG/SER.E/11) "objected" to the ratification of the Convention by Government of
Democratic Kampuchea (described by Byelorussia as "the Pol Pot clique of hangmen"),
indicating that the People's Republic of Kampuchea was the only legitimate actor on
behalf of Kampuchea/Cambodia. Though this is an objection in the literal sense, it is by
no means an objection in the legal sense, as it does not refer to a reservation. Strange
enough the Secretariat has listed the Kampuchea objections under the heading of
objections in its publication ST/LEG/SER.E/11.
40. Reservations by Bahrein, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Iraq, Kuwait, Libyan
Arabic Jamahiriya. Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates and United Arab
Republic (subsequently withdrawn by Egypt on 18-1-1980).
4L Reservation by China, and a number of communications from other States; see
ST/LEG/SER.E/11, note 3 at 111.
42. Reservation by the United Kingdom.
43. 8 States made reservations dealing with both articles 17 and 18, while 5 States made
reservations only dealing with article 17.
44. Schwelb, op.cit. at 1054-1055,1056.
29 States made reservations in respect of article 22. in the meantime 7 States have
withdrawn their reservation (ST/LEG/SER.E/11). After its accession to the CERD on
29-12-1981, China formulated a reservation to article 22 on 13-1-1982. The Secretary
General seems to think that this is still acceptable; see ST/LEG/SER.E/11 at 101. Cf.
article 2.1.d VCLT.
45. Declarations by Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden formulated as "reservations",
and declaration by Italy formulated as "understanding".
46. The Committee considers these declarations to be reservations, see CERD/C/SR.346
and SR.457^»58.
About the issue of concurrent human rights procedures see; Schwelb, op.cit. at 1046-
1048.
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discussed. It should be noted that all reservations have been accepted, as the
number of objections never amounted to two-thirds of the States Parties.
- article 1 -
Article 1 of the CERD defines racial discrimination as "any distinction, exclu-
sion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other
field of public life"'". The following paragraphs deal with the non-applicability
of the Convention in the field of citizenship, nationality or naturalization, and
with special measures.
The only reservation to article 1 has been made by the United Kingdom. It holds
that neither the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts, 1962 and 1968 nor their
application involve any discrimination within the scope of article 1.1 of the
CERD, and it reserves its right to continue to apply the Acts**. The reservation
is remarkable in as much as it seems to formulate, by way of reservation, a fact
that has already been provided for in article 1.2, namely that distinctions,
restrictions or preferences between citizens and non-citizens are allowed'*''.
The reservation raises the fundamental point of who is to determine whether or
not domestic legislation is in conformity with the demands of the Convention. In
the opinion of the United Kingdom, the reserving state can declare that conform-
ity exists, and given the acceptance of the reservation the fact is established
amongst the States Parties to the Convention.
Another question concerning this reservation is the position of future legislation,
and in particular laws amending the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts. The United
Kingdom's reservations suggests that its legislator will act within the limits of
CERD, which is an obligation to be found in article 2. l.a of the Convention. But
conformity with the Convention should be established by the States Parties, and
in the subsequent practice of the Committee. Through its reservation the United
Kingdom has become the sole judge of the conformity of its legislation with the
CERD.
- article 2 -
Article 2 deals with the obligation to take measures in order to eliminate racial
discrimination, and with special measures for the development and protection of
47. Lerner. op.cit. at 28-32; D.Mahalic and J.Gambee Mahalic. The Limitation Provisions in
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
in: 9 HRQ 1987. 74-101 at 78-82: KJ.Partsch. Die Konvcntion zur Beseitigung der
Rassendiskriminierung, in: Vereinte Nationen 1971, 1-8 and 46-53. at 2: Schwelb, op.cit.
at 1003. 1006-1007.
48. KJ.Partsch, Elimination of Racial Discrimination in the Enjoyment of Civil and Political
Rights, in:14 TJIL 1979. 191-250 (hereafter Partsch. T I U ) suggests at 212. that this
reservation in fact deals with article 5.d.i of the CERD. freedom of movement.
49. Meron. op.cit. at 44-46.
142 CONVENTION ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
specific racial groups*. Two reservations have been made with respect to article
2 of the CERD, by Fiji" and by Tonga. The reservations are remarkably simi-
lar and purport to exclude the school system from the aegis of articles 2, 3 and
5.3-v*.
The link with article 2 would seem to be the governmental influence on educa-
tion, whereas the relation between articles 3 and S.e.v and educational matters is
more obvious. From the wording of the reservation it is not clear whether it aims
at the whole provision, the negative obligations contained in paragraph 1, or the
special measures dealt with in paragraph 2.
The obligation to eliminate racial discrimination in the field of education within
the CERD is a double-sided one. The Convention guarantees equality in the
enjoyment of the right to education and training (article 5.e.v), which is enforced
by the general prohibition of segregation (article 3). Racial discrimination is not
only prohibited, there is an obligation "to adopt immediate and effective
measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education .. with a view to
combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination .." (article 7). It would
stand to reason that in case states cannot accept the obligations laid down in
articles 2, 3, and 5.e.v, they would a fortiori find it impossible to accept obliga-
tions of the kind laid down in article 7. With respect to that provision, no
reservations have been made however.
- article 3 -
The reservations of Fiji and Tonga to article 3, in combination with articles 2
and 5.e.v have been dealt with above. .tnWw>• * ; ;w * •:-.• ; .••' **<; »••»•:•
- article 4 -
Article 4 CERD is a notoriously controversial provision, trying to reconcile the
rights of freedom from racial discrimination with freedom of expression and
association. The provision may be taken to be an elaboration of the obligation
laid down in article 2.l.d, though it must be noticed that its discrimination-
concept differs from the definition laid down in article l". The article obliges
states to adopt measures such as penalizing the dissemination of ideas on racial
superiority (article 4.a), prohibiting organizations promoting racial hatred (article
4.b) and preventing the promotion of racial discrimination by public institutions
50. Lerner, op.cit. at 36-39; Mahalic, op.cit. at 82-88.
51. Previously, when the United Kingdom had ratified CERD. it had made a similar
; r:.- reservation on behalf of Fiji. On 11 January 1973. Fiji succeeded to the CERD, and,
while redrafting them, affirmed the reservations made on its behalf by the United
Kingdom. See ST/LEG/SER.E/11.
52. ; The reservations read:"., or that the school system of Fiji/Tonga may not fulfil the
obligations referred to in articles 2. 3, or 5.3.v, the Government of Fiji reserves the right
i>, , ; not to implement the aforementioned provisions of the Convention / the Kingdom of
•-•'• ' Tonga reserves the right not to apply the Convention to Tonga.
About these reservations see Partsch, TJIL, at 211-212. !•«>>*••.- :.•->-:rt:.x>- ••' '
53. Lerner, op.cit. at 47-48; Meron, op.cit. at 24. .-'.''•;&. ^ •;-;M Çf
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(article 4.c)^. This should be done with due regard to the principles laid down
in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the rights laid down in article
5 CERD, according to the introductory phrase of article 4.
Twelve states made declarations dealing with the content of article 4, and
according to Partsch three groups of statements can be distinguished". The first
group of statements refers to national constitutions and the human rights
guaranteed therein". The second group of declarations indicate how states
intend to interpret the provisions of the CERD, and must be taken to be genuine
interpretative declarations. These States indicate and stress in particular that they
will interpret the CERD in line with other human rights documents mentioned".
They all point to the fact that the obligation in article 4.a and 4.b could easily
encroach upon rights such as the freedom of association or the freedom of
expression. -im . ^., ,»t«^.--j, visihî+îwte Ik •«»***<'. riift-w//teas,'?
The third group of statements would seem to have the characteristics of reserva-
tions, for these states indicate that they will fulfil their obligation to enact the
required legislation should they feel that the need arises**. The fulfilment of
treaty obligations thus depends on national legislative considerations, which is
contrary to the rule that parties should honour their treaty-obligations, indepen-
dently of the internal situation.
Australia made a different reservation, indicating that it could not yet fulfil its
obligation to penalize racial discrimination according to article 4.a, but it sought
to do so at the first opportunity.
- article 5 -
Article 5 of the CERD presents itself as a genuine human rights catalogue. This
can be deceiving, the gist of the provision is the prohibition and elimination of
£4, .:- Lerner, op.cit. at 47-53; Mahalic, op.cit. al 89-101; Schwelb, op.cit. al 1021-1025;
95. ' Partsch, T IU , at 213-214; and CERD/C/SR.326 par.21 and SR.348 par.49.
56. ' ••.'• Reservation upon signature of the United States of America, see for a discussion under
"Constitutions" infra at....
57. v> Austria ("..the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly and association may not be jeopardized."). Belgium ("..must be
« reconciled with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association"), France
("..releasing the States parties from the obligation to enact anti-discrimination legislation
•• . •-• which is incompatible with the freedoms of opinion and expression and of peaceful
assembly and association..") and Italy ("..the obligations deriving from article 4 are not
' ' jeopardizing the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to freedom of
• * peaceful assembly and association..").
In a subsequent communication to the depository of the CERD, France explicitly
underlined that its statement had been an interpretation of article 4, and did not
purport to limit its obligations under the Convention; ST/LEG/SER.E/11, at 112.
58. Antigua and Barbuda ("..where it is considered that the need arises to enact such
legislation.."), Bahamas, Barbados, Fiji, Malta. Nepal. Papua New Guinea ("..that some
legislative addition to, or variation of the existing law and practice, is necessary to give
effect to the provisions of article 4."), Tonga and the United Kingdom.
Though Guyana and Jamaica do not explicitly mention article 4 in their reservations, the
scope of their "Constitutional" reservation may be taken to include the obligation to
legislate in article 4. : ;<>
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racial discrimination and the guarantee of equality before the law. The list of
human rights that should be enjoyed on the basis of equality is not exhaustive,
given the use of the word "notably" in the opening paragraph".
The reservations of Fiji and Tonga to article 5.e.v has been dealt with supra
under article 2. The third state to make a reservation with respect to article 5 was
Yemen*™. The then Yemen Arab Republic acceded to the Convention making a
reservation concerning article 5.c and S.d.iv, vi and vii. The reservations are
striking as Yemen purports to exclude the Convention's protection against racial
discrimination where it concerns political rights (article 5.c), the right to mar-
riage (article 5.d.iv), the right to inherit (article 5.d.vi) and the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion (article S.d.vii). It is a far-reaching statement
that can probably only be understood within the light of the Yemen domestic
legal system. At face value it definitely seems to run contrary to the very
intention of article 5 as such, the rule of equality before the law. There is
apparently only fragmentary equality in Yemen. This particular reservation is the
only substantive reservation to which objections have been made'''.
- article 6 -
France and Italy indicate that the question of remedies is governed by ordinary
law, and Italy adds that the same goes for claims for reparations. The CERD
leaves the implementation of article 6, be it through ordinary law, or through
59. Lerner. op.cit. at 55-60; Partsch, TIU, 195-201: Schwelb, op.cit. at 1025-1027.
60. On the political aspects of the merger see: Keesings Historisch Archief Maart 1990, 174-
175; Augustus 1990, 551-553: R.Schmidt, Zu einigen Aspckten der Vereinigung beider
jemenitischer Staaten, in: 19 Asien. Afrika, Lateinamcrika 1991. 293-304.
The merger of the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of
Yemen poses fascinating questions to the law of treaties. In its letter to the Secretary
General of the United Nations (ST/LEG/SER.E/ll. at 9) Yemen indicates that it will
succeed to the treaty obligations of both states, and must be considered bound from the
date of the first ratification by either state onwards.
The question thus arises whether this statement merely refers to the commencement of
the obligation, or purports to establish that the new Republic of Yemen will be bound
on exactly the same conditions as were laid down in the first ratification, abandoning the
reservations in the later ratification. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Succession
of States in Respect of Treaties. (Vienna 23 August 1978| does unfortunately not give
any guidance in this matter.
Yet, with respect to the ratification of the CERD it does make a difference. The
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen acceded to the Convention on 18 October
1972, making reservations to article 17 and 18. article 22 and to the recognition of Israel.
The Yemen Arab Republic, on the other hand, acceded to the Convention on 6 April
1989, making a reservation in respect of article 5.c and S.d.iv, vi and vii.
! The Secretariat does not seem to know how to handle this matter. The reservations
made by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (date of accession: 18-10-1972)
are printed in full, with a note indicating that both states have in the meantime merged.
Under the heading "Objections" the objections to the reservation by the Yemen Arab
Republic (date of accession: 6-4-1989) are listed. That particular reservation itself has
disappeared to the category "Notes". The whole presentation clearly lacks transparency.
61. To be discussed infra par.2.1. 14 states have objected.
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special procedures, to the States Parties. The essential obligation is to ensure that
an effective remedy is available'-.
Fiji, Nepal, Malta, the United Kingdom and Tonga make literally the same
interpretative declaration, elaborating on the meaning of the words used in the
provision". One might wonder whether the interpretation of 'satisfaction' as
"redress effective to bring the discriminatory conduct to an end", as the second
part of the declaration reads, does justice to the notion of an effective remedy for
an individual victim**. But the declaration intends to widen the scope of the
notion of 'satisfaction', as it reads "including...". In sum, this can therefore be
considered an interpretative declaration.
- Constitutions -
Three groups of "constitutional" declarations can be distinguished. A group of six
States mentions that their constitutions guarantee the fundamental rights and
freedoms to every person; that the constitutions prescribe judicial procedures in
the event of a violation of those rights, and that acceptance of the CERD does not
imply acceptance of obligations going beyond the constitutional limits*'' **.
These declarations are remarkably similar and suggest close cooperation when
drafting the text. A second group of declarations lists the rights protected in the
constitution, and underlines that the CERD does not require legislation incompat-
62. Lerner, op.cit. at 60-62.
63. The reservations of Fiji. Nepal, Malta, the United Kingdom and Tonga
read:"..interprct(s) the requirement in article 6 concerning reparation or satisfaction' as
being fulfilled if one or other of these forms of redress is made available, and inter-
prets 'satisfaction' as including any form of redress effective to bring the discriminatory
conduct to an end."
64. Cf. Lerner, op. cit. at 62.
65. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas. Barbados, Guyana. Jamaica, and Papua New Guinea.
66. Papua New Guinea acceded to the CERD on 27 January 1982. but its declaration dates
from 22 february 1982 (ST/LEG/SER.E/11). There does not seem to be any need for
the application of rule that reservations can only be made at the very moment of
accession, which follows from article 2.1.d VCLT. to interpretative declarations but the
presentation of this particular statement is question-begging.
The Secretary-General mentions that "[T|hc ramwio/i was circulated..on 22 February
1982". It is unusual for the Secretariat to qualify any of the declarations made by a State
party to a treaty. And if it is a reservation, the Secretary-General should have moni-
tored compliance with article 2.1.d VCLT. which is a rule of customary law.
However, in a strange misconception of the content of the law on reservations, the
Secretary-General writes (op.cit. note 6 at 118):"None of the States concerned having
objected to the reservation by the end of a period of ninety days after the date when it
was circulated by the Secretary-General, the said declaration is deemed to have been
permitted in accordance with the provisions of article 20.1 (of the CERD, EL)."
This statement on the conformity with article 20.1 CERD is not to be found elsewhere
in the overview of the reservations made. The assumption underlying article 2.1.d is that
reservations can only be made (and afterwards accepted) at the moment of accession.
Subsequent reservations intend to unilaterally change the treaty, which is per se
impossible. Hence, reservations made after accession should not be circulated and can a
fortiori not be accepted. Obviously, the depository fell into the "silence-trap" of article
20.5 VCLT.
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ible with the constitution". It should be noted that the rights listed do not cover
the whole content of article 5. A third declaration merely mentions that the
CERD does not contain an obligation to introduce judicial procedures going
beyond those provided in the constitution**.
In order to determine the legal status of such declarations it is necessary to see
whether they purport to restrict any of the rights and obligations contained in the
CERD. By claiming that their constitution is in accordance with CERD stan-
dards, these reserving states become the sole judge of their compliance with in
particular article 6. They may or may not comply with the Convention, but this
can not any longer be a matter for discussion as the only yardstick for compli-
ance is the constitution. This is precisely why these declarations must be seen as
reservations. The States reserve to themselves the right to supervise compliance,
and may unilaterally change their obligations under the CERD by changing their
constitution.
The reserving States interpret the CERD as not containing an obligation to
introduce judicial procedures other than the ones established in their constitution.
One might wonder whether explicitly mentioning the relevant provisions of the
Convention might not have been better and clearer. The declarations seem to be
related to the obligations contained in articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Convention.
Article 5 is a non-exhaustive list of human rights that have to be guaranteed on a
non-discriminatory basis, whereas article 4 and 6 each deal with "judicial
processes". But apparently only the obligations under article 6 are meant as the
majority of authors of the "constitutional" reservations have also made reserva-
tions to article 4".
It might be argued that extending procedural possibilities aimed at the elimination
of racial discrimination cannot be incompatible with any constitution. All the
Convention demands in article 6 is "effective protection and remedies" and the
right to seek "just and adequate reparation or satisfaction". The protection of the
right to equality and all the human rights protected by the Convention does not
necessarily require new procedures, as long as the available procedures fulfil the
CERD requirements.
- article 15 -
This provision reaffirms the right of petition for the inhabitants of Trust and
Non-Self-Governing Territories to which GA Resolution 1514(XV) applies™,
67. Nepal, and the United Slates in a reservation upon signature, mentioned in ST/LEG/-
">-••<«' T SER.E/11.
See about the United States ratification of the CERD: C.Ferguson. International
y .v . s . . Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in: U.S.Ratifi-
•Sfîî -.* ! cation of the Human Rights Treaties, with or without reservations? R.Lillich éd.,
-;*.-**;;*> Charlottesville. 1981, at 41-46; N.L.Nathanson, E.Schwelb, The United States and the
United Nations Treaty on Racial Discrimination, Washington, 1975.
68. Guyana.
' Antigua and Barbuda. Bahamas. Barbados. Nepal and Papua New Guinea. '"-:
Cf. articles 86-91 Charter of the United Nations.
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and indicates that the Committee will receive all relevant information and
petitions dealing with problems of racial discrimination". It is the only provisi-
on of the supervisory system to which reservations have been attached. The
United Kingdom, Tonga and Fiji indicate that the provision is discriminatory in
as much as it provides for a petition procedure which is not available for States
without such territories^. It is noteworthy that the right of petition is a right of
people according to General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV), whereas the
reserving states speak of a right pertaining to States. Though this might be a
logical construction within state-centred international law, it does not seem to do
justice to the "rights of people" concept in human rights law. Moreover, the right
to petition may have similarities with the individual complaints right, and nothing
seems to prevent the reserving states from making the declaration as required in
article 14 CERD.
France indicates that it maintains its position with respect to Resolution 1514-
(XV)". The French declaration raises the question whether it is sound drafting
to refer to a resolution in a convention, for both legal instruments have a
different nature. Apart from that, the construction used in article 15 seems to
suggest that those States Parties who voted against the said Resolution but ratified
the CERD, have in the meantime changed their views on the Resolution. What-
ever the merits of this discussion, France is the only state to explicitly indicate its
position with respect to both Resolution 1514(XV) and the Convention. It remains
a puzzle whether the statement is an interpretative declaration or a reservation as
it is hard to determine whether the content of article 15 reinforces Resolution
1514 as such, that is as a General Assembly resolution, or whether the previously
non-binding content of the Resolution has been transformed into a rule of law
through its incorporation in the Convention.
2. REACTIONS OF THE STATES PARTIES
2.1. Objections
Objections have only been made to the reservation to article 5 made by the
Yemen Arab Republic'''. Though it is not clear whether the reservation is still
operative", it needs to be mentioned that 14 States made the effort to object™.
There may be some doubt about the validity of the objections, apart from the fact
71. Lerner. op.cit. at 86-87 and 121-130: Schwelb, op.cit. at 1031. 1045-1046.
72. Lerner. op.cit. at 87-88.
73. Schwelb, op.cit. at 1046; see also A/C.3/SR.1368 and A/6181, par.166.
74. The "objections" to the ratification of the Convention by Democratic Kampuchea have
been dealt with supra in par. 1.3.
75. See supra par. 1.3.2.
76. The only other objection to be mentioned is the Pakistani objection to the Indian
reservation concerning article 22. the dispute settlement provision. The objection was
received on 24 February 1969. and therefore within the time-limit of article 20. It is
published in the "Notes" section of the document ST/LEG/SER.E/11.
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that they clearly did not amount to two-thirds of the States Parties". Looking at
the points in time when the objections were made, we see that while the reserva-
tion had been made at accession on 6 April 1989, five objections had been made
by the end of July 1989, another seven by the end of August 1989 and two more
reservations by the end of September 1989™.
If "from the date of the said communication" in article 20.1 CERD is taken to
mean from the moment of accession onwards, 5 July 1989 would have been the
deadline. If that is the case, Sweden is the only state to have objected in time. If
some time is allowed for the administrative handling and forwarding of the
reservation to the States Parties and the moment of dispatching is decisive, it
would depend on the time taken over these steps. Assuming that the Secretariat
needs a month for the handling, 5 August 1989 would be a deadline, and by then
seven States had objected. A further possibility would be to take the moment of
reception as the starting point, a line that also seems to be followed in article
20.5 VCLT. In that case the time-limit set in article 20.1 becomes fairly flexible
and unpredictable. In any case, the least the Secretariat could do is to indicate
why the objections listed are considered to have been received in time.
Thus the objections to the far-reaching reservation made by the former Yemen
Arab Republic prove the point made before, that it is highly questionable whether
the time-limit set in article 20.1 is realistic. Apart from the question of whether
States intend to object, there is also the problem of the relatively short period
available for the objections.
2.2. State Party meetings ^ ' ^ • • « • ' ^ > ' « v^sr:-^ ,*..-, *** - i > |> --*i
The States Parties have never discussed the issue of reservations in their meet-
ings. . . . . . . . .
- • ' - ' •'"""""---Hi:;-«/-•:•*£>• ...;..'. tjf.;
2.3. Withdrawal of reservations ' ->•* ' " ' "'<-•'"•- •'• - •
Denmark was the first State to withdraw a reservation which dealt with the
implementation of the CERD on the Faroe Islands. It had ratified the CERD on 9
December 1971 (entry into force on 8 January 1972) and was able to withdraw
77. The Yemen Arab Republic ratified on 6-5-1989, when 127 Slates were party to the
CERD. The 2/3 rule would at the time have required 84 objections!
78. Australia (8 August 1989). Belgium (8 August 1989). Canada (10 August 1989),
Denmark (10 July 1989), Finland (7 July 1989), France (20 September 1989), Germany
(8 August 1989), Italy (7 August 1989), Mexico (11 August 1989), the Netherlands (25
' " ' • August 1989), New Zealand (4 August 1989). Norway (28 July 1989), Sweden (5 July
1989) and the United Kingdom (4 August 1989) objected.
On 30 April 1990 Czechoslovakia objected to the reservation by the Yemen Arab
iu;fcfil Republic, but failed to do so in ninety day period provided for in article 20.1 CERD.
;*•; -,- Thjs may explain why the Secretariat reproduced the Czechoslovakian objection in the
.*-H • "Notes' section of the ST/LEG/SER.E/11. This objection however would have been
within the time-limit set by article 20.5 VCLT.
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the reservation within the following year on the enactment of implementative
legislation on the Faroe Islands.
Within five years after ratification Tonga, on 28 October 1977, was able to
withdraw part of its reservations, namely those relating to article S.c in respect of
elections, and articles 2, 3 and S.e.v in so far as they relate to education and
training. The text of the notification of withdrawal indicates that it is only a
partial withdrawal, and implies maintaining the reservation in other fields than
the ones mentioned. Article S.c deals also with political rights other than the right
to participate in elections, such as taking part in Government, the conduct of
public affairs and access to public service. The scope of articles 2 and 3 of the
CERD is clearly much broader then education and training, and only article 5.e.v
is literally restricted to this particular field.
In 1980 Egypt withdrew a declaration made in respect of the non-recognition of
Israel, but that declaration had not been not a reservation j/r;V/f> .SWUM.
In the aftermath of the political changes at the end of the ninety-eighties, the
USSR, Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslo-
vakia and Mongolia withdrew their reservations to article 22, the provision
concerning dispute-settlement by the International Court of Justice".
3. PRACTICE OF THE COMMITTEE
3.1. Reporting procedure, article 9 CERD
The periodic reports submitted to the Committee in accordance with article 9,
have for a long time been classified as restricted documents, and the same has
been the case with the Committee's summary records. This situation lasted until
the fifteenth session in 1977, when the issue of classification and distribution of
documents of the Committee was dealt with, and steps were taken to have the
reports as well as the summary records published as documents for general
distribution from the seventeenth session onwards*". Documents from the earlier
sessions of the Committee are thus not completely available.
Antigua and Barbuda
The Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda entrenches and guarantees to every person in
Antigua and Barbuda the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual irrespective
of race or place of origin. The Constitution prescribes judicial processes to be observed
in the event of the violation of any of these rights, whether by the State of by a private
individual. Acceptance of the Convention by the Government of Antigua and Barbuda
does not imply the acceptance of obligations going beyond the constitutional limits nor
the acceptance of any obligations to introduce judicial processes beyond those provided
in the Constitution. ' **!•
79. Withdrawals of the USSR (3 March 1989). Byelorussian SSR (19 April 1989), Ukrainian
SSR (20 April 1989), Hungary (13 September 1989), Bulgaria (24 June 1992),
Czechoslovakia (26 April 1991) and Mongolia (19 July 1990). See ST/LEG/SER.E/11.
80. CERD/C/SR.351, par.51-66; CERD/C/SR.352. par.1-12. * *
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The Government of Antigua and Barbuda interprets article 4 of the Convention s as
requiring a Party to enact measures in the fields covered by subparagraphs (a), (b) and
(c) of that article only where it is considered that the need arises to enact such legislati-
on.
Antigua and Barbuda ratified the Convention in 1988, and the initial report would
have been due in 1989. So far, no reports have been received*'.
Australia
The Government of Australia ...declares that Australia is not at present in a position
specifically to treat as offenses all the matters covered by article 4(a) of the Convention.
^ . Acts of the kind there mentioned are punishable only to the extent provided by the
existing criminal law dealing with such matters as the maintenance of public order,
* public mischief, assault, riot, criminal libel, conspiracy and attempts. It is the intention
•'*' of the Australian Government, at the first suitable moment, to seek from Parliament
ï- legislation specifically implementing the terms of article 4(a)."
In discussing the first Australian report*-, the Committee stressed the temporary
nature of the Australian statement*'' and was eager to know when legislation
would be forthcoming*''. As Australia had indicated in its report that the provi-
sion was partially covered by existing legislation such as the Racial Discrimina-
tion Act 1975, the Committee inquired about the exact scope of this Act*'. In
reply the Australian representative explained the content of penal legislation that
might be applicable, and underlined that existing legislation "went a long way
towards satisfying the requirements of article 4.a of the Convention", and stated
that the Government was considering "what additional legislation, // fl/ry, was
required"*''. This last statement is striking, as Australia had indicated its inten-
tion to legislate, on the basis of its own assessment that existing legislation did
not cover the Convention.
In the second Australian report, the focus is on the possible conflict between
article 4 and 5, and the matter of the temporary non-applicability has become one
of conditional non-applicability". The issue was discussed by the Committee as
though the reservation did not contain a temporal restriction. The Committee
stressed the mandatory nature of article 4, as it had done before with respect to
similar reservations. Only committee-member Dayal underlined that Australia
itself had already indicated that legislation did not go far enough, and hoped that
it would enact the necessary legislation**.
81. A/46/18, at 15.
82. CERD/C/R.85/Add.3. ••*-.-...
OLor-.-' CERD/C/SR.330, par.12 (Bahnev); and CERD/C/SR.335, par.7 (Sayegh). ,».
84. CERD/C/SR.330, par.5 (Nettel) and par. 12 (Bahnev).
85. CERD/C/SR.329, par.51 (Lampley), and par.67 (Dayal); and CERD/C/SR.335, par.7
(Sayegh).
86. CERD/C/SR.335, par.27, 34 and 36 (Australia). * . " sv*-1«-- /^»>,
87. The report, CERD/C/16/Add.4 at 20. reads:"., the matter (implementation of article
4.a, EL) will be kept under review to see whether specific legislation in the area is
, . desirable". ^ . . .
88. CERD/C/SR.443, par.79 (Dayal). .0*
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Australia in its third report underlined that in view of other human rights
obligations, it did not intend to fulfil its legislative obligation under article 4.a**,
and acknowledged the possible deficiency of its legislation on the control over
dissemination of racist ideas and the prohibition of racist organizations. In the
Committee discussion emphasis is laid on the fact that the Australian declaration
was not merely a reservation but also a commitment to future legislation which
appeared to have been forgotten by Australia".
In the thirtieth session, the Committee again focuses on the intention expressed
by Australia in its declaration to put legislation implementing article 4.a before
Parliament at the first suitable moment. The report does not deal with article 4,
nor does it mention the reservation". By then, it had been nine years since
Australia ratified and expressed this intention and nothing appeared to have
happened in the meantime, which was an omission'-. In reply to the questions
about Australia's reservation to article 4.a the representative indicates that it is
the subject of public debate, the outcome of which would be reflected in the next
report".
The fifth report expresses sympathy for article 4 and mentions that work is being
undertaken in the area of article 4.a, but it would appear that no conclusion had
yet been reached**. In introducing the report the representative mentions an
Australian declaration linking article 4 to the rest of the Convention and stressing
that legislative action would have to be compatible with freedom of speech".
While this appears to reflect a new policy, the statement may in fact be a
reformulation of the reservation. The hope was expressed that the next report
would contain more information on the implementation of article 4". The
rejoinder to this observation merely listed the available remedies in criminal law
against acts of violence'^. ffc*i%-- *sji<3>s ; :
The sixth report mentions that the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 partially fulfils
the obligations under article 4; and indicates that a 1983 Recommendation to
remove the reservations was still under consideration*. The combined seventh
and eighth report elaborates on the reservation to article 4, indicating that it is
partially a reservation and partially a statement of intent. The reservation had
been made because the Race Discrimination Act 1975 did not specifically meet
the requirements of article 4.a. The result of the National Inquiry into Racist
Violence would lead to review of the necessity of the reservation". In the
89. CERD/C/63/Add.3.
90. CERD/C/SR.556. par.7 (Ingles).
91. CERD/C/88/Add.3.
92. CERD/C/SR.677, par.31 (Partsch), par.38 (Shahi). par.57 (Karasimeonov), par.59
(Sherifis).
93. CERD/C/SR.679, par.69 (Australia).
94. CERD/C/115/Add.3, par. 135-137.
95. CERD/C/SR.816, par.21 (Australia).
96. CERD/C/SR.816. par.51 (Vidas). *ffi
97. CERD/C/SR.817. par.21 (Australia). ;
98. CERD/C/146/Add.3, par.67-69.
99. CERD/C/194/Add.2; par.172-180.
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Committee meeting the question is again raised when Australia would fulfil its
commitment to withdraw the reservation and prepare the necessary legisla-
tion"". The representative indicates that he would convey the questions con-
cerning article 4 to the Government"".
Austria
"Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination provides that the measures specifically described in sub-paragraphs (a),
(b) and (c) shall be undertaken with due regard to the principles embodied in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of
the Convention. The Republic of Austria therefore considers that through such
measures the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to peaceful
assembly and association may not be jeopardized. These rights are laid down in article
19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (hey were reaffirmed by the
General Assembly of the United Nations when it adopted article 19 and 21 of the
International Covenant on Civil an Political Rights and are referred to in article
5(d)(viii) and (ix) of the present Convention."
In discussing the first Austrian report'"- the Committee inquired about the
purpose of the declaration, asking whether it was in fact a reservation"". The
representative of Austria stressed that the statement was merely an interpretative
declaration, indicating the interdependence of certain human rights. Freedom of
expression should not be exercised contrary to the Convention, yet the Conven-
tion should not be interpreted as restricting all freedom of expression"". This
explanation must be taken to be authoritative, coming from the author of the
declaration. The Chairman of the Committee pointed out that article 4 refers to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which contains in article 29 the
prohibition against using rights and freedoms contrary to the purposes and goals
of the United Nations"*'.
The Austrian declaration is dealt with matter-of-factly in the thirteenth session,
mainly providing an explanation on the scope of the declaration'"*. In the
seventeenth'"' and twenty-first"* session it is not dealt with at all. And in the
twenty-fifth'** session it is again emphasized that no interpretative declaration
should keep a state from complying with article 4.
The sixth periodic report by Austria discusses the implementation of article 4 at
length"". It points out that incitement to a hostile act is punishable and thus
100. CERD/C/SR.915, par.54 (Wolfmm), par.82 (de Gouttes); SR.916. par.19 (Shahi).
101. CERD/C/SR.916, par.36-37 (Australia).
102. CERD/C/R.50/Add.6 and CERD/C/R.69/Add.l
103. CERD/C/SR.187, at 64 (Aboul Nasr).
104. CERD/C/SR.187 at 64-65 (Austria).
105. CERD/C/SR.187, at 65 (Haastrup).
106. CERD/C/R.77/Add.4, and CERD/C/SR.273 at 70 (Sayegh). CERD/C/SR.274 at 77
(Austria).
107. CERD/C/19; CERD/C/SR.367 and SR.368.
108. CERD/C/48/Add.6 and CERD/C/SR.459.
109. CERD/C/75/Add.9 and CERD/C/SRJ60-561.
110. CERD/C/106/Add.l2, par.48-57.
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broadly covers the scope of article 4.a; article 4.b is covered by legislation on
associations; and the role of public authorities in article 4.c would also seem to
be covered by penal law.
Without mentioning the declaration, the combined seventh and eighth periodic
report describes the available remedies in case of an infraction of article 4 '" .
The discussion of the Austrian report is remarkably brief, Committee members
referring to article 4 are directed to the sixth report in which the implementation
of article 4 was dealt with"^.
Bahamas
"Firstly the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas wishes to state its
understanding of article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination. It interprets article 4 as requiring a party to the
Convention to adopt further legislative measures in the fields covered by paragraphs (a),
(b) and (c) of that article only in so far as it may consider with due regard to the
principles embodied in the Universal Declaration set out in article 5 of the Convention
(in particular to freedom of opinion and expression and the right of peaceful assembly
and association) that some legislative addition to, or variation of existing law and
practice in these fields is necessary for the attainment of the ends specified in article 4.
Lastly, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas entrenches and guaran-
tees to every person in the Commonwealth of the Bahamas the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the individual irrespective of his race or place of origin. The Constitution
prescribes judicial processes to be observed in the event of the violation of any of these
rights whether by the State or by a private individual. Acceptance of this Convention by
the Commonwealth of the Bahamas does not imply the acceptance of obligations going
beyond the constitutional limits nor the acceptance of any obligations to introduce
judicial processes beyond those prescribed under the Constitution."
The first report'" is rather brief, and the chairman of the Committee suggested
that this was the consequence of the far-reaching reservation relating to the
constitution"''. The discussion goes hardly any further than stressing the need
for a complete report on the implementation of the Convention.
The second report by the Bahamas lists the articles of the Convention and
indicates whether or not action has been taken to fulfil the obligation'". The
Committee urged the Bahamas to reconsider its reservations, suggesting that it
was possible to adopt new legislation or to change the constitution'".
The third report by the Bahamas'" elaborated on the three elements of the
reservation, adding that it "does not consider its reservation an impediment to its
obligations to fulfil its obligations pursuant to its becoming a party to the
Convention". The main reason for this point of view was that the practices
addressed in article 4 of the Convention did not occur in the Bahamas. Moreover
111. CERD/C/158/Add.l, par.29-36.
112. CERD/C/SR.837, par.56 (Garvalov), par.59 (Partsch), par.75 (Ferrero Costa).
113. CERD/C/R.85/Add.4.
114. CERD/C/SR.349, par.29 (Kapteyn).
115. CERD/C/16/Add.3.
116. CERD/C/SR.438, par.22 (Dechezelles), par.25 (Bahnev).
117. CERD/C/88/Add.2, at 8.
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the Bahamas were considering legislation to implement both this Convention and
the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of /4pa/tAe/d.
The Committee stressed that its interpretation of article 4 as a mandatory
obligation did not imply that it considered that racism existed in the
Bahamas'". Yet, the statement was also called an interpretative declaration by
another member of the Committee, who on that basis agreed with the Bahamas
that its réservâtion(!) was not an impediment to the implementation to the
Convention'". In his reply the representative of the Bahamas merely repeated
his Governments position with respect to the obligation to legislate under article
41=0
In 1991, in its procedure for states that are overdue in reporting, the Committee
also dealt with the Bahamas. The rapporteur recalls the way in which the
reservation to article 4 had been dealt with earlier, and reiterates the view that
the reservation was not an impediment for the fulfilment of the obligation under
article 4'-'.
Barbados
The Constitution of Barbados entrenches and guarantees to every person in Barbados
the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual irrespective of his race or place
„..;. of origin. The Constitution prescribes judicial processes to be observed in the event of
the violation of any of these rights whether by the State or by a private individual.
Accession to the Convention does not imply the acceptance of obligations going beyond
the constitutional limits nor the acceptance of any obligations to introduce judicial
processes beyond those provided in the Constitution.
,;,'' j The Government of Barbados interprets article 4 of the said Convention as requiring a
Party to the Convention to enact measures in the fields covered by sub-paragraphs (a),
(b) and (c) of that article only where it is considered that the need arises to enact such
•••*•'*• l eg i s la t ion ."
In the opinion of the Committee's rapporteur'-- the "statement" concerning
article 4 left Barbados'^* the liberty to implement the provision as it saw fit.
The reservation concerning the constitution falls within the field of application of
article 6 and is even more categorical than the previous one. All the Committee
could do was to estimate the impact of the reservation in the absence of a
representative of Barbados. It would in particular be interesting to know how the
Barbados Parliament had used its powers under section 24 (6) of the Constitution.
In discussing the initial report of Barbados Committee-members felt that the
reservation to article 4 almost nullified the ratification of the CERD'-\ though
the report seemed to suggest that the reservation was unnecessary'-\ At the end
118. CERD/C/SR.610, par.8 (Valencia Rodriguez).
119. CERD/C/SR.610, par.27 (Ingles).
120. CERD/C/SR.610, par.28, 29 (Bahamas).
121. CERD/C/SR.926, par.10 (Sadiq Ali). » :*/v,«i i'\. »>i>t •>
122. CERD/C/SR.204 at 51 (Sayegh). '.:^ < : >i, : :.';*b
123. C E R D / C / R J O / A d d . l l . , •*; . • -•'->:• •ji\.X,'"J>J;-J.
124. CERD/C/SR.204 at 52 (Ancel). «v « ' ^ •"• ^ J -•' ^ •*"•* : ; - - > / i > i i '
125. CERD/C/SR.204, at 52 (Calovski). ? <s .->»A >KyOV :<M
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of the discussion, the Chairman raised the question as to whether the declaration
concerning article 4 was a reservation or an interpretation'-'. He added "[I]f
the latter, it would conflict with the Committee's view", thereby underlining that
the Committee ought to have dealt with that preliminary question first.
The reservations are extensively dealt with in the discussions of the second
periodic report by Barbados'*', which is a perfect example of the confusion
surrounding reservations. Barbados itself created part of the confusion by stating
that article 4.a and 4.c are in fact covered by Barbadian national legislation'-*.
This seems to narrow down its interpretative declaration to article 4.b, in spite of
the wording of the statement'-*. The Committee elaborated upon the relation-
ship between articles 4 and 5"" and underlined the mandatory character of
article 4 '" . There was however no consent on the status of the Barbadian
declaration (phrased as "..interprets.."), and moreover the Committee was not
familiar with the Barbadian constitution'". Consequently, no determination
could be made as to Barbados' fulfilment of its obligations under article 4 '" .
Finally, it was suggested that Barbados be asked for additional information"''.
In its compilation (third, fourth and fifth) periodic report'" Barbados underli-
ned the primordial role of its constitution in the domestic legal system, thereby
implicitly explaining its reservation. Given the fact that racial discrimination was
absent, there was no need for article 4 legislation. In its discussion the Commit-
tee was disturbed by the fact that the report did not contain clarifications about
the scope of the reservation referring to the Barbadian constitution, which had
explicitly been asked for. Though the report indicated that certain provisions in
the constitution were considered to be sufficient, the Committee stressed that
secondary legislation to that effect was no less vital. And again it was emphasized
that the obligation to legislate in accordance with article 4 was mandatory"'. -^
126. CERD/C/SR.204 at 53 (Haastrup). .* , ,, .-, „ ^ ^ , , , ^ ^ . ^
127. CERD/C/R.77/Add.6. . . . . . .
128. Unfortunately the Committee does not deal with the legal effect of such a restrictive
statement by a State Party in its periodic report. This may have been influenced by the
absence of a representative from Barbados.
129. CERD/C/SR.272 at 49 (Partsch). 51 (Valencia Rodriguez). 53 (Sayegh, Pahr), 55
(Blishchenko). 58 (Sayegh, Nabavi).
130. CERD/C/SR.272 at 50 (Bahnev), 53 (Sayegh).
131. CERD/C/SR.272 at 53 (Pahr), 55 (Blishchenko), 56 (Lamptey). and 57 (Kapteyn).
132. CERD/C/SR.272 at 54, Committee-member Ingles says:"It (the Committee,EL) could
not criticize Barbados for having made a reservation with regard to that article, if in fact
it was a reservation. Nor could it criticize Barbados for having interpreted the article, if
it was simply a case of interpretation;..". The difference of opinion continues at 55
(Nabavi), 58 (Aboul-Nasr) and 59 (Haastrup).
133. CERD/C/SR.272 at 54 (Ingles), 57 (Partsch), 59 (Haastrup).
134. CERD/C/SR.272 at 50 (Bahnev), 53 (Pahr), 57 (Kapteyn), 59 (Blishchenko) and 60
(Kapteyn). :;..•:':? r •-. • • ^ y^'u.^
135. CERD/C/75/Add.7.
136. CERD/C/SR.557, par.40 (Sherifis), par.46 (Valencia Rodriguez). **•
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The sixth periodic report by Barbados contains very limited information on the
implementation of article 4; and no information about the reservation at all'".
The seventh periodic report does not contain any information on the reservation
to article 4, it merely refers to the Public Order Act"*. In her introduction, the
Committee rapporteur indicates that there was evidence that the Public Order Act
did not cover the whole scope of article 4" ' . In the absence of a representative
from Barbados, there was hardly any discussion with respect to the substance of
the report.
Belgium
In order to meet the requirements of article 4 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, (he Kingdom of Belgium will take
care to adapt its legislation to the obligations it has assumed in becoming a party to the
said Convention.
The Kingdom of Belgium nevertheless wishes to emphasize the importance it attaches to
the fact that article 4 of the Convention provides that the measures laid down in sub-
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) should be adopted with due regard to principles embodied
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in
article 5 of the Convention. The Kingdom of Belgium therefore considers that the
obligations imposed by article 4 must be reconciled with the right to freedom opinion
and expression and the right to peaceful assembly and association. Those rights are
proclaimed in article 19 and 21 of the Internationale Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. They have also been stated in article 5 subparagraph (d)(viii) and (ix) of the
said Convention.
The Kingdom of Belgium also wishes to emphasize the importance which it attaches to
respect for the rights set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of
'*'' Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, especially in articles 10 and 11 dealing
respectively with freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of peaceful assembly
and association.
In discussing the declaration the question is asked whether Belgium'* could not
have gone further in the incrimination of organizations, referring to the obligation
in article 4.b''". Another member of the Committee points to the rules laid
down in articles 29 and 30 of the Universal Declaration, which provide the
option of restricting fundamental rights'''-. In his answer the Belgian representa-
tive indicated that there were options for preventing and prohibiting activities
contrary to the public order, at the same time underlining the hesitation in using
that legislation''".
The Belgian statements were not dealt with by the Committee when discussing
the second periodic report in the nineteenth session'**, or the combined third
137. CERD/C/106/Add.l3, par.22-25.
138. CERD/C/131/Add.l3, par.9-10.
jl#. CERD/C/SR.890, par.5 (Sadiq Ali).
140. CERD/C/R.85/Add.5.
141. CERD/C/SR.365. par.53 (Dechezelles).
14Z CERD/C/SR.365, par.58 (Partsch).
143. CERD/C/SR.366, par. 1-2 (Belgium).
144. CERD/C/16/Add.2 and CERD/C/SR.423.
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and fourth report in the twenty-ninth session'**. Belgium is overdue in repor-
ting, the Committee has yet to receive the fifth through eighth reports''"
"To the extent, if any, that any law relating to elections in Fiji may not fulfil the
obligations referred to in article 5(c), that any law relating to the land in Fiji which
prohibits or restricts the alienation of land by the indigenous inhabitant may not fulfil
the obligations referred to in article 5(d)(v), or that the school system of Fiji may not
fulfil the obligations referred to in articles 2,3, or 5(e)(v), the Government of Fiji
reserves the right not to implement the aforementioned provisions of the Convention."
Firstly the Government of Fiji wishes to state its understanding of certain articles in the
Convention. It interprets article 4 as requiring a party to the Convention to adopt
further legislative measures in the fields covered by paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of that
article only in so far as it may consider with due regard to the principles embodied in
the Universal Declaration set out in article 5 of the Convention (in particular to
freedom of opinion and expression and the right of peaceful assembly and association)
that some legislative addition to, or variation of existing law and practice in these fields
is necessary for the attainment of the end specified in the earlier part of article 4.
Further, the Government of Fiji interprets the requirement in article 6 concerning
'reparation or satisfaction' as being fulfilled if one or other of these forms of redress is
made available and interprets 'satisfaction' as including any form of redress effective to
bring the discriminatory conduct to an end. In addition it interprets article 20 and the
other related provisions of Part III of the Convention as meaning that if a reservation is
not accepted the State making the reservation does not become a Party to the Conventi-
on.
The Government of Fiji maintains the view that article 15 is discriminatory in that it
establishes a procedure for the receipt of petitions relating to dependent territories
whilst making no comparable provision for States without such territories.
The initial report of Fiji was very brief and incomplete'*', but the Committee
was forgiving, saying that Fiji was facing many problems in the aftermath of its
gaining independence'**.
In discussing Fiji's second report'*', Committee-members stressed the need to
reconsider the necessity of maintaining the reservation concerning article 5.c in
respect of electoral law'*.
In its third periodic report Fiji itself deals with the reservations maintained at
succession'", and underlines their necessity"-. The large number of reserva-
tions by Fiji is extensively discussed by the Committee, and the State is urged to
withdraw its reservations, or at least to indicate the envisaged duration of the
reservations. The Committee is specifically concerned with the Fijian reservation
145. CERD/C/88/Add.5 and CERD/C/SR.663-665.
146. See A/46/18.
147. CERD/C/R.63/Add.l; CERD/C/R.69.
148. CERD/C/SR.185 at 15 (Dayal), 21 (Haastrup).
149. CERD/C/17/Add.2.
150. CERD/C/SR.420, par.53 (Partsch), 56 (Bahnev).
151. CERD/C/64/Add.4.
152. The report reads:"In particular it is likely, to say the least, that the reservation and
declarations will continue to provide some protection as a condition of the succession
for Fiji in the considerable future."
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concerning the electoral system in relation to article 5.c'". And it is stressed
that inequalities as special measures may, under article 2.2, only be of limited
duration. Concerning the declaration with respect to article 4, the chairman of the
Committee indicated that in the absence of a "more authoritative" interpretation
of the Convention by the International Court of Justice, the interpretation by the
Committee of the said provision should have prevalence over the State's interpre-
tation'**.
While listing its reservations at the beginning of its fourth report, Fiji repeated
that "the reservation and declarations will continue to provide some protection as
a condition of the succession for Fiji in the considerable future"'". The Fijian
representative introducing his country's report at the twenty-ninth session, ex-
plained that apart from article 5.c, the rest of that provision was protected
through the constitution. The reservation concerning article 5.d.v was necessary
in view of the land tenure system and the reservation to article 5.e.v could be
explained by article 2.2 of the Convention'"". In its discussion of this Fijian
report, the Committee contradicted the opinion of the reporting State that it had
sufficiently implemented article 4, and again urged it to legislate along the lines
of that provision and withdraw the reservation. Given the efforts in the field of
education the Committee felt that the reservation to article 5.e.v was no longer
necessary, and the reservation concerning political rights in article 5.c was not
covered by article 1.4 of the Convention. There was a general call to review the
reservations, which had been made at succession, some ten years earlier'".
And again there was confusion about accepted reservations considered incompat-
ible by some Committee-members'•*. In his reply the Fiji representative merely
dealt with the matter of article 4 in relation to article 5.
In 1991, the Committee again considered the previous reports of Fiji in its
procedure dealing with overdue reports. The rapporteur recalls that doubts had
been expressed with respect to the extensive number of reservations made by
Fiji'". Another Committee member suggests that Fiji be invited to withdraw
the reservations, even if under article 20 CERD the reservations had been
accepted. He expresses regret about the way in which the two thirds rule on
153. Committee-member Partsch mentioned that an Indian member of the House of
Representatives needed more votes to be elected than a Fijian member, CERD/C/-
SR.553, par. 12.
154. CERD/C/SR.553, par.18 (Ingles).
155. CERD/C/89/Add.3
156. In the report it reads "..the comprehensive fundamental rights guaranteed to the
individual of any race by the Constitution must be read together with the reservations
and declarations, thus purely and simply, in the Fiji context its electoral, land and
educational laws and systems cannot be regarded as racial discrimination or a perpetu-
ation thereof".
157. CERD/C/SR.629, par.32 (Karasimeonov).
158. CERD/C/SR.629, par.36 (Ingles), 42 (Shahi), 43 (Houshmand).
ISS. CERD/C/SR.925, par.64 (Wolfrum).
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incompatibility operates, as it meant that the Fijian reservations that were
contrary to the spirit of the convention had been accepted'*.
France
With regard to article 4, France wishes to make it clear that it interprets the reference
made therein to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the
rights forth in article 5 of the Convention as releasing the States Parties from the
obligation to enact anti-discrimination legislation which is incompatible with the
freedoms of opinion and expression and of peaceful assembly and association guaran-
teed by those texts.
With regard to article 6, France declares that the question of remedy through tribunals
is, as far as France is concerned governed by the rules of ordinary law.
With regard to article 15. France's accession to the Convention may not be interpreted
as implying any change in its position regarding the resolution mentioned in that
provision.
In a reaction to the initial French report'", a Committee-member doubted
whether the reservation concerning article 6 was really responsive to the require-
ments of that article"-. The reservation concerning article 15 was dealt with as
a matter of object and purpose of the Convention, with a Committee-member
stressing that a difference of opinion on the wording of Resolutions should not
keep France from supporting sanctions against Rhodesia or restricting investment
in Southern Africa'". Importance should be attached to the objectives, rather
than the expressions used in the resolutions.
In discussing the second report of France'", the only issue dealt with is the
interpretative declaration concerning the scope of article 4. Committee-member
Partsch praised the French approach as "Roman Legal Elegance", because the
declaration took the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into account as well
as article 5 of the CERD'".
The declarations made by France have not been dealt with subsequently"*,
however the ninth and tenth reports are overdue'".
Guyana
The Government of the Republic of Guyana do not interpret the provisions of this
Convention as imposing upon them any obligation going beyond the limits set by the
160. CERD/C/SR.925, par.81 (Ferrero Costa).
161. CERD/C/R.33/Add.6 and CERD/C/R.33/Add.ll.
162. CERD/C/SR.207, at 83 (Sayegh).
163. CERD/C/SR.207, at 87 (Lamptey).
164. CERD/C/R.65/Add.ll.
165. CERD/C/SR.326 at 120-121 (Partsch).
166. Third report dealt with at the twentieth session; CERD/C/18/Add.3 and CERD/C/-
SR.438, 439. Fourth report dealt with at the twenty-third session; CERD/C/65/Add.2
and CERD/C/SR.509, 510. Fifth report dealt the twenty-eighth session; C.ERD/C/90/-
Add.3 and CERD/C/SR.627, 628. Sixth report dealt with at the thirty-second session;
CERD/C/117/Add.2 and CERD/C/SR.732. 733; Eighth report dealt with at the thirty-
seventh session CERD/C/148/Add.3 and CERD/SR.832-833.
167. See A/46/18 at 14.
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Constitution of Guyana or imposing upon them any obligation requiring the introducti-
on of judicial processes going beyond those provided under the same Constitution.
Guyana has ratified the Convention in 1977 and its initial report would have been
due in 1978. So far, neither the initial report nor the six subsequent reports have
been received by the Committee"*.
Italy
(a) The positive measures , provided Tor in article 4 of the Convention and specifically
described in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of that article, designed to eradicate all
incitement to, or acts of, discrimination, are to be interpreted, as that article provides,
"with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5" of the Convention. Consequently,
the obligations deriving from the aforementioned article 4 are not to jeopardize the
right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly and association which are laid down in articles 19 and 20 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, were reaffirmed by the General Assembly of the United
Nations when it adopted article 19 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and are referred to in articles 5 (d)(viii) and (ix) of the Convention. In
fact, the Italian Government, in conformity with the obligations resulting from Article
55 (c) and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, remains faithful to the principle laid
down in article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration, which provides that "in the exercise
of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are
determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public
order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
(b) Effective remedies against acts of racial discrimination which violate his individual
rights and fundamental freedoms will be assured to everyone, in conformity with article
6 of the Convention, by the ordinary courts in the framework of their respective
jurisdiction. Claims for reparation for any damage suffered as a result of acts of racial
discrimination must be brought against the persons responsible for the malicious or
criminal act which caused such damage.
The only matter dealt with by the Committee in its sixteenth session is the so-
called "reservation" in Italy's declaration under article 14'**. The reason behind
such a "reservation" was explained both by the Italian representative presenting
the first report and by a Committee-member'™.
The interpretative declaration concerning article 4 and 6 were reaffirmed in its
second report'^', which stressed the availability of ordinary courts for obtaining
the redress mentioned in article 6, and underlined the absence of a necessity to
legislate on the basis of article 4 given the fact that racial discrimination was
virtually absent in Italy. Discussions in the Committee's twenty-first session
168. A/46/18, at 8.
169. To the extent that the matter complained about is not already dealt with in another
international procedure. See for a discussion par. 1.3 supra; cf. the decision of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decision mentioned in 13 YbECHR
1970, 70-77.
CERD/C/R.95/Add.l and CERD/C/SR.346, par.40 (Sayegh).
170. CERD/C/SR.347, par.26 (Italy), 29 (Partsch).
171. CERD/C/46/Add.l, at 7, 9-10.
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focused on the "reservation" in Italy's declaration on the basis of article 14"*.
There was concern about the availability of this procedure, and it was stressed
that the "reservation" added the extra requirement of the matter not being dealt
with by any other international supervisory organ. The reservation was unnecess-
ary restrictive. The Italian representative indicated that the reservation followed
the recommendation of the Council of Europe and underlined that very few states
had up until then made the declaration according to article 14'".
At the twenty-ninth session a small remark was made about a provision in Italian
law dealing with the implementation of article 4'™.
The sixth periodic report by Italy does not provide any new information about the
implementation of articles 4 and 6 CERD"\ and the combined seventh and
eighth report does not contain any specific information either"*. The reserva-
tions are not discussed by the Committee'".
Jamaica
The Constitution of Jamaica entrenches and guarantees to every person in Jamaica the
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual irrespective of his race or place of
origin. The Constitution prescribes judicial processes to be observed in the event of the
violation of any of these rights whether by the State or by a private individual. Ratifica-
tion of the Convention by Jamaica does not imply the acceptance of obligations going
beyond the constitutional limits nor the acceptance of any obligations to introduce
judicial processes beyond those prescribed under the Constitution."
In the discussion of the initial report"* by Jamaica, its reservation regarding the
prevalence of the national constitution led to serious debate among Committee-
members. A need for more detailed information concerning the provisions of the
Convention affected by the reservation was felt. Did it cover the obligations in
articles 2.1.c and 4'"? It was noted that the constitution seemed to allow for
discriminatory practices that would otherwise be prohibited by the Convention, in
spite of the statement that human rights are guaranteed in Jamaica"*. The
question was raised as to whether the reservation only referred to the present
constitution or also to future constitutions"". Members were curious about the
reason for making such a general reservation'", and urged Jamaica to withdraw
it'". The most remarkable statement in the discussion was that of Committee-
member Ingles:"..although the reservation had met with no objections from States
172. CERD/C/SR.457, SR.458.
173. CERD/C/SR.458, par.6 (Italy).
174. CERD/C/104/Add.2; CERD/C/SR.671. par.26 (Partsch).
175. CERD/C/156/Add.l, par.27, 39.
176. CERD/C/182/Add.2.
177. CERD/C/SR.880, par.1-53.
178. CERD/C/R.33/Add.9.
179. CERD/C/SR.178, at 72 (Dayal, Lamptey).
180. CERD/C/SR.178 at 66 (Valencia Rodriguez), 67 (Warzazi) and at 74 (Ingles).
181. CERD/C/SR.178, at 73 (Kapteyn).
182. CERD/C/SR.178, at 67 (Valencia Rodriguez) and at 73 (Haastrup).
183. CERD/C/SR.176 at 67 (Valencia Rodriguez, Warzazi).
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Parties under article 20 paragraph 2, of the Convention and could therefore be
considered as satisfactory to them as not being incompatible with the Convention,
f/i£ Co/n/NiV/ef /ira/ a </«/>> fo exam/Vie w/V//jer Jamaica WOJ /« /acr c0/n/>/y//ig H>WJ
I'W o^Z/gaZ/foru Mwt/fr /Tje Co/tve/i/io/i"'**.
The representative of Jamaica answered the questions raised. The prevalence of
the constitution over international law is a rule of Jamaican law, and the reserva-
tion was intended to guarantee this with respect to the CERD'". In clarifying
the scope of the reservation, the representative implied that article 4 was not
affected as it was amply covered by the constitution"*. The reservation did not
prevent Jamaica from eliminating racial discrimination in the country, since there
was none. .**»;..-<.• : :t--rf--rti7{;'n,,«*-i<j35i
In its thirteenth session the Committee stressed that the reservation should not
undermine the mandatory nature of articles 4.a and 4.b"". Committee-member
Ingles underlined that "it was for the Committee to determine whether the
provisions of the constitution of that country were compatible with the Conven-
tion""*. This line of reasoning can of course only be followed if the statement
were an interpretative declaration. Again, the Committee did not seem to have
access to the constitution referred to'*'. The Jamaican representative presenting
the second periodic report''* maintained that the reservation "in no sense
prevented..from complying with the provisions of the Convention"''".
In its third report Jamaica stressed that "the reservation is certainly not designed
to weaken the Convention""-. The Committee was intrigued by this statement
and wondered in what respect the Convention and the constitution were inconsis-
tent. Examples were requested of obligations in the Convention not covered by
the constitution"'. There was confusion about the acceptability of the reserva-
tion. Some members suggested that it is merely a declaration'*", though other
Committee-members emphasized that the reservation had already been
accepted"*. The fact that the reservations of the Bahamas and Barbados were
quite similar to the Jamaican reservation was mentioned, and it was supposed that
the reservation was the consequence of extreme caution on the part of the
reserving State.
r ) . j , ' " • • • > . ; . ' / " V ^ / - •:.•«.•;.')•;<•••. S. ! ' ! , S 2 . T ' " j - : . . ^ ; ; . ? • ' " ! t f y ' i . ' : i
vi> •;; »••• "••••.•("••)»»;! •. - J i ^ / i v r < ^ : •'.!<..: • W i T . ' " ' * ' ; -
184. C E R D / C / S R . 1 7 6 at 74 ( Ing les ) . * - ' ";'• *'>' ^ — • - " " ^ • * ' ^ > ' ^ ^ -•''-'
185. CERD/C:/SR.178 at 74-75 (Jamaica). ' ' * • ' '<-• • ,i.i-
186. CERD/C/SR.179 at 76 (Jamaica). ' . , - , . . : . . . • : ,
187. CERD/C/SR.274 at 81 (Valencia Rodriguez). • ..; ^
188. CERD/C/SR.274 at 81 (Ingles). . ..'-'.-.i
189. CERD/C/SR.274 at 82 (Ingles), 83 (Partsch) and 85 (Sayegh). , . r :
190. CERD/C/R.65/Add.6 and CERD/C/R.69/Add.6. H>! • r-$.r; -»w
191. CERD/C/SR.274, at 84 (Jamaica). , ; \V.?,V: ; ; /T : ; : ' ;
192. C E R D / C / 2 3 , at 2. ' . O -VA -..e^ -. >.w "•>?. ;-> >'
193. CERD/C/SR.386, par.2 (Nabavi). 6 (Valencia Rodriguez). 22 (Hollist), 27 (Nettel).
194. CERD/C/SR.386, par.12 (Sayegh), 24 ((Videla Escada): C:ERD/C/SR.387, par.7
(Lamptey).
195. CERD/C/SR.386, par.27 (Nettel). 29 (Bahnev); CERD/C/SR.387. par.2 (Devetak).
Committee-member Goudiam even suggests attracting the attention of the States Parties
to the Jamaican reservation in relation to article 20.2 CERD. clearly ignoring the
content of article 20.1 CERD, CERD/C/SR.386, par. 15.
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In his reply the Jamaican representative underlined his country's adherence to the
basic obligation to eliminate racial discrimination, which explained why the
reservation was not meant to weaken the Convention. He stated that the imple-
mentation of article 4 was restricted by section 25 of the Jamaican constitution,
whereas there was no constitutional obligation to act upon the rights laid down in
article 5"*.
In the fourth periodic report by Jamaica"' its reservations are not explicitly
dealt with. It was however indicated that the Jamaican Government was giving
consideration to the observations made by the Committee at its consideration of
the prior report. In the discussions during the twenty-first session of the Commit-
tee the task of reconsidering the reservation and consequently reviewing the
constitution was considered a difficult one, though some Committee-members
asked whether the Convention had become part of domestic law of Jamaica'*.
The introduction to the combined fifth, sixth and seventh report by Jamaica '"
elaborated on the content of the Jamaican constitution, and indicated that in spite
of the conviction that it provided sufficient protection against racial discrimina-
tion, the Government has decided that a law specifically implementing article 4
should be enacted. After that the reservation would be withdrawn. The intention
to enact legislation on the basis of article 4 was praised by the Committee in its
thirty-second session***. Jamaica is overdue on its eighth through tenth
reports'*". :;>•-
Mal ta = -<«*•
,, "The Government of Malta wishes to state its understanding of certain articles in the
, Convention.
"It interprets article 4 as requiring a party to the Convention to adopt further measures
in the fields covered by sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of that article should il consider,
:-w,-•.:••. with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
» * Rights and the rights set forth in article 5 of the Convention, that the need arises to
enact 'ad hoc' legislation, in addition to or variation of existing law and practice to bring
to an end any act of racial discrimination.
>t "Further, the Government of Malta interprets the requirements in article 6 concerning
........ . 'reparation or satisfaction' as being fulfilled if one or other of these forms of redress is
-... • made available and interprets 'satisfaction' as including any form of redress effective to
bring the discriminatory conduct to an end."
Though the Committee emphasizes that article 4 is mandatory, there is hardly any
discussion in the eighth session about Malta's interpretation""". In the thirteenth
196. CERD/C/SR.387, par.10-12 (Jamaica). > Ms
197. CERD/C/18/Add.8. , T i
198. CERD/C/SR.463, par.8 (Dechezelles). 11 (Ordonez).
199. CERD/C/117/Add.4.
200. CERD/C/SR.741, par.54 (Cremona). 58 (Sherifis), 60 (Yutzis). 63 (Song); CERD/C/-
SR.742, par.2 (Cicanovic), 3 (Shahi), S (Sadiq Ali), 12 (Partsch), 13 (Karasimeonov).
201. See A/46/18 at 12.
202. CERD/C/R.33/Add.8 and CERD/C/SR.154, 155. r ; .«.-:.*
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session the Committee does again not deal with the declarations concerning
articles 4 and 6 made by Malta*'.
In the discussion about the third periodic report of Malta**, it was asked
whether the declaration concerning article 4 is a reservation or not. If the latter is
the case, then there is need to adopt the legislative measures as provided for in
article 4. In his reply the representative of Malta at the twenty-fifth session does
not deal with the absence of article 4 legislationr"*. WJSJ -ra .." el
The declaration was barely dealt with in subsequent sessions^"*. The seventh
periodic report of Malta reiterates the reservations made at ratification, stressing
that legislation could be made should the need arise-*".
In the combined eighth and ninth report, Malta indicates that there is little to add
with respect to articles 4 and 6 CERD-**. In his introduction to the report, the
rapporteur mentions that a difference of opinion with respect to the mandatory
nature of article 4 remained between Malta and the Committee-***, a view which
is reinforced by other Committee members-'". The Maltese representative said
he had nothing to add to the views expressed in the report-", and points at the
fact that Malta had not been the only State to make a reservation to article 4.
N e p a l • • ' * ' • • • • > - ' & ' • * < • - . . • • - ( - • " • • - • • - * > . - . ; : ; / : i s - ! • • • * • . • . < • • • : i • - . - • : i . : •:'• : - , « • ! . • . . * ! •
«•-•• -t The Constitution of Nepal contains provisions for the protection of individual rights,
including the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to form trade unions
and associations not motivated by party politics and the right to freedom of professing
his/her own religion; and nothing in the Convention shall be deemed to require or to
authorize legislation or other action by Nepal incompatible with the provisions of the
Constitution of Nepal.
"His Majesty's Government interprets article 4 of the said Convention as requiring a
Party to the Convention to adopt further legislative measures in the fields covered by
•''"'' 2sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of that article only in so far as His Majesty' Govern-
• •''••*' ment may consider, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal
''• Declaration of Human Rights, that some legislative addition to. or variation of existing
-*"'V '-' law and practice in those fields is necessary for the attainment of the end specified in
the earlier part of article 4.
' ' ' "His Majesty' Government interprets the requirements in article 6 concerning 'repara-
tion or satisfaction' as being fulfilled if one or other of these forms of redress is made
' ' - ' • • available; and further interprets 'satisfaction' as including any form of redress effective
to bring the discriminatory conduct to an end." . . . . . . . , ... .
• • r ' :
203. CERD/C/R.65/Add.lO and CERD/C/SR.288; the report by Malta mainly contained
additional information dealing with article 7 to which no reservations had been made.
204. CERD/C/65/AddJ; CERD/C/SR.552, par.26 (Ingles).
205. CERD/C/SR.552, par.29-36 (Malta).
206. CERD/C/90/Add.8, 9, 11 and CERD/C/SR.632. - r- . ,• . «•- 'Y\U?î.J
207. CERD/C/117/Add.6, par.6-7. ...-..;. .1 .• ;>v j ,
2 0 8 . C E R D / C / 1 7 1 / A d d . 2 , p a r . 1 6 - 1 9 , p a r . 2 1 . •*•*• >; •••<• < i *> < <••<-•* •
209. CERD/C/SR.897, par.43 (Vidas).
210. CERD/C/SR.897, par.46 (Banton), par.49 (Yutzis), par31 (Ferrero Costa). '• fc-
211. C E R D / C / S R . 8 9 7 , p a r . 5 2 ( M a l t a ) . ' . - » , . . , ; > ^ , ' ; r ; ; , : : Ï
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Though the Committee, at its eighth session, felt that more information about the
application of articles 4 and 6 in relation to the Nepalese constitution might be
welcome, the first report*'- was generally considered to be satisfactory. The
reservations made were not explicitly dealt with"".
The third report by Nepal*'* was limited to information about the provisions to
which no reservations or declarations had been attached. In the discussion the
chairman indicates that Nepal had only made one reservation dealing with article
22, taking the declaration concerning the constitution to be an interpretation. The
other statements were also considered to be interpretations and the wish was
expressed that Nepal would soon enact legislation satisfying the requirements of
article 4- ' \
In its fourth report Nepal repeated its reservations regarding article 4 and its
constitution-'*. The Committee suggested that Nepal should withdraw its
reservations, and stressed the need for legislation implementing article 4. It was
after all for the Committee to decide whether the protection afforded in Nepal
was sufficient on the basis of the CERD, and not merely up to the Nepalese
Government-".
The combined sixth till eighth report of Nepal mentions the reservation concern-
ing article 4, and indicates that the consideration that Nepalese legislation is
sufficient is at the origin of the reservation-'*. This same view is expressed in
the general reservation referring to the Nepalese Constitutiorr". The declar-
ation with respect to article 6 is not mentioned. Committee members expressed
regrets about the reservations made, and wondered whether they were reserva-
tions .tfr/cto je/WM or interpretative declarations--". The representative from
Nepal indicates that he will refer the issue of the withdrawal of the reservation to
article 4 to the Government"-'.
Papua New Guinea
"The Government of Papua New Guinea interprets article 4 of the Convention as
requiring a party to the Convention to adopt further legislative measures in the fields
covered by subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of that Article only in so far as it may
consider with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration set
out in article 5 of the Convention that some legislative addition to, or variation of
existing law and practice in these fields is necessary to give effect to the provisions of
212. CERD/C/R.33/Add.7 and CERD/C/SR.154. ' ' * '
213. The Nepalese reservations were not subject to discussions for the Committee in its
tenth session; CERD/C/R.65/Add.2 and CERD/C/SR.210 at 109-114. In the discussion
about the second periodic report the reservations and declarations were not dealt with
either CERD/C/R.88/Add.lO and CERD/C/SR.366.
214. CERD/C/65/Add.6.
215. CERD/C/SR.553, par.41^ 4 (Ingles) ^ . ^ h t o ^ b ^ ^ v v
216. CERD/C/148/Add.l.
217. CERD/C/SR.787, par.8 (Braunschweig), par.9 (About Nasr), par.12 (Partsch).
218. CERD/C/148/Add.l, par.6-7.
219. CERD/C/148/Add.l, par.8-9. i i..,- •.:-ïV^^J '^ Sfi.
220. CERD/C/SR.787, par.8 (Braunschweig); par.9 (Aboul Nasr): par.12 (Partsch).
221. CERD/C/SR.787, par.24 (Nepal).
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article 4. In addition, the Constitution of Papua New Guinea guarantees certain
fundamental rights and freedoms to all persons irrespective of their race or place of
origin. The Constitution also provides for judicial protection of these rights and
freedoms. Acceptance of this Convention does not therefore indicate the acceptance of
obligations by the Government of Papua New Guinea going beyond those provided by
the Constitution, nor does it indicate the acceptance of any obligations to introduce
judicial process beyond that provided by the Constitution."
In the New Guinean initial report™ the declaration regarding article 4 is
labelled a reservation, and there is an explanation about the rights protected in
the constitution, maintaining the reservation dealing with its primordial role. The
Committee stressed that, in spite of assurances from the State that no racial
discrimination existed, there was still an obligation to legislate on the basis of
article 4. Papua New Guinea was urged to withdraw the reservation, and if
discrimination does not exist there would seem to be no reason for maintaining
The second till fifth report of Papua New Guinea are overdue—*. , ,.,,
Tonga ,.;,_ . „_ ._ _.,, ,, j , _ , . ,,.-..>..,;
Reservations
.,^i*A,«ii» « ^ ^ extent, if any, that any law relating to elections in Tonga may not fulfil the
'-'" ' obligations referred to in article 5.c (withdrawn 28 October 1977], that any law relating
-'-•".! to land in Tonga which prohibits or restricts the alienation of land by the indigenous
I..-. inhabitants may not fulfil the obligations referred to in article 5(d)(v). or that the school
system of Tonga may not fulfil the obligations referred to in articles 2, 3, or 5.e.v
(withdrawn 28 October 1977], the Kingdom of Tonga reserves the right not to apply the
Convention to Tonga."
• Declarations ' ' * ^ * '•• '"= -^** *'i* <"'•<"! -!'*"'-:"' S?"-'* -"'• "•>•'•• 'H: H;?&'vf
"Secondly the Kingdom of Tonga wishes to state its understanding of certain articles in
the Convention. It interprets article 4 as requiring a party to the Convention to adopt
further legislative measures in the fields covered by sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of
that article only in so far as it may consider with due regard to the principles embodied
in the Universal Declaration set out in article 5 of the Convention (in particular to
^ " freedom of opinion and expression and the right of peaceful assembly and association)
'•' '"' that some legislative addition to, or variation of existing law and practice in these fields
. is necessary for the attainment of the end specified in the earlier part of article 4.
, Further, the Kingdom of Tonga interprets the requirement in article 6 concerning
"reparation or satisfaction' as being fulfilled if one or other of these forms of redress is
made available and interprets 'satisfaction' as including any form of redress effective to
bring the discriminatory conduct to an end.
In addition it interprets article 20 and the other related provisions of Part III of the
Convention as meaning that if a reservation is not accepted the State making the
*"' ' reservation does not become a Party to the Convention."
"Lastly the Kingdom of Tonga maintains its position in regard to article 15. In its view
•'"" this article is discriminatory in that it establishes a procedure for the receipt of petitions
relating to dependent territories whilst making no comparable provision for States
without such territories. Moreover, the article purports to establish a procedure
applicable to dependent territories of States whether or not those States have become
' . ':• - v f - "•••. ~ . \ - . - . ; ; - > / - • • j . : •.• • > , » ; • : ". > J i t <
222. CERD/C/101/Add.4. •: •:'-? i,-. • - w .MÏ.W- AU
223. C E R D / C / S R . 6 6 6 . - < o ^ A > s * - > . < $ , . v a s v ^ - . w - v f ' ••,.., •.-,• . v • • : ' > \ ' f * O K ^
2 2 4 . A / 4 6 / 1 8 a t l O . , • ; • . i ; . . ) > . ,.,, . , - ^ v ^ L i . K - ' ; > iy
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i^ît* Li parties to the Convention. His Majesty's Government have decided that the Kingdom of
1-, _i,j,i - Tonga should accede to the Convention, these objections notwithstanding because of the
importance they attach to the Convention as a whole."
The reservations Tonga made^ did not seem to be known to the Committee-
members who, during the eighth session, complained about the availability of
information on the reservations"'. A procedural discussion on the role of the
UN Secretariat in preparing a document for the Committee containing the
reservations followed, passing over the substance of the Tongolese reservations.
The remarkable statement by Committee-member Sayegh that ".. r/ie Co/wwi/tfee
H'<« wof £ow/;</ />y JUC/J rracrvnr/o/i.v, the report of the State Party concerned
might be affected by them""' was not discussed.
Discussions about the report of Tonga--* in the ninth session were fragmentai,
mainly because the initial report had been incomplete*^ and the additional
report was not any better. The large number of reservations made by Tonga
seemed to suggest that the country was fully aware of the content of the CERD,
and reservations should temper the Committee's approach-*. At the same time
the question was raised as to whether Tonga had made a declaration or a reserva-
tion, and what the legal effect of a declaration would be-". It is quite remark-
able that the representative of the UN Secretariat indicates which parts of the
statement are considered a reservation, and which parts a declaration*'*.
The second periodic report of Tonga-" was dealt with by the Committee in an
elaborate manner. As Committee-member Sayegh quite aptly states :"..//ic
CO«VCT///OM."-*' There is still uncertainty about the status of the various state-
ments made by Tonga. Though the information provided by the UN Secretariat
distinguishes between reservations and declarations, Tonga in its report relies on
a reservation concerning article 4, published as a declaration-". This led to
confusion about the classification of the statemenP*, and clarification on the
•/•>>. T ' - . J T C
225. CERD/C/R.50/Add.l and CERD/C/SR.156.
226. CERD/C/SR.156, at 132 (Tomko), 133 (Sayegh), 134 (Haastrup, Partsch), 135 (MacDo-
nald).
227. CERD/C/SR.156 at 133 (Sayegh). ^( . > .^uJ , .¥..:
228. CERD/C/R.50/Add.l and CERD/C/R.50/Add.l0. . :
229. CERD/C/R.50/Add.l, dealt with supra.
230. CERD/C/SR.194 at 120 (Partsch). < ' •"•i>*
231. CERD/C/SR.194 at 124 (Aboul-Nasr). - i . ' .;.»>
232. CERD/C/SR.194 at 124, referring to CERD/C/R.72. The Secretariat had left that
distinction to be determined by the Slates Parties, after the Genocide affaire and the
-,!••;, India-IMCO question; see Chapter 2, par.1.3 supra. The determination by a member of
the Secretariat would seem to exceed the authority of a civil servant.
233. CERD/C/5. S
234. CERD/C/SR.278 at 121 (Sayegh). on the same issue: CERD/C/SR.278 at 125 (Blishch-
enko).
235. CERD/C/5 par. 13.
236. CERD/C/SR.277 at 119 (Valencia Rodrigues), 120 (Partsch); CERD/C/SR.278 at 121
(Sayegh). 124 (Nabavi, Ingles), 127 (Dayal). 128 (Lamptey) and 129 (Warzazi). w...
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part of both the depository and the State was needed-^". It was stressed that
Tonga should take into account that the Committee considered the United
Kingdom's statement with respect to article 4 unacceptable^*. Furthermore
there is discussion about the scope of the reservation to article 5, and the
necessity of making such a reservation*". It was felt that reservations to article
2 and 3 in respect of the educational system were probably unnecessary given the
information provided in the report**. A Committee-member wonders why
Tonga referred to article 20 in a declaration^", and members complained about
the non-availability of the legislation referred to in the report*-. Finally it was
suggested all reservations and declarations be reconsidered-'".
On 27 October 1977 Tonga had withdrawn part of its reservations. In the
consideration of the third periodic report by Tonga-", members of the Com-
mittee praised the State for the withdrawal of the reservations concerning articles
5.c and 2, 3 and 5.e.\r'*''; without discussing the remaining reservations. -, ,,.^
The discussion of the fourth report did not take place in the presence of a
representative of that State-'". There was discussion of the fact that the Tongan
interpretation of article 4 left the determination of the necessity to legislate to the
State itself, which was too subjective in the eyes of the Committee-'", and
contrary to the obligation in article 29 of the Universal Declaration. The need to
enact legislation implementing article 4 was again stressed.
In subsequent sessions the reservations were barely dealt with-'*. The eighth
report by Tonga was strikingly brief and did not mention the reservations
made^'. In their consideration of the report, the Committee expressed concern
about the implementation of article 4 CERD-*. As no representative from
Tonga is present, these remarks were not contradicted.
United Kingdom
"Firstly, in the present circumstances deriving from the usurpation of power in Rhodesia
" " by the illegal regime, the United Kingdom must sign subject to a reservation of the right
'*••' ''^ not to apply the Convention to Rhodesia unless and until the United Kingdom informs
the Secretary General of the United Nations that it is in a position to ensure that the
237. CERD/C/SR.277 at 120 (Partsch). „,, • ,,. ^>,. .• ' ; , . . ^ .-.,, • • ;V*«; - - : .
238. CERD/C/SR.278 at 127 (Dayal). .V_,-".iihs.wV>.f T « J, i 1«'. Ï.<JM ïV- i l
239. CERD/C/SR.277 at 119 (Valencia Rodrigues); SR.278 at 125 (Blishchenko) and 127
(Dayal).
2<W. CERD/C/SR.278 at 127 (Dayal) and 128 (Lamptey).
241. CERD/C/SR.278 at 124 (Nabavi).
242; -.;: CERD/C/SR.278 at 125 (Blishchenko), 126 (Brin Martinez) and 129 (Nabavi). -\-iJP
243. i*; CERD/C/SR.278 at 125 (Blishchenko). >T .„
aH.rw'* CERD/C/30. >'ù , , : y ,v
245. CERD/C/SR.393, par.23 (Partsch), 24 (Valencia Rodriguez). ,. ,,„.
246. CERD/C/75/Add.3. "*^
247. - :. CERD/C/SR.551, par.3, 7, 8 (Partsch) and 22 (Bahnev), 24 (Ingles).
248. CERD/C/106/Add.5 and CERD/C/SR.656; CERD/C/131/Add.l and CERD/C/SR.-
728; CERD/C/158/Add.5 and CERD/C/SR.838. ^i -tw '^ ^.AH-i^
249: • CERD/C/158/Add.5. K
2Stt CERD/C/SR.838, par.22 (Yutzis), par.24 (Partsch), par.28 (Umptey).
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R:obligations imposed by the Convention in respect of that territory can be fully imple-
mented."
! "Secondly, the United Kingdom wishes to state its understanding of certain articles in
the Convention. It interprets article 4 as requiring a party to the Convention to adopt
further legislative measures in the fields covered by sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of
that article only in so far as it may consider with due regard to the principles embodied
in the Universal Declaration set out in article S of the Convention (in particular to
freedom of opinion and expression and the right of peaceful assembly and association)
that some legislative addition to, or variation of existing law and practice in these fields
is necessary for the attainment of the end specified in the earlier part of article 4.
Further, the United Kingdom interprets the requirement in article 6 concerning
'reparation or satisfaction' as being fulfilled if one or other of these forms of redress is
made available and interprets 'satisfaction' as including any form of redress effective to
bring the discriminatory conduct lo an end. In addition it interprets article 20 and the
other related provisions of Part III of the Convention as meaning that if a reservation is
not accepted the State making the reservation does not become a Party lo the Conven-
tion."
"Lastly the United Kingdom maintains its position in regard to article 15. In its view this
article is discriminatory in that it establishes a procedure for the receipt of petitions
relating to dependent territories whilst making no comparable provision for States
without such territories. Moreover, the article purports to establish a procedure
applicable to dependent territories of States whether or not those States have become
parties to the Convention. Her Majesty's Government have decided that the United
Kingdom should sign the Convention, these objections notwithstanding, because of the
importance they attach to the Convention as a whole."
"[..] the United Kingdom does not regard the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts, 1962
and 1968, or their application, as involving any racial discrimination within Ihc meaning
of paragraph 1 of article 1, or any other provision of the Convention, and fully reserves
its right to continue to apply those Acts."
"Lastly, to the extent if any. that any law relating lo election in Fiji may not fulfil the
obligations referred to in article 5 (c), that any law relating to land in Fiji which
prohibits or restricts the alienation of land by the indigenous inhabitants may not fulfil
the obligations referred to in article 5 (d) (v), or thai the school system of Fiji may not
fulfil the obligations referred to in articles 2.3 or 5 (e) (v), the United Kingdom reserves
the right not to apply the Convention lo Fiji."
In the eighth Committee-meeting attention focused on the interpretative declar-
ation concerning article 4, the reservation concerning Rhodesia and the question
of the reporting obligation for dependent territories in view of articles 9 and 15
of the Convention, considering the reservation made to article 15^'. There is a
notable difference of opinion on the extent to which the Committee is empowered
to deal with reservations. While Partsch thought the Committee should take the
reservations into account^-, Sayegh "maintained the position that reservations
by a State Party or several States Parties to the Convention were HO/ £f;u//Ng
H/M>M r/je CO/M/MIV/W when it made its own interpretation of provisions"^'. It
should be noted that these opinions are not necessarily contradictions, as the
Committee may very well establish its own interpretation, but will evidently have
to take into account the reservation made in its dialogue with the reserving State.
251. CERD/C/R.3O/Add.2O and CERD/C/SR.156, 157, 158.
252. CERD/C/SR.157 at 151 (Partsch).
253. CERD/C/SR.157 at 153 (Sayegh).
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On the other hand. Committee-members pledged some restraints, implying that
the Committee should accept the reservation as it sUxxP*.
The deliberations in the Committee focused on different aspects of the article 4
reservation. There was discussion about the conformity of certain sections of the
Race Relations Act 1965 with article 4 in conjunction with the reservation"'.
The question was whether the restrictions in the Race Relations Act were
adequately covered by the reservation or whether the restrictions in the Race
Relations Act went further than provided for in the reservation^*. In that
respect the discussion as hampered by the fact that Committee-members had not
established an interpretation of article 4 themselves^'. In the eyes of Commit-
tee-member Sayegh there were two questions in this respect: first, does article 4
make legislation compulsory, and secondly were there limits on the obligation to
outlaw racism^*. The representative of the United Kingdom was unfortunately
not in a position to reply to these specific questions^.
The reservation concerning the applicability of the Convention in Rhodesia was
discussed by Committee-member Haastrup who underlined that the seizure of
power was illegal and that the United Kingdom should still be considered
responsible for the application of the Convention in that particular territory-*".
The reservation would seem to be practical as much as it indicates that it is
beyond the State party's influence to guarantee the observance of the Convention
in Rhodesia-*'.
The third issue deals with the obligation to report about the implementation of the
Convention in dependent territories. The reporting obligations under article 9 of
the CERD do extend to dependent territories, and such information might be
dealt with under article 15 if not under article 9. The power of the Committee
under article 15 could not be restricted by reservations, according to Committee-
member Partsch"*-. He was probably hinting at the question of whether this
provision created rights and obligations for the States Parties or merely provided
the Committee with the authority to deal with such petitions.
The Chairman opened the discussion of the second periodic report^*' by
questioning the validity of the United Kingdom's statement regarding article 4.
He suggested that the interpretation could not be a valid reservation as it had not
been classified as such by the Secretariat. If it was meant to be a reservation, the
United Kingdom should have acted in accordance with article 20 and should have
made a formal reservation-". Committee-member Kapteyn takes a more
254. CERD/C/SR.158 at 158 (Haastrup, MacDonald).
255. CERD/C/SR.157 at 152 (Dayal).
256. CERD/C/SR.156 at 139 (Sayegh).
257. CERD/C/SR.157 at 148 (Ingles).
258. CERD/C/SR.156 at 139 (Sayegh): CERD/C/SR.158 at 159 (Sayegh).
259. CERD/C/SR.158 at 159 (United Kingdom).
260. CERD/C/SR.156 at 136 (Haastrup).
261. As emphasized by the British representative, CERD/C/SR.158 at 163.
262. CERD/C/SR.157 at 151 (Partsch).
263. CERD/C/R.70/Add.34.
264. CERD/C/SR.248 at 14 (Haastrup).
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balanced approach, considering it a "non-binding statement expressing a legal
viewpoint"^". In his eyes it contains two elements, firstly the declaration
repeats what has already been said in the opening paragraph of the provision
itself: the elimination of racial discrimination should not completely curtail the
freedom of association or the freedom of expression. The second element of the
declaration, the suggestion that it is for the United Kingdom to determine the
scope of article 4, was worrying. This could only be the case if the United
Kingdom had made a formal reservation, which it did had not**. Kapteyn's
opinion is seconded by Sayegh, who however feels that the United Kingdom
should clarify its position concerning the legal nature of the statement^".
Committee-member Valencia Rodriguez drew the attention to article 2.1 .d of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, emphasizing that the intention of the
state is of decisive importance. Hence it is necessary to establish if the statement
concerning article 4 was meant to modify the legal effect of the provision. If that
was the case it would be a reservation and the Committee would not have the
competence to deal with the matter**. Committee-member Ortiz Martin took
the statement to be an interpretative declaration and thought it was up to the
Committee to interpret the Convention, not to the States Parties-". Kapteyn, in
a later session endorsed the request of Committee-member MacDonald to ask the
United Kingdom for a clarification as regards its position with respect to the
statement"™. Aboul-Nasr seemed to differ with his colleagues on the extent of
the Committee's power to interpret the Convention"" and suggested bringing
the matter of the British statement before the Court of Justice^-.
265. CERD/C/SR.248 at 15 (Kapteyn).
266. Kapteyn eloquently makes short work of the British declaration:The second element in
the United Kingdom's interpretative statement, .... which maintained that the exclusive
right to determine the scope of the obligations under article 4 rested with each State
party, was both dangerous and disturbing, and, moreover, would be true only if the
United Kingdom had made a formal reservation and not just an interpretative state-
ment. In the absence of a formal reservation, it rested with the Committee rather than
the United Kingdom Government to determine whether or not a State party was
fulfilling its obligations under article 4. Unless and until the interpretation of the scope
of those obligations had been the subject of a decision by the International Court of
Justice under article 22 of the Convention or of an advisory opinion of the Court
requested by the General Assembly, r/io Co/fi/mr/cr, «5 f/ie ^«/rc/iu» o/ rtc C'onwn/ion,
was /i(//y co/n/MW/ir w /nfoprc/ a/irf fl/v'>' '''<* Co/nrmio/i. In so doing, the Committee
had the duty to allow States parties a measure of discretion so as to enable them to
take into account their legal and cultural traditions..." CERD/C/SR.248 at 15.
267. CERD/C/SR.248 at 17 (Sayegh).
268. CERD/C/SR.248 at 19 (Valencia Rodriguez).
269. CERD/C/SR.249 at 30 (Ortiz Martin).
270. CERD/C/SR.249 at 31 (Kapteyn).
271. CERD/C/SR.249 at 31 (Aboul-Nasr).
272. It should be noted that according to article 22 CERD. only disputes between States
Parties can be brought before the Court. The other option would be the request for an
Advisory Opinion on the grounds of article 96 of the UN Charter, but that requires the
involvement of either the Security Council or the General Assembly, given the fact that
(continued...)
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At the twelfth session, the deputy director of the Division of Human Rights
elaborated upon the depository practice of the Secretary General. It appeared that
States did not follow a very consistent practice with regard to the labelling of
their statements. Some declarations proved to be reservations and vice versa; if
doubt arose the Secretary General sought further clarification from the State
concerned*™. In reply to a question by Valencia Rodriguez, the deputy director
indicated that only the reservation concerning Rhodesia had been circulated in
accordance with article 20, implying that the statement concerning article 4 had
not been deemed a reservation-'''.
In replying to the remarks made by the Committee-members, the United King-
dom representative skilfully evaded reference to the declarations made, merely
dealing with issues that had occurred under the Race Relations Act 1968-".
In the discussions of the fourth periodic report by the United KingdomP all
attention was devoted to the declaration concerning article 4, and the assumption
that the State was free to decide upon the necessity to legislate. Committee-
member Partsch elaborated on a distinction he had made before-" and indicated
that there were three groups of statements concerning article 4. Firstly there was
the reservation by the United Kingdom to the extent that article 4 would only be
applied as far as it was compatible with national legislation^. A second group
consists of "objective interpretative statements" in which Governments stated that
they would enact legislation so far as it was compatible with the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, amongst them the declarations by Austria, France
and Italy. The United Kingdom's declaration was labelled a subjective reserva-
tion, in which the adoption of legislation is depending on considerations of
necessity relating to the Universal Declaration and article 5 of the Convention.
The issue, in the eyes of Partsch, is whether a subjective reservation could be
made in the form of an interpretative statement. Or, in other words, was the
statement in fact a reservation, and could it be formulated as an interpretative
declaration?
In spite of the elaborate discussion the United Kingdom representative did not
feel tempted to give his point of view. The whole issue was ignored in his
reply-".
In the discussion in the eighteenth session about the fifth periodic report of the
United Kingdom^", all attention was devoted to the declaration concerning
article 4. A Committee-member asked how the United Kingdom felt about
272.(...continued)
the Committee does not belong to the group of organs mentioned in article % para-
graph 2.
273. CERD/C/SR.249 at 31-32 (Das).
274. CERD/C/SR.249 at 32 (Das).
275. CERD/C/SR.249, at 33-36 (United Kingdom).
276. CERD/C/R.9O/Add.3O.
277. CERD/C/SR.348. par.49 (Partsch).
278. A reservation upon signature, the United States have so far not ratified the CERD.
279. CERD/C/SR.349, par.8-19.
280. CERD/C/20/Add.l7 and CERD/C/20/Add.26.
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banning Nazi organisations, indicating that there was a conflict between the
freedom of speech and the freedom of association on the one hand, and the duty
to combat racism on the other hand. In his reply, the United Kingdom representa-
tive qualified the declaratory statement concerning article 4 as being a reserva-
tion, which consequently led to a discussion about the qualification of all the
statements made by the United Kingdom. There was uncertainty about the
relevance of the qualification of a particular statement in relation to its legal
effect»'.
In its report^ the United Kingdom explicitly dealt with the issue of incitement
to racial hatred in response to earlier questions by the Committee. It elaborated
on the functioning of the 1976 Race Relations Act, though the reservations to
article 4 were not mentioned. The Committee noticed that the United Kingdom
was reviewing the Public Order Act 1936 with a view to reconciling the freedom
of expression with the obligations under the Convention, and the hope was
expressed that the views of the Committee would be taken into account. The
Committee maintained an opinion different from the United Kingdom on the
interpretation of article 4 . b^ . In his reply the United Kingdom representative
stressed that his Government felt that the issue of incitement should be solved
through free debate**.
In discussing the sixth report of the United Kingdom?" in its twenty-seventh
session, the issue of the prohibition of racist organizations according to article 4
was again taken up by the Committee. The Chairman suggested that the delay in
revising the Race Relations Act and the Public Order Act in order to bring them
into conformity with article 4.b might be related to the British interpretative
declaration on article 4. The Committee maintained that article 4 was not
discretionary but mandatory. The representative of the United Kingdom held that
the interpretative declaration was based on the fact that the right already existed
in common law, and the United Kingdom did not want to be obliged to legis-
late^.
The eighth report mentions with respect to article 4 that the Public Order Act
1936 was under review, while indicating implicitly why legislation in accordance
with article 4 CERD had not been made^*'. The reservations are not mentioned,
and with respect to article 6 available remedies are only dealt with briefly**.
The introduction to the ninth periodical report of the United Kingdom indicates
that legislation with respect to incitement to racial hatred will be reinforced^*'.
281. CERD/C/SR.398, par.29 (Lamptey); CERD/C/SR.399, par.23 (United Kingdom), 43
(Sayegh), 44 (Nettel).
282. CERD/C/66/Add.l3and Add.24.
283. CERD/C/SR.488, par.41 (United Kingdom).
284. CERD/C/SR.488 par.41 (United Kingdom).
285. CERD/C/91/Add.24.
286. CERD/C/SR.605, par.27 (Dechezelles) and CERD/C/SR.606. par.14 (Ingles), 16
(United Kingdom).
287. CERD/C/118/Add.7, par.28-29.
288. CERD/C/118/Add.7, par.44.
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The report discusses article 6 by outlining the role of the Commission for Racial
Equality, and the assistance it may provide to individuals under the Race Rela-
tions Act 1976. In its discussion of the British report during the thirty-fourth
session, there was a difference of opinion about the extent to which the State and
the Committee could use a differing interpretation of article 4.b of the Conven-
tion. On the other hand there was sympathy for the British intention to implement
parts of article 4 through the Public Order Act 1986^°.
The opening paragraph of the tenth report indicates that the Public Order Act
1986, containing provisions within the scope of article 4 CERD came into effect
in 1987^'. The section about article 6 CERD again refers to the role of the
Commission for Racial Equality. The report by the dependent Territories^-
does not deal with the reservations. The eleventh report quite bluntly does not
contain a paragraph on the implementation of article 4 CERD™.
The tenth and eleventh report are dealt with jointly by the Committee. The
country rapporteur mentions in his introduction that the United Kingdom had not
yet fully implemented article 4.b. The United Kingdom had made a unilateral
declaration which was not a reservation, and should thus reconsider its posi-
tion^*. Moreover, the rapporteur asked why the United Kingdom had not yet
withdrawn its reservations^*. The questions raised are however not dealt with
by the British representatives^*. se,-•-. s ^ f^> ^ n i *
3«2. Individual complaints, article 14 CERD iïs.?^.
«s^-ft; v»< •  ":*i:*,!':,vS iéf>iji fan; V^WI-JMJ-'I
Reservations have not been dealt with in the small number of cases under the
individual complaints procedure.
4. ,-i CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE RESERVATIONS TO THE
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMI-
,A._ NATION i-itifi"
v r
4 . 1 . T h e reservat ions <>i
'••• ;••,--!?^'t^*;»tr-'»JiW î te^l ivfe
In his article about the reservations clause of the CERD^", Cassese lists three
important innovations contained in article 20. For the first time the "object and
purpose" criterion was laid down in a treaty, thereby using the decisive notion
from the Genocide case. There was a prohibition on undermining the supervisory
290. CERD/C/SR.794, par.43 (Partsch), 45 (Lamptey). >•>?;•!:;'• "-.-<;
291. CERD/C/172/Add.U, par.3. . iii»^» i.«.»*..; irfKK,; ..••,('!*>••?, ='*
292. CERD/C/172/Add.l6. i t . :>; : ; ' , , : - \ a U - î :
293. CERD/C/197/Add.2. (wCs.-yjfwtf; r ; -ec ,-:a;,.^ *\,>•/•'*i.T-' . , *
294. CERD/C/SR.907, par.17 (Wolfrum). -! fc.nU;
295. CERD/C/SR.907, par.32 (Wolfrum). , ' ? # . C - . . i ?*i
296. CERD/C/SR.907, par.53-60; SR.908. par.1-33 (United Kingdom). J iC- i . r ; >«
297. Cassese, op.cit. at 271-273. :•' H.r. ™;
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system of the Convention by way of reservations. An objective procedure was
provided to establish whether the reservations made were contrary to either
criterion. Some twenty years later it is useful to consider these innovations again,
and to see if practice has turned out to be as satisfactory as Cassese thought it
would be.
The Convention established a system in which the determination of compatibility
is objective, given the Genocide case, this is an improvement to a situation in
which the depository feels obliged to interfere. The "two-thirds rule" has been
the most important element of the rule on reservations in the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. The rule creates pseudo-
objectivity, as all States Parties decide themselves about the compatibility and the
final determination is mere arithmetic. There are presumably few States who
actually decide about the compatibility of reservations and the need to object. It
would seem that the majority of the States just do not react. It is the passage of
time that establishes compatibility rather than an explicit determination. In view
of this governmental inertia the problem of the "two-thirds rule" being a rather
flexible rule-*' turned out to be of little weight in actual practice.
The two distinct criteria of object and purpose, and the operation of the supervis-
ory bodies have not been very relevant. Given the fact that the supervisory
system of the Convention, which became the prototype for supervision of human
rights treaties within the United Nations, was new at the time, a need was felt to
protect. The protection of the operation of the bodies established by the Conven-
tion is in itself a positive achievement. As it happened no reservations aiming at
the supervisory system have been made, which might be explained by the
explicitness of article 20.2 on this issue.
As to the object and purpose-rule, the present author does not share Cassese's
enthusiasm for its incorporation in the Convention. Originating from the typical
single-purpose treaty the Genocide Convention is, it is a question-begging rule
when applied to a treaty with such a multifarious content as the CERD. Though
the Convention aims at eliminating racial discrimination, the obligations are so
diverse (see e.g. article 5 CERD) that it will be hard to establish which rules do
or do not belong to the Convention's object and purpose. This does not mean that
the criterion of object and purpose is inadequate; it merely underlines that it will
be complicated to apply the notion. Though the Convention indicates that the
criterion is "object and purpose", States may want to use this as a guise for
objections based on purely political considerations. Additionally, the pseudo-
objectivity of the determination, as mentioned above, plays a role, a >> ••• - ::.
Cassese furthermore notices that the use of the collegiate system in the CERD
must be seen in the light of the tendency to protect the integrity of the vital
provisions and basic obligations of a treaty. Another example of this tendency, he
298. See supra par. 1.2 under article 20.2 .,,•• *i?.
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writes, is "the listing of provisions to which reservations cannot be appen-
ded"^.
With hindsight this analysis appears to be incorrect. The fundamental difference
between the system laid down in article 20 CERD and a specific rule on pro-
hibited reservations is the moment upon which the determination of compatibility
takes place. It must be assumed that when deciding upon those provisions of a
treaty to which reservations may not be made, States have the object and purpose
of a treaty in mind. The determination of compatibility is formalized beforehand
and the depository of the treaty merely acts on the explicit instructions provided
in the treaty. It will be the treaty itself that indicates which reservations are, or
are not allowed*". In the long run, a specific provision on reservations seems
the best method for safeguarding the object and purpose of a treaty. A system
which calls for a separate determination by the States Parties every time a
reservation is made, leaves room for political opportunism and laxity.
Turning our attention to the reservations made to the Convention on the Elimin-
ation of all Forms of Racial Discrimination it is noteworthy that out of the 133
States Parties*", only 16 States made reservations or interpretative declarations
concerning the CERD's substantive positions"*-. . h
These appear to revolve around the issue of conflicting rights and obligations.
The controversy between article 4 and its obligation to legislate, and the rights
guaranteed in article 5 is one example of this question. A less obvious example is
the reference to the constitutions of States Parties and the protection granted to
domestic legislation in a number of reservations.
As article 4 is the focal point of reservations to the CERD, it is necessary to
establish the precise content of the obligation. It deals with the prohibition of
racist propaganda (par.4.a), racist organisations (par.4.b) and governmental
involvement in racist activities (par.4.c). A closer look shows that the three
paragraphs contain a number of rules, put together on the basis of the issue
involved. Authors differ about the number of obligations contained in article
4303
Clearly there is a serious risk of a clash between the freedom from discrimination
on the one hand and the freedom of expression and freedom of association on the
other hand. The drafters of the provision have attempted to anticipate problems
by including the so-called "due regard clause". The introductory phrase of the
provision underlines that these goals should be achieved, keeping both the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights and article 5 of the Convention in mind.
299. Cassese op.cit. . . m ^ , ^ ^ «o«n*rfhul «^^'J
300. Cf. articles 19.a and 19.b VCLT.
301. ST/LEG/SER.E/11 (31-12-1992). ' ^ ' ^ " *
302. Or 17, depending on the reservations made by the Yemen Arab Republic.
303. Cf. Lerner, op.cit. at 49-51; Mahalic, op.cit.at 93-101: K.J.Partsch. Die Strafbarkeit der
Rassendiskriminierung nach de m Internationale!! Abkommen und die Verwirklichung
der Verpflichtungen in nationalen Strafrechtsordnungen, in: CiYbIL 1977, 119-138, at
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From the outset there has been an awareness that problems could arise, which led
to an obligation to reconcile these possibly conflicting rights. Consequently, apart
from the specific obligations to penalize on the basis of the paragraphs a-c, there
is a general obligation to balance these obligations with the Universal Declaration
and article 5 of the CERD. Thus neither the States Parties, nor the Committee
are right in assuming that either the duty to penalize and take legislative action,
or the duty to guarantee freedom of expression or freedom of association should
prevail, ite^vsr'
The provision and its aim of balancing the irreconcilable have been criticized for
various reasons. For some it is necessarily either freedom from discrimination (at
the expense of freedom of expression or association) or the other, adding that the
CERD is mistaken in encroaching upon the traditional rights of freedom of
expression and association**. The apparent prevalence of freedom from
discrimination is seen as a major deficiency in the Convention as a whole,
whatever the desirability of the elimination of racial discrimination.
Another criticism of article 4 focuses on the fact that the provision deletes an
element of the definition of racial discrimination given in article 1. While the
definition mentions the "effect or purpose" as an element in the discrimination
that is to be fought, this element is completely absent in article 4 and its obliga-
tion to implement legislation. Consequently there is the risk that article 4 will
lead to the penalization of acts that might hypothetically lead to racial discrimina-
tion without this actually taking place. This risk is at any rate present in par.4.a
and its prohibition of "dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or
hatred" where there is clearly no need to establish if this dissemination in fact
had the purposes or effect as mentioned in article 1.1
One might wonder whether the reservations made are the actual problem or
whether the provision itself is the bone of contention. Article 4 is the result of a
compromise in which the introduction purports to balance human rights while at
the same time paragraphs a and b stress the obligation to penalize racist propa-
ganda and racist organisations. With hindsight a provision with fewer imperfec-
tions would have done more justice to the Convention's goals of eliminating
racial discrimination. Ultimately the conclusion must be that article 4, however
important its goals, is an unfortunate provision because of its formulation. Thus
reservations may not have been completely unexpected"'.
Another problem is raised by the reservations referring to national constitutions.
Using these reservations, States not only unilaterally establish that their domestic
situation is in conformity with the obligations under CERD, but also put future
legislation beyond the reach of the Convention and its supervisory Committee.
Of course it is necessary for States to consider the relationship between their
international obligations and their domestic legal system prior to entering into the
304. Meron, Human rights Law-making at 24-25 and 49-50.
305. On the inadequacy of article 4 in general, see: Meron. op.cit. at 23-35.
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obligations laid down in the CERD. In case of conflict, the traditional policy has
been to make a reservation and in that respect there would not appear to be
anything wrong with these statements. On the other hand, it should be stressed
that human rights instruments are dynamic and aim at improving protection for
individuals. From that point of view, these reservations are too static. Moreover,
it should be made clear that by emphasizing their constitution as a ground for
restricting obligations under the CERD, States explicitly indicate that the protec-
tion afforded under their Constitution is less than that under the Convention. Such
an approach is surely contrary to the high ideals frequently included in constitu-
tions.
The issue of the domestic legal system and its rules on the prevalence of
international law is of no relevance in this respect. It is up to the States Parties to
ensure the compatibility of national and international obligations. Raising national
standards in order to match international standards is a viable alternative for the
reservations.
Reservations to the CERD are, in the eyes of Meron**, the direct result of
different opinions about the Convention's scope. The Convention is the product
of deficient drafting, it is the result of the wishes of the majority in the General
Assembly and consequently contains rules that are not acceptable for democratic
States"". Meron assumes that direct interference with private life in a way
incompatible with democracy leads to reservations, instantly adding that other
democratic States have for various reasons failed to make reservations. In actual
fact, the emphasis on "democratic States" seems to me to be a gross exaggeration
of the motives behind the reservations.
Furthermore Meron explains that reservations are the result of the CERD
adopting "maximalist" goals, this idealism influences the willingness to accept
obligations"*. He feels that the Convention is overzealous, and will not be able
to reach its high goals. It is probably a matter of personal taste whether a human
rights document should strive for the highest possible goals, or should restrict
itself to realistic
goals that can within reason be achieved. Part of the discussion is thus one
between the opposites of realism and idealism.
4.2. The role of States
States do not seem to have played an important role with respect to the issue of
reservations. Only very few states managed to withdraw their reservations, and
few states did object to the reservations of the Yemen Arab Republic.
The fact that objections to article 4 reservations have not been made, may in a
way weaken the Committee's strong stance on the obligation to legislate con-
306. Meron. op.cit. at 49.
307. Meron. op.cit. at 51.
308. Meron. op.cit. at 52.
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tained in the provision. Objections might have supported this approach. One
might say that the interest states take in the Convention is focused on its domestic
implications rather then the international obligations entered into on ratification.
4.3. The role of the Committee
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has the longest
experience with the supervisory system common to the UN Human Rights
treaties, and its consideration of reservations and declarations may indicate the
possibilities of a supervisory organ with regard thereto. In his evaluation of the
Committee's function in the first six years of its existence, Buergenthal is
optimistic about the achievements of the Committee in exploring the possibilities
of the reporting procedure as a means of supervision*". The way in which the
Committee has used its opportunities has turned the reporting obligation into a
serious instrument for monitoring the implementation of the Convention. On the
other hand, when one looks specifically at the way in which the Committee has
dealt with the matter of reservations, a number of contentious issues have arisen
over the years. In contradistinction to the general evaluation, there is no reason
for optimism as far as reservations are concerned.
The determination of the actual status and legal effect of a particular declaration
is theoretically left to the author State. But States are in the habit of not expressly
indicating the nature of their declaration, probably with a view to interpreting its
legal force at a later point in time. Sometimes called "interpretation", declarations
are referred to as "reservations" in discussions with the Committee. The dis-
cussion of the legal force of a particular statement is a recurring one in the
Committee's work. However, the Committee appears to be at a loss on the law
applicable to reservations and the reservations made. Not only is there a lack of
knowledge about the CERD's own system"", and consequently a great trust in
the wisdom of the UN Secretariat'", there is also great lack of insight into the
intricacies of interpretative declarations"".
As it may be hard to establish at face value what the exact purpose of a statement
is, the role of the Committee becomes of primordial importance. The activities of
a supervisory organ, such as the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination, necessarily imply a certain amount of interpretation of the statements
made by the States Parties, in order to establish the precise obligations binding
upon them.
309. Buergenthal. The UN Racial Convention at 218-221.
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Moreover, there is a lack of continuity in the Committee's discussions with the
reserving States. Concern about a particular reservation in one session is followed
by complete silence about the same reservation when the next report is dealt
with-"'. This suggests inadequate servicing of the Committee as well as a lack
of interest on the part of the Committee-members. It appears to lack a institu-
tional memory as far as reservations are concerned.
The Committee's authority to determine the legal effect of a particular statement
remains unclear to the Committee. There is a tendency to rely on the steps taken
by the Secretary-General acting as depositary for the Convention. It should be
noted that the Genocide-case, if anything, established that the determination of
the acceptability of reservations was a matter for the States Parties to decide"''.
From what transpires in the Committee's discussions, the Secretary General only
circulates declarations explicitly labelled "reservation" to the other States Parties,
in accordance with article 20.1"*. It is impossible to understand why the
Secretary General did not circulate all the interpretations, declarations and
reservations made, but that is what transpired. Consequently, the States Parties
never had the opportunity to object to reservations made under the guise of
interpretation, as they had not been circulated. Obviously it would be a misinter-
pretation of article 20 to consider these statements as accepted reservations.
The problem is thus the authority to decide upon the legal effect of interpretative
declarations and other statements of an uncertain nature. There are Committee-
members who consider the Committee to be empowered to make such a determi-
nation, whereas others emphasize that this is within the authority of the States
Parties only"*.
The right approach would seem to be the following. When ratifying, States may
make reservations and in practice also make interpretative declarations. Whereas
the former have a direct bearing upon the consent to be bound expressed by the
State inasmuch as they restrict the obligations under the treaty, the latter merely
suggest an interpretation of the treaty that might not be shared by other States
Parties or by the Committee. However, if this interpretation is particularly
important for the ratifying State, it has the option of choosing the form of a
(binding) reservation.
In the case of a statement of an uncertain nature, the analysis of the intention
might be influenced by the formulation and the language used. This may lead to a
comparison between the original obligation and the interpretation offered that will
give insight into the authors intentions. -; « n r ^ w -.*•.«:;•-, ^>
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When a State has made various statements labelling some explicitly as reserva-
tions, the Committee would be well advised to follow the line of reasoning used
by the European Commission on Human Rights in the Belilos case'". This
theory of distinction is not necessarily restricted to the European Convention,
though Graefrath"* is right in emphasizing that its practice is not JOT re
applicable, or even transferable, to other Human Rights Conventions. It should
be underlined that the theory of distinction, basically amounts to the principle of
erprera/o W/I/MJ erf etc/iu/o a/fer/iu, which is in line with the rules for the
interpretation of treaties'". ^
Another approach used by the Committee in its discussion with the reserving
States is to ask for clarification and for information about the scope of the
statement, and about the author's intention-*-". There is a risk that this approach
might introduce complete subjectivity into the field of reservations. It may seem
odd for the author state to determine the legal effect of a particular statement,
perhaps years after ratification. This would be very undesirable from the point of
view of legal certainty. Yet, if such a request were to be addressed to a State
which had made a distinction between reservations and interpretations, as
indicated above, confusion could not arise. After all if the statement was meant
as a reservation, it should have been labelled as such, the author state itself
would bear the "risk" of the ensuing confusion.
On the other hand such a request will probably lead to a clarification from the
author state which would at least be an authoritative clarification, as long as it is
within the limits of interpretation. Should a difference of opinion arise as to the
correct interpretation, or the permissible interpretation, then the Committee has
clearly stated that its interpretation of the Convention is more authoritative than
the interpretation by a particular State Party'-'. This would seem to follow
logically from the Committee's central role in the supervisory system, and the
extensive knowledge about the Convention it has consequently gathered.
The best way to settle a difference of opinion on the precise interpretation of the
Convention finally would be to take the issue to the International Court of
Justice, in accordance with article 22 of the Convention. This can only be done
after negotiations have taken place, or after using the dispute settlement pro-
cedures available in the Convention. It must be stressed that article 22 deals
specifically with a dispute between two or more States Parties; this definitely
excludes the possibility of the Committee bringing the dispute before the Court.
Another impediment would be the number of reservations made to article 22 it-
317. Belilos vs Switserland, European Commission of Human Rights; discussed in Chapter 3,
par.4.1.2 supra. ,-ÏÂC
31&. Graefrath, op.cit., at 74-75. U£
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Accordingly, authoritative interpretation of the Convention by the Inter-
national Court must be considered a theoretical, if not hypothetical possibility.
Apart from the rather inconclusive discussions about interpretative declarations,
the Committee frequently asked States to reconsider reservations, or more
explicitly, to withdraw reservations. This has not had a very impressive effect,
only one state managed to withdraw a substantive reservation.
The work of the Committee is seriously hampered by a lack of knowledge of the
legal systems and the legislation of the States Parties. Quite frequently the impact
of a reservation can only be seen in its true proportions within the perspective of
the existing legal system. This is in particular the case with the implementation of
articles 4, 5 and 6.
•qt. *!?îî Jsriî ifc-n s. ?.; •HwiT , ' 'nosViiffn «'KWîïy* siW IMC-UK bra .iofun-MKV'
The Committee's experience in discussing reservations and declarations concern-
ing articles 4.a and 4.b has not been particularly fortunate. Its concern about the
implementation of these provisions, and the obligation to legislate contained
therein has been politely ignored'-'. Though the introductory phrase of the
provision suggests that a solution to the apparent controversy is possible, this
may seriously be doubted when looking at the provision itself and the state
practice as reported to the Committee.
Over the years, the issue of article 4 reservations has acquired the character of a
symbolic discussion in which points of view are exchanged but never changed.
The views of States concerned and of the Committee differ on this provision, and
on the basis of the reservations made there is absolutely no need, even less an
obligation, to implement the provision. It is precisely when the implementation of
a controversial provision is at stake, that CERD's supervisory system's lack of
force becomes apparent. It is not only the somewhat ritualized discussion about
the reservations made, there is also the well-established fact that States that did
not enter a reservation have, in fact, not implemented the provision either. Here
the Committee has also lacked strength to improve the implementation of the
provision. Better drafting might have prevented this highly unsatisfactory
situation.
The most striking example of the Committee's powerlessness with regard to the
obligation to legislate in accordance with article 4 is the Australian reservation.
That State itself indicated the intention to legislate n/ //»<? _/?r.vf JU/MM? /nome/jf,
and has so far not been able to fulfill this unilateral obligation. After doubting the
need to legislate in one session'"'', the temporal restriction has become a
genuine reservation in the eyes of its author in the next session of the Commit-
tee'^. In spite of the clear wording of the reservation, the Committee has not
been able to persuade the State to honour its commitment.
322. Cf. par.1.3 supra.
323. See for instance CERD/C/SR.249(United Kingdom); CERD/C/SR.349(United
Kingdom).
324. CERD/C/SR.355 . .rf.r;.-:.*»- >.•!«''^- v .ns'- 'f . . ! . . * S ' - h:,
325. CERD/C/SR.443 . . , . , , / i r - / - • . .;i.;!:"ï i !••::.- -. I, • .n. i-'-* \ J ;
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It appears from the reports that legislation giving effect to article 4 of the
Convention is frequently absent. The Committee therefore decided to deal with it
in its first General Recommendation"'. It merely held that the Committee had
noticed the absence of the legislation implementing article 4 a and b, and
suggested states should give attention to supplement their legislation with the
required provisions.
A while later the matter was again raised by Committee-member Partsch under
the heading of "Obligations of States Parties under article 4.a"'-'
A problem related to the issue of the article 4 reservations dealt with before, is
constituted by the reservations referring to national constitutions. Though the
group of States that made these reservations is not very large, the reservations
can have a very restrictive effect on the implementation of the CERD in the
domestic legal system.
Unfortunately the Committee has not been successful in dealing with this particu-
lar group of reservations. First and foremost this appears to be the consequence
of insufficient knowledge about the content of the constitutions^ and the func-
tioning of the various national legal systems^ on the part of the Committee. It
is obvious that the Committee cannot know everything, but it could be a good
deal more strict with the States that fail to provide such information, even if
asked by the Committee. Another explanation might be that, as constitutions are
at the basis of national legal systems, the Committee is reluctant to overtly
question their compatibility with the CERD. Discussions with reserving States
revolve around the exact scope of the reservation"" and the relationship
between the CERD and the constitution"'. So far only one State has been
persuaded by the Committee to consider withdrawing its reservation, and legis-
lation to that end appears to be in progress"-.
4.4. Prospects > '
Given the great similarity between the reservations made and the fact that they
have frequently been discussed between the States Parties and the Committee,
there does not seem to be any prospect of a general withdrawal of the article 4
reservations. The discussion has not led to either of the opponents changing their
views, thus withdrawal is very unlikely. It should be kept in mind that, though
the Committee has a clear stance on the obligations under article 4, a number of
non-reserving States have not implemented the provision either. This may lead to
326. CERD/C/SR.93. 94 and 96.
327. CERD/C/R.54 and CERD/C/SR.122 at 42-44: CERD/C/SR.123.
328. CERD/C/SR.154(Nepal); CERD/C/SR.178(Jamaica); CERD/C/SR.272(Barbados);
CERD/C/SR.274(Jamaica).
329. C E R D / C / S R . 1 7 9 ( J a m a i c a ) ; C E R D / C / S R . 4 6 3 ( J a m a i c a ) . • - ' • • - ' ' • • v - • •--. << . ;.--
3 3 0 . CERD/C/SR.274(Jamaica); CERD/C/SR.349(Bahamas); CERD/C/SR.386(Jamaica).
331. CERD/C/SR.557(Barbados).
332. CERD/C/SR.463(Jamaica); CERD/C/SR.742(Jamaica). „ « , ^ ^ <f>->«0 {<,
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the conclusion that the actual situation in the States Parties to the CERD falls
short of the written obligation. The reservations are an indication of a fundamen-
tal difference of opinion amongst the States Parties about the obligations under
article 4 and the need to legislate"'.
The prospects as regards other substantive reservations, such as the article 1
reservation of the United Kingdom, and the articles 2, 3 juncto 5.3.v reservations
of Fiji and Tonga may be slightly better. The Committee may be able to persuade
these States in a constructive dialogue to withdraw these particular reservations
by stressing their rarity and the public opinion impact they have. Tonga, as has
been mentioned before, has already withdrawn a part of its reservation.
The declarations concerning the wisdom of formulating article 15 as it appears in
the Convention have by now lost their importance. Not only has the number of
Trust and Non-self governing Territories drastically decreased, the declarations
have not been discussed by the Committee at all.
Another possibility might be a more assertive approach towards the article 4 and
the constitutional reservations. The Committee might reconsider its prior dis-
cussions with the States concerned and draw up a standardized approach towards
interpretative declarations along the lines indicated in par.4.3 supra. Using such
an approach, the majority of States Parties relying on reservations formulated as
"interpretation" may be confronted with the fact that their interpretation has not
been accepted so that they are bound by the original obligations in the Conven-
tion. Though this line of reasoning gives the Committee the option of dealing
with the matter more assertively, it will doubtless run into the general problem of
the non-implementation of article 4.
| ; : ) V r ; . s f i s'.••••;
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333. Buergenthal. op.cit. at 193-194.
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5. RESERVATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE COVENANT
1.1. Content of the Covenant
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' is an extensive catalogue of "first
generation" human rights and fundamental freedoms, drafted in the ninety-sixties
together with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. These two conventions, together with the Optional Protocol to the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, completed the International Bill of Rights,
work on which began in 1948 with the proclamation of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights by the General Assembly.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter: CCPR)
consists of six parts. Part I establishes the right to self-determination for all
peoples. Part II deals with fundamental notions essential for the functioning of the
Covenant, such as the principle of equal treatment, the obligation to guarantee the
rights in the Covenant to any person, and the derogation clause in article 4. Part
III contains the Covenant's substantive provisions. It is a catalogue of civil and
political rights, and encompasses such notions as the right to life, the prohibition
of torture, slavery and arbitrary arrest as well as freedom of movement, freedom
of thought and freedom of opinion and expression. The Covenant's supervisory
system can be found in Part IV, which sets up the Human Rights Committee
(hereafter: HRC). Part V of the Covenant contains rules on interpretation, and
Part VI contains the final clauses^. The individual complaints procedure, an
additional supervisory procedure can be found in the Optional Protocol' (here-
after: OP). And in 1989 a second Optional Protocol aiming at the abolition of the
Death Penalty'' was adopted (hereafter: SOP), adding the prohibition of capital
punishment to the Covenant's system.
1.2. The law applicable to reservations
1.2.1. Reservations to the Covenant
The Covenant itself does not contain an explicit rule on reservations, though ^
1. UNTS 999 at 171; UNTS 1057 at 407; entry into force 23-3-1976.
2. D.McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee. Its Role in the Development of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Oxford 1991, at 18-20.
3. GA Res.2200A (XXI); entry into force 23 March 1976.
4. GA Res.44/128. entry into force 11 July 1991.
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the matter was discussed extensively during the drafting*, particularly because
the General Assembly had requested the inclusion of a reservations clause
following the discussions about reservations to the Genocide Convention*. Views
differed to a great extent', the Soviet Union contended that reservations should
be allowed as this was a right inherent in State sovereignty, whereas Chili and
Uruguay stressed that universal respect for human rights should lead to a com-
plete prohibition of reservations*. The United Kingdom favoured a system that
combined the system of article 64 ECHR and article 20 CERD, in which reserv-
ations to the extent that domestic law was not in conformity with the Covenant
would be admissible provided that two-thirds of the States Parties accepted the
reservations or did not object'. China, Egypt, Lebanon and the Philippines
suggested that the criterion should be the "object and purpose of the treaty", with
disputes about compatibility being referred to the International Court of Jus-
tice'".
The Commission on Human Rights was ultimately unable to draft a reservations
clause that could be agreed upon, and indicated that it was difficult to apply the
"object and purpose" criterion to the Covenant with its far-reaching and detailed
provisions. Moreover, using that criterion would make it necessary to create
safeguards against possible abuse. It was understood that the absence of a reserv-
ations clause did not imply that any reservation was permitted, as general inter-
national law would apply". Thus the "object and purpose" rule of article 19.c
VCLT would seem to be applicable'-, though it must be kept in mind that the
Covenant was adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1966, that is to
say before the adoption of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties".
Clearly this raises the ever intriguing question of what the object and purpose of
the Covenant might be. The protection of civil and political rights is a very
general notion, and it is unlikely that the States Parties meant all of the Covenant
5. RHiggins. Derogations under Human Rights Treaties (hereafter: Higgins, BYIL), in: 48
BYIL 1976/77, 281-320 at 317-319; McGoldrick. op.cit. 16: V. Pechota, The Develop-
ment of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in: The International Bill of Rights,
L.Henkin éd., New York 1981, 32-71 at 52-54; Suy, op.cit. at 943-944.
6. GA Res. 546 (VI).
7. A/2929, p.382-389.
8. E/CN.4/L.354.
9. E/CN.4/L.345 & Add.l
10. E/CN.4/L/351.
IL E.Schwelb, The International Covenants on Human Rights, in: A.Eide, A.Schou,
International Protection of Human Rights. 144; Stockholm 1968.
12. Craig, op.cit. at 851; Golsong, op.cit. at 31-33 passim; B.Graefrath, Menschenrechten
und internationale Kooperation usw., Berlin(DDR) 1988, 69-85; Higgins, BYIL at 318-
319; Higgins, MLR at 11; McGoldrick, op.cit. at 16; Nowak, op.cit. at XXIII-XXV.
19d<' \e See for a discussion of the inter-temporal law of treaties, supra Chapter 2, par.7.1.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was adopted on 23 May 1969, entered
into force 27 January 1980: the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted 19
. ;^ December 1966 and entered into force 23 March 1976.
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's substantive provisions to be part of its object and purpose. Two theories
regularly appear in literature concerning reservations to the CCPR.
First of all, it has been suggested that article 4 of the Covenant'*, the deroga-
tions clause, is an indication of its object and purpose. Discussions during the
drafting of the Covenant, when the Commission was still considering the possibil-
ity of including a reservations clause, focused on the importance of article 4. It
was suggested that reservations to that provision would not be acceptable".
Article 4 reads:
"1. In lime of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence
of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the Present Covenant may take
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with their obligations under international law and do not involve discrimina-
tion solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
2. No derogation from articles 6. 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15. 16 and 18 may be
made under this provision.
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation shall
immediately inform the other States parties to the present Covenant, through the
intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from
which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further communi-
cation shall be made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates
such derogation."
For present purposes the important aspect of the provision is the suggestion that
the Covenant's "object and purpose" is discernable in the list of non-derogable
rights in article 4.2. Yet, discussions about this provision have primarily focused
on the circumstances under which derogation is legitimate"'. In the General
Comment on article 4 of the Covenant", the HRC also focused on the oper-
ational side of the provision, rather than the substantive rights that may be
derogated from'*.
There are different ways of looking at rights from which derogations are not
allowed". The first interpretation is that these are rights from which derogations
cannot be justified by the necessities of any conceivable situation of public
emergency. The emphasis is on public emergency, and the fact that this situation
cannot legitimize the suspension of the rights listed in article 4.2. The other
interpretation is that these are core rights whose fundamentality is compelling per
14. Henkin, op.cit. at 23; Higgins, MLR. at 15 writes:There is a certain surface attractive-
ness to this idea."; McGoldrick, op.cit. par.7.13 at 305; Suy. op.cit. at 943 writes:"Dans la
mesure ou I'art .4 peut être assimilé à une clause de réserve, on peut considérer que les
parties ont clairement exprimé leur volonté d'interdire certaines réserves, et qu'aller a
rencontre de celte intention serait incompatible avec le droit des traités."
15. Higgins, BYIL, at 318; Suy, op.cit. at 943-944.
16. Hartman, op.cit.; Higgins, BYIL at 283-288; J.A.Walkate, The Human Rights Committee
and Public Emergencies, in: 9 YJWPO 1982, 133-146.
17. General Comment 5/13.
18. Walkate. op.cit. at 140-141.
19. Hartman, op.cit. at 113; Henkin, op.cit at 23-24; Suy, op.cit. at 943-947.
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5r. In this view, the nature of the rights protected is stressed. This evidently
amounts to saying that these non-derogable rights belong to the Covenant's object
and purpose"". The gist of relying on article 4 as an indication of object and
purpose of the Covenant is that, if derogations are not permitted, reservations are
a fortiori not permitted either.
Article 4.2"' protects the right to life; the prohibition of torture, slavery and
servitude; the prohibition of imprisonment on the grounds of the inability to fulfil
a contractual obligation, the ban on ex potf/flcfo laws, the right of recognition as
a person before the law, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The
right to life must be considered a rule of HM co^r/w, whereas the prohibition of
torture and slavery are both rules of /MJ cogmy and conventional law*\ More-
over, there is a great similarity between the non-derogable rights in various
human rights instruments^. The right to life, the prohibition of torture, slavery
and servitude and the prohibition of ex pott /o<7« legislation also appear in
European and American regional instruments"''. The right to a judicial personal-
ity, and freedom of conscience and religion appear both in the CCPR and in the
American Convention^. The uniformity of human rights protection in times of
emergency would seem to underline its fundamentality, and points to a certain
op/n/o m m concerning non-derogable rights. Yet, it should be noted that article
18 itself allows for limitation in paragraph 3"* and is apparently not as absolute
as its listing in paragraph 2 of article 4 would seem to suggest. And the prohib-
ition of imprisonment because of inability to fulfil contractual obligations as a
non-derogable right under the Covenant, is the odd one out".
Another non-derogable right appears in a somewhat hidden form in article 4.1^*.
The location of the prohibition of discrimination within article 4 has been the
subject of discussion, during the drafting it has been alternatively in paragraphs 2
and 1. Article 4.1 echoes the general non-discrimination clauses in articles 2.1
and 26 of the Covenant, yet it is much more restrictive as concerns which kind of
discrimination is forbidden. Whereas article 2.1 and 26 also prohibit discrimina-
tion on the ground of political or other opinion, national origin, property, birth or
other status, there is no protection against such discrimination in article 4.1. In
20. Henkin, op.cit. at 23; Suy, op.cit.at 944.
2L See for the drafting history MJ.Bossuyt. Guide to theTravaux Préparatoires" of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dordrecht 1987 at 91-96; Hart-
•••• man.op.cit. at 115-118.
22. Cf. International Agreement for the suppression of the White Slave Trade (1904);
International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic (1910);
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel. Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and
i Punishment (1984).
23. Cf. article 15.2 European Convention on Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
article 27.2 American Convention on Human Rights.
34i«n Articles 2, 3. 4.1 and 7 ECHR; articles 4, 5, 6, 9 ACHR. ,,\j
25. Articles 3 and 12 ACHR.
26. Hartman, op.cit., at 114.
27. Hartman, op.cit. at 113; Meron, op.cit. at 92.
28. Bossuyt, op.cit. at 86-87; Hartman, op.cit. at 113,118; McGoldrick, op.cit. par 7.11 at 304.
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the situation in which States may want to rely upon article 4, discrimination
solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin is
prohibited. This might be explained by the fact that particular situation demands
the use of a more restricted prohibition of discrimination. Another possible
conclusion might be that the grounds enumerated in article 4.1 are the core of the
prohibition of discrimination, and would therefore fall within the Covenant's
object and purpose. This would seem to be underlined by the fact that the
prohibition of discrimination has brought about the creation of separate interna-
tional instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimi-
nation and the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination
against Women. Additionally, it might be pointed out that an identical list appears
in the American Convention^*.
It might be suggested that when making a reservation to a provision mentioned in
article 4.2, or to the core elements of the prohibition of discrimination in article
4.1 a State may be supposed to act contrary to the object and purpose of the
Covenant". This must be seen as a rebuttable presumption", in as much as an
additional explanation or a reference to applicable national legislation may
contradict the presumption^.
Yet, one might wonder whether article 4 is the only indication of the Covenant's
object and purpose. Not only has this provision been written for the exceptional
situation of public emergency, it is conceivable that other rights are also of
fundamental importance, in spite of the fact that they may be derogated from in
an emergency situation. There is, after all, a conceptual difference between the
temporary nature of derogations and the legitimate non-compliance based on
reservations".
Apart from the non-derogable rights, a number of other Covenant provisions
have been referred to as belonging to its object and purpose. Higgins suggests
that reservations to article 14. l(public sentences) and article 14.3.d(public trials)
are impermissible-". The Netherlands and Portugal in their objections to the
Algerian reservation suggest that article 23.4(equality in marriage) is a rule of
29. Article 27.1 ACHR.
30. However, while Germany and the Netherlands objected to the Trinidad and Tobagan
reservation aiming at article 4.2, neither explicitly mentions non-derogability as the
reason for objecting. The objecting Slates merely indicate that a reservation is incompa-
tible with object and purpose of the Covenant .
31. Henkin. op.cit. at 24.
32. Suy, op.cit. at 944.
33. Higgins, BYIL at 315; Suy, op.cit. at 944 writes:"Ne s'agit-il pas en fait d'un faut
problème resultant d'une confusion entre conditions d'application (possibilité pour un
Etat partie de modifier l'application du Pacte) et de conditions de participation
(obligations pour un Etat partie de respecter un minimum de normes, même en cas de
danger public)."
34. Higgins, MLR, at 15.
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object and purpose". Reservations to articles 14.5(right to review), 14.7(ne bis
in idem) and 22(freedom of association) are unacceptable to Czechoslovakia and
the Netherlands on the grounds of object and purpose'*.
Other suggestions about reservations contrary to object and purpose of the
Covenant have been reservations to provisions reflecting iï« coge/w", or
provisions contrary of the Charter of the United Nations'*. In both cases such
reservations would not be acceptable for other reasons either, in the first case
because of the binding force of /u? cogms obligations", and in the second
because of article 103 of the Charter which itself stipulates the priority of this
constitutional instrument. Reliance upon article 19.c VCLT may therefor be
unnecessary.
Another issue frequently mentioned in respect of object and purpose of the
Covenant is the obligation to implement the Covenant in domestic legislation, an
obligation laid down in article 2 of the Covenant. It should be noted that this
minimalist approach is particularly useful for those states who want to stress, for
domestic purposes, that no obligations are taken up on the ratification of the
Covenant. The advantages of such ratifications are that being a State Party to a
human rights convention implies a certain propriety. There will not be an
obligation to legislate along the lines of the Covenant, as the reservation has
excluded the need to do so, and ratification will be purely symbolical. The
question is whether it is permissible to formulate reservations so as to protect
existing legislation against any changes that may become necessary as a conse-
quence of ratification of the Covenant. The aim of treaty-based human rights
protection is clearly to achieve an improvement in protection, rather than a stand-
still through the consolidation of the national status quo. Such declarations thus
cast doubt on the intentions of the ratifying state, as there does not appear to be
an intention to live up to the aspirations of the Covenant, in spite of the express-
ion of consent to be bound.
In practice, different forms of the minimalist approach are discernable in reserva-
tions to human rights treaties, and the Covenant in particular. The first category
is that of States who claim that their ««//<«;«/ /?£/.y/rtr/«/i /j /« coM/tfrw/Ty with the
treaty. Usually such reservations focus on a specific provision of national
legislation. Such declarations do seem somewhat superfluous as conformity is an
obligation, under article 2 CCPR, following the expression of consent to be
bound. But rather than stressing the obvious, the intention is to determine com-
patibility. Compatibility is established through a formal declaration, thereby
shielding the domestic situation from international interference. If the reservation
35. It is striking that both States did not object to the reservation made by Korea to that
i•-•?.< V) very same provision.
36. Objections to a reservation by Korea.
•Jff.<' Hartman, op.cit. at 114.
"•38.''-~ •' Higgins, MLR at 14; and objections to the Indian reservation to article 1 by France,
Germany and the Netherlands.
» . see articles 53, 64 VCLT. > i.:,J : -.;: r« ~.., >•«.:.* *t ijtt! •
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is accepted, there cannot be any doubt as to the compatibility of national legisla-
tion with the requirements in the Covenant. Consequently, the other States Parties
will have to scrutinize the domestic legislation of the reserving State in order to
establish whether or not they agree with the assumed compatibility, and would
intend to object to the reservation. It is easy to see that this will not be an
attractive approach, and may even be considered to be interference with domestic
affairs. Yet, one might say that these reservations are an explicit invitation to
undertake this, for if legislation were compatible (as it should be under the
Covenant) there would not be a need to indicate this by way of a reservation.
The second category of minimalist reservations is more explicit about the
intentions of the ratifying State, it merely indicates that //«//'««rt/ /?g/j/ar;o/i H>///
pwwi/7 owr f/z<> /-«/er /« //?<> rmjry in the case of conflict*. Two cases can be
distinguished: states may exclude a particular provision on the grounds that it is
not in accordance with domestic law. In such cases the state will usually indicate
precisely what is exclude, which is preferable. A more detrimental form of
reservations stressing the prevalence of domestic law are statements formulated
generally. These statements restrict the possible impact of the treaty even further.
If national legislation prevails one might wonder why a State took the trouble of
becoming a party to a human rights treaty at all. It would appear that here again
the promotional aspect of ratification prevails. What will stick to mind in the
international sphere is the ratification, the fact that implementation at national
level is sloppy will go unnoticed.
The question should be asked as to whether reservations giving prevalence to
domestic legislation are compatible with the CCPR, and in particular with the
obligation to implement the covenant in the national sphere, as laid down in
article 2. The general rule in the law of treaties in this respect is nm'c/e 27
VCLr, which has also been referred to in this respect*'. The provision indicates
that states may not rely on domestic law for a failure to perform a treaty, and
reads:
"A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure
to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice lo article 46''"."
At the drafting Conference in Vienna there was not much discussion about this
provision, which was proposed by Pakistan and subsequently added to the draft
Convention on the Law of Treaties. The only reason why the matter had not been
dealt with in the ILC Draft was that the Commission felt that the matter belong to
the topic of State responsibility. Given the inclusion of article 27 in the Vienna
Convention the matter lies apparently at the intersection of the law of treaties and
40. Schachter. The Obligation to Implement writes at 321:The clarity and candour of these
statements may seem commendable in comparison with questionable claims of conform-
ity made by some governments."
41. Triggs; op.cit. at 284-285, 291. ->**
42. Article 46 VCLT has no relevance in this respect, it deals with the invalidity of a treaty
concluded in manifest violation of internal law on the competence to conclude treaties.
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the law of state responsibility". The particular question that we are facing, the
relation between the VCLT provisions on reservations (and their application to
human rights treaties), and article 27 VCLT has not been dealt with at the
Conference. .•-» ,%,•<#«#$*( ,- -3<3 Tsaii«»d*: ffeiHaey
In respect of reservations, the starting point must be the assumption that the
Vienna Convention contains a coherent set of rules on the law of treaties.
Consequently there should not be a conflict between articles 19-22 and article 27.
It is necessary to recall that the articles 19-22 are in part II of the Convention,
entitled Conclusion and Entry into Force, whereas article 27 is in the general
section of Part III, entitled Observance, Application and Interpretation of
Treaties. While article 19 gives rules about which reservations are permissible
and which reservations are prohibited, article 27 gives a rule on the observance
of treaties. The fact that article 27 is not a /«x j/jirfTi/ff to article 19.c follows
from the structure of the Vienna Convention. Chronologically, both provisions
apply in a different phase of the treaty's existence. From that point of view it
would seem to be logical that article 27 does not contain elements of a rule
applicable in the earlier part of the treaty's existence. Or, to put it otherwise, if
there is a prohibition on making minimalist reservations safeguarding domestic
legislation, that rule should be in Part II of the Vienna Convention. It should be
underlined that though article 27 of the Vienna Convention is a mandatory rule of
international law, reservations are a legitimate exception to the rule. If Triggs'
line of reasoning were followed, any reservation referring to domestic legislation
would be illegal y w re**.
The answer would seem to be that reservations giving prevalence to national
legislation are, as such, a legitimate way to indicate that the treaty will not be
implemented in full. Reservations are an international legal method to restrict the
application of a convention; a state using that method does not rely on domestic
law but on a legitimate exception to article 27 VCLT by making a reservation
safeguarding its position. Such reservations necessarily imply a reservation to
article 2 CCPR, even if there does not appear to be an obligation to indicate this
expressly. Given the fact that article 27 itself cannot be considered an explicit
prohibition on minimalist reservations, it is unlikely that this general rule of
international law would implicitly be protecting the object and purpose of a
treaty.
An element to be taken into account is the fact that reservations merely indicating
which provisions will not be applicable, will usually have the same background.
While not mentioning that domestic legislation is the reason for excluding a
particular provision, this will usually be the case. The fact that the Covenant has
to be implemented in the national legal system is the obvious reason for this.
Looking at the matter of domestic legislation as a grounds for making reserva-
43. About the drafting of article 27 VCLT: Sinclair, op.cit. at 84.
4dt£- Article 27 could only be relevant in respect of reservations if it were a rule of ius
>*:«-' cogens, which is not the case. » waHtM'i^fi! tei ••••-ii;J-.j;v MS-.I :.•>.'-.-!• •;•
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tions in this way, demonstrates that the actual question is about the relevance of
an explicit or implicit reference to domestic legislation"'. 1
It is contended that, as the VCLT system stresses an approach focusing on the
substance of the reservation ("however phrased or named") this would lead to a
similar approach to the "domestic legislation" reservations. Consequently, what
matters is the scope of the reservation and this is what should be clarified. The
HRC will ask for clarifications about the scope of the reservation in its dis-
cussions with the author States, and justifiably so"*. The answers and clarifies-,
tions provided by the author State will lead to a "translation" of the reservation
from a "domestic legislation" reservation to a reservation to a particular provision
of the Covenant.
This does show that, from a practical point of view, these reservations are
undesirable as the substance is hidden behind the "domestic legislation" formula.
Uncovering the substance of the reservation will depend on the agility of the
Committee, which is not necessarily the best way to limit the scope of réserva- •
tions. A reservation indicating what it is that is excluded, is to be preferred.
A more important point in this respect, is the fact that a reference to domestic
legislation in a reservation would seem to suggest that the author state has
complete liberty in changing its legislation. Legislation is after all a matter
outside of the scope of traditional international law. It is contended that being a
party to a human rights instrument (with or without reservations) restricts
freedom to legislate from the point of view of substance. Legislation cannot
restrict human rights any further than the Covenant allows. In practice it will be
more complex to monitor whether new domestic legislation is more or less
restrictive as compared to prior legislation, and this in itself is a convincing
argument for discouraging the use of generally formulated "domestic legislation"
reservations. . , . .
It has also been suggested that domestic legislation reservations are in particular
necessary for /cY/ern/ s/fl/t'j'", which have a internal structure that may make it
more complicated to implement a human rights treaty. The implementation of
human rights treaties touches upon issues traditionally within the power of the
component parts of the State, rather than under the authority of the central
government. The two states to have formulated such reservations in respect of the
Covenant, Australia* and the United States'", are federal States*. As such,
the position of federal States and their reliance on domestic constitutional
45. Underlining a different point of view: Flinterman, Rieter. NJCM Bull, at 967.
46. This is without doubt within its mandate on the basis of article 40 of the Covenant.
47. Triggs, op.cit. at 284-285.
48. About the Australian reservation see: Triggs, op.cit. passim
49. Schachter, op.cit. at 311-331; Craig, op.cit. at 845, 868-880. «
50. On the other hand this may be a mere coincidence, similarly minimalist reservations in
respect of the Women's Convention have been made by predominantly Unitarian States.
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legislation could be covered by what has been said about domestic legislation
before.
On the other hand, the position of federal states is covered by an explicit
provision in the Covenant, article 50. It reads: .«oJ") Bt».'tevi3«i-:'. ~<i' So T;;;*- ••<:•
The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States
-•*-'•» without any limitations or exceptions." , ., _ ^
It has been suggested that federal reservations are contrary to the implicit
prohibition on federal reservations in article 50 of the Covenant", and are
therefore contrary to the object and purpose of the Covenant'-. To give some
perspective to this discussion it is necessary to refer to the drafting of the
Covenant. At the time, the possible problems of federal states were discussed,
but an accommodation was explicitly rejected by the acceptance of article 50
CCPR as it stands now. The other drafting States quite explicitly mentioned that,
while understanding Australian and American problems, they did not want
weaken the obligation to implement the Covenant in the whole of the country".
The "object and purpose" rule has a strong tendency to focus on the substance of
international instruments, dating back to the Advisory Opinion in the Genocide
case. General reservations stressing the prevalence of domestic law over the
Covenant are frequently explicitly referring to, or implicitly based upon, the
domestic constitutional system, which is more a matter of structure then a
question of substance. Although the implementation of substantive rights lies
behind these rules of structure**, it is almost impossible to track down the actual
impact on the various rights in the Covenant. The grounds for making these
reservations are not only the domestic division of power between the state and its
component parts, but may also be national constitutional rules about the imple-
mentation of international law in the domestic system, as in the case of the self-
executing nature of international obligations in the United States".
Whereas the application of the object and purpose rule in substantive matters is
quite complex, international legal theory at the moment provides little guidance
Henkin, op.cit. at 23; Pechota. op.cit. at 51. . ^ . i .^ . . ^ j , ,,.,,, ,,,-n !.-
Craig, op.cit at 869-871; Triggs, op.cit. at 291.
Bossuyt, "Travaux Préparatoires" at 761-767; Craig, op.cit. at 868-870; Graefrath, op.cit.
at 77-79; Nowak. op.cit. at 681-683; Pechota. op.cit. at 49-51; Triggs. op.cit. at 285-286.
Craig, op.cit. at 871.
In the 1978 proposal to ratify the Covenant, the transmittal message to the U.S.Con-
gress indicated that the reservations and understandings were meant to "harmonize the
treaties with existing provisions of domestic law". A similar argument can be found in
the Transmittal letter for the 1992 Ratification.
There is a direct relation with the American constitutional system in which treaties may
be self-executing. If the reservation were not made, the content of the Covenant could
overrule the fundamental rights in the Constitution. In order to prevent that, a declara-
tion indicating that the Covenant would not be self-executing in domestic law was
issued, so as to be sure of a restricted influence of the Covenant.
Craig, op.cit. at 853-862; Flinterman, Rieter, NJCM Bull, at 967. >. t,-,«.,*,
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for the application of the principle to rules of structure. The only possibility
would seem to be application of the object and purpose rule on the basis of
estimated effect, which would in turn lead to an interpretation of the impact of
the reservation on the implementation of the individual substantive rules in the
domestic legal system.
As the acceptability of a clause on federal reservations was discussed extensively,
with the participating States expressing different opinions on the matter, one
cannot conclude that the absence of a formal option amounts to a prohibition of
federal reservations, because they are contrary to object and purpose. This would
be unrealistic, given the rules in the Vienna Convention, but also in view of the
drafting history of article 50 CCPR*.
Other arguments against the federal reservations are less forceful. A number of
authors suggest that federal reservations might be construed as contrary to the
object and purpose of the Covenant because they would lead to a situation in
which non-federal States would be bound to a higher degree by the Covenant than
federal States having made a federal reservation". This argument is in a way
tautological, it is evident that non-reserving States are always bound to a greater
extent that reserving States. The fact that other federal states have ratified without
such reservations also indicates that the matter is not specific for federal states.
Another reason for the suggestion of a conflict with object and purpose of the
Convention is that the aim is to create a general minimum international standard
of human rights, and federal states should not be allowed to depart from that aim
that easily. While these may be reasons for disapproving of a federal reservation,
it is questionable whether this amounts to saying that the reservation is detrimen-
tal to the core obligations underlying the Covenant. A minimum international
standard is not necessarily the same as the complete content of the Conven-
tion'*. ,..,.- .•-;.-, :-,;*. '...;• :.. ?„•• !••; ;<"- :*-. •
Ultimately the problem is one of distinguishing between core and non-core
obligations. Constructing the Covenant's object and purpose as has been done
above is a legalistic exercise, it must be kept in mind that the decision about the
acceptability lies in the hands of the other States Parties to the Covenant.
This brings us to the fundamental question how the Committee should deal with
reservations and declarations. On the basis of the Vienna Convention system the
States Parties decide on the validity and acceptability of reservations. The
determination, as has been explained before, is an individual decision by the
States Parties based on the objective "object and purpose" notion".
Yet, when reservations and declarations appear in the work of the Committee, be
it in the reporting procedure or under the Optional Protocol, it does seem
necessary for the Committee to have an opinion on the statements and on their
56. Nowak, op.cit. at 683. O
57. Craig, op.cit. at 870; Triggs, op.cit. at 291. .;t
58. Craig, op.cit. at 870-871; Triggs, op.cit. at 291. » «*w; -
59. Higgins, BYIL, at 318; idem, MLR, at 12. ,r, «j ;,
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impact on the substance of the Covenant. It stands to reason that the Committee
can only discuss a State's compliance with the Covenant if it takes the reservation
into account, and if necessary interprets it". The interpretation of declarations
forming an integral part of a State party's obligation, would seem to be a logical
step in the work of the Committee under article 40.4 of the Covenant. Article 31
of the Vienna Convention should be the guiding principle in this respect".
1.2.2. Reservations to the Optional Protocol
The Optional Protocol does not have a specific provision on reservations either,
and reservations are consequently subject to the general system as laid down in
article 19.c of the Vienna Convention. Two points need attention when consider-
ing reservations and declarations to the Optional Protocol. First of all the
Protocol is a separate international instrument, a treaty in its own right. This can
best be seen in the need for states to explicitly express consent to be bound in
order to establish obligations under the Protocol. In spite of the fact that it is an
instrument technically distinct from the CCPR, it is intimately related to the
Covenant on substantive issues as well as supervision. It is impossible for a State
to ratify the Protocol without being party to the Covenant, according to article 1
OP. From this it follows that the direct relation between Protocol and Covenant
must be considered as essential for the Protocol, belonging to its object and
purpose.
A second issue in the same vein is that the Protocol purports to establish a
supervisory procedure additional to the two procedures under the Covenant. The
purpose of establishing a procedure is its functioning, and clearly a reservation
should not seriously hamper the procedure, as a matter of object and purpose.
1.2.3. Reservatioas to the Second Optional Protocol aiming at the abolition
of the Death Penalty
Unlike the Covenant and the Optional Protocol, the second Protocol" does have
a specific provision on reservations. Article 2 reads:
"I. No reservation is admissible to the present Protocol, except for a reservation made
at the time of ratification or accession that provides for the application of the death
j. - ; - - - - penally in time of war pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crime of a military
nature committed during wartime.
2. The State Party making such a reservation shall at the time of ratification or
accession communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the relevant
provisions of its national legislation during wartime.
3. The State Party having made such a reservation shall notify the Secretary-General of
_> ^ the United Nations of any beginning or ending of a state of war applicable to its
territory."
60. Higgins, MLR at 17; Suy, op.cit. at 944.
61. McGoldrick. op.cit. at 24; Nowak, op.cit. at 22.
62. D.Breillat, L'abolition mondiale de la peine de mort. A propos de 2e Protocole
facultatif se rappportant au Pacte internationale relatif aux droits civils et politiques,
visant a abolir la peine de mort, in: RSCDPC 1991, 261-278; G.J.Naldi, The prohibition
of the death penalty in international law, in: 38 NILR 1991, 373-384 at 375-376.
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 197
The rule in article 2.1 SOP belongs to the category described in article 19.b
VCLT, it indicates that only specified reservations may be made. These are
reservations that provide for the application of the death penalty in time of war
pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crime of a military nature committed
during wartime. Apart from indicating which reservation is allowed, the provi-
sion creates the obligation to communicate the relevant legislation to the deposi-
tory of the Second Protocol. This would seem to be a constituent element in the
legitimacy of the reservation. Without the provision of wartime legislation, the
reservation cannot be validly made. Furthermore, the reservation will only
function in exceptional circumstances, the beginning and end of which have to be
notified to the Secretary General. A reservation to the SOP is only a dormant
restriction, which will have to be invoked by notification. Consequently, notifica-
tion determines the legitimacy of the use of capital punishment during wartime.
It should be noticed that as an "article 19.b VCLT" provision, article 2 SOP is
somewhat unusual within the VCLT system. At the drafting of article 19, the
Vienna Conference felt that the determination whether reservations were accept-
able was to be left to the depository under paragraphs a and b, whereas the States
Parties would have to decide individually in the case of article 19.c. The back-
ground of this choice were the India-IMCO discussions in which the evaluation of
compatibility by the depository led to much discussion". It was felt that the
involvement of the depository should be restricted to a purely formal consider-
ation of whether or not a particular reservation was prohibited by the treaty, or
whether it belonged to the explicitly specified reservations mentioned in a treaty.
It would appear that without further qualification in the Second Protocol, the
notion of "a most serious crime of a military nature" leaves room for interpre-
tation by the Secretary General**. Does this formula refer to the grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, does it refer to the crime of
genocide? The way the reservations clause is formulated now, it calls upon the
Secretary General to appreciate the seriousness of the crime referred to in article
2.1, and in the legislation supplied under article 2.2 SOP. It might be questioned
whether the Secretary General is capable (and willing) to do this, the HRC would
seem to be distinctively better equipped to do so. It is obvious that the other
elements "application of the death penalty in time of war" and "a conviction for a
.. crime .. committed during wartime" will be easier to establish.
In respect of the reservations it is also necessary to focus on article 6.2 SOP,
which reads:
"2. Without prejudice to the possibility of a reservation under article 2 of the present
Protocol, the right guaranteed in article 1, paragraph 1 of the present Protocol shall not
be subject to any derogation under article 4 of the Covenant."
63. See Chapter 2, par.1.3 supra about India's reservation to the 1948 IMCO Convention.
64. Breillat, op.cit. at 273.
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At first sight the provision merely reiterates the possibility of making reservations
in accordance with article 2 SOP, and introduces article 1 SOP as an addition to
the list of non-derogable rights in article 4.2 CCPR.
However, logically this provision undermines the supposed "object and purpose"
nature of article 4 CCPR discussed before. As article 1 SOP is a non-derogable
right, and if the reasoning concerning article 4 CCPR and article 19 VCLT is to
be followed, reservations would be impermissible. Yet articles 6.2 juncto 2 SOP
indicate that reservations to a non-derogable right (i.e. article 1 SOP) are indeed
possible. The theory reflected above concerning article 4 CCPR would seem to
be undermined as the consequence of sloppy drafting. From a systematic point of
view, this rule is somewhat unfortunate.
1.3. Declarations and reservations
1.3.1. The Covenant
- article 1 -
Article 1 deals with the right of peoples to self-determination and to the free
disposal of their natural wealth and resources. Algeria interprets article 1 as not
impairing the right of control over natural wealth and resources, which seems to
be a repetition of article 1.2. Both France and the United Kingdom stress that
the obligations under the United Nations Charter** will prevail over article 1 of
the CCPR in cases of conflict, on the grounds of article 103 of the Charter. This
declaration merely repeats what would be the case given the rule laid down in
article 103 anyway". India declares that the words "the right to self-determina-
tion" in the provision only apply to peoples under foreign domination, and do not
apply to people in a sovereign independent State". Higgins notices that the
Indian declaration attaches conditions to the exercise of the right not to be found
in the Charter of the United Nations'*. And the HRC in its General Comment
indicates that the right implies the need to provide for constitutional and political
guarantees for its exercise". The declaration would appear to be a rather restrict-
ive interpretation, which is actually meant as a reservation™.
65. In particular articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, and for the United Kingdom also article 73.
66. It should be noted that the Charter speaks of "the principle of self-determination"(arti-
cles 1.2 and 55), whereas the Covenant speaks of "the right to self-determination". See
Nowak. op.cit. at 14.
67. Discussing the character of the provision Nowak, op.cit. at 16-17: about the right to self-
determination in a multi-ethnic State idem at 21; McGoldrick op.cit. at 15, at 247-249
and 253-254.
68. Higgins, MLR at 14.
69. General Comment 12/21, dd.12-4-1984.
70. Three states objected to the Indian reservation, see par.2.1 infra, saying that it attached
conditions to the right of self-determination not to be found in the Charter itself. See
Higgins. MLR at 13: McGoldrick, op.cit. at 248.
A similar interpretation of article 1 appears in a periodic report by Sri Lanka, CCPR/-
C/14/Add.6 par.2.
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Article 1.3 refers to States Parties having the responsibility for Non-Self-Govern-
ing and Trust Territories, and their obligation to promote the right to self-
determination. With respect to that provision Algeria emphasizes that it considers
the maintenance of the state of dependence of certain territories contrary to the
Charter of the United Nations and contrary to GA Resolution 1514(XV)";
whereas Roumania stresses that the provision is contrary to GA Resolution
2625(XXV)^. Apparently these states want to give prevalence to the Resolutions
mentioned, thereby enlarging the scope of the provision".
- article 2 -
Article 2 of the Covenant contains the non-discrimination rule, the obligation to
take the necessary steps to implement the Covenant in the domestic legal order
using the means indicated in the provision and the obligation to provide for an
effective remedy in case of violations™.
Belgium reserves the right not to apply article 2 with respect to the succession to
the throne, a reservation probably only dealing with article 2.1, and the prohib-
ition of a distinction based on sex or birth'"'.
Australia and Germany made reservations dealing with article 2.1. Australia
emphasizes that article 2.1 juncto articles 24.1, 25 and 26 should not hamper
legislation designed to achieve the equal enjoyment of the rights in the Covenants
for some classes in Australian society. The interpretative declaration aims at
safeguarding positive action. It should be noted that the HRC only explicitly dealt
with positive action in respect of women in General Comment 4/13". Germany
stresses that the articles 2.1, together with 19, 21 and 22 should be applied within
the scope of article 16 of the European Convention on Human Rights, a provision
that deals with the imposition of restrictions on the political activity of aliens™.
The reservation aims at the co-ordination of treaty obligations concerning the
position of aliens in human rights law. As the HRC stressed in General Comment
15/27", the rights laid down in the CCPR are equally applicable to aliens,
71. Cf. the French reservation concerning article 7 Optional Protocol which also refers to
GA Res.I514(XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples.
72. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States. GA Res.2625 (XXV).
McGoldrick indicates that it has been argued that this Resolution uses a much narrower
concept of self-determination than the Covenant does, op.cit at 248.
73. Nowak, op.cit. at 7-8.
74. Schachter, The obligation to give effect at 462-263.
75. Though it has been published that the reservation has in the meantime been withdrawn
(Opzij, Oktober 1991, at 38), this withdrawal has not yet appeared in either ST/LEG/-
SER.E/11 or CCPR/C/2/Rcv.3.
76. Cf. General Comment 4/13.
77. General Comment 4/13.
78. Article 16 of the European Convention reads:"Nothing in the articles 10, 11, and 14 shall
be regarded as preventing the High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on
the political activity of aliens."
79. General Comment 15/27.
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except for the distinction indicated in article 25 of the Covenant. The reservation
of Germany goes beyond this provision, putting greater restrictions on the
political activity of aliens.
It appears from the Committee's consideration of the initial report of the United
Kingdom that its reservation concerning "the preservation of service and
custodial discipline" is also related to article 2*".
Australia had also made a reservation concerning article 2.2 and 2.3 in relation
to its federal constitutional system"'. While accepting its obligations under the
Covenant for the State as a whole, it reserved the right to give effect to articles
2.2, 2.3 and 50, subject to article 2.2". Given the formulation of the declar-
ation it must be considered to have been a reservation. Behind this intricately
formulated declaration there is concern that Australia cannot guarantee a swift
and timely adaptation of existing legislation to Covenant standards by all its
component parts. Australia is both committed and cautious, and emphasizes the
prevalence of article 2.2, which, it should be noted, does not contain a time-limit
for the taking of the "necessary steps". These steps may not take a very long
time as that would be a misinterpretation of the Covenant*', gradual implemen-
tation is not the method used by the Covenant.
The reservation made at ratification on 13 August 1980, was withdrawn on 6
November 1984 when a new statement on the same issue of implementation in a
federal state was delivered in the shape of a declaration*". It has been suggested
that this revised statement, which reinforces the impression that the reservation
had not been meant as a reservation j/r/cfo «•«.«/*', was the direct result of
objections to the reservation**.
Though a reference to article 2.2 or article 50 is not included, the United
States entered a similar understanding dealing with its federal structure". The
understanding is more sweeping than the Australian one, and while maintaining
80. CCPR/C/SR.70. par.22 (United Kingdom).
81. Graefrath, op.cit. at 77-79.
82. For the text of the reservation see par.3.1 infra.
83. Nowak op.cit. at 60-61.
84. The declaration reads:"Australia has a federal constitutional system in which legislative,
executive and judicial powers are shared or distributed between the Commonwealth and
the constituent States. The implementation of the treaty throughout Australia will be
effected by the Commonwealth, State and Territory authorities having regard to their
respective constitutional powers and arrangements concerning their exercise."
85. About the apparent intentions behind the labelling of the initial statement Triggs, op.cit.
at 292-294; McGoldrick op.cit. at 271.
86. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Explanation of Proposed Reserva-
tions, Declarations and Understandings (hereafter: US Explanation) at 11.
87. The understanding reads:The United States understands that this Convention shall be
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and
judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein and otherwise by the state and
local governments; to the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction
over such matters, the Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the
Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of the stale or local govern-
ment may take appropriate measures for the fulfilment of the Convention."
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the responsibility for implementation at federal level, implementation at state
or local level becomes less certain as a result of the wording chosen. The
official explanation attached to list of reservations and declarations for dis-
cussion in the LJ.S.Senate mitigates the statement, stating that "even though the
Covenant will apply to state and local authorities, it will be implemented
consistently with U.S. concepts of federalism." Further onwards it reads "..the
intent is not to modify or limit U.S. undertakings under the Covenant but
rather to put our future treaty partners on notice with regard to the implica-
tions of our federal system concerning implementation."**, and the explanation
itself indicates a similarity between the US statement and the revised Austra-
lian declaration**.
- article 3 -
Article 3 stresses the equality of men and women in the enjoyment of civil and
political rights. Belgium is the only State to have made a reservation with
respect to article 3, in relation to article 2 and 25 and the right to succession,
discussed above.
- article 4 -
Article 4 contains the possibility to derogate from the obligations in the
Covenant in times of public emergency. Given the fact that derogation as such
runs contrary to the purpose of protecting people against the power of a State,
such possibilities are necessarily exceptional, and should be interpreted
restrictively*'.
Israel made a reservation regarding article 4.1 as a whole, indicating that the
state of emergency has been in force since 1948, which "constitutes a public
emergency within the meaning of article 4.1"". One cannot ignore the fact
88. US Explanation at 10-11.
89. Flinterman, Rieter, NJCM Bull at %6.
90. Cf.General Comment 5/13.
91. The Israeli declaration reads:
"Since its establishment, the Slate of Israel has been the victim of continuous threats
and attacks on its very existence as well as on the life and property of its citizens.
These have taken the form of threats of war. of actual armed attacks, and campaigns of
terrorism resulting in the murder of and injury to human beings.
In view of the above, the state of emergency which was proclaimed in May 1948 has
remained in force ever since. This situation constitutes a public emergency within the
meaning of article 4.1 of the Covenant.
The Government of Israel has therefore found it necessary, in accordance with the said
article 4, to take measures to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, for the defence of the State and for the protection of life and property,
including the powers of arrest and detention.
In so far as any of these measures are inconsistent with article 9 of the Covenant, Israel
thereby derogates from its obligations under that provision."
In ST/LEG/SER.E/11 this declaration is printed in the "Derogations" section, in
CCPR/C/2/Rev.3 it appears both as a declaration, and as a derogation.
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that this statement is somewhat circular: according to article 4.1 the public
emergency (which would seem to include "the state of emergency") may on
certain conditions justify a derogation from the obligations under the Covenant.
A state of emergency cannot in itself be a public emergency that gives the
rights of derogation. Apparently Israel meant to establish the existence of a
public emergency without fulfilling the requirements of article 4.1. The public
emergency is established through a reservation, evading the Covenant's
procedure. This explains the absence of notifications of derogation in accord-
ance with article 4.3 by Israel.
By using a reservation the derogation has acquired an indefinite duration,
withdrawal will be a unilateral act within the power of the author state"*. The
Covenant's notification procedure, with the requirements in article 4, stresses
the overriding character of the derogation as a temporal exception. Article 4 is
an exceptional rule in the Covenant, and must be assumed to protect the
Covenant's object and purpose". The reservation goes a lot further than the
provision allows, especially as far as the duration of the derogation is con-
cerned. The exception is turned into the rule, one can therefore within reason
claim that this reservation is contrary to a core obligation in the Covenant.
France has made a reservation regarding article 4.1**. It is a rather technical
declaration, dealing with the concordance between the requirements for
derogations in times of public emergency, such as formulated in article 4.1, and
the circumstances in French legislation concerning the declaration of the state
of siege or the state of emergency. The French reservation holds its legislation
to be meeting the requirements in article 4.1. Higgins suggests that this
reservation is unacceptable because it purports to exclude international
supervision on the issue of the compatibility of national legislation in the field
of article 4*\ "-f.-:^ ; ; iv . ^mtisa:* ao; wi;v
In a second statement on article 4.1 France states that its constitutional
criterion of "measures required by the circumstances"*" cannot be restricted by
the Covenant's criterion of "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation". It appears that the French Constitution is more permissive than
the Covenant in the evaluation of situations that necessitate to establishing a
state of emergency. The intention of the reservation is clearly to evaluate the
situation on the basis of domestic requirements rather than the requirements in
the Covenant.
The United States issued an understanding as concerns article 4.1, indicating
that the prohibition of discrimination in the latter part of the provision does
not preclude measures that may have a disproportionate effect on persons of a
92. Cf. article 22.1 VCLT.
93. See par.1.2.1 supra.
94. McGoldrick, op.cit. at 304-305.
95. Higgins, MLR at 16-17. «•
96. See article 16 of the French Constitution. • - • - ; . , . .-",'O'J
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 203
particular status. The understanding seems to restrict the scope of the provision
to direct discrimination, as opposed to indirect discrimination considered to be
covered by articles 2.1 and 26 of the Covenant. The aim appears to be to
achieve an interpretation that is common to the US domestic system and the
Covenant. In particular it is indicated that there is a difference between the
open-endedness of the Covenant's anti-discrimination provisions and the
American system of prohibitions related to specific statuses'". It should be
noted that the prohibited distinctions in article 4.1 are much more restrictive
than the non-discrimination rule in articles 2.1 and 26, in respect of which the
United States issued an understanding"*. Given the aim of excluding the legal
effect of article 4.1**, Flinterman and Rieter take the understanding to be a
reservation"*. Yet as the United States has made both reservations and
declarations, the Belilos theory of distinguishing is applicable"".
Consequently, the understanding is an interpretation that need not be followed
by the HRC.
Trinidad and Tobago made a reservation dealing with article 4.2, the list of
provisions from which derogations are not allowed"". The reservation is
somewhat hermetic, as it refers to the Trinidad and Tobagan Constitution
without indicating which rights are dealt with"". The reservation seems to
imply that derogation from the rights listed in article 4.2 is possible, as this is
apparently a possibility under its Constitution"". Contrary to the exceptional
character of the provision, with its list of provisions that may not be derogated
from, the reservation presents a highly uncertain derogation system. This is not
acceptable because of the precision and detail with which article 4 has been
drafted. Consequently a vague reservation of this kind must be assumed to be
contrary to the object and purpose of the Covenant"*.
97. U.S. Explanation at 6-7. Cf. McGoldrick, op.cit. par.7.Il ai 304.
98. Cf. Nowak. op.cit. at 93-94.
99. Cf. article 2.l.d VCLT. .•:.• :-' >- *..v«vrMu;K:
100. Flinterman, Rieter, NJCM Bull, at 966.
101. The Belilos case, and the importance of the European Commission's opinion in this case
is discussed in Chapter 3, par.4.1.2 supra.
102. Suy, op.cit. at 945, writes that the reservation is in fact an interpretative declarati-
on:"Bien que formulée en termes similaires, le déclaration de la Trinité-et-Tobago dans
l'instrument figurait sous la rubrique "réserve". A la demande de Secrétariat, le
Gouvernement de la Trinité-et-Tobago a alors indiqué qu'il s'agissait seulement d'une
déclaration interprétative."
This fact is only reported by Suy, and has in any case not lead to a change in the
presentation of the declaration in UN documents.
103. The reservation reads:""..since section 7(3) of its Constitution enables Parliament to
enact legislation even though it is inconsistent with sections (4) and (5) of the said
Constitution."
104. McGoldrick. op.cit. par.7.17 at 306-307.
105. Cf. CCPR/C/SR.765, par.16-18 (Higgins). ..'!»
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Article 6 is the Covenant's provision on the right to life, and it is one of the
non-derogable rights listed in article 4.2 CCPR'°*. The prohibition of capital
punishment as an elaboration of the right to life led to the conclusion of the
Second Optional Protocol in 1989. '>
Norway entered a reservation concerning article 6.4, the right to seek pardon
or commutation of the sentence in case of a death sentence. The reservation
does not give any information on the backgrounds, and was withdrawn within
four-and-a-half year after the Norwegian ratification'".
In a declaration about article 6.5, the prohibition of the death sentence for
crimes committed by person below the age of eighteen, or the execution of the
death sentence on pregnant women, Ireland indicates that legislation to give
effect to the provision has not yet been introduced, but states that it will have
regard to its obligation under the Covenant to advise commutation of such
sentences. In contradistinction to what the Irish statement suggests, article 6
(and paragraph 5 in particular) points to the right for the convict to seek
pardon or commutation of sentence. The intention has probably been to
indicate that in spite of the absence of legislation, there is a overall willingness
to be most restrictive in carrying out the death sentence""*. In that respect the
declaration merely explains the domestic implementation of the Covenant in
spite of the absence of legislation. The declaration, read together with article
2.2 of the Covenant suggests its own withdrawal in due course. It must be
considered to be a unilateral obligation to legislate and abolish the death
penalty.
Without explicitly mentioning article 6.5, the United States'"" reserves the
right to impose capital punishment on persons below eighteen years, only
excluding the category of pregnant women"". The Covenant does not contain
a general prohibition on the death penalty, yet it excludes this sentence for
crimes committed by persons under eighteen and the execution of this sentence
on pregnant women. .;-,-,- , ; i i : r • ' " * ' ; ' : » • - • ;• :f . \(r<- 'v- ' : >
In the previous proposal to ratify the Covenant in 1978 the reservation had
excluded article 6.5 completely. The administration now indicates that in
contemporary practice pregnant women are not executed'". The explanation
. i'-.'i
106. Cf. Naldi. op.cit. at 373-375.
107. Withdrawn 12 December 1979. ..» .- ,- .
108. Cf.General Comment 6/16, par.6.
109. The réservation reads:The United States reserves the right, subject lo its Constitutional
-;•:!• . ! constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman)
duly convicted under exiting or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punish-
- • ment, including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years
of age."
110. It should be noted that the protection for the mother only lasts until the end of the
pregnancy, cf. Meron, op.cit. at 99-100: Nowak, op.cit. at 129-130.
111. Craig, op.cit. at 881-882; Henkin, op.cit. at 24.
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indicates that the reservation dealing with the execution of minors is in
conformity with recent Supreme Court decisions"*.
The General Comment on article 6 explicitly reiterates that the Covenant itself
does not abolish the death penalty'". Desirable though a general prohibition
of capital punishment may be, it can at present not be considered to be
included in the object and purpose of the Covenant'". The drafting of the
Second Optional Protocol is more than proof of this interpretation. That is why
the contention that the American reservation stressing the permissibility of
capital punishment should be regarded as contrary to the object and purpose of
the Covenant"'', cannot be accepted. Article 6.5 itself however, prohibiting
the execution of minors is non-derogable right, and reservations excluding that
provision must be assumed to be contrary to the object and purpose of the
Covenant. <K^wRidu^«iw^.;.«p^^K^<%-<- .MM; ^ja»: S«JP
Another problematic aspect of the American reservation is that it explicitly
mentions the permissibility of capital punishment under future legislation'"'.
Clearly future legislation must be restricted by the limits set by the Covenant
(together with the article 6.5 reservation). In article 6, as underlined by the
General Comment on this article, there is a general tendency to abolish the
death penalty'". Increasing the number of cases in which the death penalty
may be imposed is contrary to the spirit of the provision, and is in general
contrary to the obligation to implement the CCPR.
- article 7 -
Article 7 is the prohibition of torture and of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment. It is a non-derogable right under article 4.2 of the Covenant, and
the prohibition has been elaborated in the Convention against Torture, and
other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment"*.
In an interpretative declaration the United States indicates that it considers
itself bound by article 7 on the assumption that "cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment" has the same meaning as "cruel and unusual treat-
ment" in the fifth, eight and fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. The
declaration has the shape of a reservation giving prevalence to domestic
legislation. In the explanation it is indicated that this interpretation is in line
with a similar interpretation foreseen at the ratification of the Convention
against Torture. It is furthermore explained that the interpretation is a reaction
to the views of the Human Rights Committee about the length of judicial
proceedings and the consequences this could have in cases involving capital
punishment; the same goes for the views taken by the Committee on issues
112. Naldi, op.cit. at 380-384.
113. General Comment 6/16, par.6 I
114. Naldi, op.cit. at 373, 378.
115. Flinterman, Rieter, NJB at 935; Flinterman, Rieter, NJCM Bull, at 964.
116. Flinterman, Rieter, NJCM Bull., at 963.
117. Cf. preamble Second Optional Protocol, third paragraph.
118. GA Res. 39/46, entry into force 26 June 1987. - J^O
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such as corporal punishment and solitary confinement"". Clearly, as a State
adhering to the Covenant almost 25 years after it was first opened for ratifica-
tion, the United States used the opportunity to react on the views and practice
of the Human Rights Committee'". This raises the interesting question of
the authority of the Human Rights Committee's interpretation of the Covenant
in relation to subsequent ratifications.
- Article 8 -
Article 8 deals with the prohibition of slavery, servitude and compulsory labour.
The first two paragraphs on slavery and servitude are non-dcrogable rights.
Iceland made a reservation in respect of article 8.3.a, the prohibition of forced
or compulsory labour. It indicates that there is a provision of Icelandic law to
the effect that a person who is not the main provider may be sentenced to
work in a labour facility to satisfy arrears in support payments for children. It
should be noted that this is not an issue under the (non-derogable) right laid
down in article 11 CCPR, the inability to fulfil a contractual obligation, as this
is an obligation under national law'*'.
- article 9 -
Article 9 is the Covenant's provision on arbitrary arrest. A large number of
States made reservations with respect to article 9. France made a reservation
to the effect that articles 9 and 14 will have no bearing on the enforcement of
disciplinary rules in the army. India indicated that article 9 will be applied in
consonance with sections of article 22 of the Indian Constitution. Israel
derogates from the obligations under article 9 in relation to the existence of
the state of emergency, suggesting that it does not precisely know to what
extent the state of emergency measures deviate from the guarantees in article
9. These general reservations to article 9 as a whole all indicate the prevalence
of domestic legislation over the safeguards provided for prisoners and
detainees. As a consequence of the vagueness of the reservations it is hard to
establish which rights and what protection are exactly excluded.
In a reservation dealing specifically with article 9.3'", Finland also refers to
domestic legislation, indicating that under its legislation administrative author-
ities may take decisions on arrest and imprisonment after which some time
may pass before a decision is taken in court. It should be noted that article 9.3
calls for prompt access to a judge, the Finish reservation speaks of "a certain
time lapse". Austria interpreted articles 9 and 14 as not prohibiting the
measures in its Administrative Procedure Acts and in the Financial Penal Act.
In spite of the lack of detailed information on the content of this legislation, it
appears that this reservation also purports to safeguard the delay in access to a
119. Flinterman. Rieter, NJCM Bull., at 965-966.
120. Cf. General Comment 7/16.
121. Cf. Nowak, op.cit. at 203.
122. Nowak. op.cit. at 184-185.
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court'". Article 9.3 speaks of prompt access to a judge, and General Com-
ments 8/16 interprets this as "delays must not exceed a few days"'".
Five states made reservations concerning article 9.5, the right to compensation
for miscarriages of justice. Italy indicates that it considers this right to be
restricted to the cases of arrest and detention contrary to article 9.1, arbitrary
arrest or ex post facto procedures. It should be noticed that article 9.5 deals
with any kind of unlawful arrest of detention, implying that this is not necessar-
ily restricted to the rights guaranteed in the Covenant and includes illegality
under domestic law as much as illegality under international law'**. In its
interpretative statement Mexico indicates that a right to compensation exists
for procedures as a result of false accusations. Apparently what is meant is a
right against the accuser, which is not necessarily excluded in article 9.5'**. In
the understanding issued by the United States the right of compensation is also
considered to be enforceable against either governmental entities or the
individual responsible. Moreover the compensation is subject to reasonable
requirements in domestic law. India is the one State to indicate plainly that no
right of compensation for the victims of unlawful arrest exists.
- article 10 -
Article 10 is the provision dealing with the treatment of accused and convicted
persons. The majority of reservations and declarations made with respect to
article 10 focus on paragraph 2, and its obligations to separate the accused
from the convicted, and to separate adults from juveniles. Two issues appear in
the declarations, first of all the capacity problems that strict separation might
cause, and consequently some States indicate that they feel that this an
objective to be implemented progressively. On the other hand there is the
consideration that sometimes separation is not beneficial to juveniles. It is
noteworthy that the HRC is quite uncompromising on the rules laid down in
article 10.2, as can be seen in General Comment 9/16'".
In a reservation concerning article 10.1 and withdrawn in 1984, Australia stated
that provisions of the Covenant are without prejudice to the rules for the
preservation of custodial discipline in penal establishments'^.
With respect to article 10.2.a, Ireland and Australia'*' indicate that they
consider separation an objective to be achieved progressively. Belgium states
that it will interpret the provision in conformity with the Council of Europe
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners"®, and indicates
123. Nowak, op.cit. note 103 at 185.
124. Cf. General Comment 8/16, par.2.
125. Nowak, op.cit. at 189.
126. Nowak, op.cit. at 190.
127. General Comment 9/16, par.2
128. Triggs. op.cit. at 295-296.
129. Triggs. op.cit. at 296.
130. Resolution (73) 5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 19 January
1973.
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that under certain circumstances communal activities for accused and convicted
persons are possible. The Netherlands entered a reservation indicating that it
does not want to be considered bound by the provision, as "ideas about the
treatment of prisoners are so liable to change"'*'. It is noticeable that the
Netherlands is the only State to have formulated this opinion in a reservation.
The United Kingdom reserves the right not to apply article 10.2.a to Gibraltar,
Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands. And the United States indicates
that under "exceptional circumstances" the menace constituted by an individual
must be considered included, and states that the accused may waive their right
to separation.
The separation of juveniles and adults in article 10.2.b is clearly meant to be to
the benefit of the juveniles'". But States do feel that the obligation is too
absolute, and indicate that they may deviate from the general rule if that is
more beneficial, or if there is a lack of suitable prison facilities. Australia''",
Finland, Iceland, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland all indicate that they
have a policy of separation, but cannot agree with a general and absolute rule
to that effect. The availability of adequate prison facilities is mentioned in the
declarations of New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Trinidad and Tobago.
Without further elaboration Norway and the United States entered a reserva-
tion to articles 10.2.b concerning juvenile convicts and 10.3.
Article 10.3 deals with reformation and social rehabilitation as the essential
aims of the penitentiary system. A number of States link the latter part of this
provision to article 10.2.b and the protection of juveniles'^, overcoming the
distinction between accused and convicted juveniles. The United States issued
an understanding indicating that article 10.3 does not diminish other aims of
the penitentiary system, such as deterrence, incapacitation and punishment'^.
It would seem that the main goal of the understanding is to shelter the
American prison system from criticism by the States Parties or the Human
Rights Committee'*".
- article 11 -
Article 11 contains the prohibition of imprisonment on the ground of the
inability to fulfil contractual obligations, and it is listed in article 4.2 of the
Covenant as a non-derogable right. Congo made a reservation to this provision,
indicating that it is incompatible with domestic legislation which allows for
imprisonment as enforcement measures for the payment of debts over a certain
131. In the same vein Craig, op.cit. 882-883; Nowak, op.cit. at 201.
132. Nowak, op.cit. at 199-200.
133. Australia twisted the criterion of benefit around, stating "accepted only to the extent
that such segregation is considered by the responsible authorities to be beneficial to the
juveniles or at/i/to concerned." (emphasis added. EL): Triggs, op.cit. at 296.
134. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand. Norway, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States.
135. Nowak, op.cit. at 200-201.
136. Craig, op.cit. at 882-883; Flinterman, Rieter, NJCM Bull, at 966-967.
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 209
amount of money when the debtor has acted in bad faith. The reservation
indicates that imprisonment is possible for debts exceeding the amount of
20,000 CFA francs, logically speaking one may assume that through the process
of inflation the number of debtor cases within the ambit of the reservation will
only grow with the passing of time and the deterioration of the economy in
Africa. Thus, while a rule of domestic law is involved, it is a rather flexible rule
in which the value of money has a decisive role'". Without any further expla-
nation as to the reason for making the reservation, the United Kingdom claims
the right not to apply article 11 in Jersey.
On the face of it, these are ordinary reservations indicating the prevalence of
national legislation over the Covenant's rules. The seriousness of these reserva-
tion, lies in the fact that article 11 is a non-derogable right, and therefore
belongs to the core-obligations underlying the Covenant. It should be noted
that this has however not led to an abundance of objections on that
ground"*.
- article 12 -
Article 12 is the provision that deals with liberty of movement and the right to
leave and return to one's country.
India issued a general declaration that the provision shall be applied in
conformity with a provision in its Constitution. The Netherlands reserved their
right to consider the Netherlands (the so-called "Kingdom in Europe") and the
Netherlands Antilles as separate territories for the purpose of article 12.1 and
as separate countries for the purpose of articles 12.2 and 12.4, clearly with the
purpose to retain the power to restrict these rights between the component
parts of the Kingdom'". The United Kingdom made similar reservations with
respect to article 12.1, indicating that territory in the provision would apply to
each of the territories of the United Kingdom and its dependencies separately.
In respect of article 12.4 the United Kingdom explicitly indicates that their
acceptance of the provision is subject to the continued application of existing
immigration legislation, which also amounts to restricting the application of
137. Cf. CCPR/C/SR.732, par.59 (Dimitrijevie).
138. See supra par. 1.2.1; only Belgium and the Netherlands objected to the Congolese
reservation referring to article 11 as a non-derogable right. No objections were made to
the UK-Jersey reservation to the same non-derogable right.
Cf. Higgins, MLR at 15; Nowak op.cit. at 205.
139. It is remarkable that the Netherlands felt the need to make a reservation concerning
article 12.2 (the right to leave any country), whereas the United Kingdom did not make
such a reservation. Both states intended to safeguard their power of restricting intra-
territory movement.
The parliamentary papers concerning the law of approval for the Covenant (Memorie
van Toelichting bij de Goedkeuringswet) indicate that the difference between "country",
in articles 12.1 and 12.4 CCPR and the usual term "state" prompted the reservation. TK
1975-1976, 13 932 (R 1037) at 23-24.
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article 12 between the component parts of the State'*". Given the general
phrasing of the provision, reservations are necessary if the rights of people
from colonies and dependent territories need to be restricted'*'. Switzerland
reserved the application of article 12.1 to those foreigners having a valid
residence permit for a particular canton, thereby excluding the nation-wide
scope of the provision'**. Article 12 contains a general rule on liberty of
movement once someone is lawfully present within the territory. Consequently
a reservation is necessary if there are geographical restrictions to a residence
permit. Trinidad and Tobago reserve the right not to apply article 12.2 because
of the fact that persons wanting to travel abroad must furnish tax clearance
certificates first. In somewhat exceptional reservations dealing with article 12.4
Austria reserves the right to maintain the expulsion of the House of Habsburg-
Lorraine, and Italy does the same for some members of the House of Savoy. It
would appear that Austria and Italy were not certain whether the expulsion
might not be consider arbitrary.
- article 13 -
The expulsion of aliens lawfully within the territory of a State is surrounded by
procedural guarantees in article 13 of the Covenant. Decisions about the
expulsion itself are protected by other provision of the Covenant, article 13
merely deals with the execution of the expulsion decision and the right of
appeal against such a decision'**. Finland indicated by way of a reservation
that its legislation was not in conformity with this provision, and was able to
withdraw the reservation some ten years later'**. France made a plain reser-
vation that the provision would not derogate from any domestic instrument
concerning the entry and sojourn of aliens in France. The reservation of
Iceland is much more restricted and indicates that legislation on the matter of
objecting to the expulsion decision is not in conformity with the Covenant.
India indicates that it will apply domestic law to foreigners in respect of article
13, thereby apparently indicating the non-conformity of Covenant and Indian
legislation on this point. Non-conformity is also the case with the legislation of
Malta, the reservation however appears to be a temporal one, as it seems to
express a willingness to make the necessary legislative changes in the
140. Higgins. BYIL, note 4 at 319.
141. Nowak. op.cit. at 211.
142. The Swiss reservation reads :The right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
->*• one's residence is applicable, subject to the federal laws on aliens which provide that
-'•'•• residence and establishment permits shall be valid only in the canton which issues
them."
s*î»yftï" Though paragraph 6 of General Comment 15/27, would seem to suggest that the Swiss
Vi«i«- reservation is acceptable, this is contradicted by Nowak. op.cit. at 211-212.
143. Cf. General Comment 15/27, par. 10.
144. See infra par.2.4 :*. >
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future''". Mexico mentions the non-compatibility of its Political Constitution
with article 13, and the United Kingdom reserves the right not to apply article
13 (and the right of review provided therein) for a deportation order in Hong
Kong.
- article 14 -
Article 14 is the Covenant's long and extensive due process provision. A
considerable number of reservations have been made, most of them safeguard-
ing domestic legislation against the influence of the Covenant. Ireland indicates
that its military law on minor offenses may not in all respects be in conformity
with article 14.
With respect to the earlier part of article 14.1, publicity of the trial'**, Austria
indicates that this will be subject to the Federal Constitution Law. Switzerland
indicates that pre-trial penal procedures before an administrative authority will
not be public. Neither will civil procedures be public, depending on cantonal
legislation.
Concerning the latter part of article 14.1, the obligation to make public
criminal judgments'^, Belgium asserts that its system, which does not allow
for derogations from the principle mentioned, is in conformity with the
Covenant. Denmark indicates that its legislation allows for the exclusion of the
press and the public to a greater extent than the Covenant appears to do. In a
reservation withdrawn ten years after ratification Finland reserved the right to
keep certain sentences secret, based on considerations other than the ones
mentioned in the latter part of article 14.1"". With respect to public sentenc-
ing Switzerland indicates that, depending on cantonal legislation, the judge-
ment will not be delivered in a public hearing but communicated to the parties
in writing'''''.
Malta made a reservation with regard to article 14.2, the right to be presumed
innocent"*. It interprets the provision as not prohibiting legislation that
imposes upon any person the obligation of proving particular facts, which is
contrary to the intention behind the provision.
Article 14.3, the minimum guarantees in a penal procedures, attracted many
reservations. Australia made a reservation to article 14.3.b indicating that
adequate facilities does not mean the provision of the same facilities to the
prisoner as to the prisoners legal representative"'"*.
145. The Maltese reservation reads:The Government of Malta endorses the principles laid
down in article 13. However, in the present circumstances it cannot comply entirely with
the provisions of this article."
146. See first part of article 14.1; cf. McGoldrick op.cit. at 402-403, Nowak. op.cit. at 261-264
and General Comment 13/21 par.6.
147. Nowak. op.cit. at 264-267. ^ 3
148. About the reservations by Denmark and Finland. Higgins. MLR at 13-14.
149. Cf. Nowak, op.cit., at 261 and 264-266. and General Comment 13/21 par.6.
150. McGoldrick op.cit. at 403-404; Nowak. op.cit. at 267-268 and Genera! Comment 13/21
par.7. . . . .
151. McGoldrick op.cit. at 406; Triggs op.cit. at 296.
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Fourteen States made reservations regarding article 14.3.d, and emphasize two
of the most important obligations under that provision'". With respect to the
right to be tried in his presence, Australia, Austria and the Netherlands
indicate that it remains possible to exclude the defendant from the procedure
on the grounds of disturbance and improper conduct'**. Venezuela reserves
the right to apply its in absentia procedure for offence against the /•« pufr/fca.
Germany made a reservation in respect of its Revisionsgericht procedure,
indicating that it is for the Court to decide whether the defendant held in custody
is to appear before the court. Australia, Barbados, Finland, Gambia, Guyana,
and the United Kingdom all indicate that they cannot guarantee free legal
assistance, while Switzerland indicates that legal assistance does not relieve the
beneficiary from the obligation to pay the ensuing fees. Italy indicates that it
considers domestic legislation permitting a defendant to conduct his own defence
to be compatible with article 14.3.d. The United States focuses on the free
choice of counsel, indicating that a court may appoint a counsel in the case of
indigence, and stating that the rule does not apply when the defendant is able to
pay for alternative counsel or when imprisonment is not imposed"'.
The United States is the only State to have made a reservation in respect of
article 14.3.e, indicating that this provision does not prohibit the obligation to
show that a witness is necessary for the defense'**. Switzerland made a reser-
vation in view of article 14.3.f, to the extent that free assistance from an inter-
preter does not relieve the defendant from the obligation to pay the ensuing
fees'".
The United States made a reservation to article 14.4 and its special treatment for
juveniles, linked with paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of article 10, dealt with supra"".
The right to a review by a higher tribunal in article 14.5 met with a variety of
reservations all dealing with specific rules of domestic law'™. Italy, Belgium,
the Netherlands and Switzerland all exclude this right in view of procedures
concerning persons holding a public office, held in first instance before the
152(...continued)
152. Though CCPR/C/2/Rev.3 indicates that this reservation has been withdrawn, the
section on withdrawals in the same document merely mentions the Australian reservati-
on to article 14.6 to be withdrawn. The present situation is consequently uncertain.
153. McGoldrick, op.cit. at 408-409; Nowak op.cit. at 272-274 and General Comment 13/21,
par. 11.
154. Triggs, op.cit. at 297, 299-302.
155. The reservation reads:The United States understands that subparagraphs 3(b) and (d)
of article 14 do not require the provision of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice
when the defendant is provided with court-appointed counsel on the grounds of
indigence, when the defendant is financially able to retain alternative counsel, or when
imprisonment is not imposed..."
156. Craig, op.cit. at 883-884; McGoldrick op.cit. at 409; Nowak op.cit. at 274-275 and
General Comment 13/21 par.12.
157. McGoldrick op.cit. at 409-410; Nowak op.cit. at 275-276 and General Comment 13/21
par.13. See for a discussion of the Temeltasch case see Chapter 3, par.4.1.1 supra.
158. McGoldrick, op.cit. at 410-411; Nowak, op.cit. at 277-279 and General Comment 13/21
par. 16.
159. McGoldrick. op.cit. at 411-412: Nowak op.cit. at 279-281.
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highest jurisdictional authority"". Trinidad and Tobago reserve the right to
continue the application of its system of leave to appeal as a specific requirement
in a number of cases. Norway and Denmark merely exclude article 14.5, with
the latter indicating that its domestic legislation differs from the obligations under
the Covenant. Considerations of domestic legislation also led to the reservations
of France'", Germany, and Korea. Austria indicates that article 14.5 is no
restriction to higher courts pronouncing a heavier sentence in second
instance""-. Belgium and Luxembourg made similar reservations, indicating
that article 14.5 does not provide for another instance after an acquittal in first
instance.
The obligation to provide compensation for the miscarriage of justice in article
14.6 met with a number of reservations'". Guyana, Malta, and Trinidad and
Tobago indicate that while supporting the principle they are at present not in the
position to implement the provision, because of financial constraints. Austra-
lia'" and Ireland indicate that rather then drafting legislation to deal with these
cases, they will be dealt with in administrative procedures. In a similar vein New
Zealand reserves the right to consider its system of ex gratia payments as
satisfying the requirements of the Covenant. The United States interprets the
provision as requiring the existence of an effective and enforceable mechanism
through which a person may obtain compensation, subject to reasonable require-
ments of domestic law.
The we 6/.v /'// /7/WM rule in article 14.7 met with a variety of reservations'".
Without further explanations, Denmark, Norway, Korea, and Sweden indicate
their reservation to the provision, with a view to domestic legislation. Austria,
Iceland, and the Netherlands mention the existence of the possibility to reopen,
resume or review a case. Finland indicates that under certain circumstances a
change for the worse is possible under its domestic system, whereas the United
States limits the protection to judgments of acquittal rendered by a court of the
same governmental unit. This would not seem to prevent prosecution for the
same case in two different states'".
- article 15 -
Article 15 contains the wu//«m cr/7w«i s//je /<?gp rule, as well as provisions on the
imposition of lighter penalties in cases of a change in the law"'. It appears in
the list of non-derogable rights in article 4.2 of the Covenant, yet five States
issued reservations and declarations in this respect. Italy indicates that the rule in
160. Nowak. op.cit. par.69 at 281.
161. France states that it considers the rule in article 14.5 to be "a principle to which the law
may make limited exceptions."
162. McGoldrick, op.cit. par.10.21 at 411.
163. McGoldrick. op.cit. at 412; Nowak. op.cit. at 281-284.
164. Triggs. op.cit. at 297.
165. McGoldrick. op.cit. at 412-413; Nowak. op.cit. at 285-286.
166. Henkin, op.cit. at 23-24.
167. Nowak. op.cit. at 292-294.
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the latter part of article 15.1 is held to be applicable in cases in progress,
excluding possible benefit for convicts. Trinidad and Tobago shares the Italian
point of view, whereas the United States is stricter, indicating that the law in
force at the time of the crime will be applied"*. Germany is more lenient
indicating that the previous law may remain applicable to certain crimes com-
mitted before the change in legislation.
Argentina issued an understanding concerning article 15.2, indicating that it will
be applied subject to Argentine constitutional law'". *-.«; ;*«•••<# "3 . ^ ^ ;
- article 17 - - ,. . . . . . . . >.... -.„*.:
The prohibition of interference with privacy, family, home and correspondence
can be found in article 17'™. Before withdrawing its reservation to article 17
some ten years after it was made'", Australia was the only state to have made
a reservation which indicated that it reserved the right to limit the protection in
the interests of national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the
country, the protection of public health or morals and the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others'^.
- article 18 - * . . .
Mexico is the only state to have issued an interpretative statement concerning
article 18, which is the non-derogable right of freedom of thought, conscience
and religion'". It indicates that it considers the limitation clauses concerning
public religious acts and the professional education of ministers in the Mexican
Constitution to be in conformity with the limitation clause in article 18.3.
Whether this is a correct interpretation remains to be seen, as paragraph 3 uses
two distinct criteria: prescribed by law, and necessary for the protection of the
goals listed in the provision. ••>. ••:•-, ~. .,. ..tti;- :- -v•->• ••«* v %:•:•. : :i >.:si^ i< ,
- article 19 - • -• *--•- ' < • -*< • ; ».», „.•> .,.« .., •—•
Article 19 deals with the freedom of opinion and expression, and five States
made general reservations to the provision. Austria, Belgium, France, and
Germany indicate that they will apply the articles 19, 21 and 22'™ of the
Covenant in conformity with articles 10'", 11"* and 16'" of the European
168. Flinterman/Rieter, NJCM Bull., 966. ' ' ' • ' ' • ' • ' •• t • ' t .-<
169. As a consequence of a strange omission, the Argentine understanding does not appear
in CCPR/C/2/Rev.3, and can only be found in ST/LEG/-SER.E/11.
170. Nowak, op.cit. at 306-310, General Comment 16/32.
171. Though CCPR/C/2/Rev.3 indicates that the reservation is withdrawn at p.5 (referring
to section C of the document), a notice of withdrawal of this particular reservation
cannot be found in section C (at p.35). It is consequently unclear whether the reservati-
on to article 17 has indeed been withdrawn.
172. T r i g g s , op .c i t . a t 298 . •••-••. <• ; ^ > jf.-.-..' >... • ; , , .>• ; y
173. Nowak, op.cit. at 343-345. -v . - • • + • **•"
174. G e r m a n y also indicates the relevance of art icle 2.1 of the Covenan t . --i'-*>!•}••-• ••.•
175. Belgium and France. ; - * _ ; s>;
176. Belgium and France. • •- . .-. - •.
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
Malta indicates that it will maintain its constitutional restrictions on the freedom
of speech for public officers, and reserves the right not to apply the provision in
as much as it is not compatible with domestic legislation implementing article 16
of the European Convention.
With respect to the second paragraph of article 19'™, Australia'", Ireland,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands made reservations dealing with the regulation
and licensing of radio and television broadcasting, whereas France made a
reservation in this respect to the provision as a whole'*". Australia indicates that
the object of licensing is to provide "the best possible broadcasting services", a
goal clearly not mentioned in paragraph 3 of the same provision. Luxembourg
and the Netherlands also mention a licensing system for film companies and
cinema's respectively.
The issue of licensing is dealt with by Italy in respect of article 19.3"". India
indicates that article 19.3 is to be applied in conformity with the Indian Constitu-
tion, and the United States formulated a similar reservation indicating that the
requirements and constraints in the Constitution prevail over article 19.3'"-.
- article 20 -
Article 20 is the much discussed prohibition of propaganda for war. The reserva-
tions to article 20 in general stress the fact that the provision will be considered
to be compatible with articles 18, 19, 21 and 22"" of the same Covenant, and
with article 18, 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights"".
Apart from the fact that is logically necessary for the Covenant to be construed as
non-contradictory, such an interpretation also follows from article 31 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Additionally a number of States
indicates that it is not their intention to implement the provision through legisla-
tion^.
In respect of article 20.1"", the majority of the reserving states indicate that
they do not intend to legislate along the lines of this provision, and stress the
possible conflict between this provision and the rules on freedom of express-
ion'*'. France indicates that it interprets "war" as war in contravention of
, .
177.(...continued) . "
177. Austria, France and Germany.
178. McGoldrick op.cit. at 464: Nowak, op.cit at 362-363 and General Comment 10/19 par.2.
179. A reservation withdrawn in 1984; Triggs, op.cit. 298. ..* . .
180. The reservation was withdrawn in 1988. • «i» •••If^wrj. i ^M'-<: I A
181. Cf. Nowak. op.cit at 378. , ^ .,,, . .^, _ ,^ ," ^ ^ ^ , , , _ ^ , , ",
182. Craig, op.cit. at 880. . r
183. Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta and the United Kingdom.
184. Belgium and Luxembourg.
185. Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta. New Zealand, United Kingdom and United
States.
186. Higgins, MLR at 15-16 and 17; McGoldrick, op.cit. at 481-483; Meron, op.cit. at 118-119;
Nowak. op.cit. at 385-387 and General Comment 11/19.
187. Belgium. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland
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international law, thereby apparently indicating that propaganda for the few
remaining categories of lawful warfare is legitimate under article 20.1'**.
With respect to article 20.2, the obligation to penalize incitement to discrimina-
tion'"', Switzerland indicates that legislation will be forthcoming with the
ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. This is
obviously a temporary reservation, including a unilateral obligation to withdraw
the reservation in due course.
- article 21 -
The reservations of Austria, Belgium, France, and Germany to article 21 and
the right of peaceful assembly have been dealt with under article 19. They all
focus on the relevance of the articles 10, 11 and 16 of the European Convention
for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
India refers to the compatibility of article 19 of its Constitution with article 21 of
the Covenant; whether this is a formal compatibility or a matter of substance
remains unclear.
Trinidad and Tobago reserves the right to impose lawful and or reasonable
restrictions with respect to the right of assembly. The formulation "lawful rtw//
«r reasonable" is problematic, as the provision itself requires both, and restricts
the notion of "reasonable" to a limited number of cases'*.
- a r t i c l e 2 2 - - ~ ~ ^ • . , * = < - • , ,.-. •-•-.
Article 22 is the provision on freedom of association. Apart from the reservations
of Austria, Belgium, France, and Germany dealt with above, as well as the
similar reservation of India referring to article 19 of its Constitution, a number
of states refer to their national legislation. Malta and New Zealand both indicate
that existing legislation may not be in conformity with the provision, whereas the
Republic of Korea understands its national legislation and Constitution to be in
conformity with the Covenant on this point. Algeria interprets the provision as
making the law the framework of action for the State with respect to the right to
organize. This is a contentious interpretation, as far as the provision goes a legal
basis is a requirement for restricting the right which is a much more liberal
system than the one proposed by Algeria. ;
In a reservation concerning article 22.2 Japan indicates that it includes firemen
in the categories of professional groups in respect of which the freedom of
association may be restricted'". ..... . .,.,...< !..
- article 23 - -
A number of reservations deal with the Covenant's provision on family rights. In
a general reservation Israel reserves the right to apply the religious law of the
188. Cf. the Nether lands expressing a similar line of thought in the considerat ion of the
second periodical report. C C P R / C / S R . 8 6 3 , par.49.
189. McGoldrick op.cit. at 483-484; Nowak op.cit. at 388-390. '-t • • - •• 3S>s >*<
190. Nowak op.cit. at 400-402. "••<•• ' " ' • - • - '
191. Nowak, op.cit at 424^426. ;•-••-< - i " ^ il .in;,: • : , ... , .i-.;?.- . ; . . , - • i ; : ! - ! TK;
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parties in matters concerning the family and the personal status. In a superfluous
declaration concerning the second paragraph Belgium indicates that it has the
power to regulate the exercise of the right to marry.
In respect of article 23.3 the United Kingdom reserve the right not to apply the
provision in a small number of customary marriages in the Solomon Islands"^. <
Through a reservation Algeria safeguards the validity of domestic legislation
concerning the rights and responsibilities of spouses. Ireland indicates that the
right to obtain a dissolution of marriage is not accepted'", and the Republic of
Korea merely excludes this provision. The United Kingdom made a reservation
concerning the first sentence of article 23.4, indicating that there may be inequal-
ities arising from the law of domicile'**.
- article 24 -
This provision deals with the protection of children''*. Australia made a
reservation indicating that this provision, together with article 2.1, 25 and 26 of
the Covenant, is without prejudice to Australian legislation concerning positive
action"*. The reservation has subsequently been withdrawn.
The United Kingdom reserved its right to enact legislation in the field of
nationality based upon the criterion of sufficient connection with the United
Kingdom, in respect of paragraph 3 dealing with the right to nationality for
children'". >.'' w-:.-. .-;-. n>u.-^-a V—*' • •;•->•-
- a r t i c l e 2 5 - ' • ' • • • - ' ' < ^ « - ••--•*•*
Article 25 of the Covenant covers issues such as the right to vote and the right to
participation in politics and public service. Australia'''* made a general reserva-
tion indicating that these rights may be restricted in the case of persons convicted
of serious crimes'". Restrictions of this kind would in all likelihood fall within
the notion of "reasonable restrictions" in the opening phrase of the provision. The
Belgian reservation concerning succession to the throne has been dealt with
supra.
Mexico reserves the right to continue to apply article 130 of its Constitution to
the effect that ministers of religion may not vote or take part in political
organisations^". Switzerland indicates that article 25.b will not prevent the
possibility under cantonal and local law that particular elections do not take place
192. Nowak . op.cit . at 443-444. . ...» M ; > : . . .;: •-,: . ; . •«'
193. Nowak.op.cit. at 439-440. > < - • » • • • • • • - » ••- -<" ^ ' v v
194. Nowak, op.cit. at 445^49.
195. In 1989 the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which
entered into force on 2 September 199(1. ~; j»,-.-«'•/ ' •
196. Triggs, op.cit. at 302-304. . s£ ;<;•'! "'h^"">
197. Nowak. op.cit. at 463-465; General Comment 17/35 par.8 -,"•'* u î»-îv>
198. Triggs, op.cit. at 299.
Ujp.-s--: While indicating in section B that this reservation is withdrawn, similar information
cannot be found in section C of CCPR/C/2/Rev.3.
200. Nowak. op.cit at 488. ' .V' . >1 : . ;.>:(:. -*;«.,: ' --.f'
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in a secret ballot*'. The United Kingdom reserves the right not to apply
article 25.b in respect of an Executive or Legislative Council in Hong Kong and
article 25.c in respect of jury service in the Isle of Man. In a withdrawn reserva-
tion the Netherlands excluded the application of article 25. c in the Netherlands
Antilles.
- article 26 -
Article 26 is the general non-discrimination provision. Australia indicates that it
considers the law concerning persons convicted of serious criminal offenses to be
consistent with article 26 of the Covenant. Austria indicates that differential
treatment of nationals and aliens is permissible under article 26 as well as under
article 1.2 CERD. The reservation of Trinidud and Tobago amounts to
legitimizing the distinction between nationals and aliens as far as landownership
is concerned. In an understanding the United States indicate that article 26 does
not prohibit distinctions, based upon the categories mentioned, that are rationally
related to a legitimate governmental objective.
In its reservation concerning article 26, Switzerland limits the scope of this
provision to the rights protected in the Covenant*"-, in an apparent reaction to
the Committee decisions*" about the provisions.
- article 27 -
The rights of persons belonging to minorities are protected in article 27 of the
Covenant*". Referring to article 2 of the French Constitution, France indicates
that it will not apply the Covenant's provision on minority rights. In a reaction,
Germany proposed to understand this reservation as implying that the rights are
already guaranteed in the French Constitution**.
- article 47 -
With respect to the provision on the right of people to enjoy and utilize their
natural wealth and resources*", the United States declared that this right may
only be exercised in accordance with international law. The apparent aim of the
201. Nowak. op.cit.at 481.
202. Cf. Nowak. op.cit. at 499-500: 503-504.
203. See: Message sur I'adhesion de la Suisse aux deux Pactes intcrnalionaux de 1966 relalifs
aux droits de I'homme et une modification de la loi federate d"organisation judiciaire
(91.004). dd.30 January 1991; at 12.
Switzerland refers to the recent practice of the Human Rights Committee and its
' interpretation of article 26 as an independent right (cf. General Comment 19). It is
fi indicated that Switzerland considers article 26, comparable to article 14 of the European
•' Convention, as an accessory right.
Cf. Views in Cases S.W.M.Broeks v. Netherlands (case No.172/1984). in: CCPR/C/-
OP/2, 196: and F.H.Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands (case No. 182/1984), in: CCPR/C/-
OP/2 at 209.
204. Nowak, op.cit. at 513-539.
JWI'w Graefrath. op.cit. at 70; reinforced in the initial report by France. CCPR/C/22/Add.2,
p.40.
206. Nowak, op.cit. at 673-674.
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declaration is to maintain the United States' position with respect to compensation
for nationalization of foreign property. The issue of nationalization is intimately
linked with natural resources, and the whole discussion about prompt, adequate
and effective compensation, as opposed to adequate compensation*". This is
also reflected in the information sent to Congress'**.
- article 48 -
Article 48 is the Covenant's participation clause, to which communist states have
traditionally made reservations on the grounds that the formulation used is
contrary to the principle of sovereign equality as participation is restricted to
States members of the United Nations or the specialized agencies. Other motives
for the reservations are the fact that all States should have the right to become
parties to multilateral treaties governing matters of general interest
(Czechoslovakia) or the principle of the universality of international treaties and
the democratization of international relations (Guinea). A remarkable statement is
the one by Hungary, which indicates that it considers the participation clause to
be incompatible with the objectives and purposes of the Covenant. The reserving
states are Afghanistan (reservation to both articles 48.1 and 3), Byelorussian
SSR (Belarus), Bulgaria (reservation to both articles 48.1 and 3), Czechoslovak
SR (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic), German Democratic Republic,
Guinea, Hungary, Mongolia, Romania, USSR (Russian Federation), Syrian
Arab Republic, Ukraine SSR (Ukraine), and Viet Nam.
Though not specifically related to article 48 as such, a number of Arab states
indicated that they objected to establishing treaty-relations with Israel. These
political reservations need not be discussed extensively*'.
Though not specifically related to article 48, the reservation of the United
Kingdom concerning the impossibility to implement the Covenant in Southern
Rhodesia needs to be mentioned. At the time of ratification, in 1976, Rhodesia
was technically still a British colony-'"
- article 50 -
Article 50 of the Covenant emphasizes the Covenant's validity in the component
parts of federal States. Australia and the United States are the only federal
states to have made reservations in respect of article 2.2 and 50, dealt with
supra*''.
1.3.2. Declarations and reservations relating to the Optional Protocol
- article 1 -
207. Cf. GA Res. 1803 (XVII) and 3281 (XXIX).
208. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Explanation of Proposed Reserva-
tions. Declarations and Understandings etc., at 13-14.
209. Reservations by Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen.
210. S.A.de Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Harmondsworth, 3rd.ed. repr.
1978. at 642.
211. See the discussion reflected at article 2 CCPR supra.
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Article 1 OP establishes the Committee's competence to receive individual
communications. France, Malta''', and the Russian Federation have made
declarations concerning article 1, amounting to a restriction on the Committee's
power based on the moment of entry into force of the Optional ProtocoP".
France and Malta restrict the Committee's competence to "acts, omissions,
developments or events occurring after the date (of entry into force, EL)" as well
as "a decision relating to acts, omissions, developments or events occurring after
the date"; whereas Russia indicates that the Committee's competence is restricted
to "situations or events occurring after the date", which is clearly more restrictive
than the French and Maltese declarations are.
From the point of view of the law of treaties there is no problem with reiterating
that the Committee's competence in the field of individual communications only
begins after the entry into force of the Optional Protocol, which is after all a
legal instrument technically distinct from the Covenant. From that angle the
declarations state the obvious: that the Optional Protocol cannot cover cases that
occurred prior to its entry into force.
However, every State Party to the Optional Protocol must be a party to the
Covenant, as indicated in article 1 OP^ . The French accession to the Optional
Protocol took place more than three years after its accession to the Covenant'*,
and Russia"'* had been a party to the Covenant for eighteen years before
acceding to the Optional Protocol. Both declarations intend to exclude the power
of the Committee to consider individual communications about cases occurring in
the period after the entry into force of the Covenant but prior to the entry into
force of the Optional Protocol"". Given the fact that both France and Russia
were bound by the Covenant in that interim period, the declaration is peculiar,
and suggest to a certain extent bad faith on the part of both States. In terms of
article 19.c VCLT, one might say that these reservations to the Optional Protocol
are possibly contrary to the object and purpose of the Covenant.
212. Malta acceded to the Covenant and the Optional Protocol on the same day, 13 Septem-
ber 1990. The Maltese declaration, which is a carbon copy of the French text, will not be
dealt with explicitly.
213. The French declaration reads:"France interprets article 1 of the Protocol as giving to the
,\ i Committee the competence to receive and consider communications from individuals
subject to the jurisdiction of the French Republic who claim to be victims of a violation
by the Republic of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant which result either from
acts, omissions, developments or events occurring after the date on which the Protocol
entered into force for the Republic, or from a decision relating to acts, omissions,
developments or events after that date." ; ,, ...... „.-..-., ,,,= H : • - . . * • • < . . ; . !
214. On this issue see par.1.2.2 supra.
215. France acceded to the Covenant on 4-11-1980; and acceded to the Optional Protocol on
17-2-1984.
216. Russia ratified the Covenant on 16-10-1973, and acceded to the Optional Protocol on 1-
10-1991.
217. V.Coussirat-Coustere, L'adhesion de la France au Protocole Facultatif se rapportant au
Pacte International relatif aux Droits Civils et Politiques, in: XXIX AFD1 1983, 510-532
at 517.
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 221
Before ratification of the Optional Protocol, the only form of supervision States
Parties have to participate in is the reporting procedure under article 40 CCPR.
Theoretically this covers the whole of the domestic implementation of the
Covenant, yet it is know to be a very imprecise and vague procedure. It is quite
possible that deficiencies in the implementation may escape the Committee's
attention. The reporting procedure will seldom lead to a definite decision that a
particular situation is not in accordance with the Covenant. This is distinctly
different in the procedure under the Optional Protocol, in which a well-founded
complaint may lead to an authoritative view of the Committee that a certain
situation is below Covenant standards. By indicating an explicit reluctance to
submit prior practice to the Optional Protocol procedure, the authors of the
declarations cast doubt on their implementation of the Covenant in the period
preceding ratification of the Protocol.
- article 5 -
A number of European States have made a similar reservation in respect of
article 5.2, a provision dealing with facts the Committee has to ascertain prior to
dealing with the individual communication. The paragraph requires the Commit-
tee to establish that the matter is not being examined under another international
procedure, and the declarations and understandings indicate that the Committee is
also to establish that the matter has not already been examined under another
international procedure. This is what Denmark, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Sweden indicate. Austria
merely states that the Committee should ascertain that same case has not been
dealt with by the European Commission of Human Rights, thereby presenting a
more flexible reservation-'*. The reservations all deal with the possible coinci-
dence of various international human rights procedures"". Within the Council
of Europe it was recommended that the States Parties would all make reserva-
tions to the effect that the European Convention procedures would prevail""*.
The declaration of the Soviet Union is somewhat surprising as it repeats the
obvious: the substantive content of article 5.2 subparagraphs a and b. It is
possible that the Soviet Union had the same restrictions as the ones mentioned
above in mind, this is however not mentioned in the understanding^-'. !»•• ?; .>-iv>
218. For instance procedures such as ECOSOC Res.l503(XLVIII). article 14 CERD, article
22 CAT are not excluded under this formulation.
219. Discussing the issue of parallel procedures, Coussirat-Coustere. op.cit. at 516-528.
220. Coussirat-Coustere, op.cit. at 523. See: 13 Yb ECHR 1970. 70-77; and about this P.van
Dijk, GJ.H.van Hoof, De Europese Conventie in theoric en praktijk, 2nd Rev.Ed.,
Nijmegen 1982.
It should be noted, however that not all member States of the Council of Europe
followed this recommendation. Portugal and the Netherlands did not make that
particular reservation.
221. The Russian understanding reads:The Soviet Union also proceeds from the understan-
ding that the Committee shall not consider any communication unless it has been
ascertained that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of
(continued...)
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- article 7 -
France is the only state to have made a declaration concerning article 7 of the
Optional Protocol and the reference to GA Resolution 1514 (XV) contained
therein. It merely states that the acceptance of the Optional Protocol does not
imply a change in its position concerning this particular Resolution.
1.3.3. Declarations and Reservations to the Second Optional Protocol
aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty
- article 5 -
Spain is the only state to have made a reservation to the Second Optional
Protocol so far. It reserves the right to apply the death penalty in exceptional and
extremely serious cases such as provided for in its domestic Military Criminal
Code in wartime. No texts of the relevant laws appear in the information
compiled by the Office for Legal Affairs, it must be assumed that the information
was communicated to the Secretary-General, who sent it to the Human Rights
Committee".
2. REACTIONS OF THE STATES PARTIES
2.1. Objections
So far^* only eight States""" have objected to substantive reservations made
by other States Parties^*.
The Indian reservation concerning article 1 of the Covenant met with objections
from France, Germany and the Netherlands. France indicates that the reservation
attaches conditions to the right to self-determination not provided by the Charter.
Germany states that the Indian interpretation of the right in the Charter is
contrary to the clear language of the provision, and is moreover incompatible
with the object and purpose of the Covenant. The Netherlands refers to the
formulation of the right to self-determination in the Covenant and to the Declar-
ation on Principles of International Law concerning the Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States"' as an authoritative statement of the law con-
221.(...continued)
international investigation or settlement and that the individual in question has
exhausted all available domestic remedies."
Clearly the necessary formulation of "is not being examined or Anj //of occ/i cra/ninn/"
[emphasis added, EL] is absent.
222. This assumption is based on article 2.2 SOP, and CCPR/C/2/Rev.3.
223. CCPR/C/2/Rev.3; Nowak. op.cit. par.23 at p.x.\iv.
224. Suy. op.cit. at 947.
225. This is excluding the traditional objection by Argentina to the United Kingdom's
declaration on the territorial extension of the Covenant to the Falkland lslands/Malvi-
'" nas Islands. The United Kingdom reacted with a declaration indicating that it is fully
entitled to make such a declaration of territorial extension.
226. GA Res. 2625 (XXV).
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cerned; and states that attempts to limit the right to self-determination would
seriously weaken its universally acceptable character. Here again the objecting
States do so beyond the time-limit set in the Vienna Convention--'.
Both Germany and the Netherlands responded to the reservation concerning
article 4.2 made by Trinidad and Tobago. Germany and the Netherlands use
an identical formulation, stating that it follows from the text and history of the
Covenant that the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Covenant^. Yet, neither state explicitly refers to the fact that article 4.2 is the
provision dealing with non-derogable rights.
Both Belgium and the Netherlands^ objected to a reservation made by the
Congo regarding article 11, the prohibition of imprisonment on the grounds of
inability to fulfil a contractual obligation"^". The Belgian objection is a long-
winded expose about the fact that the reservation is not necessary in respect of
Congolese law, and, being aimed at a non-derogable right, is highly undesirable.
The wish is expressed that the reservation be withdrawn^'.
Four States^- objected to the reservation concerning the reservations made by
the Republic of Korea relating to articles 14.5, 14.7 and 22 of the Covenant.
Germany issued an observation relating to the reservation concerning article 22,
the provision on freedom of association. It states that the declaration made by
Korea is interpreted as not restricting the obligations under article 22 by referring
to the domestic legal system. Given the fact that the Korean declaration is
explicitly labelled a reservation, one wonders why Germany took this line of
action. It should be noted that Korea is under no obligation to respond to this
benevolent interpretation of its reservation. Czechoslovakia indicates that it
considers the reservations concerning articles 14.5, 14.7 and 22 incompatible
with the object and purpose of the Covenant, adding that the Korean approach is
contrary to the principle of international law that one may not invoke its internal
law as a justification for a failure to perform a treaty. The Netherlands raises a
227. India acceded to the Covenant on 10 April 1979: France objected on 4 November 1980,
Germany on 15 August 1980 and the Netherlands on 12 June 1980.
228. Trinidad and Tobago acceded on 21 December 1978: Germany objected on 21 April
1982 (more than three years later), the Netherlands objected on 12 June 1980 (one and
a half years later).
229. Through a strange omission the Netherlands objection does not appear in CCPR/C/-
2/Rev.3: ST/LEG/SER.E/11 mentions that the Netherlands made an objection identical
to the Belgian objection.
230. Nowak, op.cit. par.23 at p.xxiv and par. 11 at p.205.
231. The "non-paper" by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicates that as a
result of the objection (dd.6 November 1984), the Permanent Representative of Congo
in New York indicated on 11 January 1985, that Congo had decided to withdraw the
reservation.
In spite of this statement, the reservation has not been formally withdrawn according to
UN documents.
232. All of them reacted after the end of the twelve month time-limit set by article 20.5
VCLT. The Republic of Korea acceded on 10 April 1990; Germany reacted on 24 May
1991. the United Kingdom on 25 May 1991, Czechoslovakia on 7 June 1991 and the
Netherlands on 10 June 1991.
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similar objection to this reservation, indicating that the reservations are contrary
to the object and purpose of the Covenant. The United Kingdom issued a
declaration in which it is stated that there is not sufficient indication of the effect
of the reservation^". Consequently, it reserves the right to respond in the
future*".
Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal objected to the Algerian declaration
concerning article 23.4, the obligation to ensure equality in marriage. The
interpretative declaration reads that Algeria interprets the provision as "..in no
way impairing the essential foundations of the Algerian legal system." Given the
fact that no further explanation concerning these essentials is provided, the scope
of the declaration is fairly vague. In its objection Germany indicates that it
understands Algeria as not intending to restrict the obligation to ensure equality
of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its
dissolution. It should be noted that within the procedure of objecting to reserva-
tions, there is no way of finding out whether this German assumption is correct,
unless Algeria clarifies its position. It is however not obliged to do so. The
Netherlands states that the declaration must be considered to be a reservation,
and says that it follows from the text and history of the provision that the
reservation is contrary to object and purpose of the Covenant. Portugal takes a
similar point of view and finds the Algerian declaration to be a reservation
incompatible with the purposes and object of the Covenant. Both the Netherlands
and Portugal indicate that their objections will not preclude entry into force, but
as the objections were received too late that would probably not have been
possible anyway-".
The Netherlands issued a non-committal statement concerning a number of
reservations made by Australia. It indicates that the reservations regarding
article 2 and 50, the federal clause, is only acceptable if it does not impair the
obligation to implement the Covenant in all the component parts of the Sta ted
With respect to the reservations concerning article 10 and concerning Convicted
233. The United Kingdom declaration reads: "" •'•"•*"
'•"'<• - "The Government of the United Kingdom have noted the statement formulated by the
Government of the Republic of Korea on accession, under the title "RESERVA-
•-.-*•-" TIONS". They are not however able to take a position on these purported reservations
'-*V in the absence of a sufficient indication of their intended effect, in accordance with the
terms of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the practice of the Parties
to the Covenant. Pending receipt of such an indication, the Government of the United
Kingdom reserve their rights under the Covenant in their entirety."
234. It remains to be seen whether it is at all possible to reserve such a right, given the fact
that this imprecise reaction of the United Kingdom was received after the end of the
time-limit set in article 20.5 VCLT. The Republic of Korea ratified on 10 April 1990, the
United Kingdom's declaration was issued on 25 May 1991.
235. Algeria ratified on 12 September 1989: Germany issued a declaration on 25 October
1990; the Netherlands objected on 18 March 1991 and Portugal on 26 September 1990.
*"* All these reactions are clearly beyond the twelve month time-limit set by article 203
VCLT. ••")»•'•-•••"•? f " W 0 * * K » *•-•"*••
236. Nowak, op.cit. at 683. i t v ••»•».: 'TM'„••
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Persons, the Netherlands indicates that it cannot determine the effect of these
reservations, and asks for a further clarification by Australia*". c t*dmtt*»
Germany in a peculiar reaction to the French reservation concerning article 27,
indicated that it understood the reservation to mean that the individual rights
protected by article 27 were guaranteed under the French Constitution. The legal
nature of this statement^* is unclear, and the German assumption seems to be
rather far-fetched. In particular, the assumption that the rights excluded by the
reservation are covered by the Constitution is not entirely credible. Moreover,
France is under no obligation to respond to the German statement, and
consequently it is not known if the German interpretation is correct.
The reservations to the Covenant have seen the creation of a pseudo-objection, a
statement in which the author State indicates that is cannot evaluate the impact of
a particular statement, and consequently requests additional information as to the
effect of a particular reservation. It is hard to establish the legal nature of these
statements, and the obligations, if any, following from them. In particular, there
would not seem to be an obligation on the part of the reserving State to provide
information. It also unclear whether it would still be possible to object if the
information were not provided or proved to be unsatisfactory. Moreover, if the
reserving State were to provide such information, there is no rule on the dissemi-
nation of the additional information. This might be exchanged in bilateral contacts
between the reserving State and the objecting State; though it would be equally
valuable for the other States Parties, if not for the Committee. ;
2.2. State Party meetings fj.j.
So far''* the matter of reservations and interpretative declarations to the CCPR
has only been discussed once in a meeting of the States Parties, held bi-annually
on the basis of articles 30.4 and 32 of the Covenant. In one of the earlier
meetings Sweden raised the issues of reservations to non-derogable rights**,
237. The Netherlands statement reads: • • » ' -
The Kingdom is not able to evaluate the implications of the first part of the reservation '
regarding article 10 on its merits, since Australia has given no further explanation on
the laws and lawful arrangements, as referred to in the text of the reservation. In
expectation of further clarification by Australia, the Kingdom for the present reserves
the right to raise objections at a later stage."
"The Kingdom finds it difficult, for the same reasons as mentioned in its commentary
on the reservation regarding article 10. to accept the declaration by Australia that it
reserves the right not to seek amendment of laws now in force in Australia relating to
the rights of persons who have been convicted of serious criminal offences. The
Kingdom expresses the hope that it will lie possible to gain a more detailed insight into
the laws now in force in Australia, in order to facilitate a definitive opinion on the
extent of this reservation."
238. The statement appears in the category "Notes" (ST/LEG/.SER.E/11. 153). ( ,i»*
239. CCPR/SP/37. dd.3-8-1992; CCPR/C/SR. 15, dd.19-9-1990. * &',
240. CCPR/SP/SR^, par.25-27 (Sweden). •".» ' Ms?
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under the agenda-item "other matters". This led to a discussion in which a
number of States Parties indicated that the election of the Human Rights Commit-
tee was the only task of the meeting. It should not discuss any questions of
substance**'.
It has been suggested that the matter of reservations be put on the agenda^**,
and it might be that there would be more willingness to discuss this in the
meeting of States Parties at present. Yet, the issue of reservations does not
appear to have had great importance for the States Parties in general. a^ssat
2.3. Withdrawal of reservations
So far six states have been able to withdraw their reservations to the Covenant.
Australia announced the withdrawal of all of its reservations with the exception
of reservations to articles 10.2.a; 10.2.b; 10.3(second sentence); 14.6 and article
20, some four years after the ratification of the Covenant. In actual fact, four
reservations were withdrawn, relating to articles 17, 19, 25 and the reservation
relating to Convicted Persons. The reservation referring to the federal clause in
article 50 juncto article 2 was reformulated as a positive obligation stressing that
the implementation of the Covenant would take place in accordance with the
division of power within the domestic legal system"'". The statement is now
labelled a declaration, and could not be a reservation on the basis of the point in
time at which it was issued. Consequently half of the Australian reservations
were maintained after the withdrawal. The Netherlands objections to the Austra-
lian reservations does seem to have had some impact, the statement on the
implementation of the Covenant in a federal State was re-formulated"'".
Finland managed to withdraw reservations twice. In March 1985, almost ten
years after ratification, it revoked the reservations to article 13 and article 14.1 as
a consequence of the amendments in domestic legislation. For similar reasons the
reservations concerning article 9.3 and article 14.3.d have been withdrawn in
1990. This means that at present only three of the original seven reservations
remain in force.
In 1988 France withdrew it reservation relating to article 19 and the monopoly in
the French national broadcasting system. In 1983, five years after ratification, the
Netherlands withdrew their reservation excluding the application of article 25.c
to the Netherlands Antilles, and in 1979 Norway withdrew its reservation to
article 6.4. Korea withdrew its reservation to article 23.4 within a year after
accession, and here again the objections do not seem to have had any influence,
the objections were aimed at the Korean reservations that have been maintained.
241. CCPR/SP/SR.5-7 passim.
242. Flinterman, Rieler, NJCM Bull, at 969.
243. Nowak, op.cit. at 683; Triggs. op.eit. at 292-294.
244. Cf. "non-paper", at 3-5.
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3. PRACTICE OF THE COMMITTEE
3.1. Reporting Procedure, article 40 CCPR
The Covenant has entered into force in March 1976, and a number of States have
already had the opportunity to report a few times. The Covenant indicates in
article 40.1 that States Parties are obliged to submit a report within one year after
the entry into force for the State in question, and after that whenever the Com-
mittee so requests. In the Human Rights Committee's decision on periodicity^",
the Committee indicated that it expects reports every five years. In the following,
we shall consider the way in which the Human Rights Committee treated
substantive reservations in the reporting procedure.
ALGERIA
The Algerian Government interprets article 1, which is common to the two Covenants,
as in no case impairing the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and to
control over their natural wealth and resources.
It further considers that the maintenance of the state of dependence of certain territo-
ries referred to in article 1. paragraph 3. of the two Covenants and in article 14 of the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations, to the Charter of the Organization and to the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and peoples
(General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV)).
The Algerian Government interprets the provisions of article 8 of the Covenant on
Economic. Social and Cultural Rights and article 22 of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights as making the law the framework for action by the Stale with respect to
the organization and exercise of the right to organize.
The Algerian Government interprets the provisions of article 23 paragraph 4. of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights regarding the rights and responsibilities of
spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution as in no case impairing
the essential foundations of the Algerian legal system.
Algeria's first periodical report was due in September 1990, it gives an extensive
description of the legal aspects of the implementation of the Covenant^*. With
respect to article 22 CCPR the report presents an outline of Algerian legislation
dealing with the legal position of associations. No mention is made of the
interpretative declaration concerning this provision, nor is the declaration with
respect to article 23.4 CCPR mentioned. The Committee was very concerned
with the consequences of political upheaval in Algeria, and the declarations are
barely dealt with-**. ^
ARGENTINA
The Argentine Government states that the application of the second part of article 15 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights shall be subject tot the principle
laid down in article 18 of the Argentine National Constitution.
245. CCPR/C/19/Rev.l.
246. CCPR/C/62/Add.l.
247. CCPR/C/SR. 1125, 1128 and 1129.
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The initial report by Argentina*** indicates that articles 18 and 31** of its
Constitution, dealing with the n«//«m cr/me/i «'«e fcge principle as well as with
the application of treaties within the domestic legal order, have led to the
reservation concerning article 15.2. The report states that the "general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations" do not constitute a law authorizing
judgement and sentence^®. Committee-member Pocar indicated that the
Argentine reservation was hard to understand, as it dealt with an imperative rule
of international law^'. The Argentine representative did not reply to this
remark"*". And Committee-member Higgins indicated that in her view the
reservation was in fact an interpretative declaration"".
AUSTRALIA
Articles 2 and 50 [withdrawn)
. < ^ Australia advises that, the people having united as one people in a Federal Commonwe-
alth under the Crown, it has a federal constitutional system. It accepts that the provisi-
ons of the Covenant extend to all parts of Australia as a federal State without any
limitations or exceptions. It enters a general reservation that article 2, paragraphs 2 and
' ) i- ' ' . ^' ^"^ article 50 shall be given effect consistently with and subject to the provisions in
.,„, >' article 2, paragraph 2.
0^ j» Under article 2, paragraph 2, steps to adopt measures necessary to give effect to the
rights recognized in the Covenant are to be taken in accordance with each State Party's
.',, , Constitutional processes which, in the case of Australia, are the processes of a federati-
on in which legislative, executive and judicial powers to give effect to the rights
^ «-,^  recognized in the Covenant are distributed among the federal (Commonwealth)
, authorities and the authorities of the constituent States.
In particular, in relation to the Australian States the implementation of those provisions
of the Covenant over whose subject matter the federal authorities exercise legislative,
executive and judicial jurisdiction will be a matter for those authorities; and where a
, provision has both federal and state aspects, its implementation will accordingly be a
y-. matter for the respective constitutionally appropriate authorities (for the purpose of
> implementation, the Northern Territory will be regarded as a constituent State).
,^ .. To this end, the Australian Government has been in consultation with the responsible
State and Territory ministers with the object of developing cooperative arrangements to
coordinate and facilitate the implementation of the Covenant.
rt Article 10
h< Australia accepts the principle stated in paragraph 1 of article 10 and the general
:**£• i j - principles of the other paragraphs of that article, but makes the reservation that these
.jij,... and other provisions of the Covenant are without prejudice to laws and lawful arrange-
ments, of the type now in force in Australia, for the preservation of custodial discipline
'*' in penal establishments.
ftifiC^r In relation to paragraph 2 (a) the principle of segregation is accepted as an objective to
fflvrf.V:. he achieved progressively. In relation to paragraph 2 (b) and 3 (second sentence) the
j , .-. obligation to segregate is accepted only to the extent that such segregation is considered
by the responsible authorities to be beneficial to the juveniles or adults concerned.
248. CCPR/C/45/Add.2, par.172-176.
249. It should be noted that this provision is not referred to in the reservation.
250. CCPR/C/45/Add.2, par. 176.
251. CCPR/C/SR.952, par.55 (Pocar). " .;.^3VM\'>\^'f X>
252. CCPR/C/SR.955, passim. Ai:'-: ! N;A\&»\S\»-O0
253. CCPR/C/SR.956, par. 11 (Higgins). •'?(; :-«.. ^ ,f i .-:*:{ (..rfapCfl f t )
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Australia accepts paragraph 3 (b) on the understanding that the reference to adequate
facilities does not require provision to prisoners of all the facilities available to a
prisoners's legal representative.
Australia accepts the requirement in paragraph 3 (d) that everyone is entitled to be
tried in his presence, but reserves the right to exclude an accused person where his
conduct makes it impossible for the trial to proceed.
Australia interprets paragraph 3 (d) of article 14 as consistent with the operation of
schemes of legal assistance in which the person assisted is required to make a contribu-
tion towards the cost of the defence related to his capacity to pay and determine
according to law, or in which assistance is granted in respect of other than indictable
offenses, only after having regard to all relevant matters.
Australia makes the reservation that the provision of compensation for miscarriage of
justice in the circumstances contemplated in paragraph 6 of article 14 may be by
administrative procedures rather than pursuant to specific legal provisions.
Article 17 [withdrawn)
Australia accepts the principles stated in article 17 without prejudice to the right to
enact and administer laws which, in so far as they authorize action which impinges on a
person's privacy, family, home or correspondence, are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the
country, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others. i
Article 19 (withdrawn!
Australia interprets paragraph 2 of article 19 as being compatible with the regulation of
radio and television broadcasting in the public interest with the object of providing the
best possible broadcasting services to the Australian people.
Article 20
Australia interprets the rights provided for by articles 19. 21 and 22 as consistent with
article 20; accordingly, the Commonwealth and the constituent slates, having legislated
with respect to the subject matter of the article in matters of practical concern in the
interest of public order (ordre public), the right is reserved not to introduce any further
legislative provisions on these matters.
Article 25 [withdrawn]
The reference in paragraph (b) of article 25 to "universal and equal suffrage", is
accepted without prejudice to law which provide that factors such as regional interest
may be taken into account in defining electoral divisions, or which establish franchises
for municipal and other local government elections related to the sources of revenue
and the functions of such government.
Convicted persons [withdrawn]
i,*lr .x Australia declares that laws now in force in Australia relating to the rights of persons
•»; >.';V'' *"° ^ v e been convicted of serious criminal offenses are generally consistent with the
requirements of article 14. 18, 19, 25, 26 and reserves the right not to seek amendment
t. of such laws.
Discrimination and distinction Iwithdrawnl ? i • ' , .• "• .-..-?
The provisions of articles 2. paragraph 1. and 24. paragraph 1. 25 and 26 relating to
discrimination and distinction between persons shall be without prejudice to laws
designed to achieve for the members of some class or classes of persons equal enjoy-
ment of the rights defined in the Covenant. Australia accepts article 26 on the basis that
the object of the provision is to confirm the right of each person to equal treatment in
the application of the law.
Declaration'" -*--: '*> * S
Australia has a federal constitutional system in which legislative, executive and judicial
powers are shared or distributed between the Commonwealth and the constituent
254. 8 December 1984.
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States. The implementation of the treaty throughout Australia will be effected by the
Commonwealth, State and Territory authorities having regard to their respective
constitutional powers and arrangements concerning their exercise.
In its initial report*", Australia interprets its position with respect to articles 2
and 50 in a manner distinct from the reservation made. It states that the Covenant
extends to all parts of Australia, stressing that implementation is a complex
matter in a federal State***, and indicates how the federation is reviewing the
conformity of legislation with the Covenant*". It elaborates on the background
of the article 10 reservation, stressing the need for disciplinary measures in
prison***. Australia states that the separation of the accused from the convicted
is a problem in sparsely populated regions of the country. A similar motivation is
provided for the separation of juveniles, in some cases separation would lead to
solitary confinement which is not considered to be beneficial at all"". With
respect to the reservation concerning article 14.3.b, the report indicates that this
was a reaction to a recent decision of the US Supreme Court""'. Australia feels
that the reservation concerning article 14.3.d and the right to be tried in one 's
presence, is somewhat obvious, but the report indicates that it was made for
safety's sake-". The second reservation relating to article 14.3.d is intended to
safeguard the means testing in the provision of legal aid***. Compensation for
miscarriages of justice is provided through administrative procedures, as the
reservation to article 14.6 indicates, rather than through legislation. Australia's
reservation to article 17 and the protection of privacy, can be traced back to
uncertainty about the use of the word "arbitrary" in paragraph 1 of the provi-
sion*". The reservation concerning article 19.2 of the Covenant is similar to
other reservations in that field, and the same goes for the reservation concerning
articles 19, 21 and 22 of the Covenant*". With respect to the article 25 reserva-
tion, it is indicated that under certain circumstances people may be disqualified
from voting, whereas other groups of people may also be excluded from the right
to vote in local elections. The report underlines that the reservation concerning
article 26 excludes the obligation to provided legislative protection against
discrimination, and to stress the legitimacy of affirmative action programmes.
Finally, it is indicated that the main reason for the reservation concerning
convicted persons lies in the fact that at present Australian jurisdictions differ in
the restrictions imposed on convicts. ... ,; . •
255. CCPR/C/14/Add.l. , ' '
256. CCPR/C/14/Add. l , par.64. .-,,.•, * s>;,,,. = x> ,i ' ^« «.;<< f. ;«*•;
257. CCPR/C/14/Add. l , par.67. .,-.« ,..• .->.- • - .>,i» in >:->.--t> ..•:,•
258. CCPR/C/14/Add. l , par.203-204. «-«: .,,: • , r£«i«>-i^.:« -•*(
259. CCPR/C/14/Add. l , par.205-208. S,,.;;nfe'!
260. CCPR/C/14/Add.l, par.256-257. •••» |«f,i«!:i}:j*r ••, Jj^t-v <• ^ i \ ' . • P 7 \ 7 .
261. CCPR/C/14/Add.l, par.267-269. - W a9-*v«s;;»--•: i r i i . v '-^. -• -.*f,q
262. CCPR/C/14/Add.l, par.276.
263. CCPR/C/14/Add.l. par.316-319.
264. It is indicated that the reservation is similar to the one made concerning article 4.a
C E R D . . - - . . • . • , . • , - r , . , . . . : - : ^ v , ^ , - u ; » >>v
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During the Committee discussions-** concern is expressed about the number of
reservations made, and about the impact of the reservation in respect of articles
2.2, 3 and 50. There is uncertainty about the meaning of the declaration as a
whole, and of the third paragraph as such. Committee members seemed to feel
that the labelling of the statement as a reservation, and its content were contradic-
tory. Or, as one member put it, if Australia meant to indicate that implementation
would be in accordance with its federal system the reservation was superfluous;
whereas if the intention were to exclude responsibility for the implementation by
the federal States that would be incompatible with the Covenant. It appears that
the labelling "general reservation" was meant to indicate that the aim would still
be conformity with treaty obligations, but by then semantics had a hold on the
discussion-**. Ultimately the Australian representative indicated that his country
had probably been overcautious in the formulation of its reservations, and
stressed that Australia had deemed it desirable to draw the attention to the
arrangements concerning the implementation of the Covenant in a federal
Stated
A small number of members focuses on other substantive issues, such as the
relation between General Comment 9/16 and the reservation concerning article
10.2.b and 10.3"**, the need to protect affirmative action by means of a reser-
vation to article 26-*' and the need for making a reservation to article 14-*\
Other issues dealt with were the reference to the economic well-being in the
reservation to article 17*", the mandatory nature of article 20 CCPR"-, and
the means testing in the reservation to article 25. Ir".
The second periodical report of Australia indicates the withdrawal in 1984 of the
majority of the reservations and declarations-'''. Australia by then maintained
the reservations concerning articles 10, 14 and 20 of the Covenant. Indicating
that "[I]n a federation, implementation of the provisions of the Covenant is a
matter of some complexity.", Australia reformulated its statement on the implica-
tions of a federal structure in respect of the implementation of the Covenant".
The report then goes on to elaborate on the three remaining reservations. In
respect of the reservation concerning the segregation of juvenile delinquents from
265. 17th Session, October 1982. ... .;,, ,.
266. CCPR/C/SR.401 par.12 (Evans), par.29 (Tarnopolsky); CCPR/C/SR.402 par. l l , 15, 19
(Prado Vallejo), par. 28 (Movchan); par.37 (Ermacora); CCPR/C/SR.403 par.3
-.. , , .•• (Opsahl). par . l l (Graefrath), par.37-38 (Tomuschat); CCPR/C/SR.407 par. 3-4
- , (Australia); CCPR/C/SR.408 par.32-36 (ultimate confusion).
267. CCPR/C/SR.407, par.3-4 (Australia). . . ^ * ^ v. .
268. CCPR/C/SR.401 par.24 (Bouziri). . ,... v
269. CCPR/C/SR.401, par.30 (Tarnopolsky). * '
270. CCPR/C/SR.401, par.41 (Tarnopolsky).
271. CCPR/C/SR.402, par.22 (Prado Vallejo).
272. CCPR/C/SR.402, par.23 (Prado Vallejo). <*"i
273. CCPR/C/SR.403, par.25-26 (Al Douri). ^
274. CCPR/C/42/Add.2, par.59-60.
275. It should be noted that this statement is necessarily a mere interpretative declaration,
whatever its content. In 1984 Australia could not have made a reservation, as it had
ratified in 1980.
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adults and of accused persons from the convicted (article 10.2.a, 10.2.b and
10.3) it is stated that the reservation originates in, on the one hand, changing
views about the best way to punish criminal offenses and on the other hand the
problems created by the size of the country"'; while it is recognized that the
separation of accused from the convicted is recognized as an objective to be
achieved gradually. The report indicates that the reservation to article 14.6 is in
substance covered by the availability of administrative procedures to obtain
compensation for miscarriage of justice. With reference to the reservation
concerning article 20 of the Covenant, it is indicated that a similar reservation
has been made in respect of article 4.a CERD, and that the reservation purports
to protect the freedom of expression. The imprecision of the formulation in
article 20, the prohibition of "propaganda for war" is criticized.
Discussions with the Australian representative focuses on the need for the article
14 reservation. The questions deal with the administrative procedure concerning
compensation for miscarriage of justice, and the question whether the Covenant
explicitly provides for a written legal instrument in this case-". The withdrawal
of the reservation concerning articles 2 and 50 of the Covenant (federal reserva-
tion) is discussed, the representative making a mistake by labelling the new
declaration a reservation; and correcting it the next day, indicating that it is a
statement"™. The reservation concerning article 20 is discussed-", and the
withdrawal of the statement with respect to article 25.b which had only been an
interpretative declaration and Australia did not want to suggest that it did not give
its unqualified support to the provision^".
AUSTRIA
1. Article 12, paragraph 4, of the Covenant will be applied provided that u will not
,, ij affect the Act of 3 April 1919. State Law Gazette No.209, concerning the Expulsion and
' "" the Transfer of Property of the House of Habsburg-Lorraine as amended by the Act of
30 October 1919, State Law Gazette No.501, the Federal Constitutional Act of 25 July,
Federal Law Gazette No.292. and the Federal Constitutional Act of 28 January 1928,
Federal Law Gazette No.Of, read in conjunction with the Federal Constitutional act of 4
,,; v July 1963, Federal Law Gazette No.172.
" ' ' 2. Article 9 and article 14 of the Covenant will be applied provided that legal regulations
: :••-»»>• governing the proceedings and measures of deprivation of liberty as provided for in the
v. ...';. Administrative Procedure Acts and in the Financial Penal Act remain permissible within
;t .-.-.', the framework of the judicial review by the Federal Administrative Court or the Federal
**' "'* . Constitutional Court as provided by the Austrian Federal Constitution.
f..t4'; r 3. Article 10. paragraph 3, of the Covenant will be applied provided that legal regulati-
••-' if ons allowing for juvenile prisoners to be detained together with adults under 25 years of
age who give no reason for concern as to their possible detrimental influence on the
juvenile prisoner remain permissible.
'X)
27ft. CCPR/C/42/Add.2, par.274, 275, 294, 300. 301.
277. CCPR/C/SR.806, par.30 (Higgins); CCPR/C/SR.808, pars.23 (Chanel), 33 (El Shafei);
CCPR/C/SR.809, par.59 (Chanet).
2 m !•> CCPR/C/SR.807, par.8 (Australia); CCPR/C/SR.809, par.13-14 (Australia). -1
279. -i CCPR/C/SR.807, par.9, 13 (Australia); CCPR/C/SR.809, par.51 (Higgins). "
28a CCPR/C/SR.809, pars.11.12 (Australia).
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4. Article 14 of the Covenant will be applied provided that the principles governing the
publicity of trials as set forth in article 90 of the Federal Constitutional Law as amended
in 1929 are in no way prejudiced and that:
a) Paragraph 3, subparagraph (d) is not in conflict with legal regulations which stipulate
that an accused person who disturbs the orderly conduct of the trial or whose presence
would impede the questioning of another accused person, of a witness or of an expert
can be excluded from participation in the trail;
b) Paragraph 5 is not in conflict with legal regulations which stipulate that after an
acquittal or a lighter sentence passed by a court of the first instance, a higher tribunal
may pronounce conviction or a heavier sentence for the same offence, while they
exclude the convicted person's right to have such conviction or heavier sentence
reviewed by a still higher tribunal;
c) Paragraph 7 is not in conflict with legal regulations which allow proceedings that led
up to a person's final conviction or acquittal to be reopened.
5. Articles 19, 21, 22 in connection with article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant will be
.' applied provided that they are not in conflict with legal restrictions as provided in article
16 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.
6. Article 26 is understood to mean that it does not exclude different treatment of
Austrian nationals and aliens, as is also permissible under article 1, paragraph 2, of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
The first Austrian report deals with the reservation concerning article 9"*'. The
report elaborates on the application of the segregation principle in article 10.3 of
the Covenant, explaining that the reservation protects a system in which minors
are imprisoned together with delinquents up to the age of 25 years, and states that
the reservation safeguards the existing Austrian prison system"*-. In respect of
the reservation concerning article 14.1 and the publicity of the trial and the
judgement, it appears that the reservation rests on the wish to maintain a slightly
stricter system in Austria. Restrictions on the right to be tried in one's presence
are motivated by the possibility under Austrian law to expel the accused from the
court room in case of disturbing of the proceedings^". The reservation concern-
ing article 14.5 appears to deal with a rule of procedural law in which a higher
Court may impose a sentence after an acquittal in first instance, this being a
decisive verdict against which appeals are not possible^"*. The consideration
leading to the reservation concerning article 14.7 has been that the possibility to
review a case should new information come to light is contrary to the ne bis in
idem principle^. The reservation to article 19 is motivated by the necessity of
having a tool to restrict the political activities and similar meetings of foreigners
if the need should arise^**.
In the Committee's consideration of the Austrian report, a number of issues are
dealt with. On the basis of detailed knowledge about the Austrian Constitutional
system, Committee-member Graefrath criticizes the different approach used on
281. CCPR/C/6/Add.7. p.9. , .,
282. CCPR/C/6/Add.7, p. 13.
283. CCPR/C/6/Add.7, p. 15, 16, 17.
284. CCPR/C/6/Add.7, p.19.
285. CCPR/C/6/Add.7, p.20.
286. CCPR/C/6/Add.7, p.31. 32.
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the ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights on the one hand
and the ratification of the CCPR and ESCR on the other hand. The different
position of the latter documents under Austrian law appeared to have led to a
number of reservations^'. The representatives of Austria do not respond to this
remark. The exclusion of domestic administrative procedures under articles 9 and
14 is dealt with frequently. It is suggested that this reservation is incompatible
with the Covenant, and asked whether the whole body of administrative law is
considered to be outside of the scope of the Covenant-**. In reply to these
remarks, Austria elaborates on its system of administrative and juridical pro-
cedure, indicating that under certain circumstances an administrative body has the
authority to deprive a person of its liberty-*'*. Committee-member Opsahl
wonders how the reservation to article 9 must be seen in relation to the guarantee
of effective remedies in article 2.3^°. In respect of the reservation to article
10, it is asked who will decide whether harmful influence must be feared-*",
and Austria indicates that the reservation is in keeping with the spirit of the
Covenant-^-. The Committee members have the impression that a number of
reservation are based on outdated laws, and the withdrawal of the reservations
concerning articles 14.3.d, 14.5 and 14.7 is suggested to Austria. In respect of
these suggestions, Austria indicates that it might consider withdrawing the
reservation to article 14.3.d, states that there are good reasons for retaining the
reservation to article 14.5, and indicates that the reservation to article 14.7 is in
most cases to the advantage of the accused.
The second periodical report by Austria^" begins with an historical overview of
the constitutional system, and then moves on to a discussion of the provisions of
the Covenant. The information about the implementation does not specifically
refer to the interpretative declarations and reservations made.
The Committee almost unanimously voices concern about the large number of
reservations formulated too generally^** and it is suggested that Austria con-
siders withdrawing reservations, and making them more specific^".
Initially Austria replies that its reservations are based on concern about the
conformity of national legislation on the European Convention on Human Rights
with the Covenant, whereas the reservation to the OP was meant to preclude
287. CCPR/C/SR.412, par.12. 13. 14(Graefrath); CCPR/C:/SR.413. par,18(AI Douri).
288. CCPR/C:/SR.412, par.l7(Graefrath).
289. CCPR/C/SR.416, par.6-8(Austria).
290. CCPR/C/SR.412, par.43(Opsahl).
291. CCPR/C/SR.412, par.4(Herdocia Ortega); CCPR/C/SR.413. par.4 (Bouziri).
292. CCPR/C/SR.416, par.33.
293. CCPR/C/51/Add.2.
294. CCPR/C/SR.1098, par.18 (Ando), 21 (El Shafei), IS (Lallah). 31 (Myullerson), 33
(Aguilar Urbina), 39 (Prado Vallejo).
295. CCPR/C/SR.1098, 39 (Prado Vallejo).
This raises the interesting question whether States have the right to reconsider and
~' reformulate reservations after ratifying the Covenant. Reservations may only be made at
;7.\- ratification, yet from the perspective of the progressive development of human rights
yv-. protection formulating a less restrictive reservation should be favoured.
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discussions about parallel procedures under the ECHR and the CCPR^*. In the
discussion about article 1, and in reply to the Committee's question concerning
the possible withdrawal of these reservations^', Austria takes the unusual step
of asking for the assurance by the Committee that the reservation was not
necessary, in which case it would be withdrawn^*. The Committee decided to
postpone answering the Austrian question whether legislation was in conformity
with the Covenant^".
The matter of the Austrian reservations to article 14.5 and 14.7, and the Commit-
tee's competence to make comments such as the one requested by Austria is dealt
with in the forty-fifth session"*. It appears that the Working Group ex article
40 CCPR had not been able to reach a conclusion with respect to the question
whether or not the Committee could refer to the reservations in its concluding
remarks after the consideration of a report™'; and it is suggested that alternative-
ly, a general comment on the issue of reservations might be prepared*-.
The discussion in the Human Rights Committee is a clear example of the
confusion surrounding the issue of reservations to the Covenant. A number of
Committee-members stress that the States Parties had the competence to react to
reservations by way of objections, and that the Committee had no authority in
this respect. While it was acceptable that individual members might express their
opinions orally, an explicit view of the Committee as a whole was not accept-
able*". It was supposed that this was different under the Optional Protocol,
when the Committee was specifically asked to pronounce upon the impact of
reservations'**.
The majority of the Committee do not doubt that the States Parties are competent
to react to reservations, but see a distinct role for the Committee itself**. As
Higgins puts it: "77M? C/OXJ/C /W.V/7/O// //;«/ /•c.wrwj/u.w.y /<•> fmif/'w H O T «
296. CCPR/C/SR.1098. par.56-57.
297. CCPR/C/SR.1099, par.64.
298. CCPR/C/SR.1099, par.68 reads:"As for the question (d) concerning Austria's reservati-
ons in connection with article 14 of the Covenant, he explained that those reservations
were explained essentially by the principle that a person could not be tried twice for the
same offence. Since criminal proceedings were invariably of a two-tier nature, could it
really be said that article 14 (5), had been violated if a person received a more severe
sentence by a court of second instance? it had simply been out of caution that the
Austrian authorities had entered a reservation in ratifying the Covenant and
cnrwo '^f >vi7/irfran7/!g w i/ //if Co/rim/mc or rtny O//KT £/mVerf MI/IOIM ftorfy /vm'iVta
ivtf/i f/;c Hcccra7;y assi/ro/iccj I/I //in/ ovinwrio/i."
299. CCPR/C/SR.1100, par.16.
300. CCPR/C/SR.1167; see also A.Woltjer, VN Verdragen inzake de Rechten van de Mens
in: 18 NJCM Bull. 1993 183-202 at 198.
301. CCPR/C/SR.1167, par.49 (Pocar).
302. CCPR/C/SR.1167, par.50 (Pocar).
303. CCPR/C/SR.1167, par.53 (Ndiaye), par.54 (Chanet), par.55 (El Shafei), par.62 (Prado
Vallejo).
304. CCPR/C/SR.1167, par.53 and par.60 (Ndiaye).
305. CCPR/C/SR.1167, par.51 (Higgins), par.56 (Wennergren), par.57 (Myullerson). par.63-
64 (Herndl), par.65-67 (Higgins). par.73-76 (Higgins).
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of 5fti/p jovera'gwfy </W no/ worifc _/br /jw/n<w n'^/ite fre<i//e?, /n
/o g» w cmaf/i r/g/itt /o i/k//v/V/ufl/^ . 77ie rai//7y way //ia/, /or //ie
S/«/ey </W wo/ recog/i/'z^ /AWr /ni//«a///y o/ /'n/eres/s /n /ne _/?eW o/
fl/iW/«//«/ fo mo/»7or r«erva//o/w. 77ie Comm/7/ee */7OMW surety no/
co/werva//ve view //J<J/ a 5/fl/e par/y sTiowW AwaJte wna/ever reyerww/on //
O no/n/n^ //"//?« Com/n/7/^ <? </W no/
7 / /o /n« C<ovc/M/<r, no on? ei
JO. "**, thereby clearly indicating the specific and supplementary role of a
supervisory organ.
While the Working Group had suggested either to formulate a general comment
or an answer to the Austrian request*", there is general consent about taking up
the issue of reservations as a matter to be dealt with in a general comment**.
The question about whether or not to reply to Austria is troubled by doubts about
the seriousness of the request*", and is more seriously hampered by the fact
that the Committee does not want to pronounce in general on the reservations
made. Such a pronouncement would require an in depth study of Austrian
law"". The Working Group had established that the law referred to was indeed
incompatible, and that the reservations were necessary for Austria'". It was
thus decided that Austria would receive a message that the Committee was
unable to pronounce on the compatibility of the reservations, "a polite way of
refusing to answer""-.
The way in which the Committee had dealt with the specific request by Austria,
calls for some remarks. It would appear that, although there is no unanimity, the
majority of the Human Rights Committee does agree that the Committee has a
role to play with respect to the reservations. The precise nature of this role, and
in particular whether it would consist of a full review of the compatibility of
reservations or merely of marginally reviewing the compatibility, is not very
clear.
One could, at first sight, be disappointed that the Human Rights Committee
declines to explicitly answer the Austrian request. This, it appears, would have
been an opportunity for guidance with respect to compatibility. Yet, Committee
member Ando raises the interesting issue"' that if Austria were to change its
legislation, the Committee might be partially responsible. It might be added to
this observation that, if the Committee would have accepted the Working Group's
view that the reservations were necessary, it would have been responsible for
Austria's upholding incompatible reservations. This would clearly have put the
306. CCPR/C/SR. 1167, par.67 (Higgins).
307. CCPR/C/SR.1167, par.49-50 (Pocar).
308. CCPR/C/SR.1167, par.80-81.
309. CCPR/C/SR.1167, par.54 (Chanet), par.66 (Higgins), par.68 (Chanet), par.74 (Dimitrije-
vic), par.78 (Myullerson).
310. CCPR/C/SR.1167, par.69 (Chanet), par.72 (Prado Vallejo), par.74 (Dimitrijevic), par.77
(El Shafei), par.84 (Higgins).
311. CCPR/C/SR. 1167, par.83 (Pocar).
312. CCPR/C/SR. 1167. par.89 (Dimitrijevic).
313. CCPR/C/SR.1167, par.59 (Ando).
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Human Rights Committee in a peculiar position. Looking back the Committee
was trapped between either agreeing with Austria, which it could not do on the
basis of the views of the Working Group, or declining to answer as it did, which
conveys a sense of lack of determination. It is likely that the preparation of the
general comment will lead to a further clarification of the position of the Human
Rights Committee, hopefully leading to an improvement in its possibilities to
contribute to the withdrawal of incompatible reservations.
BARBADOS
The Government of Barbados states that it reserves the right not to apply in full, the
guarantee of free legal assistance in accordance with paragraphs 3 (d) of article 14 of
the Covenant, since, while accepting the principles contained in the same paragraph, the
problems of implementation are such that full application cannot he guaranteed at
present.
The reservation concerning article 14.3.d is not dealt with in the initial report of
Barbados"*, yet the Committee asks if Barbados intends to provide for free
legal assistance in the future"'. Committee-member Ermacora asked whether
the death penalty could be imposed on persons below 18 years of age, and if so
why Barbados had not made a reservation to article 6.5 of the Covenant".
The Barbadian representative indicated that he did not know what the legal
position was about the death penalty for minors under the age of 18. In reply to a
question, it was indicated that legal aid was available to persons charged with a
number of specific offenses, and the Government were considering widening the
scope of legal aid'".
In the second periodical report the reservation is dealt with by providing a list of
criminal and civil matters for which free legal aid is available"*, following
changes in the Community Legal Services Act 1981-33. In the consideration of
the report the Barbadian representative indicates that he is unaware of the
position of his government as to the withdrawal of the reservation in view of the
change in legislation"'.
In the discussions about the second periodical report of Barbados, the question is
asked why Barbados did not make a reservation in view of the discrepancy
between its rules on the death penalty for minors, and the Covenant's provisions
in article 6.5'"*. The representative states that he will raise the matter with his
Government'-'.
314. CCPR/C/l/Add.36.
315. CCPR/C/SR.264, par.31(Bouziri).
316. CCPR/C/SR.265, par.33 (Ermacora).
317. CCPR/C/SR.267, par. 11 (Barbados).
318. CCPR/C/42/Add.3, par.59; CCPR/C/SR.823, par.8 (Barbados).
319. CCPR/C/SR.823, 825.
320. CCPR/C/SR.823, par.29 (Wennergren).
321. CCPR/C/SR.823 (Barbados)
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BELGIUM
Reservations
1. With respect to articles 2, 3 and 25, the Belgian Government makes a reservation, in
that under the Belgian Constitution the royal powers may be exercised only by males.
With respect to the exercise of the functions of the regency, the said articles shall both
preclude the application of the constitutional rules as interpreted by the Belgian State.
2. The Belgian Government considers that the provisions of article 10, paragraph 2 (a),
under which accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated
from the convicted persons is to be interpreted in conformity with the principle, already
embodied in the standard minimum rules, for the treatment of prisoners (resolution
(73) 5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 19 January 1973],
that untried prisoners shall not be put in contact with convicted prisoners against their
will [rules 7 (b) and 85(1)]. If they so request accused persons may be allowed to take
part with convicted persons in certain communal activities.
3. The Belgian Government considers that the provisions of article 10 paragraph 3.
under which juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and be accorded
treatment appropriate to their age and legal status refers exclusively to the judicial
measures provided for under the regime for the protection of young persons. As regards
other juvenile ordinary-law offenders, the Belgian Government intends to reserve the
option to adopt measures that may be more flexible and be designed precisely in the
interest of the persons concerned.
4. With respect to article 14, the Belgian Government considers that the last part of
paragraph 1 of the article appears to give States the option of providing or not provi-
ding for certain derogations from the principle that judgements shall be made public.
Accordingly, the Belgian constitutional principle that there shall be no exceptions to the
public pronouncements of judgements is in conformity with that provision, paragraph 5
of the article shall not apply to persons who, under Belgian law, are convicted and
sentenced at second instance following appeal against their acquittal of first instance or
who, under Belgian law, are brought directly before a higher tribunal such as the Court
of Cassation, the Appeals Court or the Assize Court.
5. Articles 19, 21 and 22 shall be applied by the Belgian Government in the context of
the provisions and the restrictions set forth or authorised in articles 10 and 11 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4
november 1950, by the said Convention.
Declarations
6. The Belgian Government declares that it does not consider itself obligated to enact
legislation in the field covered by article 20, paragraph 1, an that article 20 as a whole
shall be applied taking into account the rights to freedom of thought and religion,
freedom of opinion and freedom of assembly and association proclaimed in articles 18,
19, 21 and 22 of the Covenant.
7. The Belgian Government declares that it interprets article 23, paragraph 2, as
meaning that the right of persons of marriageable age to marry and to found a family
presupposes not only that national law shall prescribe the marriageable age but that it
may also regulate the exercise of that right.
The Belgian initial report'" discusses the reservation excluding women from
rights to the throne'^. The report elaborates on the practice underlying its
322. CCPR/C/31/Add.3.
323. In respect of article 3 of the Covenant there is also mentioned another reservation to
that provision, which was withdrawn in 1978. This is confusing, and probably deals with
reservations at signature. Belgium only ratified the Covenant in 1983, and could
therefore not withdraw reservations in 1978.
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reservation to article 10.2.a, indicating that the segregation between accused and
convicted persons is not complete, but offering a list of distinctions that is used in
prison practice'-''. With respect to the reservation concerning article 10.3,
which is mentioned in the report as an interpretative declaration, it is indicated
that while a strict separation is not practised the system intends to identify the
needs of the juvenile prisoners**. While passing over the reservation to article
14.1 (latter part), the report cites two domestic cases in which article 14.5 was
invoked, but declared inapplicable on the basis of the Belgian reservation"*. In
respect of the interpretative declaration to article 20, the report mentions a law
incriminating racism and xenophobia and refers to the Belgian report under the
CERD"'. The reservation in respect of article 19, 21 and 22 as well as the
interpretative declaration to article 23 are not discussed in the report.
The Committee asks about the Belgian reservation dealing with the right to
succession and the Belgian representative indicates that the relevant legislation is
likely to be changed"*. The issue of the relation between the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and the Covenant is discussed in respect of the
reservation to articles 19, 21 and 22; however the Belgian representatives do not
clarify this issue to the Committee"'. The question what cases are within the
ambit of the reservation to article 14.5 is not answered"", but the Belgian
representatives do indicate that the prison regime with respect to juveniles (article
10.3) had been the subject of a judgement by the European Court of Human
Rights, that might lead to legislative changes"'. The Committee calls upon
Belgium to withdraw its reservations'", and a member of the Committee is of
the opinion that by failing to legislate along the lines of article 20 of the Coven-
ant, Belgium is in breach of its obligations'".
The second Belgian report does not mention the reservation concerning suc-
cession to the throne, which has officially not yet been withdrawn'**. The
paragraph about article 10 mentions the reservation concerning juvenile offenders
(article 10.3) but omits a discussion of the reservation with respect to article
10.2.a'". With respect to article 14 the report mentions that decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights have increased the kinds of judgements that
need to be made public"*.
324. CCPR/C/31/Add.3, paras.178-181.
325. CCPR/C/31/Add.3, par. 186-190.
326. CCPR/C/31/Add.3, p.52-53 under (p).
327. CCPR/C/31/Add.3, par.284-286.
328. CCPR/C/SR.815, par.24 (Cooray); CCPR/C/SR.821 (Belgium), par.35.
329. CCPR/C/SR.815, par.30 (El Shafei); CCPR/C/SR./822. par.47 (Movchan).
330. CCPR/C/SR.816, par.31 (Pocar).
331. CCPR/C/SR.821, par.60 (Belgium).
332. CCPR/C/SR.816, par.36 (Movchan).
333. CCPR/C/SR.822, par.47 (Movchan).
334. ST/LEG/SER.E/11.
335. CCPR/C/57/Add.3, par. 119.
336. CCPR/C/57/Add.3, par. 155.
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In reply to questions from the Committee, the Belgian representative indicated
that changes in the Protection of Young Persons Act 1965 had taken place,
apparently with consequences for the scope of article 10.3 CCPR*". Later on
in the discussion, Committee member Ndiaye asked whether the monarchy in
Belgium had implications for equal access to public office"*. The Belgian
representative </M «o/ 6tf//eve that this was the case. Reservations with respect to
articles 2, 3, and 25 CCPR were not mentioned. Various members of the Com-
mittee suggest the withdrawal of unnecessary reservations such as the reserva-
tions to articles 10 and 14.5"'
CONGO
The Government of the Peoples's Republic of the Congo declares that it does not
consider itself bound by the provisions of article 11.
Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is quite incompati-
ble with the articles 386 ff. of the Congolese Code of Civil, Commercial, Administrative
and Financial Procedure, derived from Act 51/83 of 21 April 1983. Under those
provisions, in matters of private law, decisions or orders emanating from conciliation
proceedings may be enforced through imprisonment for debt when other means of
enforcement have failed, when the amount due exceeds 20,000 CFA francs and when the
debtor, between 16 and 60 years of age makes himself insolvent in bad faith.
The initial report by Congo did not mention its reservation to the non-derogable
right contained in article 11 of the Covenant"". One Committee-member asks
whether Congo had considered amending the legislation and withdrawing the
reservation, as it was not consistent with the protection of human rights as a
whole*"; and another member wonders about the impact of the reservation
taking into account that inflation could increase the scope of the provision?*-.
No explicit reference is made to article 11 being a non-derogable right.
The Congolese representative does not address the matter of the reservation to
article 11 in his reply, and neither does the Committee-"-*.
DENMARK
1. The Government of Denmark makes a reservation in respect of article 10, paragraph
3, second sentence. In Danish practice, considerable efforts are made to ensure
appropriate age distribution of convicts serving sentences of imprisonment, but it is
considered valuable to maintain possibilities of flexible arrangements.
2.(a) Article 14, paragraph 1. shall not be binding on Denmark in respect of public
hearings. In Danish law, the right to exclude the press and the public from trials may go
beyond what is permissible under this Covenant, and the Government of Denmark finds
that this right should not be restricted,
(b) Articles 14, paragraphs 5 and 7, shall not be binding on Denmark.
337. CCPR/C/SR.1143, par.16 (Belgium).
338. CCPR/C/SR.1143, par.57 (Ndiaye).
339. CCPR/C/SR.1143, par.63 (Ando), par.68 (Herndl), par.70 (Serrano Caldera).
340. CCPR/C/36/Add.2.
341. CCPR/C/SR.732, par.25 (Pocar).
342. CCPR/C/SR.732, par. 59 (Dimitrijevic).
343. CCPR/C/SR.736.
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The Danish Administration of Justice Act contains detailed provisions regulating the
matters dealt with in these two paragraphs. In some cases, Danish legislation is less
restrictive than the Covenant (e.g. a verdict returned by a jury on the question of guilt
cannot be reviewed by a higher tribunal, cf.para.5); in other cases, Danish legislation is
more restrictive than the Covenant (e.g. with respect to resumption of a criminal case in
which the accused party was acquitted, cf.para.7).
3. Reservation is further made to article 20, paragraph 1. This reservation is in
accordance with the vote cast by Denmark in the sixteenth session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations in 1961 when the Danish delegation, referring to the
preceding article concerning the freedom of expression, voted against the prohibition
against propaganda for war.
The initial report by Denmark is strikingly brief, and does not mention any of the
reservations made***. The additional report does not cover articles 8 to 16, and
the majority of Danish reservations fall within part II of the Covenant, and
merely mentions the reservations to article 20.1 succinctly'^. In the discussions
about both reports it is indicated that reservations had been made in case of
discrepancies between the Covenant and the Danish legal situation?**. As early
as the third session of the Committee the issue of the reservations to article 20.1
is mentioned*", without an in depth discussion of article 20 supposedly restrict-
ing the freedom of opinion. The Danish reply merely mentions article 20.2***.
A subsequent additional report""' contains the section on articles 8-16, particu-
larly relevant in the case of reservations. The report indicates that reservations
have been made to article 10.3*® articles 14.5 and 14.7"', and states that
though a reservation has been made to article 14.1, the domestic rules are in
essentials in consonance with the provision"*'*. In its discussion about this
additional report, there is some concern about the Danish reservation to article
10.3'". Denmark indicates that the reservation seeks to safeguard experiments
in this field**. It is indicated that the reservation concerning article 14.1 was
necessary because Danish law provided better protection to witnesses'". The
reservations to articles 14.5 and 14.7 are not dealt with in the discussion.
The second periodical report of Denmark"* mentions an approach differing
from the system of segregation of prisoners, as underlined in article 10.3 in the
Covenant, which appears to be the reason for the reservation to that provi-
344. CCPR/C/l/Add.4.
345. CCPR/C/Add.19, p.19.
346. CCPR/C/SR.54, par.3 (Denmark)
347. CCPR/C/SR.54, par.43 (Movchan).
348. CCPR/C/SR.54, par.54 (Denmark).
349. CCPR/C/l/Add.51.
350. CCP R/C/1 /Add.51, p.41.
351. CCPR/C/l/Add.51, p.15.
352. CCPR/C/l/Add.51, p.12.
353. CCPR/C/SR.250, par.36 (Koulishev), par.38 (Evans).
354. CCPR/C/SR.250, par.58 (Denmark).
355. CCPR/C/SR.251, par.5 (Denmark).
356. CCPR/C/37/Add.5.
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sion"'. In his introduction, the Danish representative indicated that Denmark
had made reservations to articles 10.3, 14.1, 14.7 and 20.1, thereby omitting the
reservation to article 14.5. The Committee focuses on the reservations to article
14.1 and to article 14.5 and 14.7. With respect to article 14.1 and the exclusion
of the press and public from trials, Denmark is asked to indicate in what kind of
circumstances the reservation would apply, and if these are not circumstances
already covered by the provision itself*. Denmark indicates that the reserva-
tion was made out of uncertainty about the meaning of "where publicity would
prejudice the interests of justice" in article 14.1'". The reservation is meant to
protect minors, the interests of the witnesses or the privacy of the co-defend-
ant"". !•-,•:. loa &v>b i.-:'r. ."**•<•.-•! /! • ;-an)> >s tfrsainaCl ^ fr;>q:si lfi:)tn- -.-•<!'
One remarkable incident was the discussion about the Danish reservation to
article 14.4. Committee-member El Shafei wonders about the merits of the
Danish reservation to article 14.4 and the non-segregation of juvenile offenders,
probably confusing article 14.4 and article 10.3'". The Danish representative
answers that the Danish government still considers it preferable to treat juvenile
offenders in the same institutions as adult offenders, explicitly referring to article
14.4"*. It should be noted that article 14.4 does not deal with the issue of
juvenile offenders, and that Denmark never even made a reservation to article
14.4. Consequently, El Shafei and the Danish representative are discussing a non-
existing reservation, even if the subject matter is covered by another Danish
reservation.
The Committee is concerned about the reservation to article 14.7 and wonders
about its necessity. The Danish representative indicates that the reservation is a
consequence of the fact that Danish legislation differs from the Covenant on this
point. The reservation to article 14.5 appeared to be related to appeals after a
verdict rendered by a jury when review was restricted to specific grounds'*'. In
the discussion about the Danish reservation to article 20.1, it is indicated that
article 20.2 is indeed incorporated into Danish law""*.
FINLAND
1. |withdrawn| With respect to article 9, paragraph 3. of the Covenant, Finland declares
that according to the present Finnish legislation the Administrative authorities may take
decisions concerning arrest or imprisonment, in which event the case is taken up for
decision in court only after a certain time lapse.
2. With respect to article 10. paragraph 2(b) and 3. of the Covenant. Finland declares
that although juvenile offenders are. as a rule, segregated from adults, it does not deem
357. CCPR/C/37/Add.5, par. 61. r ,E-. , - . ; ' ! rf = -^,f- ."V.
358. CCPR/C/SR.778, par.25,48(Higgins); par.51 (Movchan). ' ' •&$*
359. CCPR/C/SR.778, par.38 (Denmark). ' «*?
36a CCPR/C/SR.778, par.49; CCPR/C/SR.779, par.53 (Denmark).
361. CCPR/C/SR.778, par.26 (El Shafei).
362. CCPR/C/SR.778, par.38 (Denmark).
363. CCPR/C/SR.778, par.25 (Higgins), par.37 (Denmark); CCPR/C/SR.779, par.50
(Dimitrijevic).
364. CCPR/C/SR.778, par.26 (El Shafei), par.39 (Denmark) par.45-46 (Movchan); CCPR/-
C/SR.780. par.32 (Denmark).
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appropriate to adopt an absolute prohibition not allowing for more flexible arrange-
ments.
3. |withdrawn] With respect to article 13 of the Covenant, Finland declares that the
article does not correspond to the present Finnish legislation regarding an alien's right
i-'ev-v jo be heard or lodge a complaint in respect of a decision concerning his expulsion.
• 4. [withdrawn] With respect to article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, Finland declares
that under Finnish law a sentence can be declared secret if its publication would be an
affront to morals or endanger national security.
"" 5. [withdrawn] With respect to article 14, paragraph 3 (d) of the Covenant, Finland
declares that the contents of this paragraph do not correspond to (he present legislation
inasmuch as it is a question of the defendant's absolute right to have legal assistance
!»viii«,s« already at the stage of preliminary investigations.
6. With respect to article 14, paragraph 7, of the Covenant, Finland declares that it is
going to pursue its present practice, according to which a sentence can be changed to
the detriment of the convicted person, if it is established that a member or an official of
^ -'*' the court, the prosecutor or the legal counsel have through criminal or fraudulous
activities obtained the acquittal of the defendant or a substantially more lenient penalty,
(j; , rj- or if false evidence has been presented with the same effect, and according to which an
f'.-rif : aggravated criminal case may be taken up for reconsideration if within a year until then
unknown evidence is presented, which would have led to conviction or a substantially
more severe penalty;
Ui15 K 7. With respect to article 20, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, Finland declares that it will
•JiiMs .' not apply the provisions of this paragraph, this being compatible with the standpoint
Finland already expressed at the 16th United Nations General Assembly by voting
against the prohibition of might endanger the freedom of expression referred in article
19 of the Covenant."
The initial report by Finland indicates that during the ratification process Finnish
legislation was scrutinized with a view to tracing differences between the
Covenant and the legislation. This led to the conclusion that in a number of cases
Finnish legislation was considered to reveal discrepancies in respect of the
Covenant, in which cases reservations were made"\ The report indicated that
Finland intends to change its legislation and bring it into conformity with the
Covenant, the reservations will then be withdrawn. Following this introductory
explanation, the report lists the seven reservations made, illustrating the differ-
ences between the Covenant's system and the Finnish system. This presentation
has the advantage of being very understandable and accessible, moreover by
stressing that Finland is maintaining a reservation "for the present", it implies the
acceptance of the desirability of future withdrawal of reservations.
In his introduction the Finnish representative indicates that the differences
between Finnish law and the Covenant are mainly matters of structure rather than
content'**. The approach to making reservations is praised by a Committee-
member, stating that reservations are to be preferred over ratifications that will
not be fully implemented'*'. In its discussion of the report the question is asked
why Finland did not make a reservation to article 25 on the exercise of political
365. CCPR/C/l/Add.10; the Finnish supplementary report CCPR/C/l/Add.32 does not
contain information about reservations.
366. CCPR/C/SR.170, par.6 (Finland). <»,j_; 7s r?f.
367 CCPR/C/SR.171, par.12 (Dieye). . i ^ v - H ) : .-,;-, ^ o . ^ r ..'...iHT. .;~"
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rights by aliens. This question is prompted by the observation that the Finnish
situation is below Covenant standards and could only be justified by a reserva-
tion'**. With respect to article 14.7 it is asked whether the application of pro-
cedures already available in the Finnish system, the reservation could be over-
come'*'. The discussion about the reservation to article 20, dealing with the
prohibition of propaganda for war did not reach any serious conclusions"".
The second periodical report by Finland simply repeats the paragraph about
reservation in the supplementary report, repeating its intention to withdraw the
reservations once the legislation had been amended"'. The report indicates that
the reservations to articles 13 and 14.1 had been withdrawn, while legislative
changes concerning the reservations to articles 9.3 and 14.3.d are pending. The
reservation to articles 10.2.b and 10.3 are considered to have been superfluous
from the beginning. This last remark is intriguing, as it is uncertain what the
consequences of this determination by the author state are.
In its discussion of the Finnish report, the Committee expressed its interest in
learning the reservation to article 9.3 was to be withdrawn, and the Finnish
representative indicated that draft legislation relating to the pre-trial arrests was
pending"^. The Committee was equally interested in the withdrawal of the
reservations to article 14.3.d and 14.7; and the representative indicated that after
a change in legislation the relevant reservations would be withdrawn. Further-
more the Finnish representative indicated that in spite of his suggestions, the
Government had decided not to withdraw the reservation to article 20 .1" '
The third periodical report by Finland mentions the reservations to articles 10.2.b
and 10.3"\ and indicates that the reservations in respect of articles 14.1 and
14.3 (public trial) as well as article 14.3.d (legal counsel) have been with-
drawn'". The possibility of withdrawing the reservation to article 14.7 is being
discussed"*. The report repeats that concern about the freedom of expression
leading to the reservation to article 20. l " '
In his presentation to the HRC, the Finnish representative indicated that new
legislation made it possible to withdraw the reservation to article 14.3.d"*. The
Committee inquired about the withdrawal of the reservation to article 14.7, and
Finland answered that this matter had been raised before, particularly because
Finland had agreed with the principle. It would not withdraw the reservation for
the present, as its legislation was in conformity with the non bis in idem principle
368. CCPR/C/SR.170, par.40(Tomusehat). -. .* ft
369. CCPR/C/SR.170, par.64(Hanga). >, ^ j
370. CCPR/C/SR.171, par.40(Movchan).
371. CCPR/C/32/Add.7.
372. CCPR/C/SR.643. par.l4(Cooray), 16(Higgins), 19(Finland); CCPR/C/SR.644. par.37-
(Opsahl).
373. CCPR/C/SR.646, par.34-35(Finland).
374. CCPR/C/58/Add.5, par.66.
375. CCPR/C/58/AddJ, par.82-84. ' ' " *
376. CCPR/C/58/Add.5, par.85.
377. CCPR/C/58/Add.5, par.108-109.
378. CCPR/C/SR. 1014, par. 13 (Finland).
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in article 14.7'". A Committee member refers to the discussion of the reserva-
tion to article 20, and wonders why it had been maintained**. It appears that a
prohibition on incitement to war against Finland is included in the draft Penal
Code'*', that might lead to a withdrawal once the legislation is adopted.
FRANCE
1. The Government of the Republic considers that, in accordance with Article 103 of the
Charter of the United Nations, in case of conflict between its obligations under the
Covenant and its obligations under the Charter (especially Articles 1 and 2 thereof), its
obligations under the Charter will prevail.
2. The Government of the Republic enters the following reservation concerning article
4, paragraph 1: firstly, the circumstances enumerated in article 16 of the Constitution in
respect of its implementation, in article 1 of the Act of 3 April 1978 and in the Act of 9
August 1849 in respect of the declaration of a stale of siege, in article 1 of Act No. 55-
385 of 3 April 1955 in respect of the declaration of a state of emergency and which
enable these instruments to be implemented, are to be understood as meeting the
purpose of article 4 of the Covenant: and, secondly, for the purpose of interpreting and
implementing article 16 of the Constitution of the French Republic, the terms "to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" cannot limit the power of the
President of the Republic to take measures required to circumstances.
3. The Government of the Republic enters a reservation concerning articles 9 and 14 to
the effect that these articles cannot impede enforcement of the rules pertaining to the
disciplinary regime in the armies.
4. The Government of the Republic declares that article 13 cannot derogate from
chapter IV of Order No. 45-2658 of 2 November 1945 concerning the entry into, and
sojourn in, France of aliens, nor from the other instruments concerning the expulsion of
aliens in force in those parts of the territory of the Republic in which the Order of 2
November 1945 does not apply.
5. The Government of the Republic interprets article 14. paragraph 5. as stating a
general principle to which the law may make limited exceptions, for example, in the case
of certain offenses subject to the initial and final adjudication of a police court and
criminal offenses. However, an appeal against a final decision may be made to the Court
of Cassation which rules on the legality of the decision concerned.
{*** 6. The Government of the Republic declares that articles 19. 21 and 22 of the Covenant
!" will be implemented in accordance with articles 10. 11 and 16 of the European Conventi-
on for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November
1950.
7. The Government of the Republic declares that the term "war", appearing in article 20,
paragraph 1. is to be understood to mean war in contravention of international law and
>"-1- considers, in any case, that French legislation in this matter is adequate.
8. In the light of article 2 of the Constitution of the French Republic, the French
Government declares that article 27 is not applicable so far as the republic is concerned.
The initial report of France elaborates on the reservations made, and puts them in
the perspective of existing French legislation"-. While dealing with the major-
ity of the French reservations and declarations, a reference to the reservation to
article 19 and the broadcasting monopoly, as well as a reference to the reserva-
379. CCPR/C/SR.101S, par.55.
380. CCPR/C/SR.1016, par.33 (Ndiaye).
381. CCPR/C/SR.1016. par.43 (Finland).
382. CCPR/C/22/Add.2. ^ ^ - « v c
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tion concerning article 20.1 are absent. Without mentioning the declaration
concerning the non-applicability of article 27, it is stated that there are no
minorities in France.
The Committee proves to be very much interested in the reservation to article 27.
It is indicated that France must have misunderstood the provision, and it is
suggested that rather than focusing on specific groups, the Covenant uses a de
facto approach'*'. Other matters of concern to the Committee are the reserva-
tion to article 4.1'**, and the declaration concerning articles 19, 21 and 22***.
Individual members also mention the reservations to articles 13***, 14.5*",
19» and 2O™.
In his reply the French representative emphasizes that France does not feel
obliged to withdraw the reservation to article 4.1, indicating that it is only
dealing with the first paragraph of the provision, and is legitimate under the
VCLT"°. In the matter of the existence of minorities in France, and in particu-
lar the reservation to article 27, a difference of opinion about the concept
minority appeared to exist between the State and the Committee. It was indicated
that different communities all enjoyed rights that gave them the opportunity to
maintain their identity. France stresses that such rights follow from being a
citizen, and are not related to membership of a legally protected minority. To
take it even further, France was uneasy about the concept "minority", and felt
that article 27 did contradict article 26 of the same Covenant. Furthermore
France referred to the declaration by the Federal Republic of Germany which
accepted the French reservation because the rights protected in that provision
were fully protected under the French Constitution"'. In answering to a
question about the reservation to article 20, it is indicated that the reservation
finds its legal basis in article 51 of the UN Charter, which takes precedence over
the Covenant"-.
The French supplementary report"' is rather succinct, and merely refers to the
legislation related to the implementation of the Covenant. It does not refer to any
of the reservations made,, and it is discussed together with the second periodical
report. This repeats verbatim the texts about reservations in the initial report'**.
383. CCPR/C/SR.440, par.65 (Tarnopolsky), CCPR/C/SR.441. par.19 (Dimitrijevic). par.30
(Tomuschat), par.52 (Al Douri), par.55 (Movchan).
384. CCPR/C/SR.440, par.55 (Tarnopolsky); CCPR/C/SR.441. par.35 (Ciraefrath).
385. CCPR/C/SR.441, par.41(Al Douri). par.55(Movchan).
386. CCPR/C/SR.440, par.60(Tarnopo!sky).
387. CCPR/C/SR.441. par.28(Tomuschat).
388. CCPR/C/SR.440, par.64(Tarnopolsky).
389. CCPR/C/SR.441. par.55(Movchan).
390. CCPR/C/SR.44S, par.32(Francc): see Ciraefrath, op.cil. al 70.
3»1. , CCPR/C/SR.445, pars.77-83(France), see supra par.2.1.
iH, CCPR/C/SR.445, par.72 (France). It should be noted that the formulation of the
-•&* French reservation to article 20 mentions "war in contravention of international law",
"*'•' thereby leaving the possibility of propaganda for wars in self-defense (article 51 UN
TT-* Charter) open.
3B8. CCPR/C/22/Add.4.
3*1. CCPR/C/46/Add.2.
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It is a striking example of the advantages of the computer age: the only editorial
changes are a different lay-out of the paragraphs, the text itself is completely
identical.
In the subsequent discussion a Committee member asked about the reservation to
article 27, and the denied existence of minorities in France. The question in
particular refers to the compatibility of such an approach with articles 2.1 and 26
of the Covenant, and the position of languages other than French"'. The
French answer focuses on cultural identity and the use of regional languages, and
indicates that the community bears the main responsibility for maintaining
regional cultures"*. This does not satisfy a number of Committee-members,
who indicate that the reservation to article 27 reinforces the idea that the protec-
tion of minorities is only necessary in a non-democratic country, which is
incorrect'". The French representative indicates that with changes in the
legislation, the reservation to article 19 in respect of the broadcasting system had
been withdrawn. The reservation concerning articles 19, 21, 22 of the Covenant
and their relation with provisions of the ECHR is merely meant to ensure that
France will fulfil its obligations under both instruments. In particular there was
concern about the possibility to restrict the exercise of the right of assembly for
members of the Armed Forces'*.
GAMBIA
"For financial reasons, free legal assistance for accused persons is limited in our
constitution to persons charged with capital offenses only. The Government of the
Gambia therefore wishes to enter a reservation in respect of article 14(3)d of the
Covenant in question."
Gambia made a reservation to one provision only, and neither the initial
report'" nor the supplementary report*" refers to the reservation made.
The HRC did not deal explicitly with the reservation, but a member of the
Committee suggested that Gambia would call upon the Bar to provide free legal
assistance*". In his reply the representative of Gambia indicated that the reason
for making the reservation had been the small size of the bar, which led to the
inability to provide legal aid at all times*".
395. CCPR/SR/801, par.38 (Dimitrijevic).
396. CCPR/C/SR.803, par.36-38 (France).
397. CCPR/C/SR.803, par.42(Higgins), par.46(Dimitrijevic).
398. CCPR/C/SR.803, par.9-12 (France).
399. CCPR/C/10/Add.7.
400. CCPR/C/10/Add.l2.
401. CCPR/C/SR.501, par.35(Bouziri).
402. CCPR/C/SR.506, par. 12 (Gambia). The second periodical report of Gambia was due in
1985. but has not been received yet. See A/47/40, at 187.
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GERMANY*'
"1. Articles 19, 21 and 22 in conjunction with Article 2(1) of the Covenant shall be
applied within the scope of Article 16 of the Convention of 4 November 1950 for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
"2. Article 14(3)(d) of the Covenant shall be applied in such manner that it is for the
court to decide whether an accused person held in custody has to appear in person at
the hearing before the court of review (Revisionsgerichti.
"3. Article 14(5) of the Covenant shall be applied in such manner that:
(a) A further appeal does not have to be instituted in all cases solely on the grounds the
accused person - having been acquitted by the lower court - was convicted for the first
time in the proceedings concerned by the appellate court.
(b) In the case of criminal offenses of minor gravity (he review by a higher tribunal of a
decision not imposing imprisonment does not have to be admitted in all cases.
"4. Article 15(1) of the Covenant shall be applied in such manner that when provision is
made by law for the imposition of a lighter penally the hitherto applicable law may for
certain exceptional categories of cases remain applicable to criminal offenses committed
before the law was amended.'
The first German report indicates that the existence of a different domestic rule
concerning the presence of an accused during the trial before the Court of Appeal
(related to a procedure dealing specifically with questions of law, rather than
questions of fact) was the reason for making a reservation to article 14.3.d**.
A similar situation appears to exist in respect of the right to appeal that is not
necessarily restricted to persons having been convicted in an earlier instance,
which explains the German reservation to article 14.5*'. The report further-
more indicates that political activities of aliens may be restricted on the basis of
the reservation to articles 19, 21 and 22 in accordance with article 16 ECHR**.
The Committee questions whether the European Convention in fact permits such
a far reaching restriction as has been entered by Germany*".
In the discussion about the initial report of the Federal Republic of Germany in
the fourth session, neither the Committee**, nor Germany*^ raise the issue
of the reservations made, except by implication.
In the second periodic report of Germany the discussion of article 14.3.d focuses
on the orderly conduct of the proceeding, and the reservation made in respect of
the provision is not mentioned'"". The report merely deals with the"self-
inflicted incapacity" to stand trial. With respect to the reservation to article 15.1
the report indicates that the reason for making the reservation has been that a part
of a group of offenders that could not be tried at the same time should not benefit
from a change in the law that could not be beneficial to the other offenders. The
403. These are the reservations made by the Federal Republic of Germany at ratification on
17 December 1973. The former German Democratic Republic, which ratified on 8
November 1973, only made a reservation in respect of article 48.1.
404. CCPR/C/l/Add.18, p.18.
405. CCPR/C/I/Add. 18, p.21.
406. CCPR/C/l/Add.18, p.27, 28.
407. CCPR/C/SR.94, par. 13 (Prado Vallejo).
408. CCPR/C/SR.92-94.
409. CCPR/C/SR.95.
410. CCPR/C/28/Add.6, par.112-113.
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report furthermore indicates that no use had been made of the reservation'"'.
The reservations made by Germany have not been dealt with in the discussion
about the second periodical report*'-.
The section on the implementation of article 14 and 15 in the third periodical
report of Germany elaborates on the changes in the relevant legal measures,
without mentioning the reservations made'"'. Questions are not raised in the
discussion about article 14 of the Covenant""
GUYANA
In respect of sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 3 of article 14
"While the Government of the Republic of Guyana accept the principle of Legal Aid in
all appropriate criminal proceedings, is working towards that end and at present apply it
in certain denned cases, the problems of implementation of a comprehensive Legal Aid
Scheme are such that full application cannot be guaranteed at this time."
In respect of paragraph 6 of article 14
"While the Government of the Republic of Guyana accept the principle of compensation
for wrongful imprisonment, it is not possible at this time to implement such a principle."
The initial report of Guyana is rather brief, and merely lists the provisions of
Guyanese law corresponding to the rules in the Covenant"'. No reference to
the reservations is to be found. -
The reservations are not dealt with during the consideration of the report and the
Committee appears to be unaware of their existence''"'.
ICELAND
1. Article 8, paragraph 3(a), in so far as it affects the provisions of Icelandic law which
provide that a person who is not the main provider of his family may be sentenced to a
term at a labour facility in satisfaction of arrears in support payments for his child or
children.
2. Article 10, paragraph 2(b), and paragraph 3. second sentence, with respect to the
separation of juvenile prisoners form adults. Icelandic law in principle provides for such
separation but it is not considered appropriate to accept an obligation in the absolute
form called for in the provisions of the Covenant.
3. Article 13, to the extent that it is inconsistent with the Icelandic legal provisions in
force relating to the right of aliens to object to a decision on their expulsion.
4. Article 14, paragraph 7, with respect to the resumption of cases which have already
been tried. The Icelandic law of procedure has detailed provisions on this matter which
it is not considered appropriate to revise.
5. Article 20. paragraph 1, with reference to the fact that a prohibition against propagan-
da for war could limit the freedom of expression. This reservation is consistent with the
position of Iceland at the General Assembly at its 16th session.
Other provisions of the Covenant shall be inviolably observed.
411. CCPR/C/28/Add.6, par.122-123.
412. CCPR/C/SR.664-666.
413. CCPR/C/52/Add.3, p.24-28.
414. CCPR/C/SR.964, par.51-53.
415. CCPR/C/4/Add.6.
416. CCPR/C/SR.353-354. The second periodical report of Guyana was due in 1987, but it
has not been received yet. See A/47/40, at 189.
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The first Icelandic report'"' indicates that though Iceland made a reservation to
article 8.3.a, this reservation is not strictly necessary as these rules of Icelandic
law fall within the scope of article 8.civ, and moreover these laws are not used
at present. The reservation with respect to articles 10.2.b and 10.3 was made
because of the absolute nature of the obligations, though Icelandic law in general
accepts the principle underlying these provisions'"*. The report merely repeats
the formulation of the reservation concerning article 13, and elaborates in more
detail on the reason for the reservation concerning article 14.7 and the possibility
to retry a case'"'. It is indicated that article 20.1 is considered to be contrary to
the freedom of expression''-*.
In its discussion of the Icelandic report, the Committee comments on the necess-
ity of a reservation to article 20 of the Covenant*-', and the Icelandic represen-
tative indicates that in spite of the affront about the horrors of propaganda for
war, the concern for the freedom of expression prevailed*--. It was suggested
that Iceland consider withdrawing its reservations relating to articles 8 and
13*^, and information was requested on the reservation to articles 10.2.b and
10.3"-". The Icelandic representative indicated that the withdrawal of reserva-
tions was being considered, but would take time'"*.
INDIA
I. With reference to (...) article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the Government of the Republic of India declares that the words "the right of
self-determination" appearing (in that article] apply only to the peoples under foreign
domination and that these words do not apply to sovereign independent States or to a
section of a people or nation - which is the essence of national integrity.
II. With reference to article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the Government of the Republic of India takes the position that the provisions
of the article shall not he applied as to be in consonance with the provisions of the
clauses (3) to (7) of article 22 of the Constitution of India. Further, under the Indian
legal system, there is no enforceable right to compensation for persons claiming to be
the victim of unlawful arrest or detention against the State.
HI. With respect to article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the Government of the Republic of India reserves the right to apply its law
relating to foreigners.
IV. With reference to [...] articles 12. 19. paragraphs 3, 21. 22 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Government of the Republic of India
declares that the provisions of the said articles shall be so applied as to be in conformity
with the provisions of article 19 of the Constitution of India.
417. CCPR/C/10/Add.4, par.36.
418. CCPR/C/10/Add.4, par.39.
419. CCPR/C/10/Add.4, pars.44, 49.
420. CCPR/C/10/Add.4, par.58.
421. CCPR/C/SR.391, par.44 (Prado Vallejo), 49 (Movchan), CCPR/C/SR.392 par.72
(Tomuschat).
422. CCPR/C/SR.395, par.31 (Iceland).
423. CCPR/C/SR.391, par.45 (Prado Vallejo).
424. CCPR/C/SR.392, par.58 (Al Douri).
425. CCPR/C/SR.395, par.34 (Iceland). The second periodic report of Iceland was due in
1987, it has not been received yet. See A/47/40, at 190.
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The first report by India elaborates on the reasons underlying its contentious
reservation to article 1 of the Covenant. It is indicated that India supports the
right of self-determination for people under colonial domination, and that the
right to self-determination is supposed to co-exist with the principle of sovereign
equality*-'. With respect to the reservation to article 13 it is indicated that the
Government may order an alien to leave the country, but a recourse to court is
available''-'. The Indian report elaborates on articles 21 and 22 of the Constitu-
tion in respect of article 9 CCPR, and mentions the declarations concerning the
absence of a right to claim compensation for unlawful arrest^*.
The Committee proves to be very concerned about the declaration in respect of
article 1 of the Covenant. The gist of the Committee's questions is that there is a
need for clarification about the reasons underlying the declaration, and a number
of Committee-members wonder whether the intention has been to deny the right
to self-determination to a particular groups within India^. In his reply the
Indian representative indicated that it was his country's understanding that the
declaration concerning article 1 was in conformity with "the principles of
international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, according to which the right
of self-determination in the international context applied only to dependent
Territories and peoples'"*-"'. The Committee also inquire about the need to make
a reservation to article 13, and wish to know the difference between the rules in
the Covenant and the domestic rules*". The Indian representative indicated that
aliens did not have political rights in India and that the reservation specifically
related to issues such as registration, passports and entry and stay within the
country'"-. In reply to questions about the reservation concerning article 9, a
certain amount of confusion arose''".
The second periodic report by India states that it adheres to the principle of self-
determination in coexistence with the principle of sovereign equality, which
serves as an explanation for the reservation to article I*". With respect to
article 9, the earlier report is repeated with a small number of changes in the
text. It now includes a remark by a Committee-member on awards by the
Supreme Court contrary to the reservation to article 9 " \ The reservation to
article 13 does not deprive foreigners of protection against human rights viol-
426. CCPR/C/10/Add.8, par.25-28.
427. CCPR/C/10/Add.8, par.71-73.
428. CCPR/C/10/Add.8, par.60.
429. CCPR/C/SR.494, par.6 (Tomuschat), par.32 (Serrano Caldera), par.41 (Cooray), par. 54
(Bouziri).
430. CCPR/C/SR.498, par.6 (India).
431. CCPR/C/SR.493, par.36 (Prado Vallejo); CCPR/C/SR.494, par.62 (Opsahl).
432. CCPR/C/SR.498, par.12.
433. CCPR/C/SR.498, par.15 (India), par.34 (Tomuschat), par.36 (India).
434. CCPR/C/37/Add.l3, par.10-11.
435. CCPR/C/37/Add.l3, par.54-56.
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ations**. With respect to article 12 it is indicated that article 19.6 of the
Constitution seeks to safeguard the interests of the general public'"'.
The Committee remains concerned about the reservations made'"* and questions
are asked about the way in which India perceives the relationship between the
Covenant and domestic legislation. It is felt that India intends to interpret the
Covenant in conformity with its legislation, rather than the other way around*".
There is also concern about the meaning of the reservation to article 1, and its
application in a multi-ethnic society**. The reply to the questions about article
1 is quite clear, the representative indicates that: "[B]y definition a group of
people within sovereign territory could not break away and form a nation". This
was also stressed in the report which made it clear that the right to self-determi-
nation only applied to those outside of India, living under foreign domina-
tion*". The question about the precedence of the Covenant is not completely
clarified in the discussion. After an extensive exchange of views on the state of
emergency**-, the representative makes it clear that this area had been covered
by the reservation referring to articles 22, 23 and 24 of the Constitution, which
was a reservation excluding further discussions'"-'. In rebuttal Committee-
member Higgins underlines that the availability of domestic legislation does not
necessarily guarantee compliance with the Covenant*". In the conclusion of its
discussion of the report by India, the Committee expresses concern that the
reservations lead to a situation in which article 4 would cease to have a func-
tion*". There is concern that the reservations preclude the implementation of
the Covenant and their withdrawal is urged**. The Indian representative indi-
cates that reservations were essentially a political issue*".
IRELAND
"Article 6. paragraph 5
Pending the introduction of further legislation to give full effect to the provisions of
paragraph 5 of article 6, should a case arise which is not covered by the provisions of
existing law. the Government of Ireland will have regard to its obligations under the
Covenant in the exercise of its power to advise commutation of the sentence of death.
Article 10. paragraph 2
436. CCPR/C/37/Add.l3, par.70
437. CCPR/C/37/Add.l3, par.69.
438. CCPR/C/SR.1039, par.24 (Chanet), CCPR/C/SR.1042, par.3 (Ando), par.7 (Chanet),
par.ll (Wennergren).
439. CCPR/C/SR.1039. par.38(Higgins), par.41 (Aguilar), par.45(Sadi).
440. CCPR/C/SR.1039, par.30(EI Shafei), par.33(Mullerson). par.43(Aguilar).
441. CCPR/C/SR.1040, par.4-5.
442. CCPR/C/SR.1040, par.21-28 passim.
443. CCPR/C/SR.1041. par.3 (India).
444. CCPR/C/SR.1041, par.61 (Higgins).
445. CCPR/C/SR.1042, par.7 (Chanet), par. 14 (Higgins).
446. CCPR/C/SR.1042, par.3 (Ando), par.ll (Wennergren), par.16 (Aguilar), par.19
(Mavrommatis), par.21 (Lallah); par.28 (Serrano Caldera), par.30 (Herndl).
447. CCPR/C/SR.1042, par.32(India).
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Ireland accepts the principles referred to in paragraph 2 of article 10 and implements
them as far as practically possible. It reserves the right to regard full implementation of
these principles as objectives to be achieved progressively.
Article 14
Ireland reserves the right to have minor offenses against military law dealt with
summarily in accordance with current procedures, which may not, in all respects,
conform to the requirements of article 14 of the Covenant.
Ireland makes the reservation that the provision of compensation for the miscarriage of
justice in the circumstances contemplated in paragraph 6 of article 14 may be by
administrative procedures rather than pursuant to specific legal provisions.
Article 19, paragraph 2
Ireland reserves the right to confer a monopoly on or require the licensing of broadcast-
ing enterprises.
Article 20, paragraph 1
Ireland accepts the principle in paragraph 1 of article 20 and implements it as far as it is
practicable. Having regard to the difficulties in formulating a specific offence capable of
adjudication and national level in such a form as to reflect the general principles of law
recognised by the community of nations as well as the right to freedom of expression,
Ireland reserves the right to postpone consideration of the possibility of introducing
some legislative addition to, or variation of, existing law until time as it may consider
that such is necessary for the attainment of the objective of paragraph 1 of article 20.
Article 23, paragraph 4
Ireland accepts the obligations of paragraph 4 of article 23 on the understanding that
the provision does not imply any right to obtain a dissolution of marriage."
Ireland ratified in December 1989, and the introduction to the Irish report
indicates that since ratification the death penalty had been abolished, leading to
the withdrawal of the reservation to article 6.5 CCPR***. The report clearly
states the reservations made to articles 10.2, 14.6 and 20.1, without elaborating
on the reasons for such reservations. The reservation about the licensing of
broadcasting enterprises (article 19.2) is however followed by a discussion of the
licensing system. With respect to the reservation concerning article 23.4 the
report indicates that it is based on article 41.3.2 of the Constitution and the
prohibition of divorce contained therein. Up until 1992, the Committee had not
dealt with the Irish initial report.
ISRAEL
"With reference to Article 23 of the Covenant, and any other provision thereof to which
the present reservation may be relevant, matters of personal status are governed in
Israel by the religious law of the parties concerned.
T o the extent that such law is inconsistent with its obligations under the Covenant,
Israel reserves the right to apply that law."
Israel ratified in October 1991, at the time of writing its initial report was not yet
due for submission to the Human Rights Committee.
448. CCPR/C/68/Add.3, par.2. The announced withdrawal has not yet taken place.
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ITALY or 4fe
Article 9. paragraph 5
The Italian Republic, considering that the expression "unlawful arrest or detention"
contained in article 9, paragraph 5, could give rise to differences of interpretation,
declares that it interprets the aforementioned expression as referring exclusively to cases
of arrest or detention contrary to the provisions of article 9, paragraph 1.
Article 12. paragraph 4
Article 12, paragraph 4, shall be without prejudice to the application of transitional
provision XIII of the Italian Constitution, respecting prohibition of the entry into and
sojourn in the national territory of certain members of the House of Savoy.
Article 14, paragraph 3
- The provisions of article 14, paragraph 3(d), are deemed to bo compatible with existing
Italian provisions governing trial of the accused in his presence and determining the
, cases in which the accused may present his own defence and those in which legal
. • j assistance is required.
Article 14. paragraph 5
Article 14, paragraph 5, shall be without prejudice to the application of existing Italian
provisions which, in accordance with the Constitution of the Italian Republic, govern the
®| conduct, at one level only, of proceedings instituted before the Constitutional Court in
respect of charges brought against the President of the Republic and its Ministers.
,. Article 15. paragraph I
With reference to article 15, paragraph 1, last sentence: "If, subsequent to the commissi-
on of the offence, provisions is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the
offender shall benefit thereby", the Italian Republic deems this provision to apply
; exclusively to cases in progress.
*" Consequently, a person who has already been convicted by a final decision shall not
benefit from any provision made by law, subsequent lo that decision, for the imposition
^ of a lighter penalty. ^.., j_ ^. ^
Article 19. paragraph 3
The provisions of article 19, paragraph 3, are interpreted as being compatible with the
existing licensing system for national radio and television and with the restrictions laid
'*'?? i?) down by law for local radio and television companies and for stations relaying foreign
programmes.
The initial report by Italy indicates that it made a reservation to article 5 OP*",
and discusses each of the reservation made. The reservation concerning article
9.5 was made to underline specifically that Italy considered this a rule related to
article 9.1, while the text does not emphasize this*'®. The report merely men-
tions the reservation to article 12.4 in respect of the former rulers of Italy, and it
is indicated that the reservation to article 14.3 reflects the rule of Italian law that
in spite of absence of the accused a trial may proceed if the defence counsel is
present*". The explanation about the reservation to article 14.5 refers to crimi-
nal procedures against the president and the ministers to be held before the
Constitutional Court, when no appeal will be available"". The reservation to
article 15.1 seeks to prevent the impact of a change in the law during current
449. CCPR/C/6/Add.4 par.6.
450. CCPR/C/6/Add.4, par.48
451. CCPR/C/6/Add.4. par.65.
452. CCPR/C/6/Add.4, par.67.
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proceedings*". It is indicated that the reservation to article 19.3 seeks to
legitimize the licensing of local broadcasting operations in Italy***.
The Committee was concerned about the Italian rules concerning compensation
for judicial error, it was indicated that article 9.5 has a broader scope than Italian
law*"; and the question arose as to whether the House of Savoy constituted a
threat to the republic, their banning being covered by a reservation to article
12.4**. There is also concern about restrictions on public hearings, guaranteed
in article 14.3*".
With respect to the declaration relating to article 9.5, the Italian representative
indicated that the declaration was made in order to underline that this provision
was interpreted as referring to article 9.1, and, moreover, stated that it was
possible to invoke article 9.5 in a request of compensation for unlawful detention,
which fitted in the Italian system of compensation for damages*'". With respect
to the position of the House of Savoy the representative did not answer the
question and merely referred to a similar reservations made by Austria*".
The second Italian report** provides information on an article-by article basis.
No information is provided on the reservations made. The Committee wishes to
know whether the many reservations needed to be maintained. In particular,
questions are asked about the restrictions on the right to entry for the House of
Savoy*", to which it is replied that a change in the Constitution would be
necessary to withdraw the reservation**-, and about the reservation to article
19**'. It was indicated that this reservation might be withdrawn in future***.
Questions were asked about the reservations concerning articles 9.5**' and
14.3***. The Italian representative indicated that the latter was not really a
reservation**'.
JAPAN
"..the Government of Japan declares that members...of the police referred to in...para-
graph 2 of article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights be
interpreted to include fire service personnel of Japan." r
iJ .•*' £
453. CCPR/C/6/Add.4, par.70. »*'-•-'••
454. CCPR/C/6/Add.4, par.82.
455. CCPR/C/SR.258, par.28 (Koulishev). par.59 (Bouziri).
456. CCPR/C/SR.258, par.44 (Prado Vallejo).
457. CCPR/C/SR.258, par.61 (Bouziri).
458. CCPR/C/SR.261, par.17
459. CCPR/C/SR.261, par.13 (Italy).
460. CCPR/C/37/Add.9.
461. CCPR/C/SR.908, par.25 (Chanel).
462. CCPR/C/SR.908. par.48(Italy).
463. CCPR/C/SR.908, par.25 (Chanet).
464. CCPR/C/SR.908, par.49(Italy).
465. CCPR/C/SR.910, par.44 (Chanet).
466. CCPR/C/SR.911, par.17 (Higgins).
467. CCPR/C/SR.911, par. 20 (Italy).
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The Japanese initial report does not mention its reservation to article 22 of the
Covenant, and the issue is not brought up in the discussion with the Committee
either**. A discussion of the reservation is equally absent in the second period-
ical report and the consideration thereof by the Committee*".
LUXEMBOURG
"(a) The Government of Luxembourg considers that article 10, paragraph 3, which
provides that juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and accorded treatment
appropriate to their age and legal status, refers solely to the legal measures incorpor-
ated in the system for the protection of minors, which is the subject of the Luxembourg
youth welfare act. With regard to other juvenile offenders falling within the sphere of
£&* ordinary law, the Government of Luxembourg wishes to retain the option of adopting
measures that might be more flexible and be designed to serve the interests of the
; persons concerned."
«»!» "CO Th^ Government of Luxembourg declares that it is implementing article 14,
paragraph 5. since that paragraph does not conflict with the relevant Luxembourg legal
statutes, which provide that, following an acquittal or a conviction by a court of first
instance, a higher tribunal may deliver a sentence, confirm the sentence passed or
O3 R-_ impose a harsher penalty for the same crime. However, the tribunal's decision does not
give the person declared guilty on appeal the right to appeal that conviction to a higher
appellate jurisdiction."
The Government of Luxembourg further declares that article 14. paragraph 3. shall not
apply to persons who, under Luxembourg law, are remanded directly to a higher court
or brought before the Assize Court,
"(c) The Government of Luxembourg accepts the provision in article 19, paragraph 2,
;,r;a provided that it does not preclude it from requiring broadcasting, television and film
companies to be licensed."
*"' "(d) The Government of Luxembourg declares that it does not consider itself obligated
to adopt legislation in the field covered by article 20. paragraph 1. and that article 20 as
a whole will be implemented taking into account the rights to freedom of thought,
:.. religion, opinion, assembly and association laid down in articles 18. 19 and 20 of the
., Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed in articles 18, 19, 21 and 22 of
- the Covenant." „•, !/>in-,.-;,. !ii,,.
The initial report by Luxembourg is rather brief in its description of the back-
ground of the reservations made. It refers to the interpretative declaration made
in respect of article 10.3"™. It appears that the declaration relating to article
14.3 and 14.5 is made to provide for the situation in which particular persons,
such as judges, are brought before the Assize Court in the first instance. Luxem-
bourg indicated that legislation was pending to change this procedure'"'. The
reservation to article 20.1 is merely mentioned in the report^.
The Committee wonders about the necessity to make a reservation to article 10.3
of the Covenant, and it appears from the answer by the representative that the
468. CCPR/C/10/Add.l; CCPR/C/SR.319, 320, 324.
469. CCPR/C/42/Add.4; CCPR/C/SR.827-831.
470. CCPR/C/31/Add.2, par.46.
471. CCPR/C/31/Add.2, par.63.
472. CCPR/C/31/Add.2, par.82.
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problem was one of different opinions about the educational value of segrega-
tion*™. Luxembourg is praised for its intention to change the legislation that led
to the reservation to article 14.5*'*, and there is a discussion about the reserva-
tion concerning article 20.1 of the Covenant*".
MALTA
1. Article 13 - The Government of Malta endorses the principles laid down in article 13.
However, in the present circumstances it cannot comply entirely with the provisions of
this article;
2. Article 14(2) - The Government of Malta declares that it interprets paragraph 2 of
article 14 of the Covenant in the sense that it does not preclude any particular law from
imposing upon any person charged under such law the burden of proving particular
facts;
3. Article 14(6) - While the Government of Malta accepts the principle of compensation
for wrongful imprisonment, it is not possible at this time to implement such a principle
in accordance with article 14, paragraph 6, of the Covenant;
4. Article 19 - The Government of Malta desiring to avoid any uncertainty as regards
the application of article 19 of the Covenant declares that the Constitution of Malta
allows such restrictions to be imposed upon public officers in regard to their freedom of
expression as are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. The Code of Conduct
for public officers in Malta precludes them from taking an active part in political dis-
cussions or other political activity during working hours or on the premises.
The Government of Malta also reserves the right not to apply article 19 to the extent
that this may be fully compatible with Act 1 of 1987 entitled "An act to regulate the
limitations on the political activities of aliens, and this in accordance with Article 16 of
the Convention of Rome (1950) for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms or with Section 41(2)(a)(ii) of the Constitution of Malta;
5. Article 20 - The Government of Malta interprets article 20 consistently with the rights
conferred by Articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant but reserves the right not to introduce
any legislation for the purposes of article 20;
6. Article 22 - The Government of Malta reserves the right not to apply article 22 to the
extent that existing legislative measures may not be fully compatible with this article.
Malta acceded in September 1990, at the time of writing its initial report had not
yet been received by the Human Rights Committee*'*.
MEXICO
Interpretative statements: •
* Article 9. paragraph 5
Under the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States and the relevant
implementing legislation, every individual enjoys the guarantees relating to penal
matters embodied therein, and consequently no person may be unlawfully arrested or
detained. However, if by reason of false accusation or complaint any individual suffers
473. CCPR/C/SR.628, par.37 (Movchan); CCPR/C/SR.629, par.23 (Higgins); CCPR/C/SR.
632, par. 15 (Luxembourg). <*
474. CCPR/C/SR.629, par.14 (Tomuschat); CCPR/C/SR.632. par.18 (Luxembourg).
475. CCPR/C/SR.628, par.28 (Prado Vallejo), par.40 (Movchan); CCPR/C/SR.632, par.24
(Luxembourg), par.39 (Ndiaye). The second periodic report of Luxembourg has been
received, but has not yet been considered. See A/47/40, at 198.
476. See A/47/40, p. 185.
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an infringement of this basic right, he has, (Mer a/ia, under the provisions of the
appropriate laws, an enforceable right to just compensation.
Article 18
Under the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, every person is free to
profess his preferred religious belief and to practice its ceremonies, rites and religious
acts, with the limitation, with regard to public religious acts, that they must be perfor-
med in places of worship and, with regard to education, that studies carried out in
establishments designed for the professional education of ministers of religion are not
officially recognized. The Government of Mexico believes that these limitations are
included among those established in paragraph 3 of this article.
i. Reservations:
p Article 13
., . The Government of Mexico makes a reservation to this article, in view of the present
text of article 33 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States.
0,. Article 25. subparagraph (bi
,^ The Government of Mexico also makes a reservation to this provision, since article 130
of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States provides that ministers of
jij., . religion shall have neither an active nor a passive vote, nor the right to form associati-
.• -•> ons for political purposes.
The initial report by Mexico mentions the reservations and declarations made at
the ratification of the Covenant. The interpretation of article 9.5 is repeated,
although formulated slightly differently*". With respect to article 13 of the
Covenant, the report reveals the content of article 33 of the Mexican Constitution
dealing with the right of the Executive to expel foreigners without prior notice of
previous legal action''™. The report repeats the declaration concerning article
18, and the constitutional practice in Mexico, and reiterates the reservation
concerning article 25.b and the political rights of the clergy"'.
The discussions in the Committee focus mainly on the relations between the State
and the Church, and the system laid down in the Mexican Constitution and the
declarations made. Committee-members indicate that they are strongly opposed to
such far-reaching restrictions on the right to religion, as seem to follow from
article 130 of the Mexican Constitution and are underlined by the declarations
concerning articles 18 and 25.b of the Covenant*". Mexico indicates that the
concern of the Committee has been transmitted to the Government, and states that
ministers have all the human rights Mexicans have. Article 130 is merely a
provision leading to a complete separation of the church and the State''*'. The
Committee is equally concerned with the reservation concerning article 13 of the
Covenant, and the reference to article 33 of the Mexican Constitution, and
wonders whether Mexico is unfamiliar with the work of the Third Committee (of
the General Assembly) on the human rights of aliens. It is suggested that Mexico
477. CCPR/C/22/Add.l, par.22; this might be due to differences in the translation of the
declaration and the report from Spanish to English.
478. CCPR/C/22/Add.l. par.29.
479. CCPR/C/22/Add.l, par.40, par.47.
480. CCPR/C/SR.387, par.17 (Tomuschat). par.38 (Evans), par.62 (Bouziri).
481. CCPR/C/SR.404, par.65-68 (Mexico).
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might consider amending its Constitution in order to withdraw the reserva-
tion** .^ In its reaction Mexico indicates that it does not see any necessity to
review legislation in the light of GA Resolution 36/165, which it had supported.
After repeating the declaration concerning article 9.5, the second periodic report
gives a lengthy elaboration on the historical background of article 33 of the
Mexican Constitution leading to the conclusion that this provision has never
encroached upon any human right and is meant to defend and preserve the
sovereignty of the nation''*-'. With respect to the reservation to article 25.b of
the Covenant, the report indicates that article 130 of the Constitution has a
similar historical background***. The report reinforces the declaration concern-
ing article 18.3 by stating that Mexican rules on public worship are in conformity
with the declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination based on Religions or Belief".
In its discussion with Mexico, the Committee expresses surprise about historical
reasons for maintaining the reservation to article 25.b, and suggest that legislation
might be improved in this respect. A wish for an informal follow-up to the
dialogue on this matter is expressed*". The other issue mentioned briefly in the
discussion with Mexico is the reservation to article 13, which is unnecessary in
the eyes of Committee-Member Chanet, as the relevant provision of Mexican law
is only used when compelling reasons of national security so indicate**'. This is
a remarkable statement, as this restrictive use is itself not indicated in the
Mexican report. The Mexican representative reiterated the position with regard to
article 18 and article 24 of the Mexican Constitution***. The Committee ques-
tions the compatibility of article 24 of the Constitution with the right to freedom
of religion***.
NETHERLANDS
Reservations r
Article 10
The Kingdom of the Netherlands subscribes to the principle set out in paragraph 1 of
this article, but it takes the view that ideas about the treatment of prisoners are so
liable to change that it does not wish to be bound by the obligations set out in para-
j--:si.'."-• graph 2 and paragraph 3 (second sentence) of this article.
Article 12. paragraph 1
The Kingdom of the Netherlands regards the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles
as separate territories of a State for the purpose of this provision.
Article 12. paragraphs 2 and 4
482. CCPR/C/SR.386, par.44 (Herdocia Ortega); CCPR/C/SR.387, par.37 (Evans).
483. CCPR/C/46/Add.3, par.255-262.
484. CCPR/C/46/Add.3, par.372.
485. GA Res.36/55; CCPR/C/46/Add.3, par.312.
486. CCPR/C/SR.852, par.44 (Ndiaye); CCPR/C/SR.853, par.14 (El Shafei).
487. CCPR/C/SR.853, par.10 (Chanet).
488. CCPR/C/SR.851, par.35 (Mexico).
489. CCPR/C/SR.852, par.3-4 (Zielinski). '.
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The Kingdom of the Netherlands regards the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles
as separate countries for the purpose of these provisions. , , *«*« -jit
Article 14, paragraph 3(d)
"The Kingdom of the Netherlands reserves the statutory option of removing a person
charged with a criminal offence from the courtroom in the interests of the proper
conduct of the proceedings. -fc.aJfCt
Article 14. paragraph 5
The Kingdom of the Netherlands reserves the statutory power of the Supreme Court of
the Netherlands to have sole jurisdiction to try certain categories of persons charged
with serious offenses committed in the discharge of a public office.
i'' f--t- Article 14, paragraph 7
B iJJl : The Kingdom of the Netherlands accepts this provision only in sofar as no obligations
- iniOac ^"*^ from it further to those set out in article 68 of the Criminal Code of the Nether-
lands and article 70 of the Criminal Code of the Netherlands Antilles as they now apply.
They read:
10 J . . . .J Except in cases where court decisions are eligible for review, no person may be
prosecuted again for an offence in respect of which a court in the Netherlands or the
iftC-r Netherlands Antilles has delivered an irrevocable judgement.
,-, "2. If the judgement has been delivered by some other court, the same person may not
be prosecuted for the same offence in the case of (I) acquittal or withdrawal of
proceedings or (II) conviction followed by complete execution, remission or lapse of the
sentence.
Article 19. paragraph 2
The Kingdom of the Netherlands accepts the provision with the proviso that it shall not
prevent the Kingdom from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
Article 20. paragraph 1
The Kingdom of the Netherlands does not accept the obligation set out in this
provision in the case of the Netherlands."
Article 25 (el [withdrawn]
The Kingdom of the Netherlands does not accept this provision in the case of the
Netherlands Antilles.
Explanation
"[The Kingdom of the Netherlands) clarifies that although the reservations (...) are
partly of an interpretational nature, (it] has preferred reservations to interpretational
declarations in all cases, since if the latter form were used doubt might arise concerning
whether the text of the Covenant allows for the interpretation put upon it. By using the
reservation form the Kingdom of the Netherlands wishes to ensure in all cases that the
relevant obligations arising out of the Covenant will not apply to the Kingdom, or will
apply only in the way indicated.
The initial report by the Netherlands indicates that a different opinion exists as to
the wisdom of implementing the rule in articles 10.2.b and 10.3. The report
indicates that there is an increasing awareness that there should be a selection on
the basis of personality criteria rather than on the basis of age''*. With respect
to the reservations concerning article 12.1, 12.2 and 12.4 it is indicated that the
Netherlands Antilles and the Netherlands are separate countries with differing
regulations as to admission and residence'"'. The reservation to article 14.3.d
>#0L CCPR/C/10/Add.3, p. 17.
•?4«. CCPR/C/10/Add.3, p.18.
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refers to a number of exceptions to the rule about trial in his presence*^. The
reservation to article 14.5 protects the special procedure possible before the
Supreme Court for a small group of Government officials*", and the reserva-
tion to article 14.7 seeks to maintain the domestic rules on «e £ry /« /Y/CTM***.
Both the Netherlands report and the report by the Netherlands Antilles indicate
that there is uncertainty about the reference in article 14.7 to the ne bis in idem
rule in its domestic or international application. While the reservation to article
19.2 is not dealt with in the report, it does underline that the reservation to article
20.1 is necessary because the implementation of this provision might run contrary
to the freedom of expression'"'
There are some striking differences between the Netherlands report and the report
of the Netherlands Antilles. The Antilles indicate that the reservation to article
10.2.b and 10.3 does not apply on its territory, and that the accused and the
convicted are separated as are the juveniles and the adults"'*'. The explanation
about the reservations to article 12.1, 12.2 and 12.4 is substantially the same as
the Netherlands explanation. The Antilles' report merely indicates reservations to
articles 14.3.d*" and 14.7; apparently forgetting the reservation to article 14.5
and the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. After mentioning the reservation
to article 19.2. the report indicates that the reservation concerning article 20.1
has been made in respect of the Antilles, who were at the time preparing a Bill to
include the prohibition in the Criminal Code.
Both reports are dealt with together by the Committee. In the introduction the
Netherlands representative points out that in spite of the reservations made by
other States Parties to the European Convention, the Netherlands had not made a
reservation to article 5 of the Optional Protocol''*'. A certain amount of con-
fusion arises because of the structure of the Kingdom and the relation between
the component parts, as well as the fact that a reservation to article 25.c has been
entered on behalf of the Antilles*". The matter of the reservation to article
20.1 was brought up by a number of Committee members, but the representative
upholds the Netherlands point of view*". Furthermore there is discussion about
the reservation to article 10.2.a and the comment to that by the Dutch section of
the International Commission of Jurists*'; it is indicated that the reservation to
article 14.3.d is superfluous as the rules intended to be protected by the reserva-
tion would be acceptable under the Covenant anyway*-. The Netherlands
492. CCPR/C/10/Add.3, p.20. ;
493. CCPR/C/10/Add.3, p.23. , ,
494. CCPR/C/10/Add.3, p.23.
495. CCPR/C/10/Add.3, p.27.
4%. CCPR/C/10/Add.5, p.7.
497. Mentioning a reservation to article 14.3.e as the report does on p.9 must be a mistake.
498. CCPR/C/SR.321, par.10; referring to the reservations to article 5 OP.
499. CCPR/C/SR.322, par.27 (Hanga): CCPR/C/SR.325, par.3 (Netherlands). " ^
500. CCPR/C/SR.321, par.27 (Movchan), par.50 (Graefrath); CCPR/C/SR.322, par.5 (Sadi),
par.73 (Tomuschat); SR.325, par.35 (Netherlands).
501. CCPR/C/SR.321, par.38 (Opsahl).
502. CCPR/C/SR.322, par.71 (Tomuschat).
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clarified the group of people falling within the scope of the reservation to article
I4.5*».
The second periodical report by the Netherlands does not refer to any of the
reservations made"".
The Committee calls for the withdrawal of the reservations to article 10, but
notes at the same time that there might be harmful effects following from
isolation*". It is noteworthy that the reply of the Netherlands representative
stresses the need for prison capacity as one of the reasons for maintaining the
reservation, and gives the different opinion on the merits of separation as a
secondary reason**. The capacity issue is new, it had not been raised in the
earlier discussion. Few words are spent on the reservation to article 20, which is
maintained by the Netherlands*". At the conclusion of the discussion a Com-
mittee member indicates that a withdrawal of all reservations would be very wel-
NEW ZEALAND
C * i Reservations
"The Government of New Zealand reserves the right not to apply article 10(2)(b) or
; article 10(3) in circumstances where the shortage of suitable facilities makes the mixing
of juveniles and adults unavoidable: and further reserves the right not to apply article
* 10(3) where the interests of other juveniles in an establishment require the removal of a
particular juvenile offender or where mixing is considered to be of benefit to the
f^t? *T persons concerned.
- ^ "The Government of New Zealand reserves the right not to apply article 14(6) to the
extent that it is not satisfied by the existing system for cv grnr/fi payments to persons
who suffer as a result of a miscarriage of justice.
** "The Government of New Zealand having legislated in the areas of the advocacy of
KaW. national and racial hatred and the exiting of hostility or ill will against any group of
<; persons, and having regard to the right of freedom of speech, reserves the right not to
introduce further legislation with regard to article 20.
The Government of New Zealand reserves the right not to apply article 22 as it relates
" to trade unions to the extent that existing legislative measures, enacted to ensure
• effective trade union representation and encourage orderly industrial relations, may not
i' be fully compatible with that article."
Although the reservations of New Zealand do not refer to this, the ratification of
New Zealand is also on behalf of its dependent territories Niue, Tokelau and the
Cook Islands. On each of these territories separate reports are submitted, which
makes the New Zealand reports rather bulky. ;;• y - .;>.- t;*,;:.
503. CCPR/C/SR.325, par.25 (Netherlands).
504. CCPR/C/42/Add.6. The second periodic report by the Netherlands Antilles was due in
1986, but has not been received yet. See A/47/40, at 189.
505. CCPR/C/SR.862, par.51 (Ando). par.54 (Dimitrijevic); CCPR/C/SR.864, par.23
(Chanet).
506. CCPR/C/SR.863, par.3 (Netherlands).
507. CCPR/C/SR.863, par.49 (Netherlands).
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The initial report by New Zealand mentions that apart from the issues covered by
reservations, the Covenant is fully implemented**'. It is indicated that the
reservation to articles 10.2 b and 10.3 is motivated by the shortage of suitable
facilities to separate juveniles from adults*'". In respect of article 14.6 it is
indicated that the matter of compensation for miscarriages of justice has no legal
basis, but is settled on the basis of ex graz/a payments'". The reservation in
respect of article 20 is merely mentioned in the report, without further explana-
tion"". The reports on Niue"', on Tokelau"' and on the Cook Islands"'
all refer to the same reservation to article 20. The report on Cook Islands also
mentions the reservation to article 14.6 and the provision of er graf/rt payments
in such cases"*.
A great number of Committee members proved to be concerned about the reser-
vation made in respect of article 20"', but New Zealand indicates that there is
at present no problem with propaganda for war, and it may reconsider its position
if the need should arise"*. With respect to the reservations to articles 10.2.b
and 10.3 the question is asked whether the reservation rests on necessity or on
considerations of desirability, and the representative answers that both elements
played a role in making the reservation"'. Another question relates to the need
to make a reservation to article 14.6, if a practice of er grrtf/fl payments exits.
Here it is indicated that there is no formal obligation to do so*". In general
there is concern that not all the reservations are justified"'.
The initial report on the Cook Islands had been submitted later, and is conse-
quently considered in a different session'". There is some discussion about the
implementation of article 22 of the Covenant, although it is noted that New
Zealand entered a reservation in that respect and was therefor not bound by the
provision'*'.
The matter of the reservation to article 22 of the Covenant and the rights of trade
union representation is mentioned in the second period report by New Zea-
/ ; S T . • •• ? •'
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land'-\ The reservations are not mentioned in the reports of Niue"* and
Tokelau**. ;,:,
In the Comnuttee discussions the question is asked whether New Zealand is con-
sidering withdrawing its reservations, and the reply is that no need is felt to do so
in general, but that the reservation to article 14 is being reconsidered at the
moment"'. New Zealand elaborates on the content of the legislation in respect
of article 10.2.b and the relevant reservations*-*. When asked about article 20,
New Zealand indicated that it did not intend to withdraw that reservation'**.
Perhaps more interesting is the beginning of a discussion about the reservation to
article 22, and the question if New Zealand could not withdraw the reservation in
view of its new legislation on labour relations. The representative indicates that
these questions will be answered in writing*".
N O R W A Y %!')*/>! tfi.Tr c f.<r* J-.W H:«1 *i<M?ev-f|O'iQ *ii»w J>T>H?V^ o n
|Subject to] reservations to article 10, paragraph 2(b) and paragraph 3 "with regard to
the obligation to keep accused juvenile persons and juvenile offenders segregated from
adults" and to article 14, paragraph 5 and 7 and to article 20. paragraph 1.
The initial report by Norway indicates that the reservation in respect of article
10.2.b and 10.3 has been made on practical grounds, together with a certain
amount of doubt about the advisability of keeping young offenders strictly
separated from adult offenders'". The reservation concerning article 14.5 is
based on doubt as to the acceptability of certain domestic procedures excluding
the right to review in particular cases"". The reservation to article 14.7 has a
similar background, there are possibilities under Norwegian law to resume a case
to the disadvantage of a person'". Although Norway tried to legislate in
accordance with article 20.1, the report indicates that the law to that effect was
rejected by parliament*".
In the discussion with Norway, questions were asked about the reservations to
articles 14.5 and 14.7, it was indicated that the reservation to article 14.7 might
not be necessary, and it was suggested that the law be changed in order to
withdraw the reservation"'. Apart from mentioning a difference of opinion
524. CCPR/37/Add.8, par. 129. The second periodic report of the Cook Islands was due in
1985. but has not been received yet. See A/47/40 at 187.
525. CCPR/C/37/Add.ll. :.-} « i.-.-nq ,tc <"
526. CCPR/C/37/Add.l2. .«•'
527. CCPR/C/SR.888, par.25 (Chanet); par.56 (New Zealand). ; >,
528. CCPR/C/SR.889, par.53 (New Zealand). .*.
529. CCPR/C/SR.890, par.37 (Ndiaye). par.48 (New Zealand).
530. CCPR/C/SR.890, par.54 (Chanet), par.58 (New Zealand); CCPR/C/SR.891, par.15
(Chanet).
531. CCPR/C/l/Add.5, p.5. \3*'iir-.'jyiPrSa- '-•<¥•:
532. CCPR/C/l/Add.5, p.6. ..t- f ;,;!"'.>:• "'
533. CCPR/C/l/Add.5, p.6. , r . " f . p . . : i v ; v K , H ) 3 .ii.-"
534. C C P R / C / l / A d d . 5 , p.8 .'; yi.-A '> •_£!:
535. CCPR/C/SR.77, par.6 (Graefrath), par.20 (Koulishev). u c 1 * '.•'
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about the aim of article 10.3***, there is general concern about the reservation
to article 20, and it was suggested the bill prohibiting war propaganda be re-
introduced to parliament again"'. A noteworthy question deals with a clarifica-
tion of the Norwegian reservation to the Optional Protocol"*.
The Norwegian reply is rather brief, the representative takes note of the remark
that the goal of articles 10.2.b and 10.3 had only been to prevent mixing adults
and juveniles without taking due account of age"'. The questions concerning
article 14 would be answered in writing and Norway felt that there was no reason
for withdrawing the reservation to article 20 at present**.
In an apparent reaction to the discussion with the Committee, the Norwegian
interim report gives ample information about the reason for making the reserva-
tion to articles 10.2.b and 10.3, and indicates that there is a certain amount of
scepticism on the part of the Ministry of Justice in respect of total segrega-
tion**'. The Norwegian report reiterates the position with respect to the imple-
mentation of articles 14.5 and 14.7**-, and does not discuss article 20. In
respect of the Optional Protocol and the Norwegian reservation thereto, it is
indicated that the reservation does not preclude the application of article 5.3.a
OP*".
In the discussion about the interim report it is again stressed that non-separation
is considered to be beneficial, and the Committee indicates that is would like to
see information supporting this point of view***. A debate takes place between
the Norwegian representative and Committee-member Evans on the consequences
of the re-opening of a trial under Norwegian law protected by the Norwegian
reservation to article 14.7), in relation to the w<' fe/.y /'« /</<'»; rule***.
The second periodic report by Norway merely indicates that, although the
Criminal Procedures Act had been changed, the system remained very much the
same as the one originally protected by the reservation to article 14.5 and article
14.7***.
In the discussion the question was raised why a number of reservations are still
maintained**'. The Norwegian representative elaborated upon the fact that
536. CCPR/C/SR.77, par.6 (Graefrath).
537. CCPR/C/SR.77, par.7 (Graefrath), par.22 (Koulishev), par.31 (Hanga).
538. CCPR/C/SR.77, par.43 (Tarnopolsky).
539. CCPR/C/SR.79, par. 18 (Norway).
540. CCPR/C/SR.79, par.21 and par.25 (Norway). ,.*. ,- • - , .&
541. CCPR/C/l/Add.52, p.4-5.
542. CCPR/C/l/Add.52, p.l 1-12. '•>(;•
543. CCPR/C/l/Add.52, p.25.
544. CCPR/C/SR.301, par.29 (Norway), par.32 (Sadi).
545. CCPR/C/SR.302, par. 1.4,6 (Norway); par.3,5 (Evans).
546. CCPR/C/42/Add^, par.78, 80.
547. CCPR/C/SR.844, par.36 (Movchan). The definition used by Movchan is remarkable
because of the focus on the substance of international obligations:"A reservation meant
the exercise of the sovereign right of a State to restrict its obligations under an
-.^ s international instrument f>ccoi«c « was i//»aWc w ///ip/cmcnf //icni.
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implementing the obligation under article 20.1 of the Covenant would not be
acceptable in the Norwegian society, which explains why the reservation will not
be withdrawn**. The reservations to article 14.5 and 14.7 might be recon-
sidered in view of the Committee's General Guidelines, and Norway indicated it
was looking forward to a further dialogue*".
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The Government of the Republic of Korea (declares] that the provisions of paragraphs
5 and 7 of article 14, article 22, article 23.4 [withdrawn] of the Covenant shall be so
applied as to be in conformity with the provisions of the local laws including the
Constitution of the Republic of Korea.
Korea ratified in April 1990, its initial report was considered by the Human
Rights Committee in 1992. The introduction to the report of Korea mentions
reservations to articles 14.5 and 22 CCPR as well as the withdrawal of reserva-
tions to article 23.4 CCPR'*. It is remarkable that the reservation to article
14.7 is not mentioned there, but only further below.
The report indicates that the reservation to article 14.5 CCPR is prompted by
article 110.4 of the Constitution and article 543 of the Military Court Act dealing
with the absence of a right to appeal in military trials'". It indicates that the
reservation to article 14.7 refers to a rule that a sentence in Korea, for a crime
for which a sentence has also been imposed abroad, might be mitigated'".
Article 33.2 of the Constitution, which limits the liberty to join a trade union for
civil servants is the reason for the reservation to article 22'".
In his introduction the representative indicates that the reservations only sought to
maintain limitations prescribed in the relevant domestic laws, but they did not
represent a derogation from basic principles in the Covenant""*. Committee-
member Aguilar Urbina asks about the imposition of the death penalty by military
courts, the only case falling outside of the scope of the reservation to article
14.5'", and some Committee members express the wish that Korea would
withdraw its reservations, in particular the reservation to article 14.5 which was
an essential provision with respect to the right to appeal"*.
In its reply to questions by the Committee about the status of women, the re-
presentative indicates that Korea is considering an amendment to its nationality
laws which might lead to a wi7Mr«HYj/ <>/f7.v revfr»'«r/w« f<> f/ic WWHCM'S Co/iven-
548. CCPR/C/SR.846, par.20,21 (Norway).
549. CCPR/C/SR.846, par.26 (Norway).
550. CCPR/C/68/Add.l, par.6.
551. CCPR/C/68?Add.l, par.211.
552. CCPR/C/68/Add.l, par.214.
553. CCPR/C/68/Add.l, par.265 c.
554. CCPR/C/SR.1150, par.7 (Korea).
555. CCPR/C/SR.1150, par.51 (Aguilar Urbina).
556. CCPR/C/SR.1150, par.73 (Sadi); SR.1151. par.14 (Prado Vallejo).
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. With respect to the question of the absence of the right of appeal in
military courts, it is explained that this did not apply to death sentences, in which
case appeal was compulsory"*. Committee-member Higgins indicated that she
was pleased to hear about the possible withdrawal of reservations to the Coven-
ant, which had however not been announced by Korea"'.
SWEDEN
Sweden reserves the right not to apply the provisions of article 10, paragraph 3, with
regard to the obligation to segregate juvenile offenders from adults, the provisions of
article 14, paragraph 7, and the provisions of article 20, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.
The Swedish initial report mentions the reservation made to article 10.3 and
states that as a rule juvenile offenders are separated from adults, but that crimi-
nological methods suggest that exceptions should be possible"". The report
indicates that the reservation to article 14.7 was made in order to protect certain
cases in which under Swedish law a case might be retried to the detriment of the
convicted person**'. In respect of the reservation to article 20.1 it is indicated
that the reservation seeks to prevent a conflict between the freedom of expression
and the prohibition of war propaganda'*".
A number of Committee-members questioned all the Swedish reservations'", in
particular stressing the reservation to article 20.1 of the Covenant'".
The supplementary report by Sweden provides little additional information on the
reservations made, and demonstrates a distinct irritation on the part of Swe-
den**' concerning the Committee's consideration of its reservations.
The discussion of the Swedish report is rather brief, it is suggested that Sweden
withdraws its reservations"*. The Swedish reply is that such an intention does
557. CCPR/C/SR.1154, par.22 (Korea).
This is a perfect, although probably not deliberate, example of constructive approaches
to the coherence of human rights instruments, discussed in Chapter 3. par.2.3 supra.
The Korean reservation to article 9 CEDAW has so far not been withdrawn.
558. CCPR/C/SR.1154, par.37.
559. CCPR/C/SR.1154, par.51 (Higgins).
560. CCPR/C/l/Add.9, p.11-12.
561. CCPR/C/l/Add.9, p. 18.
562. CCPR/C/l/Add.9, p.26. ' '
563. CCPR/C/SR.52, par.12-15 (Movchan), par.31 (Hanga). par.35 (Koulishev).
564. CCPR/C/SR.52, par.15 (Movchan), par.3l (Manga), par.35 (Koulishev). » '<*>
565. The report recalls that reservations have been made on points where the Swedish
legislation did not comply with the Covenant; see CCPR/C/l/Add.42, p.3.
The report then continues:"!! should be recalled in this connection that, according to
international law, reservations have the effect of modifying provisions of an internation-
al instrument to the extent provided for the reservations, subject to objections by other
Contracting Parties.The objections were raised against the Swedish reservations to the
Covenant and, consequently, the reservations have their full legal validity. Since the
provisions in respect of which Sweden has made reservations are not binding on
Sweden, the Swedish Government does not find it necessary to provide further informa-
tion in regard to these provisions."
566. CCPR/C/SR.188. par.7 (Prado Vallejo).
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not exist, as the reservations refer to provisions that were not totally acceptable
to Sweden*".
The second periodical report by Sweden does not mention the reservations at
all"*. The Committee again raises the issue of the withdrawal of the reserva-
tion to article 14.7, and the fact that the reservation covers a rare exception to
the rule in article 14.7^. In its reply, Sweden indicates that its domestic
situation is in general in conformity with the provision, and that the exception in
the reservation was perhaps formulated in rather terse language, giving a wrong
impression of its scope'™. The ongoing discussion about reservations to article
20.1 is picked up again, with a Committee member wondering "[H]ow long
would Sweden continues to contest the provisions of the Covenant? When would
it stop derogating from them?""'. Sweden did not explicitly react to this
misrepresentation of the reservation, and merely stated that it would maintain the
reservation as the implementation of the provision would be contrary to the
protection of the freedom of expression'^.
The third periodic report by Sweden*" observed again that the reservation
concerning article 10.3 had been made for the benefit of juvenile offenders,
although Sweden endorsed the principle underlying the provision"''. A similar
explanation is provided for the reservation to article 14.7, Sweden does agree
with the principle but an exception is necessary to maintain the credibility of the
system*". It was indicated that the opinions on article 20.1 have not
changed"*.
The Committee barely discussed the Swedish reservations, only the reservation to
article 14.7 was brought up. There was some concern about the protection against
double jeopardy'" and Sweden explained that the credibility of the system was
not the only reason for reopening a case, insufficient evidence at the time could
be another reason'™.
SWITZERLAND
a) Reservation concerning article 10, paragraph 2 (b):
The separation of accused juvenile persons from adults is not unconditionally guaran-
teed.
b) Reservations concerning article 12, paragraph 1:
567. CCPR/C/SR.188. par. 15 (Sweden).
568. CCPR/C/32/Add.6,8.12.
569. CCPR/C/SR.637, par. 13 (Cooray).
570. CCPR/C/SR.637, par.25 (Sweden).
571. CCPR/C/SR.638, par.27 (Movchan).
572. CCPR/C/SR.638, par.24. 33 (Sweden).
573. CCPR/C/58/Add.7.
574. CCPR/C/58/Add.7. par. 104.
575. CCPR/C/58/Add.7, par.201.
576. CCPR/C/58/Add.7, par.244.
577. CCPR/C/SR.1044. par. 36 (Lallan), par.37 (Wako).
578. CCPR/C/SR.1044. par.38 (Sweden).
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 269
The right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose one's residence is applicable
subject to the federal laws on aliens, which provide that residence and establishment
permits shall be valid only for the canton which issues them.
c) reservations concerning article 14, paragraph 1:
The principle of a public hearing is not applicable to proceedings which involve a
dispute relating to civil rights and obligations or to merits of the prosecution's case in a
criminal matter, these, in accordance with cantonal laws, are held before an administra-
tive authority. The principle that any judgement rendered shall be made public is
adhered to without prejudice to the cantonal laws on civil and criminal procedure, which
provide that a judgement shall not be rendered at a public hearing, but shall be
transmitted to the parties in writing.
The guarantee of a fair trial has as its sole purpose, where disputes relating to civil
rights and obligations arc concerned, to ensure final judicial review of the acts or
obligations of public authorities which have a bearing on such rights or obligations. The
Term "final judicial review" means a judicial examination which is limited to the
application of the law, such as a review by a Court of Cassation.
d) Reservation concerning article 14, paragraph 3. sub-paragraphs d) and f):
The guarantee of free legal assistance assigned by the court and of the free assistance of
an interpreter does not definitively exempt the beneficiary from defraying the resulting
costs.
e) Reservation concerning article 14. paragraph 5:
The reservations applies to the federal laws on the organization of criminal justice,
which provide for an exception to the right of anyone convicted of a crime to have his
conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal, where the person concerned is
tried in the first instance by the highest tribunal.
f) Reservation concerning article 20:
Switzerland reserves the right not to adopt measures to ban propaganda for war, which
is prohibited by article 20, paragraph 1.
Switzerland reserves the right to adopt a criminal procedure which will take into account
the requirements of article 20, paragraph 2. on the occasion of its forthcoming accession
to the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination.
g) Reservations concerning article 25. subparagraph b):
The present provision shall be applied without prejudice to the cantonal and communal
laws, which provide for or permit elections within assemblies to be held by a means
other than secret ballot,
h) Reservation concerning article 26
The equality of all persons before (he law and their entitlement without any discrimina-
tion to the equal protection of the law shall be guaranteed only in connection with other
rights contained in the present Covenant.
As Switzerland ratified in June 1992, its initial report would only be due in 1993.
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
(i) The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago reserves the right not to
apply in full the provision of paragraph 2 of article 4 of the Covenant since section 7(3)
of its Constitution enables Parliament to enact legislation even though it is inconsistent
with sections (4) and (5) of the said Constitution;
(ii) Where at any time there is a lack of suitable prison facilities, the Government of the
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago reserves the right not to apply article 10(2)(b) and
10(3) so far as those provisions require juveniles who are detained to be accommodated
separately from adults;
(iii) The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago reserves the right not to
apply paragraph 2 of article 12 in view of the statutory provisions requiring persons
intending to travel abroad to furnish tax clearance certificates;
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(iv) The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago reserves the right not to
apply paragraph 5 of article 14 in view of the fact that section 43 of its Supreme Court
of Judicature Act No. 12 of 1962 does not confer on a person convicted on indictment
an unqualified right of appeal and that in particular cases, appeal to the Court of
Appeal can only be done with the leave of the Court of Appeal itself or of the Privy
' » Council;
(v) While the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago accepts the
principle of compensation for wrongful imprisonment, it is not possible at this time to
implement such a principle in accordance with paragraph 6 of article 14 of the Cove-
nant;
' " (v<) Wi'h reference to the last sentence of paragraph 1 of article 15 "If, subsequent to
' .fr/i". » the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter
• «», y* penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby", the Government of the Republic of
_• Trinidad and Tobago deems this provision to apply exclusively to cases in progress.
3 Consequently, a person who has already been convicted by a final decision shall not
' - benefit from any provision made by law, subsequent to that decision, for the imposition
'***'"••'••"• of a lighter penalty;
>• (vii) The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago reserves the right to
2; - impose lawful and or reasonable restrictions with respect to the right of assembly under
article 21 of the Covenant;
(viii) The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago reserves the right not to
-'sK:rt. apply the provision of article 26 of the Covenant in so far as it applies to the holding of
v property in Trinidad and Tobago, in view of the fact that licences may be granted to or
withheld from aliens under the Aliens Landholding Act of Trinidad and Tobago.
The first report by Trinidad and Tobago does not refer to the extensive number
of reservations made"*. The Committee in its discussion stresses the issue of
the reservation to article 4.2 made by Trinidad and Tobago. The fact that the
Constitution does not exclude the application of article 4.2 in times of emergency
is mentioned**. The representative is told that the provision is at the core of
the Covenant and the reservation is a serious inconsistency with the objectives
and purposes of treaty lav/*'. The representative indicated that she would take
the matter back to the Ministry in Port of Spain'*-.
The second report by Trinidad and Tobago does not mention the reservations
either"'. In her introduction the representative stated that the Government had
not given consideration to withdrawing the reservation to article 4.2, but that
Parliament could legislate contrary to the Constitution under a particular section
of the Constitution**. She indicated that human rights issues might be dealt
with in the forthcoming review of the Constitution"". The Committee, and in
particular Committee-members Higgins, are greatly concerned with the reserva-
tion to article 4.2**'. It is indicated that certain provisions of the Covenant
579. CCPR/C/10/Add.9.
580. CCPR/C/SR.551, par.2 (Opsahl). •-;•< . -.*
581. CCPR/C/SR.555, par.l (Tomuschat). >cl
582. CCPR/C/SR355, par.2 (Trinidad and Tobago), wi i
583. CCPR/C/37/Add.7. «M;.>uiyi
584. CCPR/C/SR.764, par. 13 (Trinidad and Tobago). *J wwir.w.?. • .
585. CCPR/C/SR.765, par. 15 (Trinidad and Tobago).
586. CCPR/C/SR.765, par.16-18 (Higgins). par.20 (Cooray), par.22 (Lallah).
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cannot be derogated from, which is why the Netherlands justifiably objected to
the reservation. The reservation is a unusable weapon against disorder, which is
incompatible with the Covenant'*'.
The Committee also deals with the reservation concerning article 12.2 of the
Covenant and the need to furnish tax clearance certificates. Trinidad and Tobago
is told that a reservation is not necessary in this respect as such rules would
ordinarily be covered by article 12.3, it is suggested that the reservation be
withdrawn***.
UNITED KINGDOM
Upon ratification:
"Firstly the Government of the United Kingdom maintain their declaration in respect of
article 1 made at the time of signature of the Covenant. [Upon signature: "the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom declare their understanding that, by virtue of Article 103
of the Charter of the United Nations, in the event of any conflict between their
obligations under Article 1 of the Covenant and their obligations under the Charter (in
particular, under Articles 1, 2 and 73 thereof) their obligations under the Charter shall
prevail.]
"The Government of the United Kingdom reserve the right to apply to members of and
persons serving with the armed forces of the Crown and to persons lawfully detained in
penal establishments of whatever character such laws and procedures as they may from
time to time deem to be necessary for the preservation of service and custodial
discipline and their acceptance of the provisions of the Covenant is subject to such
restrictions as may for these purposes from time to time be authorised by law.
"Where at any lime there is a lack of suitable prison facilities or where the mixing of
adults and juveniles is deemed to be mutually beneficial, the Government of the United
Kingdom reserve the right not to apply article 10(2)(b) and 10(3), so far as those
provisions require juveniles who are detained to be accommodated separately form
adults, and not to apply article 10(2)(a) in Gibraltar, Montscrrat and the Turks and
Caicos Islands in so far as it requires segregation of accused and convicted persons.
"The Government of the United Kingdom reserve the right not to apply article 11 in
I ..;&..T, Jersey-
•'• "The Government of the United Kingdom reserve the right to interpret the provisions
of article 12(1) relating to the territory of a State as applying separately to each of the
territories comprising the United Kingdom and its dependencies.
The Government of the United Kingdom reserve the right to continue to apply such
immigration legislation governing entry into, stay in and departure from the United
,-.'?j, -, , Kingdom as they may deem necessary from time to time and. accordingly, their
.; '".,;< , acceptance of article 12(4) and of the other provisions of the Covenant is subject to the
provisions of any such legislation as regards persons not at the time having the right
under the law of the United Kingdom to enter and remain in the United Kingdom. The
United Kingdom also reserves a similar right in regard to each of its dependent
territories.
The Government of the United Kingdom reserve the right not to apply article 13 in
Hong Kong in so far as it confers a right of review of a decision to deport an alien and
a right to be represented for this purpose before the competent authority.
The Government of the United Kingdom reserve the right not to apply or not to apply
in full the guarantee of free legal assistance in sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 3 of
article 14 in so far as the shortage of legal practitioners renders the application of his
587. CCPR/C/SR.765, par.16-18 (Higgins).
588. CCPR/C/SR.766, par.26 (Trinidad and Tobago), par.30-31 (Higgins), par.32 (El Shafei)
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guarantee impossible in the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Falkland
Islands, the Gilbert Islands, the Pitcaim Islands Group, St. Helena and Dependencies
and Tuvalu.
The Government of the United Kingdom interpret article 20 consistently with the
rights conferred by articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant and having legislated in matters
of practical concern in the interests of public order (ordre public) reserve the right not
to introduce any further legislation. The United Kingdom also reserve a similar right in
regard to each of its dependent territories.
"The Government of the United Kingdom reserve the right to postpone the application
of paragraph 3 of article 23 in regard to a small number of customary marriages in the
Solomon Islands.
"The Government of the United Kingdom reserve the right to enact such nationality
legislation as they may deem necessary from time to time to reserve the acquisition and
possession of citizenship under such legislation to those having sufficient connection
with the United Kingdom or any of its dependent territories and accordingly their
acceptance of article 24(3) and of the other provisions of the Covenant is subject to the
provisions of any such legislation.
"The Government of the United Kingdom reserve the right not to apply sub-paragraph
(b) of article 25 in so far as it may require the establishment of an elected Executive or
Legislative Council in Hong Kong and sub-paragraph (c) of article 25 in so far as it
relates to jury service in the Isle of Man.
"Lastly, the Government of the United Kingdom declare that the provisions of the
Covenant shall not apply to Southern Rhodesia unless and until they inform the
Secretary-General of the United Nations that they are in a position to ensure that the
obligations imposed by the Covenant in respect of that territory can be fully imple-
mented."
The reservations and declarations made by the United Kingdom are remarkably
extensive. The reports by the United Kingdom on the implementation of the
Covenant in the United Kingdom, in the dependent territories and the depend-
encies of the Crown are voluminous and bulky. Given the fact that a difference
exists between the ratification for the United Kingdom itself and the ratification
for the dependent territories, a certain amount of confusion necessarily arises. In
the following we will first deal with the reports from the United Kingdom, and
then with the reports from the dependent territories.
UNITED KINGDOM
The first report by the United Kingdom states the reasons behind the reservation
to article 1 of the Covenant**', and indicates that the regime provided for in
article 10.2.b and 10.3 of the Covenant is considered to be neither desirable in
general, nor practical'*. The report illustrates that the background to the
reservation to articles 12.1 and 12.4 is the Immigration Act '71 which regulates
the lawful entry of persons from the dependencies into the United Kingdom, as
well as regulating of immigration controF". In respect of article 20 it is
589. CCPR/C/l/Add.17, p.2
590. CCPR/C/l/Add.17, p.12-13.
591. CCPR/C/l/Add.17 p.14-15.
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indicated that the United Kingdom does not feel the need to legislate in accord-
ance with this provision"^.
In the Committee-discussions the number of reservations is mentioned*", and a
certain extent of confusion exists about the dependencies and the reservations
made in their respect'**. Most important issue discussed is the imprecision of
the reservation focusing on the "preservation of the service and the custodial
discipline", does it refer to article 7, to articles 2 and 3"*? Another issue dealt
with are the reservations about articles 12.1 and 12.4'". Some remarks are
made about the reservation to article 20"'; and the need for a reservation to
article 1 is questioned'''*.
The United Kingdom representative admits that the reservation concerning article
1 is perhaps over cautious'*'. Talking about the "discipline" reservation the
representative merely indicates that is it within the scope of article 2*"°. The
status of the dependencies is explained, as well as the system of the Immigration
Act '71"". It is stated that the reason for making a reservation concerning
article 20 were the difficulties with possible legislation to implement the provi-
sion*".
The additional report by the United Kingdom"" answers the questions raised by
the Committee in greater detail. Information is provided on the implementation of
article 12"" without mentioning the reservation made. In the discussion about
the additional report, reservations are not mentioned*'.
The second periodical report by the United Kingdom merely refers to the
reservation concerning article 12.4"". The report indicates that legislation
concerning juvenile offenders has been changed, although the reservation made
concerning articles 10.2.b and 10.3 is not mentioned"". Changes in legislation
relevant to the implementation of article 12.4 are mentioned""*, as well as
related changes in nationality legislation relevant to article 24.3"".
592. CCPR/C/l/Add.17, p.23.
593. CCPR/C/SR.69, par.44 (Prado Vallejo); CCPR/C/SR.70, par.l (Koulishev)
594. CCPR/C/SR.69, par.12 (Graefrath), par.97 (Ganji); CCPR/C/SR.70, par.l (Koulishev).
595. CCPR/C/SR.69, par.13 (Graefrath). and par.51 (Hanga).
596. CCPR/C/SR.69, par.13 (Graefrath). par.65 (Movchan), par.90 (Tomuschat).
597. CCPR/C/SR.69 par.48(Prado Vallejo); CCPR/C/SR.70, par.7 (Koulishev).
598. CCPR/C/SR.70, par.3 (Koulishev).
599. CCPR/C/SR.70, par.3 (Koulishev); par.18 (United Kingdom): cf. CCPR/C/SR.164,
par.66 (United Kingdom).
600. CCPR/C/SR.70, par.22 (United Kingdom).
601. CCPR/C/SR.70, par. 19 and 43 (United Kingdom).
602. CCPR/C/SR.70, par.49 (United Kingdom).
603. CCPR/C/l/Add.35.
604. CCPR/C/l/Add.35, par.33-36.
605. CCPR/C/SR.147-149.
606. CCPR/C/32/Add.5, par. 53.
607. CCPR/C/32/Add.5, par.40-48.
608. CCPR/C/32/Add.5, par.51-53.
609. CCPR/C/32/Add.5, par.99-102 idem.
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In its discussion with the United Kingdom, the reservation concerning article 1 of
the Covenant is raised again, and the representative admits (again) that the
reservation is superfluous"". The question whether the United Kingdom would
like to consider withdrawing the reservation is however not answered. With
respect to the reservation concerning article 12.4 it is indicated that its aim is the
protection of the domestic labour market, which explains the distinctions made
between men and women in the Immigration Act ' 7 1 ' " . Though the Commit-
tee-members have different opinions about the origins of the people the reserva-
tion intends to exclude from the right of immigration"-, a more important
question is the one brought up by Committee member Cooray. He wonders
whether the Immigration Act '71 and its distinguishing on the basis of sex are
acceptable in the light of articles 2.1, 3 and 26 of the Covenant*". In his reply
the United Kingdom representative states that "apart from the distinction drawn
between men and women for certain purposes", immigration control was consist-
ent with the Covenant. At this point in the discussion, one would have expected
the Committee to be more vigilant and strict towards this State Party. Why was
the reservation to article 12.4 which also had an impact on articles 2.1, 3 and 26
accepted, without an express reservation to that effect? With respect to questions
about the reservation concerning article 20, it was indicated that there was no
intention to withdraw the reservation and to develop the required legislation"''.
UNITED KINGDOM DEPENDENT TERRITORIES & DEPENDENCIES
OF THE CROWN
The first reports by the United Kingdom about the implementation of the Coven-
ant in the dependent territories'" and in the dependencies of the Crown"' are
brief, and merely list the situation in respect of a particular provision, without
discussing the situation or the backgrounds in greater detail. The report on the
dependent territories indicates that the Court of Appeals in the British Virgin
Islands may assign a solicitor and/or a counsel to an appellant who has been
sentenced to death, in spite of the reservation to article 14.3.d"'. With respect
to the Cayman Islands it was indicated that the building of a new prison facility
would make it possible to withdraw the reservation concerning article 10.3"*.
The reservation on behalf of the Cayman Islands in respect of article 12.4 was
mentioned and it was indicated that in spite of the reservation to article 14.3.d
there was a possibility for <yr £/•«//« payments by the Executive Council"'.
610. CCPR/C/SR.594, par.43 (Wako), par.50 (United Kingdom).
611. CCPR/C/SR.595, par.4 (United Kingdom).
612. Lallan (CCPR/C/SR.595, par.10) mentions the Indian subcontinent, whereas Cooray
states that the goal is people from East Africa (CCPR/C/SR.595, par.15).
613. CCPR/C/SR.595, par.15.
614. CCPR/C/SR.595, par.39 (Movchan); CCPR/C/SR.597, par.42 (United Kingdom).
615. CCPR/C/l/Add.37
616. CCPR/C/l/Add.39
617. CCPR/C/l/Add.37, par.78 p.32.
618. CCPR/C/l/Add.37, par.15 at p.43^4.
619. CCPR/C/l/Add.37, par.17, par.19 at p.44.
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With respect to the Falkland Islands the report merely indicated that a reserva-
tion has been made to article 20**\ The report referred to the reservation to
article 14.3.d in respect of the Gilbert Islands and indicated that professional
legal practitioners were absent from the island*-'. With respect to Hong Kong,
it was indicated that a reservation has been made to article 13"-, and explained
that although a reservation had been made in respect of article 20, it was possible
to prosecute if the propaganda for war led to public disorder*^. The reservation
to article 25 and the rights to free elections was mentioned, indicating that the
circumstances in Hong Kong are special and precluded progress towards an
elected Government"''. The report also mentions the reservation to article 20 in
respect of St.Helena*^.
In view of the multitude of different domestic situations presented by the United
Kingdom in its report, the Committee was unable to devote in depth attention to
all the different dependent territories. It was asked what the reasons were behind
the reservations to article 12.4, 14.3.d and 20 on behalf of the Cayman
Islands*"''. Similar questions were asked about the reservations to articles 13
and 25 on behalf of Hong Kong*".
The report about the dependencies of the Crown merely indicates that reserva-
tions have been made in respect of articles 11, 12 (extension of the Immigration
Act '71) and 20 in respect of Jersey**. The reservation to article 20 is also
mentioned in respect of Guernsey*^. And with respect to the Isle of Man, it
was indicated that a reservation has been made to article 25.c of the Covenant,
covering the inability of women to be liable for jury service**.
The initial report for the dependencies of the Crown is discussed together with
the additional (initial) report of the United Kingdom, leading to a confusing
exchange of views. Confusion about the structure of the United Kingdom pre-
vails*", and the reservations made in respect of Jersey and the Isle of Man
were not discussed.
The second report on the implementation of the Covenant in the dependent
territories"-, was structured around the questions that arose in the previous
discussions with the Committee. While this may have the merits of being very
much to the point, it is at the expense of presenting an over-all picture of the
implementation.
620. CCPR/C/l/Add.37, par.39 at p.52
621. CCPR/C/l/Add.37. par.14 al p.76.
622. CCPR/C/l/Add.37, par.70 at p.91.
623. CCPR/C/l/Add.37, par.105 at p.93.
624. CCPR/C/l/Add.37. par.126 at p.102.
625. CCPR/C/l/Add.37, par.39 at p.120.
626. CCPR/C/SR.161, par.27 (Bouziri).
627. CCPR/C/SR.162, par.66 (Opsahl).
628. CCPR/C/l/Add.39, par.24, 26 at p.6, and par.46 at p.8.
629. CCPR/C/l/Add.39, par.51 at p. 16.
630. CCPR/C/l/Add.39, par.43 at p.23.
631. CCPR/C/SR.148, par.9 (Sadi), par.13 (NWchan), par.30-31, 68 (United Kingdom).
632. CCPR/C/32/Add.l4, CCPR/C/32/Add.l5.
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The report indicates in respect of the Cayman Islands that the United Kingdom
had made the reservation to article 12.4 applicable to all the dependent terri-
tories'". The reservation to article 14.3.d was reiterated, and the same was
true for the reservation to article 20*". With respect to the Falkland Islands,
the reservation to article 20 was again explained, indicating that the Falklands did
not have the population or the resources to wage a war*". It might be stressed
that this is not what article 20 seeks to prohibit. The report explains the imple-
mentation of articles 10.2.a and 10.2.b in Gibraltar and indicates that a reserva-
tion has been made in respect of article 10.2.a"*. The explanation about the
reservation to article 13 in respect of Hong Kong is rather brief and merely
suggests rereading the earlier report'". A similarly bleak approach is taken
with respect to the reservation to article 25 on behalf of Hong Kong"*.
In its discussion of the report the Committee proves to be very concerned about
the situation in Hong Kong, and in particular the reservations concerning articles
13 and 25*". Although the United Kingdom sets out to explain the particular
situation of Hong Kong and the possible consequences of the agreement reached
with China**, the discussion turns sour when a Committee-member asks about
the reasons for making a reservation to article 13"' . There is also some
discussion about the reservation to article 12.1 and 12.4, and the functioning of
appeal procedures in the expulsion system"-. In respect of article 25.b and the
reservation thereto, it was asked if the United Kingdom was not acting contrary
to its own commitments in a 1984 Green Paper on the electoral situation in Hong
Kong, and should not withdraw its reservation to that provision. The representa-
tive of the United Kingdom replied that this reservation might be reviewed before
the transfer of Hong Kong in 1997*".
633. CCPR/C:/32/Add.l4, par.20 at p.26.
634. CCPR/C/32/Add.l4, par.24 at p.27; par.29 at p.28. ^ 4*1
635. CCPR/C/32/Add.l4, par.32 at p.36
636. CCPR/C:/32/Add.l4, par.26 at p.53.
CCPR/C/32/Add.l4, par.143 at p.93. ^ , ^ . , ^ > ^ i r - i t e ^ c ^ ^ i &<*-;*
CCPR/C/32/Add.l4, par. 157 at p.99.
639T " CCPR/C/SR.855, par.36 (Lallah), CCPR/C/SR.S57, par.19 (Zielinski), par.81 (El
a;K-E.jt.i-; shafei).
fi|& f CCPR/C/SR.856, par.5, par.8. v-,^ rv.;>;f>.^i hy ffe. ^ v , wi<-t C':W-'f
641. The discussion (CCPR/C/SR.857) is striking because of the difference of opinions:
"Par.19. Mr.Zielinski asked what were the material reasons for the United Kingdom's
reservation to article 13 of the Covenant. -----
•• I-]
'=• • Par.21 Mr.Fearn (United Kingdom), said that, as he understood it, Governments were
-• not required to set out the reasons for any reservations they had made. Their obligation
was, rather, to explain how they implemented the provisions that they had accepted.
1-1
Par.23 Mr.Zielinksi said that while it was true that it was not the Committee's function
to consider the reasons underlying the reservations, one of its tasks was to consider the
problem of protection of human rights...."
642; CCPR/C/SR.857, par.20 (Dimitrijevic), par.22 (United Kingdom), par.24 (Dimitrijevic),
•••••* ' par.26 (United Kingdom)
643. CCPR/C/SR.857, par.81 (El Shafei), par.83 (United Kingdom),
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The third periodic report by the United Kingdom'*' is a joint report on the
dependencies of the Crown, the dependent territories as well as the United
Kingdom itself, supplemented with two addenda containing additional informa-
tion"*. The report mentions changes in legislation relevant to the implementa-
tion of article 12"*. Apart from implicit references, no reservations are men-
tioned in all three parts of the report.
The Committee proved to be surprisingly strict with the United Kingdom. Apart
from concern about the future application of the Covenant to Hong Kong, they
were irritated by the absence of legislation implementing the Covenant, and by
the consistent refusal to ratify the Optional Protocol. The Committee explicitly
asked if the United Kingdom intended to withdraw the reservations"', in view
of the period of time that had passed since ratification. In reply the United
Kingdom indicated that the reservations were kept under review, and that the
reservation to article 25.e concerning the Isle of Man would soon be with-
drawn"*. The Committee stressed the need to reconsider the reservations"'
and wished to know if the reservation to article 1 excluded the right to self-
determination'"'*.
The representative indicated that he would convey the Human Rights Commit-
tee's concern to his Government, adding that the United Kingdom was usually
very cautious in making reservations'". It was furthermore indicated that the
declaration concerning article 1 was merely an understanding to the extent that
the Charter would prevail in cases of conflict, and was not a reservation at
all"*.
UNITED STATES
Reservations
1) That article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United
States that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
2) That the United states reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to
impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted
under existing legislation or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment,
including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of
age.
3) That the United states considers itself bound by article 7 to the extent that 'cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel and unusual treatment
fcu or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth amendment to the
•^ hj Constitution of the United States.
644. CCPR/C/58/Add.6. „
645. CCPR/C/58/Add.ll; Add. 12. ,<
646. CCPR/C/58/Add.6, par.175. ,1
647. CCPR/C/SR.1045, par. 14 (Chairman).
648. CCPR/C/SR.1045, par. 15 (United Kingdom).
649. CCPR/C/SR.104S, par.21(Chanet), par.38(Ando), par.45(Mavrommatis), par.51(Sadi);
CCPR/C/SR.1046, par.ll(Prado Vallejo), par.28(Herndl).
650. CCPR/C/SR.1045, par.21 (Chanet): CCPR/C/SR.1046. par.14 (Wako).
651. CCPR/C/SR.1046, par.38 (United Kingdom). _<=•,..
652. CCPR/C/SR.1046, par.40 (United Kingdom). ;«; .: - .v- ,y .^ --%* V*?*•?' st T*_
278 COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
4) That because U.S. law generally applies to an offender the penalty in force at the
time the offense was committed, the United States does not adhere to the third clause
do paragraph 1 of article 15.
5) That the policy and practice of the United States are generally in compliance with
and support of the Covenant's provisions regarding the treatment of juveniles in the
criminal justice system. Nevertheless, the United States reserved the right, in exceptional
circumstances, to treat juveniles as adults, notwithstanding paragraphs 2 (b) and 3 of
article 10 and paragraph 4 of article 14. The United States further reserves to these
provisions with respect to states with respect to individuals who volunteer for military
service prior to age 18.
Understandings
1) That the Constitution and the laws of the United States guarantee all persons equal
protection of the law and provide extensive protection against discrimination. The
United States understands distinctions based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or any other status -
as those terms are used in article 2, paragraph 1 and article 26 - to be permitted when
such distinctions are, at minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental
objective. The United States further understands the prohibition in paragraph 1 of
article 4 upon discrimination, in time of public emergency, based "solely" on the status
,. _, of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin, not to bar distinctions that may
have a disproportionate effect upon persons of a particular status.
2) That the United States understands the right to compensation referred to in articles
9 (5) and 14 (6) to require the provision of effective and enforceable mechanisms by
which a victim of an unlawful arrest or detention or a miscarriage of justice may seek
and, where justified obtain compensation from either the responsible individual or the
appropriate governmental entity. Entitlements to compensation maybe subject to
reasonable requirements of domestic law.
3) That the United States understands the reference to "exceptional circumstances" in
• I - paragraph 2 (a) of article 10 to permit the imprisonment of an accused person with
'/,.' convicted persons where appropriate in light of an individual's overall dangerousness,
and to permit accused persons to waive their right to segregation from convicted person.
The United States further understands that paragraph 3 of article 10 does not diminish
the goals of punishment, deterrence and incapacitation as additional legitimate purposes
for a penitentiary system.
4) That the United states understands that subparagraphs 3 (b) and (d) of article 14 do
not require the provisions of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice when the
defendant is provided with court-appointed counsel on grounds of indigence, when the
defendant is financially able to retain alternative counsel, or when imprisonment is not
imposed. The United States further understands that paragraph 3 (e) does not prohibit
a requirement that the defendant make a showing that any witness whose attendance he
seeks to compel is necessary for his defense. The United States understands the
prohibition upon double jeopardy in paragraph 7 to apply only when the judgement of
S»> acquittal has been rendered by a court of the same governmental unit, whether the
Federal Government or a constituent unit, as is seeking a new trial for the same case.
5) That the United States understands that this covenant shall be implemented by the
Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative jurisdiction over the
matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments; to the extent
that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the federal
Government shall take measures appropriate to the federal system to the end that the
competent authorities of the state or local governments may take appropriate measures
for thee fulfilment of the Covenant.
'•"-* Declarations
1) That the United States declares that the provisions of article 1 through 27 of the
Covenant are not self-executing.
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2) That it is the views of the United States that States Party to the Covenant should
wherever possible refrain from imposing any restrictions or limitations on the exercise
of the rights recognized and protected by the Covenant, even when such restrictions and
limitations on the are permissible under the terms of the Covenant. For the United
States, article 5, paragraph 2 which provides that fundamental human rights existing in
any State Party may not be diminished on the pretext that the Covenant recognizes
them to a lesser extent, has particular relevance to article 19, paragraph 3 which would
permit certain restrictions on the freedom of expression. The United States declares
that it will continue to adhere to the requirements and constraints of its Constitution in
respect all such restrictions and limitations.
3) That the United States declares that the right referred to in article 47 may be
exercised only in accordance with international law.
As the United States had ratified in 1992, the initial report would be due in 1993.
VENEZUELA
Article 60, paragraph 5, of the Constitution of the Republic of Venezuela establishes
that: "No person shall be convicted in a criminal trial unless he has first been personally
notified of the charges and heard in (he manner prescribed by law. Persons accused of
an offence against the r« puMca may be tried I/I a/wc/ma. with the guarantees and in
the manner prescribed by law". Venezuela is making this reservation because article 14,
paragraph 3(d), of the Covenant makes no provision for persons accused of an offence
against the rcspuW/ca to be tried /« (jfotviHu.
The initial report by Venezuela is peculiar inasmuch as it presents an overview of
the domestic legislation within the scope of the Covenant. Under article 14, the
report refers to article 60.5 of the Constitution mentioned in the reservation'".
In discussing the Venezuelan report, the HRC indicates that information about the
purpose of article 60.5 of the Constitution would be welcome'*''. The Vene-
zuelan representative does however not clarify this provision'".
The additional report by Venezuela**' is a long-winded expose about its constitu-
tional law, which does not clarify the reservation referring to article 60.5 of the
Constitution. During the twenty-third session, the Venezuelan representative
answered questions raised by the Committee during the consideration of the initial
report*". It was indicated that a new law had been enacted following questions
by the Committee about this issue. The 1982 Organic Law on the Protection of
Public Property gave a legal basis for referring to offenders in article 60.5 of the
Constitution***.
653. CCPR/C/6/Add.3, p.17.
654. CCPR/C/SR.248, par.16 (Prado Vallejo); CCPR/C/SR.249, par.77 (Tomuschat). •:
655. CCPR/C/SR.252, passim.
656. CCPR/C/6/Add.8.
657. CCPR/C/SR.556,557.
658. CCPR/C/SR.557, par.10 (Venezuela). The second periodic report by Venezuela has
been received, but has not yet been considered by the Committee. See A/47/40, at 197.
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3.2. Individual Complaints, the Optional Protocol
Under the Optional Protocol a number of cases involving reservations have come
up. In the following a chronological presentation of the relevant material is given,
with an emphasis on the questions concerning reservations.
A.M. v. Denmark"'
The case of A.M. is the first one in which the reservation concerning article
5.2.a OP appears. The plaintiff is a Pakistani complaining about an expulsion
order, following a prison sentence on the grounds of bodily injuries with death as
a result. The plaintiff had submitted the same matter to the European Commis-
sion, which had declared the matter inadmissible being manifestly ill-founded.
The HRC notices that Denmark had made a reservation concerning article 5.2.a,
and decides that the case is inadmissible.
In an Individual Opinion, Committee member Graefrath comes to a different
conclusion. In his opinion the case is inadmissible on the grounds of article 3 OP,
the matter is not covered by any of the provisions of the Covenant. He disagrees
with the majority interpretation of the Danish reservation. Graefrath feels that an
application that has been declared inadmissible in Strasbourg falls outside of the
scope of the reservation. The Committee is not precluded from considering the
application because the European Commission did not consider the substance of
the complaint. Following the reasoning of the majority opinion would lead to a
situation in which the conditions for admissibility under the European Convention
would overrule the provisions of the Optional Protocol"". Graefrath's point is
well taken; as a consequence of the majority's interpretation the Committee relies
on the work of a supervisory body under a different Convention**'.
Duilio Fanali v. Italy"".
Fanali was a retired general in the Italian air force, who had been sentenced on
corruption charges following the Lockheed scandal. His case was tried jointly
with those of a number of members of Government as part of a larger criminal
suit. Consequently the trial took place before the Constitutional Court which is
the single court with authority in matters involving the President or the Ministers.
No appeals are allowed against decisions of this Court in first instance.
659. No.121/1982 (CCPR/C/OP/1, 32); Decision on Admissibility 23 July 1982.
660. The Individual Opinion reads:"If the Committee interprets the reservation in such a way
that it would be excluded from considering a communication when a complaint referring
to the same facts has been declared inadmissible under the procedure of the European
Convention, the effect would be that any complaint that has been declared inadmissible
under that procedure could later on not be considered by the Human Rights Commit-
tee, despite the fact that the conditions for admissibility of communications are set out
in a separate international instrument and are different from those under the Optional
Protocol."
661. McGoldrick, op.cit. at 184-185.
662. No.75/1980 (CCPR/C/OP/2, 99); Views 31 March 1983.
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Fanali claimed that his right to review by a higher tribunal under article 14.5
CCPR had been violated as he did not fall within the scope of the reservation
which was specifically meant for the President and the Ministers. Italy put forth
that the matter had already been submitted to the European Commission on
Human Rights by Fanali's co-defendants, thereby relying on a reservation to
article 5.2.a OP. Furthermore it invoked the reservation concerning article 14.5.
The HRC states that with respect to article 5.2.a OP, the same matter must be
understood as "the same claim concerning the same individual, submitted by him
or someone else who has standing to act on his behalf before the other interna-
tional body'"'". The Committee then follows the Italian reservation to article
14.5, indicating that there is no doubt as to the international validity of the
reservation. Fanali's claim that he does not belong to either of the categories
mentioned in the reservation is rejected on the basis of its formulation""'. The
"existing Italian provisions ...in accordance with the Constitution" legitimize the
joining of the cases of Fanali with those of the Government members, who are
tried in first instance by the Constitutional Court"*. Consequently the Italian
reservation is applicable to Fanali, and the Committee is of the view that no
violation of the Covenant took place.
The case is a rare example of the scope reservations may have. Through an
unfortunate coincidence, Fanali found himself to be within the ambit of the
reservation as a consequence of its confluence with Italian Criminal Procedure.
O.F. v. Norway***.
The case of O.F. concerns the alleged violation of certain rights under article
14.3 of the Covenant. After the exhaustion of local remedies O.F. submitted the
matter to the European Commission on Human Rights prior to submitting the
matter to the Human Rights Committee. The submission under the European
Convention had been too tardy, and O.F. had informed by the secretariat of the
European Commission that his case would not be considered, as it was not
received within the six months of the date of the exhaustion of local re-
medies'*'.
In its reply to the Human Rights Committee Norway indicates that it had made a
reservation to article 5.2.a OP to the effect that the European procedure would
preclude the procedure under the Optional Protocol. It states that as the matter
had not been dealt with in Strasbourg mr/one fra/wm, it would not rely on the
663. No.75/1980, par.7.2.
664. The reservation reads:"Article 14, paragraph 5, shall be without prejudice to the
application of existing Italian provisions which, in accordance with the Constitution of
the Italian Republic, govern the conduct, at one level only, of proceedings instituted
before the Constitutional Court in respect of charges brought against the President of
the Republic and Ministers."
665. No.75/1980, par.11.7-11.8
666. No. 158/1983 (CCPR/C/OP/2, 44); Decision on Admissibility 26 October 1984.
667. Article 26 ECHR.
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reservation. As far as Norway is concerned, the case has not been examined
within the meaning of article 5.2.a OP. The HRC concurs with the State Party's
opinion that the reservation does not apply in this case. The case is declared
inadmissible for other reasons"*.
V .0 . v. Norway'*'.
The case of V.0. is about the rights of a father after divorce. The father had
submitted an application to the European Commission on Human Rights which
had decided that the application was inadmissible. The detailed decision on
admissibility held that the allegations were manifestly ill-founded on all
accounts'™. In his submission to the HRC, V.0. indicated that the provisions
of the Covenant were better suited to protect his rights than the provisions of the
European Convention invoked in his submission to the European Commission.
In its reply Norway argued that it had made a reservation to article 5.2.a OP
concerning the same matter being considered under another international pro-
cedure. It indicated that the European Commission had examined the substance of
the complaint, and that consequently the reservation was applicable in this
case*"'. The HRC agreed, and stressed that "the same matter" regards identical
parties, complaints and facts. Consequently the Norwegian reservation led to the
decision that the complaint was inadmissible'^.
S.R. v. France'"
This case is about a teacher of both French and Breton in conflict with the
educational authorities. It is the first in a long list of Breton cases in which
article 27 CCPR (amongst others) is invoked. The importance of the Breton
cases is that they show the development in the HRC's approach to a declaration.
The claim is about the creation of a full-time position (instead of a part-time
position) as a teacher of Breton which was not achieved, and about a transfer
from the Academy at Versailles to the Academy at Lille without the consent of
the claimant.
As the plaintiff was unable to indicate which judicial steps, if any, he had taken
in order to exhaust the local remedies, the case was dismissed by the Human
Rights Committee on the basis of article 5.2.b OP.
Carl Henrik Blom v. Sweden""
The case of Carl Henrik Blom is about government support for pupils of private
schools under State supervision. Blom claimed that the denial of such grants,
668. McGoldrick. op.cit. at 185.
669. No.168/1984 (CCPR/C/OP/2, 48): Decision on Admissibility 17 July 1985.
670. No.168/1984 par.2.4.
671. No.168/1984. par.4.2.
672. McGoldrick. op.cit. at 185.
673. No.243/1987 (A/43/40, 263-265); Decision on Admissibility 5 November 1987.
674. No.191/1985 (CCPR/C/OP/2, 216); Views 4 April 1988.
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because of the fact that the Rudolf Steiner school he attended was not under State
supervision, was a violation of his rights under the Covenant.
In its reply Sweden indicated that two other pupils of the same school had
brought an application before the European Commission which had been declared
inadmissible; thereby apparently invoking its reservation to article 5.2.a OP*".
Blom informs the HRC that the case before the European Commission was a
distinct one, related to granting free textbooks to pupils in private schools. The
Committee agrees with Blom, and repeats that the "same matter" must be under-
stood as including:"the same claim concerning the same individual, submitted by
him or someone else who has standing to act on his behalf before the other
international body". Consequently the Swedish reservation did not apply.
C.L.D v. France"* (1st communication)
The case of C.L.D. is another Breton case, it deals with various refusals on the
part of administrative officials to use the Breton language instead of French.
C.L.D. complains about the refusal by the Postal Administration, as well as the
fiscal authorities to use Breton, invoking amongst others article 27 CCPR.
In an initial reaction the Committee asked C.L.D. to provide information on the
exhaustion of local remedies, and it turns out that apart from a number of letters
no procedural steps have been taken. Consequently the majority of the Committee
decided that the communication was inadmissible because of the non-fulfilment of
the conditions in article 5.2.b OP.
In a joint Individual Opinion, Committee-members Dimitrijevic, Higgins,
Mavrommatis, Pocar and Wennergren also concluded that the communication was
inadmissible, but disagreed with the majority as to the grounds for inadmissibil-
ity. In their view the matters complained about were beyond the competence of
the Committee ra//o«c waftr/Yi^. The rights referred to were not protected,
consequently the communication was inadmissible under article 3 OP"', and
the issue of exhaustion of local remedies did not need to be dealt with. The five
Committee-members explicitly stated that there was no need to discuss the
character of the French declaration concerning article 27 CCPR*™, but would
apparently like to do so. They indicated that should the issue arise, the Commit-
tee would have to consider whether the statement was a reservation or a mere
675. No.191/1985, par.5.6, the text does not explicitly mention the Swedish reservation.
676. No.228/1987 (A/43/40, 252-257): Decision on Admissibility 18 July 1988.
677. The authors of the individual opinion venomously write:"None of the articles cited by
the author, including article 27. even potentially provide the entitlement to receive
postal cheques or to have acknowledgement of one's address in one's mother tongue.";
Individual Opinion, par.4.
678. The declaration reads:"In the light of article 2 of the Constitution of the French
Republic, the French Government declares that article 27 is not applicable so far as the
Republic is concerned."
284 COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
interpretation. The clarity of the Individual Opinion could easily be read as an
invitation for communications dealing with the French declaration'".
In a separate Individual Opinion Committee-member Ndiaye disagrees with both
the majority opinion and the joint individual opinion. In his view the decision
about admissibility includes a pr/WKie /ac/e examination of the submission in
relation to the rights guaranteed in the Covenant and the treaty obligation of the
State involved. This would have led to the conclusion that the violations claimed
do not correspond to rights under article 27 of the Covenant**". The author of
the Individual Opinion understands the statement to be an obvious reservation,
based on an internal law of fundamental importance**'. As a result of that
France is not bound by article 27, and submissions invoking article 27 against
France are inadmissible. Ndiaye indicates that the French "reservation" to article
27 is the principle ground for inadmissibility, the fact that the rights claimed are
not protected by the Covenant is a subsequent ground for inadmissibility.
J .B. and H.K. v. France***
The case of J.B and H.K. is about two Bretons who allegedly spray-painted road
signs in Brittany in a campaign aimed at obtaining bilingual road signs. When
taken to Court they did not receive the services of an interpreter, as the Tribunal
found them able to understand French. The plaintiffs invoke article 27 CCPR.
They indicate that they have not pursued the exhaustion of local remedies because
679. The 5th paragraph of the Individual Opinion reads: "... Nor is it necessary to examine
whether the declaration of the Government of France made upon accession to the
f" Covenant is to be interpreted as a reservation or as a declaration «»ip//aV<?r. [...]
Declarations do not have the same legal effect as reservations. In any case where the
jurisdiction turned on the effect of a declaration, it would be necessary to see whether
the statement of the country concerned was in fact, regardless of its nomenclature, a
reservation as to the Committee's jurisdiction or a declaration of interpretation by the
State Party. This is not such a case and no view is offered here as to the legal effect of
the French declaration regarding article 27."
Cf. Nowak, op.cit. at xxiv-xxv.
680. Nowak, op.cit. at xxiv, par.24.
681. Here the Individual Opinion refers to article 46 VCLT; the provision reads:
"1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding the competence to
conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and
concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself
in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith."
In view of the text of article 46 VCLT, the author of the Individual Opinion must
clearly have misinterpreted it when referring to this provision in respect of article 27
CCPR. Article 46 deals with the competence to express consent to be bound, and the
consequences if consent to be bound has been expressed contrary to domestic rules on
the issue. Clearly there is no discussion about a French accession in violation of its
domestic rules.
See about article 46 VCLT: Sinclair, op.cit. at 160-171.
682. No.324 and 325/1988 (A/44/40, 303-304); Decision on Admissibility 25 October 1988.
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that would have been absolutely futile, given the fact that the Tribunal in Rennes
systematically refuses to hear cases in Breton.
This approach by the applicants is criticized by the Committee, who indicate that
the pursuit of the available remedies cannot be deemed a /wioW futile, and that
mere doubts about the success of such remedies do not render them ineffective.
Consequently the complaint is inadmissible on the ground of article 5.2.b.OP.
R.M. v. Finland""
The plaintiff has been convicted on a charge of smuggling hashish, and complains
about the non-availability of legal assistance during the preliminary investigations
in his case. In its reply to the Committee, Finland indicates that it made a reser-
vation concerning article 14.3.d CCPR, the provision about legal assistance.
The Committee takes note of the Finnish reservation, and decides that the
communication is inadmissible'*''.
R.T. v. France*'
In this Breton case, the issue is the treatment of a Breton teacher who complains
that his right to teach his native language is denied, a right supposed to be
protected under article 27 CCPR. It is indicated that the educational administra-
tion registered him as a teacher of English and Armenian, but failed to acknowl-
edge Breton. It appears that the plaintiff did not submit his case to an administra-
tive tribunal, and merely exchanged letters with various officials.
France objects to admissibility on the grounds of the non-exhaustion of local
remedies, and because of the fact that the complaint is "incompatible with the
Covenant". In that respect it indicates that it made a declaration concerning
article 27. The plaintiff comments that France made a mere declaration, as
opposed to a reservation.
In its decision on the admissibility the Committee indicates that it will take three
steps: first of all the question in article 5.2.a OP, then article 3 OP, and finally
the question in article 5.2.b OP. This order appears to be a reaction to the
confusion in the C.L.D. case. However, in spite of indicating the steps to be
taken the Committee does not abide by the rules it sets itself. After dealing with
article 5.2.a, it mentions that it will not be necessary to pronounce on the French
declaration concerning article 27 (this is the article 3 OP question) as the author
has not exhausted the domestic remedies. Consequently the communication is
inadmissible.
683. No.301/1988 (A/44/40, 300-302); Decision on Admissibility 23 March 1989.
684. It should be noted that the Finnish reservation concerning article 14.3d, that lead to
this decision on inadmissibility in this case in March 1989, was withdraw by Finland in
July 1990.
685. No.262/1987 (A/44/40, 277-281); Decision on Admissibility 30 March 1989.
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Ibrahima Gueye et al. v. France"*
The case of Ibrahima Gueye et al. concerns the pension rights of some 742
retired Senegalese members of the French Army. Though initially treated exactly
like retired French members of the Army, France introduced legislation that
differentiated between the pensions of retired French and Senegalese army
personnel in 1974 and again in 1981. The authors claim that this is a violation of
article 26 of the Covenant.
France indicates that the claim is inadmissible, because pension rights are not
protected under the Covenant (article 3 OP), and adds that it made a reservation
raft'ow? r«w/wr/j concerning article 1 OP. It states that the facts of the case all
took place before the French accession to the Optional Protocol and can therefore
not be complained about. The authors indicate that negotiations about the issue
had still been going on in 1984, at the time of the French accession. The
Committee then decided that the communication was admissible, referring to its
interpretation of "violation" in article 1 OP as including "an alleged violation of
human rights said to have taken place prior to entry into force of the Covenant
for a State party, unless it is a violation that continues after that date or
w/i/cA rt«wK'/vcj co/wmuft' « Wfl/fl//7w of //»? Co WHOM/ n/fer
" While stating that it did not have authority to deal with violations
prior to the French accession to the Protocol, it declared the communication
admissible with a view to consider violations after accession.
In its View, the Committee concluded that there had indeed been a violation of
article 26 CCPR, qualifying the distinction made between people with a similar
professional background in the army, but with different nationalities following the
Senegalese independence as "discrimination on any ground such as., other
status". Given the services rendered in the past by French as well as Senegalese
army personnel there is no reasonable and objective criterion to distinguish
between them in respect of pension rights.
It should be noted that the Committee does not devote much attention to the
French temporal reservation, apart from mentioning it in respect of the admissi-
bility. It would appear that in spite of the reservation, the whole issue is
justiciable under the Covenant even if the relevant legislation dates from long
before French obligations under the Covenant or the Protocol. The French
reservation does not seem to have had the intended effect. The Committee's
interpretation of "violation" in article 1 OP appears to overrule the reservation,
though the Committee devotes some formal consideration to the matter.
T.K. v. France*** and M.K. v. France'*'
The case of T.K. is about a Breton legal entity applying in Breton for a license,
and the problems arising from the fact that Breton is not an official language in
French Courts. M.K. complains about the refusal of the tax authorities to use his
686. No.1%/1985, (A/44/40, 189-195); Views 3 April 1989.
687. • See par.5.3 of the Decision on Admissibility on 5 November 1987.
688. No.220/1987. (A/45/40, at 118); Decision on Admissibility 8 November 1989.
No.222/1987, (A/45/40 at 127); Decision on Admissibility. 8 November 1989.
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address in Breton, and also complains about the fact that his daughter does not
enjoy an education in Breton. Both T.K. and M.K. did communicate with the
judicial authorities (in Breton), but their communications were not received or
registered because they were not written in the French language. France indicated
that neither T.K. and his association, nor M.K. exhausted the local remedies, and
that the claims were incompatible with the Covenant because France made a
reservation"" concerning article 27 CCPR. Yet, the plaintiffs stressed that
France itself indicated that the "article 27 reservation" was a mere decla-
ration"'.
Both communications were dealt with by the Committee on the same day, leading
to a similar decision on (in)admissibility, with the same Individual Opinions
attached. In both decisions the Committee did not explicitly decide whether or not
domestic remedies had been exhausted. It raised the issue of whether remedies in
French, rather then Breton, could be considered unavailable or ineffective. The
Committee noticed that the authors of the complaints were proficient in French,
and could therefore have pursued their case in that language.
The Committee then goes on to decide whether the French declaration concerning
article 27 prevents it from examining the complaint. Referring to article 2.l.d
VCLT which does not distinguish between the labelling of the statement, but
focuses on the intentions of the author State, the Committee had decided that the
declaration was in fact a reservation"-. Supportive arguments are found in the
first and second periodical reports of France which explained the reasons behind
the reservation*". The Committee then proceeded to declare the communication
inadmissible on the grounds of articles 2 and 5.2.b OP.
Two Individual Opinions were attached to the decisions on admissibility in the
cases of T.K and M.K. The Individual Opinion of Committee-member Wenner-
gren focuses on the issue of the availability of effective remedies, knowing that
French case law does not allow the use of any other language than French in
Court. Finding that the available remedies cannot be considered effective
remedies, Wennergren concludes that the communication should have been
declared admissible.
The Individual Opinion of Committee-member Higgins is proof of a better insight
into the Law of Treaties aspects of the French declaration, and provides a
satisfactory solution. While agreeing that both cases are inadmissible on the
grounds of non-exhaustion of local remedies (she mentions again that no harm
690. It should be noted that France itself labels the declaration a "reservation" in the reply to
the Committee on the matter of admissibility.
691. See par. 7. of the Decision on Admissibility.
692. The view reads:"In the present case, the statement entered by the French Government
upon accession to the Covenant is clear: it seeks to exclude the application of article 27
to France and emphasizes the exclusion semantically with the words "is not applicable".
693. Contrary to the Committee's opinion, one could consider this a case of a particularly
successful manipulation of the Committee's insights. If France could reinforce the
dubious nature of its "reservation", or change the nature of its interpretation by
explaining the background in its periodical reports, that would be contrary to the rule
that reservations can only be made at ratification, cf. article 19 VCLT opening phrase.
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
would be done to the Breton cause if the procedure were conducted in French),
Higgins strongly disagrees with the majority opinion. It is quite clear that as
France itself made the distinction between reservations and declarations, it did so
deliberately and should therefore bear the consequences. Article 2.1.d VCLT is
of no relevance here, it cannot serve to turn declarations into reservations***.
Consequently, as the declaration is merely an interpretation, the final interpreta-
tion of the French declaration is to be made by the Committee rather then by
France. Higgins' Individual Opinion is interesting because it clearly echoes the
Belilos approach of distinguishing between the legal effects of interpretative
declarations and reservations, when a State Party has made both"*.
Dominique Guesdon v. France**
Dominique Guesdon is a Breton alleged to have spray-painted road signs in the
fight for bilingual road signs, facts which took place in April 1984 whereas
France became a party to the Optional Protocol in May 1984.
Guesdon claims that he was convicted in the absence of any proof, at the hearing
he introduced twelve Breton-speaking witnesses on his behalf, but their testi-
monies were not accepted, nor were they granted the assistance of an interpreter.
Consequently the witnesses were not heard. This led to a violation of the right to
a fair hearing (in article 14 CCPR), as well as a violation of minority rights in
article 27 CCPR, according to the plaintiff.
The Human Rights Committee asked the plaintiff whether he spoke and under-
stood French and was assured that he did. The State indicated that if the plaintiff
was a victim of a violation of article 14.1 CCPR, this was his own fault because
of his unwillingness to speak French, and indicated that the right to an interpreter
is limited to those accused who have insufficient mastery of the French language.
With respect to article 27 CCPR the State mentions that it has made a "rejcrvrt-
riow""^, according to France the concept of an ethnic, religious or linguistic
community is irrelevant as this concept is not recognized under its Constitution.
Counsel for the applicant agrees that France had made a "declaration", but
indicated that within France opinions about minority rights were changing.
The Human Rights Committee had not dealt with article 27 in its decision on
admissibility. In the submission of the State in the second stage of the procedure,
the fundamental question was about the right to speak Breton as a matter of
personal preference (as advocated by the applicant) or the right to an interpreter
j ' i - * The Individual Opinion reads:To note, by reference to article 2 (l)(d) of the Vienna
. Convention, that it does not matter how a reservation is phrased or named, cannot
.„ serve to turn these interpretative declarations into reservations. Their content is clearly
that of declaration. Further, the French notification shows that deliberately different
language was selected to serve different legal purposes. 77icrc « HO rawo/i /o ii/ppoic
//KH //IC co/i/ras/i/ig uw, I'/I aV i^ro/// />ara^rap/«, o///if p/ir«5f 'Vwc/rn/io/i" a/id 'ycctora/i-
IflCTIf
695. See Chapter 3, par.4.1.2 supra.
696. No.219/1986 (A/45/40, 61-68): Views 25 July 1990.
$f7.-"»« These are French quotation marks (EL).
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only in case of a lack of understanding of the French language (as advanced by
the State).
The View by the Committee ultimately relies on the scope and meaning of article
14 CCPR, rather than on the meaning of article 27. Thus the matter revolves
around the ability of Guesdon to speak French, and the fact that the right to an
interpreter is limited to those who do not understand the official language, "/f r/if
court is ccrf«/«,.., r/iar r/ie accuse*/ /$ su$7c/<7/r/;y /?ro/fc/>wf i« rtoe court's
e, /r /s nor r«7«/V«/ ro <ucerr<i/n w/iez/jfr /r wouW /V />r*/mi£fc /or r/ie-
ro cxpreyj /i/wse// /« a /a/iguage or/ier r/jrt/ r/je cowrr /fl/jguage." French
law does not give everyone the right to speak their language of preference; there
has thus not been a violation of a right protected under the Covenant.
Herv£ Barzhig v. France"*
Barzhig was charged with defacing 21 road signs, and requested permission to
speak Breton in court. This was rejected, and he was heard in French both in
first instance as well as in appeal.
France claims the applicant did not exhaust local remedies as he could have
lodged an appeal against the decision not to allow Breton in court. Moreover the
State claims that "cr/m/mi/ ^>roc«/wr<'j are a// /'//rt/;>/>ropr/«r<' ICTUP ^
nJta/ ro rAf promor/ow o/ r/ie «.«' o / re^/own/ /angi/agra. 77JC
o/ rrr/n/na/ /Jrocce<////^s /s ro rcrflo/V.Y/i r/w £u/7r or r/ic //mocCTJCf o/ r/?c
". The judge had the power to order the assistance of an interpreter, but
had great discretion in doing so. France furthermore reiterates that it had made a
reservation with respect to article 27 CCPR.
In dealing with the issues raised by the application, the Human Rights Committee
specifically dealt with the rights protected under article 14 CCPR, stressing that
neither Barzhig nor his witness had been unable to understand French. The
Committee then repeated its earlier position that French law did not give every-
one the right to speak the language of their preference in court. •
Yves Cadoret and Herve" le Bihan v. France***
Both applicants had been charged with vandalizing three road signs, and had not
been allowed to speak Breton before the criminal tribunal, and neither had their
witnesses been allowed to do so. They alleged that no domestic remedies were
available, as Breton was not accepted within the French judicial system at all.
The claim is about articles 14 and 19 CCPR, and the fact that the denial of the
right to use Breton is a discrimination on the basis of language (article 27
CCPR). France indicated that domestic remedies had not been exhausted, and
that criminal proceedings were not the place to discuss the use of regional
languages.
The Human Rights Committee repeated its earlier view that the use of one
language in court did not violate the principle of equality of arms in the article 14
698. No.327/1988 (A/46/40, 262-266); Views 11 April 1991.
699. No.221/1987 and 323/1988 (A/46/40. 219-225); Views 11 April 1991.
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CCPR, and the fact that French law did not authorize the use of other languages
in court was not a violation of the Covenant. j- v ,. ..,:.,{.•,» c _.;jt
G.B. v. France'"
The plaintiff was charged with spray-painting road sign in Brittany, and was
sentenced (together with Herve Barzhig and S.G.) to a suspended sentence and a
fine. Testimony in Breton had not been accepted. None of the sentences had been
subject to amnesty, and the plaintiff felt that the suspended sentence was merely
meant to prevent her from entering the civil service.
France indicates that domestic remedies had not been exhausted, that the viol-
ations had not been substantiated and that it had made a reservation to article 27
CCPR. The Committee considers the claim inadmissible on the grounds that
G.B. has failed to substantiate her complaint and that the reservation to article 27
would have prevented the Committee from dealing with an alleged violation of
that provision anyway.
In her separate opinion, Higgins stresses that she does not agree with the
interpretation of the French declaration as a reservation, and does not think that
the declaration could prevent the Committee from dealing with a complaint about
article 27. Yet the facts do not give a />r»«<i/flc/V indication that article 27 CCPR
had been violated.
S.G. v. France™'
The applicant was arrested on charges of defacing several road signs, and
sentenced to a suspended sentence together with Herve Barzhig and G.B. He was
employed by the French postal service, and his employer supposedly harassed
him after the incident. He was the subject of a disciplinary investigation, in
which it was proposed to suspend him from his post for six months. After
reactions from the public, the disciplinary committee gave him a suspended
sentence of six days suspension.
France contends that local remedies have not been exhausted, that defacing road
signs is not a matter of the freedom of speech; and that it had made a reservation
to article 27 CCPR. The Committee finds the claim to be unsubstantiated, and
indicates that the declaration to article 27 is tantamount to a reservation.
In a separate opinion, Committee member Higgins repeated her view in the cases
of T.K and M.K. v. France™" that it was incorrect to accept the declaration
with respect to article 27 CCPR to be a reservation. The Committee would in her
opinion not be precluded from considering complaints about violations of article
27. There is however no substantiation in the complaint that article 27 has been
violated.
.me- i ' " " ' • '
700. No.348/1989 (A/47/40, 359-362); Decision on Admissihility 1 November 1991, with
Individual Opinion by Higgins.
701. No. 347/1988 (A/47/40, 354-358); Decision on Admissibility 1 November 1991, with
Individual Opinion by Higgins. ... , i f • • wvi>..-.i...«'.
702. No.220/1987 and 222/1987, dealt with supra. . .\-'. •> -.' < - \ u i v*
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C.L.D. v. France'"' (2nd communication)
The applicant** was fined for refusing to pay parking tickets, and was refused
the use of the Breton language when the matter was dealt with in court. He then
conducted his own defense, but was found guilty.
In its Decision on Admissibility the Committee established that the claim of a
violation of the rights protected under articles 2, 3, 14, 26 and 27 had not been
substantiated. Moreover the Committee reiterated its point of view that the
French declaration was tantamount to a reservation, and would thus preclude the
Committee from dealing with the alleged violation of article 27 CCPR.
R.L.M. v. France™
The plaintiff was a teacher of Breton at the Academy of Nantes, who claimed
that the Rectorate of the Academy has discouraged and obstructed the teaching of
Breton. His action is based upon personal grievances in the shape of the obstruc-
tion of his career, and freedom of choice with respect to the fields of specializ-
ation. He had not appealed the decision, as he claimed that no remedies had been
available.
France contends that the author of the complaint had not exhausted local rem-
edies, and that the complaints were about the general issue of the discrimination
of Breton which should not be the subject of an Optional Protocol case. Contrary
to the allegation of the plaintiff, remedies would have been available.
The Committee indicates that the claim has not been substantiated, that France
had made a reservation to article 27 CCPR, and that all available remedies had
not been exhausted. Thus the complaint was inadmissible.
4. CONCLUSIONS ? > r - ' ^ ••;«;. v * : i a >^B. «Bh
4.1. The reservations ••"•*••«"• • - ;-CJ ;; - ? •-l-w,
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not contain a reservations clause
in spite of the fact that this had been contemplated during the drafting.
Consequently the "object and purpose" rule should be applied to the reservations
to the Covenant. This instantly raises the question as to what the content of
"object and purpose" would be, what are the core obligations from which
derogation is not allowed. Suggestions for such core obligations are the non-
discrimination rule, and the non derogable rights. The rule that the Covenant be
implemented in the domestic legal system is also frequently mentioned in this
respect.
* No.439/1990 (A/47/40, 432-433); Decision on Admissibility 8 November 1991.
This is indeed the same applicant as in case 228/1987, discussed supra.
70S. No.363/1989 (A/47/40, 375-379); Decision on Admissibility 6 April 1992.
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With the extensive practice that has been considered in the foregoing, a number
of general remarks can be made about the reservations made, and about the
attitudes of their authors.
Reservations have been made with respect to non-derogable rights™*, and every
reservation is one too many in this respect. Although not each and every reserva-
tion to a non-derogable right has a similarly detrimental impact on the implemen-
tation of the Covenant, as a matter of principle such reservations are highly
undesirable.
A number of almost identical reservations have been made. Given the fact that
most of these have been discussed by the author states and the Committee in the
reporting procedure, one could assume that since the reservations have not been
withdrawn, they indicate a difference of opinion about the desirability of a
particular rule, or the wisdom of implementing it. In a number of cases, reserva-
tions are the obvious reaction to majority drafting and the concessions this
entails. Differences of opinion between the individual States Party and the
original drafters are not unusual reasons for making reservations, or for maintain-
ing reservations. A number of reservations frequently made will be briefly
indicated below.
A reservation to article 10.2.b and 10.3 CCPR is frequently made by western
European states, who explain this reservation on the grounds that contemporary
insights into the best way to treat prisoners, and in particular the question
whether separation of accused and convicted and the separation of juveniles and
adults, differ from the Covenant's rules. While the Committee consistently asked
about the policy underlying such reservations, the gist of the issue appeared to be
one of different points of view. The Committee's vigilance did not lead to a
change of position. A question arising from this debate is whether the rights in
the Covenant, such as the separation issue in articles 10.2.b. and 10.3 CCPR, are
absolute rights or whether they may be influenced by developments in science
and society. This is a serious issue, as the reserving states clearly indicate that
their goal (not the means) is the same as the goal underlying the Covenant's
provisions.
Though it has never been suggested that these provisions belong to the object and
purpose of the Covenant, the test would be to discuss the validity of the assump-
tions underlying the choices made in the Covenant and the choices made by the
reserving States. This would however be an unusually flexible approach.
Another reservation that is constantly discussed without leading to a change in
position on either side is the matter of article 20 CCPR. The States that have
made reservations in this respect are maintaining the prevalence of freedom of
expression over the prohibition of war propaganda. In spite of the fact that some
Committee members™' have never failed to ask questions about these reserva-
706. Article 4: Israel, France (twice). Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States; article 6:
Norway [withdrawn], Ireland, United States; article 7; United States; article 11: Congo,
United Kingdom (Jersey); article 15: Argentina, Italy, Germany, Trinidad and Tobago,
United States; article 18: Mexico.
707. Committee member Movchan has been notably active in this respect.
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tions, it seems to have been completely pointless, as no reserving State changed
its views in order to withdraw the reservation and provide the necessary legisla-
tion. The issue here is not about the undesirability of war-propaganda, but about
a conflict between the provisions in the Covenant that has not been solved
satisfactorily during the drafting.
4.2. The role of States
As the authors of reservations, States frequently purport to safeguard their
domestic legislation against any changes that might be necessary as a consequence
of expressing consent to be bound by the Covenant. As there is no obligation to
explain the reasons for making reservations, there is little certainty in this field.
It may be assumed that apart from reluctance to bring legislation into conformity
with the Covenant, there is in a number of cases a distinct difference of opinion
on the wisdom of a particular rule. The best example of this is the pointless
discussion about the reservations to article 20 CCPR, which are clearly the result
of a difference of opinion.
It is also useful to look at the attitudes of States towards reservations in the
course of time. Although a distinct amount of irritation about interference with
the reservations sometimes arises™*, this does not amount to an overall reluc-
tance to discuss reservations, either with the Committee or with other States.
Yet it must be emphasized that relatively few states have been able to formally
withdraw reservations. So far only six states have been able to withdraw a total
of twelve reservations. Not only is the number not particularly impressive, it
should be noted that a number of States do agree with the Committee, that their
reservations are superfluous'**', but in spite of that fail to formalize such
statements by withdrawing the reservations officially.
A similarly disappointing picture must be drawn in respect of the objections,
eight States objected to reservation made by a total of five (possibly seven"")
States. This might be interpreted as meaning either that the reservations do not
have such a detrimental impact that a great number of States made the effort to
object, or it might be the consequence of a complete lack of interest on the part
of the other States Parties, to be traced back to the absence of reciprocity in the
implementation of the Covenant.
708. Cf. CCPR/C/l/Add.42, p.3 (Sweden); CCPR/C/SR.857 (United Kingdom before the
Committee).
709. Or other States may say so, cf. the objection by Belgium and the Netherlands to the
reservation to article 11 by Congo, expressly indicating that the reservation was not
necessary m Wov o/Congo/ere /atv.
710. The pseudo objections by the Netherlands and Germany to reservations by Australia
and France respectively, see supra par.2.1.
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4.3. The role of the Human Rights Committee
Some confusion has surrounded the authority of the HRC to deal with reserva-
tions. Whereas some have argued that the Committee could pronounce on the
validity of reservations (that is, admissibility in VCLT terms), others have
repeatedly stressed that reservations are a mere fact for the Committee to take
into account.
The right position would seem to be the following. Under general international
law, it is for the States Parties to accept reservations, or if necessary object to the
reservations. The Committee has no role to play in this respect. Yet, when it
comes to the application of the Covenant, and the impact that reservations may
have in this respect the Committee is fully entitled, if not obliged, to interpret the
reservation. It goes without saying that the "object and purpose" of the Covenant
will be the guideline for the Committee.
Moreover, it would seem to follow from the Committee's role as a guardian of
the Covenant that it is fully entitled to ask the States Parties to reconsider their
reservations with a view to withdrawal. States have every right to be irritated,
and to disclaim the authority of the Committee to ask such questions, but it would
seem to be completely in keeping with the Committee's tasks under the Covenant
that it should monitor not only the implementation but also the declarations
influencing that implementation.
For the purpose of clarity the role of the Committee in the reporting procedure
and under the Optional Protocol will be discussed separately. As will be seen, the
discussions in both procedure about reservations and their impact differs signifi-
cantly.
•»«•!« I * sJr'
4.3.1. Reservations in the reporting procedure
Discussions about the reservations under the reporting procedure of article 40 of
the Covenant are distinctly monotonous, to the point of boredom. Looking at the
Committee's practice, three phases can be distinguished. The consideration of the
initial report left much to be desired in general, and the Committee paid little
attention to the reservations made. Attention slightly improved in the consider-
ation of the second periodic reports, but this did not lead to particularly funda-
mental discussions. On the whole the Committee had little insight into the
reservations made, and did not know the rules on reservations.
The outlook for scrutinizing reservations seems somewhat better with the method
developed by the Committee for discussing the third periodic reports. In the
approach focusing on a set of articles, questions are explicitly asked about the
reservations made. This has led to more in depth discussions, and also led to
more refusals of representatives to discuss reservations. The only advantage in
this last respect is the fact that states have sometimes been made to clarify their
position explicitly, which may in turn give the HRC the opportunity to narrow
down the scope of a particular reservation.
Interpretative declarations are identical to reservations, at least that sometimes
seems to be the opinion of the Committee. This may be the result of a lack of
knowledge on the part of Committee members, and it appears to have been used
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by States who claim that their interpretative declaration was (and had always
been) a reservation. Some reflection on the applicability of the distinguishing rule
as developed by the European Commission on Human Rights in the Belilos
case'", might help to narrow down the number and scope of the exceptions
States create. ;
Another thing to be noticed is the fact that in spite of the discussions about
reservations to non-derogable rights, the HRC has not achieved the withdrawal of
any of those reservations made. Given the fact that there is little discussion about
the core character of non-derogable rights, this must be seen as a distinct failure
of the Committee.
4.3.2. Reservations under the Optional Protocol
With its characteristics of a legal, almost judicial procedure the occurrence of
reservations in cases under the Optional Protocol can best be discussed in the
order in which the procedure is structured.
To begin with, only genuine reservations could prevent the Committee from
considering an individual complaint. Reservations to the Protocol itself, restrict-
ing the availability of that procedure, as well as reservations to the Covenant
excluding provisions that are invoked by the claimant, must be dealt with in the
admissibility phase. The earlier cases about the reservations to article 5.2.a OP
are an example of the former, even if Graefrath"- is right in asserting that the
applicability of a reservation to the Optional Protocol when a case has been
declared inadmissible under the European Convention, would be interpreting the
reservation to extensively.
This implies the necessity to consider, in the admissibility stage, whether or not a
State can indeed rely upon a particular statement which it presents as a reserva-
tion. To begin with, there will be a /;/•/««? /«r/V test as to the scope of the
reservation, is it reasonable to assume that the complaint invokes a right excluded
through the functioning of the reservation. In case of uncertainty about the scope
of the reservation, and its impact on the situation of the plaintiff, there is reason
to declare the complaint admissible and investigate the scope of the reservation in
the merits-stage. The cases of Ibrahima Gueye"' (uncertainty about the scope
of the reservation raz/ow wm/wm) and of Duilio Fanalf'' (uncertainty about
the scope of the reservation rano/if /KT.«>/IW) are an indication that the Commit-
tee is following this line. '
In the decision on admissibility article 2.1.d VCLT plays a role. In view of that
provision, there is no certainty as to the legal effect of an "interpretative declar-
ation". It might, or might not be a reservation. Consequently, when an interpreta-
tive declaration has been made with respect to a right invoked in a procedure
under the Optional Protocol, this would seem to oblige the HRC to determine in
711. For a discussion of the Belilos case, see Chapter 3, par.4.1.2.
712. Communication 121/1982, Individual Opinion.
713. Communication 196/1985.
714. Communication 75/1980.
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the admissibility stage what legal effect it considers the declaration to have. Thus
the admissibility stage is the moment to decide upon the legal effect of interpreta-
tive declarations in a "Belilos situation". Should the communication deal with a
matter falling within the scope of an interpretative declaration, when the State
party has made both declarations and reservations, it will be for the Committee to
indicate clearly that the declaration cannot go under the guise of reservation, and
consequently does not prevent the Committee from dealing with the matter.
With its focus on individual cases, rather then the more general matter of
implementation, the Optional Protocol leaves some room for case-law engin-
eering. The surprisingly long list of cases under the Optional Protocol regarding
the rights of Bretons as a minority in France and their rights under article 27
CCPR, to which France had made an interpretative declaration, clearly demon-
strates two issues.
France had made both interpretative declarations and reservations when ratifying
the Covenant, thus a provision to which an interpretation had been attached led to
a "Belilos" situation. In its consideration of the Breton cases under the OP, the
HRC demonstrated a notable lack of insight into the law on reservations. The
nature of declarations leads to confusion and disparity amidst the Committee. The
reference in the majority opinion in the cases of M.K. and T.K. v. France"' to
article 2.1.d VCLT is uncalled for, "//"a •s/fl/e /wflA'?.y rewriti/iow «//</
«/ //?e M/WI ///we, o/i /w/w/>/Y7fl//w rf«7flra//«// vv/7/
/« ftf «7Mfl/«/ H'///I rt «wrwi//o/i"'". The Belilos theory of
distinguishing would lead to the burden of proof that the declaration was a
reservation resting on France. The Committee however, was satisfied that France
itself had indicated that the declaration was in fact a reservation, in a previous
periodic report. Consequently France managed to change the legal effect of its
declaration years after ratification, and the Human Rights Committee facilitated
that.
On the other hand, there has been a striking lack of procedural ingenuity in all
the Breton cases. Being more stubborn than smart, the Bretons stumbled over the
barrier of the non-exhaustion of local remedies in article 2 OP all the time. While
this may have been an excusable problem in the initial cases, the same domestic
remedies issue in the following cases prevented the discussion of the French
declaration as a matter of substance. The Bretons clearly irritated the Committee
by suggesting that they could not take legal action in the French language, and
frequently complained about rights that are not protected under the Covenant.
This lack of strategy on the part of the Bretons is regrettable because, with the
developments under the ECHR and the Belilos theory of distinction, a situation
existed in which the Committee could have followed this line, thereby ignoring
the fact that France considered its statement to be a reservation'". It is my
715. Communications 220/1987 and 222/1987. '
716. Belilos report para. 102.
717. This is clearly a possibility in the first case of C.L.D. v. France, Communication
228/1987.
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impression that the Committee could have been persuaded to distinguish, if the
Bretons had not consistently failed to exhaust local remedies, and had presented
complaints that would have challenged the Committee to give the declaration
concerning article 27 thorough consideration. This did not happen, and the cases
of G.B. and S.G. indicate that the acceptance of the French declaration as a
reservation has become standard case law of the HRC. Thus ending all hope for
the advancement of the Breton case through the Optional Protocol.
The admissibility stage is the crucial moment in dealing with reservations under
the Optional Protocol, and important choices need to made in that phase of the
procedure. By being precise about the potential scope of a reservation, and
thereby selecting between the "reservations" that do and do not prevent the
Committee from looking at an individual complaint, it will be possible to give the
Covenant the widest possible impact.
4.4. Prospects
Prospects to reduce the impact of reservations and interpretative declarations on
the Covenant are not all that gloomy. There are few indications that states will
want to withdraw large numbers of reservations in the near future. However, it is
beyond doubt that the Committee could improve its grip on the reservations issue,
by drafting a General Comment on Reservations™ and by improving the dis-
cussion of reservations when the periodic reports are considered. To further
enhance their success in this field, it would be worthwhile analyzing the remarks,
suggestions and perhaps promises made by state representatives during the con-
sideration of earlier reports. If the consistency of the Committee's approach could
be improved, the Committee would be on solid ground when it recalls earlier
commitments by the reserving States. However, such a project could only be
undertaken if the servicing of the Committee were improved.
Prospects for restricting the impact of reservations under the Optional Protocol
are not particularly good. It would appear that reservations are dealt with in a
formal way, and that they thus preclude a consideration of the substance by the
Committee. Perhaps some room for imaginative case-law exists where it concerns
interpretative declarations, but in that respect it must be stressed that such cases
should be presented with greater care than has happened up until now. •> •
718. Which is under consideration at present (spring 1994); see CCPR/C/SR.1167, par.81
(Pocar).
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6. RESERVATIONS TO THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMIN-
ATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONVENTION
1.1. Content of the Convention'
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women was adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 1979% and was
opened for ratification on 1 March 198O\ It entered into force on 3 September
1981, when twenty states had ratified the Convention^.
The Convention consists of six parts, dealing with substantive law (parts 1-4),
supervision (part 5) and final clauses (part 6). It begins by recalling that, in spite
of various instruments proclaiming the equality of men and women, extensive
discrimination against women continues to exist. The long-winded preamble also
mentions the New International Economic Order, and the importance of strength-
ening international peace and security.
The first part of the Convention (articles 1-6) lays down fundamental rules.
Article 1 defines discrimination against women as "any distinction, exclusion or
restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of
their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any
1. Unfortunately so far no detailed commentary on the Convention has been published.
Nor has the Committee "..developed a detailed jurisprudence of the substantive articles
of the Convention..'', cf. Byrnes. The Work of the Committee, at 46. The /ravmir of the
Women's Convention are published as Guide to the 7raraitv /V£yw7/woire.v of the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women;
L.A.Rehof; Dordrecht. 1993.
2. GA Res.34/180, 18 December 1979.
3. On the origins of the Convention:N.Burrows, The 1979 Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, in:32 NILR 1985. 419^60 at 419-421;
RJ.Cook. Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women. in:30 VJIL 1990, 643-716 at 663-678 (hereafter: Cook. Women's Convention);
J.Delbriick, Die Konvention der Vereinten Nationen zur Beseitigung jeder Form der
. Diskriminierung der Frau von 1979 im Kontcxt der Bemiihungen urn einen volkerrecht-
lichen Schutz der Menschenrechte. in: Staatsrecht. Volkerrecht. Europarecht (festschrift
Schlochauer), Berlin 1981. 247-270 at 252-254; Th. Meron. Human Rights Law-making in
the United Nations, Oxford 1986, at 53-57; E.Oeser. Neue Elappe im Kampf fur die
Gleichberechtigung und Forderung der Frauen (hereafter: Neue Etappe), in: Geschrif-
ten und Informationen des DDR-Komitees fur Menschenrechte 1982, 43-57 at 43^ 46 and
49-50.
4. Article 27.1 CEDAW.
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other field." This part furthermore contains the complementary obligation for the
States Parties to incorporate the principle of equal treatment in their legislation,
and to modify existing discriminatory legislation. Adopting temporary measures
aimed at accelerating de facto equality of men and women is possible. States
undertake to modify customary practices based on ideas of inferiority or superior-
ity of either of the sexes.
The second part of the Convention deals with the right to participate in public
and political life. It also provides for equal treatment in nationality law, including
the nationality of children.
Economic, social and cultural rights are dealt with in part three. It contains
provisions on education, including the obligation to eliminate stereotypes in
educational materials. Discrimination in employment, in health care and other
areas of economic and social life are dealt with. Article 14 pays attention to the
situation of women in rural areas, and stresses the need for equal participation in
development planning and access to relevant training and education.
Part four of the Convention consists of provisions on equality before the law, and
on equal treatment in matters of family law.
The fifth part of the Convention contains the supervisory system. A Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women is established, consisting of
twenty-three experts in the field of women's rights. The States Parties undertake
to report to the Committee on the measures adopted to implement the Convention
and on the progress made, in the year following ratification and then every four
years and whenever the Committee so requests. The Committee meets for two
weeks every year.
And finally the Convention contains in part six the final clauses, dealing amongst
others with revision, with the entry into force and with reservations.
The Convention covers a wide range of women's rights, including civil and
political rights, economic and social rights as well as human rights related to
development. The preamble reaches beyond the usual scope of a preamble, and
seems to indicate that women's rights are related to international political goals.
The provisions are formulated in rather vague terms and may prove to be not
specific enough for a meaningful interpretation. The Convention reaches into the
private sphere, and given the scope and nature of women's discrimination this
seems a logical approach'. However, implementation of the Convention in the
private sphere may be considerably more difficult than implementation between
the states and the individuals under its jurisdiction. The CEDAW's supervisory
5. Cook, Women's Convention at 667-670; L.Lijnzaad. Het kussen van een kikker, de
werkelijke betekenis van het Vrouwenverdrag (hereafter: Met kussen van een kikker),
in: Nemesis 1991.2, 5-17 at 14-15: D.Sullivan. Gender equality and religious freedom:
toward a framework for conflict resolution, in: 24 JILP 1992. 795-856 at 799: S.C.Zear-
foss. Note, The Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women: Radical, Reasonable, or Reactionary? in: 12 MichJIL 1991. 903-942 at 907-909;
917-920.
300 CONVENTION ON WOMEN'S DISCRIMINATION
system, consisting of a reporting obligation only, is minimal and seriously
undermines the strength of the Convention's provisions'.
1.2. The law applicable to reservations
The dispute settlement procedure provided in article 29.1 contains the option of
referring a dispute unilaterally to arbitration, and if this is not successful,
unilateral referral to the International Court of Justice. Reservations may be made
to this provision under article 29.2. This provision will not be dealt with in what
follows.
According to article 28.2 CEDAW a reservation incompatible with the object and
purpose shall not be permitted. During the drafting of the Women's Convention
the issue of reservations has been discussed in relation to the universality -
integrity dilemma. Initial views were that reservations were not permitted
(Philippines), or that reservations were a sovereign right and could therefore not
be restricted (Eastern Europe). It was suggested by Finland that partial ratifica-
tion could be a measure to accommodate the obligations under the Convention. In
the same line of thought, Sweden suggested later on in the drafting debates that a
limited number of reservations might be allowed, valid for a short period of time,
by way of a transitional measure. The United Kingdom suggested that the
solution be sought along the lines of article 19 VCLT, and a number of States
felt that a reservations clause was not necessary in view of the adequacy of the
rules laid down in the Vienna Convention. Denmark submitted a proposal for a
reservations clause identical to article 20 CERD\ which was heavily criticized
by Japan*.
Ultimately, in the final stages of the drafting process the Danish draft lost much
of its substance because of the repeated views that the Vienna Convention
provided adequate rules. This lead to the formulation of article 28 as it now
stands'. Reading the drafting records some fifteen years later, one cannot but be
struck by the shadow the Vienna Convention cast over the debate. The delegates
clearly operated on the assumption that the Vienna Convention provided adequate
solutions fcr the universality - integrity dilemma they perceived. Since then, the
history of the Women's Convention has proved them to have been wrong.
6. Byrnes, The Work of the Committee at 56-59; Delbriick. op.cit. at 263. 269: Th.Meron,
Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Prohibition of Discrimination against Women, in:84
AJIL 1990, 213-217; and M.Wadstein. Implementation of the UN Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in: SIM Newsletter 1988,
5-21 at 19-21; Zearfoss, op.cit. at 922-924.
7. For a discussion of article 20 CERD see Chapter 4. par.1.2 supra.
8. About the drafting of article 28 CEDAW: Cook. Women's Convention at 673-678;
Rehof, 7rav<i<« at 234-237: and the UN documents mentioned.
9. Burrows, op.cit. at 460 says:The possibility of reservations may make it an attractive
instrument which would enable some States who would not otherwise be able to do so
i to ratify the Convention."
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Article 28 CEDAW reads:
"1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all States
the text of the reservations made by states at the time of ratification or accession.
2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention
shall not be permitted.
3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to this effect addressed to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall then inform all slates thereof.
Such notification shall take effect on the date on which it is received."
One might read article 28.2 CEDAW as a provision referred to in article 20.1
VCLT'°. Article 28.2 indicates which reservations are expressly authorized by
the Convention, namely the ones compatible with its object and purpose. This
implies a priori acceptance of all reservations fulfilling the compatibility require-
ment of article 28.2. No objections can be raised, as such reservations have been
accepted prior to opening the Convention for ratification.
States are supposed to make compatible reservations, and will indeed usually
maintain that their reservations are compatible. The system of a priori acceptance
leads to a situation in which (incompatible) reservations are accepted at the very
moment of ratification. A consequence of article 20.1 VCLT is that States Parties
give away their authority to determine the compatibility of each individual
reservation, on the assumption that contracting States will not ignore article 19.b
VCLT. It does not leave room for objections and leads to the instant acceptance
of a reservation". Moreover, the depository is supposed to monitor "article
19.b provisions". In this particular case the Secretary-General of the UN acting
as depositary would have to judge the compatibility of the reservations, which is
understandably a delicate matter.
Disagreement about the compatibility of the reservation is in this situation a
problem of treaty interpretation. The determination of compatibility may have to
take place within the dispute settlement procedure of article 29 CEDAW. The
purpose of the interpretation could either be to determine whether or not the
reservation is compatible, and if not to determine what would be the conse-
quences; or to interpret the reservation so that its impact does not extend beyond
the object and purpose of the Convention. Yet, the dispute settlement procedure
may not be available, as a large number of states have made reservations to
article 29.1.
10. Article 20.1 VCLT reads:"A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not
require any subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so
provides."
11. Article 19.b reads:"A State may formulate a reservation unless:
b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the
reservation in question, may be made .."
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In practice article 28.2 CEDAW has been understood to refer to article 19.c
VCLT'-. When the question arose in the Committee as to who was to monitor
article 28.2, and in particular whether the Committee itself had the competence to
do so", the Office for Legal Affairs of the UN Secretariat held the provision to
belong to the article 19.c VCLT system'''. It must be assumed that the literal
similarity between both provisions led to this interpretation. Monitoring whether
or not reservations are compatible would be a delicate task for the UN Secretariat
acting as depository. As this would be the only other alternative, it makes this an
acceptable solution.
Both article 19.c VCLT and 28.2 CEDAW mention "object and purpose" as a
yardstick for reservations, and in the Vienna Convention system the States Parties
are considered to be the guardians of the Convention's "object and purpose".
Although reservations incompatible with object and purpose may not be formu-
lated according to article 19.c, they need (theoretically) to be accepted. States
may object to reservations or otherwise, in accordance with article 20.4 and 20.5
VCLT, the reservation will be (tacitly) accepted 12 months after ratification.
While objections may not have a substantial impact on the treaty relations, they
are an opportunity to voice disapproval of certain reservations, thereby possibly
influencing the interpretation given to a reservation by the Committee. If the
opportunity to object is not used, one might however wonder whether there is
any relevant distinction between the tacit acceptance of article 20.5 and the a
priori acceptance of article 20.1 VCLT.
12. As stated by Czechoslovakia in A/41/608/Add.l:This provision of the Convention
(referring to article 28.1, EL) only confirms the general rule of the law of treaties
concerning reservations that is stated in article 19 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties." Cf. B.Graefrath. Menschenrechte und internationale (Cooperation,
Berlin 1988, at 69-70.
13. E.Oeser, Legal questions in the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (hereafter: Legal questions), in: 14 Bulletin of the GDR Committee for
Human Rights 1988, 86-99, at 93-95.
14. A/39/45 Volume II Annex II. Legal opinion submitted by the Treaty Section of the
Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat upon an Inquiry by the
Committee concerning the implementation of article 28 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
Rather than discussing the substance of the matter, the Treaty Section deals with the
procedural aspects of determining the incompatibility.
The opinion reads, inter alia:
,-j. "a)., the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
does not offer any specific criterion of incompatibility (the Treaty Section is far too
demanding at this point, there are little or no examples of treaties explicitly indicating
the content of a compatibility criterion. EL) ..a question of interpretation of the
Convention is involved here."
"b) Assuming a dispute arose with regard to the interpretation of article 28 of the
Convention, article 29 thereof would become applicable .."
"c)The depository., does not have the power to interpret the Convention..."
"d)..the functions of the Committee (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
vrt; Against Women) do not appear to include a determination of the compatibility of
reservations..". ..
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Article 28.2 does indeed not contain a specific criterion as to what the "object
and purpose" of the Women's convention are'*. Looking at theory and practice,
a number of suggestions as to the core obligations have been made. Cook
suggests that the object and purpose of the Convention is that the states parties
move progressively towards elimination of discrimination, and that consequently
reservations that threaten the achievement of this goal are contrary to the object
and purpose".
The Committee itself has indicated during its discussions with the States that it
considers articles 2", 9 and 16" to be provisions essential to the object and
purpose of the Convention.
In its reply to the survey by the Secretary General", Canada suggested that
reservations to general provisions such as articles 1, 2, 3 and 24 were prohibited,
as well as reservations to particularly crucial provisions such as article 15. Other
criteria in order to establish incompatibility would be whether a significant aspect
of national life was involved, or whether the reservation aimed at a complete
provision or at specific elements of the provision. The latter criteria seem to
outline modalities of incompatibility, whereas the first two criteria provided more
insight into the substantial content of the "object and purpose" of the Convention,
as viewed by Canada.
Looking at the practice of the four States that have objected most frequently
(Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands and Sweden), their objections seem to
specifically aim at reservations to articles 2, 9, 11, 15 and 16*\
Authors writing about the Convention have suggested a number of rules that
could be considered core obligations under the Conventions. Writing elsewhere
about the way to determine compatibility. Cook suggests that it be measured by
quantitative and qualitative factors, and indicates that "object and purpose" are
related to the situation in the reserving States rather than to one singular objective
norm-'. She writes that the Women's Convention "mandates relative assessment
of reservations for the purpose of legal determination of compatibility"^-. This
approach necessarily leads to a relative system. However, Cook also mentions a
number of provisions that have the character of core rights, such as article 2 and
15. H.Charlesworth, C.Chinkin, S.Wright. Feminist approaches to international law, in: 85
AJIL 1991, 613-645, at 632-633: Zearfoss. op.cit. at 924-925.
16. Cook. Women's Convention at 648.
17. See discussion of the initial reports by Bangladesh and Egypt, par.3.1 infra.
18. See discussion about the initial report by the Republic of Korea, par.3.1 infra.
19. To be discussed in par. 2.4.1 infra.
20. For a discussion of the objections see par.2.1 infra.
21. Cook, Women's Convention at 680. writes:To propose that compatibility is specific to
the circumstances of individual countries, and that with such features as a large
differential literacy rate between men and women or with many households headed by
women are different from other countries, suggests that legal determination of compati-
bility arises not from the object and purpose of the convention per se, but from the
specific applications of treaty provisions to individual countries. In other words compati-
bility may seem determinable not as a function of interpretation of the treaty as a
whole, but from socio-political measurements of effects of reservations on women."
22. Cook, Women's Convention at 681.
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the obligation therein to eliminate discrimination of women without delay. Other
rights within the ambit of "object and purpose" are, in the opinion of Cook, the
entrance into military service under article 7^, article 9, article 11, article 15
and article 16. In discussing the reservations referring to Sharia law, Jacobs
suggests that articles 2, 9 and 16 are core obligations*. I would personally like
to suggest that articles 2 and 5 are essential obligations outlining the goals of the
Convention. On the basis of the notion that protection against the most detrimen-
tal restrictions to the elimination of discrimination^ are necessary; articles 9
(nationality), 11 (employment), 15 (equality before the law) and 16 (equality in
family law) would also seem to be core-obligations.
On the whole there would seem to be a communis opinio on the core value of
articles 2, 9, 11, 15 and 16. While article 2 presents the goals of the Convention
in a nutshell, the other articles deal with discrimination in the fields of nation-
ality, labour, equality before the law and equality in family matters. It may be
suggested that these are the fields in which discrimination is most detrimental to
the achievement of women's equal rights.
.!#<,$£. -'<•> Reservations and declarations
Up until now-* 120 states have ratified Convention. Of these 81 ratified without
reservations-', 23 made reservations in accordance with article 29 (the dispute
settlement procedure)-*, and 27 made reservations to substantive provisions or
other declarations. The reservations relating to the dispute settlement procedure
will not be dealt with in depth. In the following the focus will be on the reserva-
tions and declarations made to the Convention's substantive provisions.
- preamble -
France, and the Federal Republic of Germany have made interpretative
declarations concerning the 11th paragraph^ of the preamble"'. France indi-
23. Cook, Women's Convention at 692. writes:"(W]omen have few prospects of equality with
men where they are legally excluded from military careers or advancement." The present
cJi m ,W4, author does not agree with this point of view.
24. : MJacobs, Onder Voorbehoud. In: Nemesis 1993, 81-87, at 81-82.
25. See for a discussion of ways to determine the content of object and purpose, Chapter 3,
par.2.1 supra.
26. ST/LEG/SER.E/11, 31 December 1992.
27. Or have withdrawn their reservations to this date.
28. 8 reservations to this provision have been withdrawn.
29. It reads:"Affirming that the strengthening of international peace and security, relaxation
of international tension, mutual co-operation among all States irrespective of their social
and economic systems, general and complete disarmament, and in particular nuclear
disarmament under strict and effective international control, the affirmation of the
principles of justice, equality and mutual benefit in relations among countries and the
realization of the right of peoples under alien and colonial domination and foreign
occupation to self-determination and independence, as well as respect for national
sovereignty and territorial integrity, will promote social progress and development and
(continued...)
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cates that it contains debatable elements, whereas the FRG states that it "would
be unable to recognize as legally valid" the formulation of the right to self-
determination in the 11th paragraph. These declarations both seek to maintain a
different interpretation of the principle of self-determination than the one laid
down in the preamble. The Netherlands objected to both the 10th and the 11th
paragraph, indicating that it feels that it is undesirable to include these political
considerations into the preamble. Moreover they were not related to the achieve-
ment of total equality between men and women.
Although the preamble is an integral part of the treaty, it is not legally bind-
ing". The preamble is merely an introduction to the treaty. Thus, even if the
declarations are aimed at restricting the interpretation of the right to self-determi-
nation, they do not exclude or modify the legal effects of any provision of the
treaty, and can thus not be considered reservations.
- general reservations -
Although as a rule reservations of a general nature are prohibited, because of the
uncertainty they bring for the co-contractants both Malawi and Libya" made
such reservations".
Malawi, in a reservation withdrawn in 1991, upheld traditional customs and
practices rather than the Convention in cases of conflict*'. While the reservation
seemed to be aimed at article 5.2 CEDAW, the modification of social and cul-
tural patterns of conduct, it in fact encompassed discrimination in all spheres of
society. Without wanting to ridicule the importance of Malawian customs and
practices, these would almost everywhere be the foundation of discrimination
against women. As Cook quite rightly says: "reservations made on grounds of
culture are suspect"". If anything the reservation was incompatible with the aim
of the Convention, and made Malawi's adherence to the Convention ambiguous.
29.(...continued)
as a consequence will contribute to the attainment uf full equality between men and
women.
30. Criticizing the preamble: Burrows, op.cit. at 423-424; Delbriick op.cit. at 255; Meron,
op.cit. at 58-59. Advocating the linking of women's rights to other international political
questions: Oeser, Neue Etappe, at 46.
31. Cf. article 2.1.d VCLT. ^
32. Libyan reservation invoking Sharia law to be dealt with in par.3.1 infra.
33. See about the specificity rule Chapter 3. par.2.1.2 supra.
34. The Malawian reservation read:"Owing to the deep-rooted nature of some traditional
customs and practices of Malawians, the Government of the Republic of Malawi shall
not for the time being, consider itself bound by such of the provisions of the Conventi-
on as require immediate eradication of such traditional customs and practices."
35. Byrnes, The Work of the Committee at 53; Cook, Women's Convention at 689;
similarly: RJ.Cook, Etnische culturen en vrouwendiscriminatie (hereafter: Etnische
culturen); in: 3 Nemesis 1987. 49-55 at 50-52; and the anonymous quote "When men are
oppressed, it is a tragedy, when women are oppressed, it is their culture."
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- article 1 -
The United Kingdom, also on behalf of various dependent territories, has made
rather extensive declarations concerning article 1, the definition of women's
discrimination".
Firstly there is a reservation to the extent that the phrase "irrespective of their
marital status"" does not prohibit discrimination between single and married
persons, but merely prohibits discrimination between married men and married
women. i*4J«afc»a«ii«*¥KRid ;si*k-y$-.si-*-s;..a,'ty-fe-S5«r
The second reservation relating to article 1 deals amongst other things with suc-
cession to the throne, peerage and affairs of religious denominations'*. Cutting
it into pieces, it contains four different reservations. •*<i.# .^S>H»••iitBB.-...
As far as the reservation deals with succession to the throne, it is necessary to
determine which of the rights laid down in the Convention are involved. Without
wanting to ponder on specific aspects of royal succession, the reservation
obviously restricts the application of article 7, equality in the participation in
political and public life". It should be noted that other states wanting to uphold
male priority in royal succession opt for the much more restricted approach of
making a reservation to article 7*. It is difficult to see the point of bringing up
this issue in relation to the definition of women's discrimination.
As concerns the succession to, or possession and enjoyment of the peerage, titles
of honour, social precedence or armorial bearings it is again hard to determine to
which of the rights formulated in the Convention they exactly relate. These
traditions seem to have an impact on the enjoyment of a variety of rights, such as
the right to hold public office (article 7), and the right of equality before the law
(article 15)'". It could be assumed that these customs belong to the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women that article 5 seeks to eliminate,
although not everyone will accept that they are based on "the idea of the inferior-
36. About the definition of discrimination against women in the Convention see: Cook,
Women's Convention at 667-670; Lijnzaad. Het kussen van een kikker at 6-7; Meron,
Human Rights Law-making at 59-63: Zearfoss, op.cit at 907-909 and 917-920.
'#J . ft'-' On this element of the definition see the Canadian answer in A/41/608 at 5: "It is
?4 understood that the term "discrimination against women" means any practice or act
W- which distinguishes women from other citizens because of their sex and/or marital
'*••' status in such a way as to prevent them from fully realizing their human rights and
> fundamental freedoms in all areas of national life." Cf. article 23.b CEDAW, and
- Burrows, op.cit. at 426.
3B. The reservations reads:" ..the United Kingdom's ratification is subject to the understan-
ding that none of its obligations under the Convention shall be treated as extending to
i,n; • t*>» the succession to. or possession and enjoyment of. the Throne, the peerage, titles of
' " ' • ' ™" honour, social precedence or armorial bearings, or as extending to the affairs of
« i3 >•.• religious denominations or orders or to the admission into or service in the Armed
Forces of the Crown."
*3W. • Cook, Etnische culturen at 52; Cook, Women's Convention at 680 discussing this as a
•'•"' symbolic qualitatively limited reservation.
40. Cf. reservations to article 7 by Belgium. Luxembourg and Spain, dealt with infra.
41. Or perhaps even article 16.1.h CEDAW. .,<% )
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ity or superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women".
As far as the affairs of religious denominations are concerned, the reservation
poses interesting questions. Making a reservation excluding the applicability of
the Convention in affairs between private persons (if one may qualify the affairs
of religious denominations as such) seems to indicate on the contrary that the
United Kingdom is of the opinion that, in the absence of such a reservation, the
provision would be applicable. Conventions are usually supposed to contain
obligations binding upon the states parties, and in the case of human rights
treaties, obligations between States and persons under their jurisdiction. The
Women's Convention has an even wider scope, it claims applicability between
private persons'*-. The United Kingdom may have felt the need to reserve its
position as far as the affairs of its State Church are concerned. At this point in
time it seems highly unlikely that a state church in Europe would be taken to be a
state organ, for whose compliance with the Convention a state party would be
responsible"'.
The final part of the reservation related to article 1 deals with the admission into,
or service in the Armed Forces of the Crown. It is not clear what is actually
covered by this reservation, whether it seeks to exclude combat duties. Assuming
that these are meant, the actual reservation is again much narrower and should
have been directed at a specific provision. One might wonder if women should
not rather have the freedom to decide for themselves on the safety risks involved
in military careers'".
- article 2 -
Article 2 CEDAW contains a variety of obligations to eliminate discrimination in
the legislative sphere'". Bangladesh excludes the application of article 2 because
the provision is in conflict with Sharia law. Egypt indicates that it will comply
with the provision provided that this does not run counter to Sharia law, and Iraq
mentions the equivalent rights of women under Sharia law with respect to article
2"*.
42. Lijnzaad, Het kussen van een kikker at 12-15: General Recommendation 19 (Eleventh
Session). Expressing a contrary opinion: Dclbriick, op.cit. at 260-261.
43. A.Krishnaswami, Study of discrimination in the matter of religious rights and practices,
New York 1960 [E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.l| at 49:"Where there is an Established
K . Church, the relationship between the Stale and that Church is usually so intimate that
-V, the political organs of the State are clothed with the power to decide questions relating
to faith, doctrine and ritual, including rules for the management of religious affairs. But
•;--:i.. this does not mean that public authorities can intervene at will in the management of
<W'fl«4 religious affairs In addition, today, in a large number of countries having an
.»•" ~*i -jf >j Established Church, the State concedes considerable autonomy to elected church bodies
in several fields, including not only day-to-day administration but also the organization
v«; {.!;,'> of the church."
4Ar ->-i > Comparable reservations have been made with respect to article 7 by Austria, Germany
and Thailand. r^»
45. Wadstein, op.cit. at 10. .^.i ...,-•»•&
46. See infra for a discussion of reservations related to Sharia law. , 3 £?
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On behalf of the Cook Islands, New Zealand entered a reservation implying the
right not to apply articles 2.f and 5.a in view of the inheritance of chiefly titles.
This is supposedly comparable with the British reservation to article 1, discussed
supra*'.
The United Kingdom and a number of dependent territories entered a long-
winded reservations related to articles 2.f and 2.g dealing with the fact that the
UK is constantly reviewing its legislation related to the elimination of discrimi-
nation against women. The reservation is initially self-applauding, as nothing in
the Convention restricts a state's freedom to review its own legislation, as far as
it ameliorates the position of women". But there is a snake in the grass, as the
reservation ends by stating that the legislative changes would be dependent on
economic considerations'". The subordination of legislative changes to economic
policy completely ignores the object and purpose of the Convention*. Article 2
is one of the few provisions formulated as an absolute obligation, using the
expression "all appropriate means and without delay", leaving no room for
gradual implementation depending on economic circumstances.
The reservation states, also in respect of article 2.f and 2.g, that the United
Kingdom will continue to apply national legislation as far as sexual offenses or
prostitution are concerned". If national legislation is not discriminatory, no
reservation is needed. However, there may be difference in the treatment of male
and female prostitutes, which is prohibited by the Convention on the grounds of
article 1, as well as article 2.g and h. It is noteworthy that the United Kingdom
brings up the issue of prostitution in relation to article 2, dealing with legislative
measures to eliminate discrimination, rather than article 6 which explicitly deals
with the suppression of prostitution*-.
-article 4 -
The United Kingdom states with regard to article 4 of the CEDAW, temporary
measures aimed at accelerating </e_/hcto equality, states that it intends to under-
stand article 1 in terms of this provision and thus is not obliged to repeal laws
providing for women to be treated favourably.
47. Cook, Women's Convention, at 688-689.
48. Cf.article 23a CEDAW.
49. The reservation reads:" .. by keeping under review such of its laws and regulations as
may still embody significant differences in treatment between men and women with a
view to making changes to those laws and regulations KTKVJ fo rfo TO wou/rf ftc co/?i/>a//We
WM/7 ewe/mo/ o/id overriding cowi/rfcrano/ii o/mvio/mc /?o/icv."(my emphasis, EL).
50. Cf.Y.Klerk, Working paper on Article 2(2) and article 3 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in: 9 HRQ 1987, 250-273, and similarly
L.Lijnzaad. Teleurstellende vrijheid, de positie van vrouwen in post-communistisch
Polen. in: Nemesis 1993, 15-23 at 19.
$1. It reads:" With regard to paragraphs ( 0 and (g) of this Article (article 2, EL) the
•,<"**rr United Kingdom reserves the right to continue to apply its law relating to sexual
offenses and prostitution: this reservation will apply equally to any future law which may
modify or replace it."
52. Burrows, op.cit. at 430-431.
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- article 5 -
Article 5 CEDAW deals with the elimination of prejudices and the proper under-
standing of the role of parents. In relation to article S.b, France made an
interpretative declaration, explaining that "family education" means public
education concerning the family, adding that this should be applied in line with
article 17 CCPR and article 8 ECHR. As both provisions deal with the right to
privacy, one might question whether the French declaration is not in fact a
reservation. This depends upon the operational scope of article 5, which is at
present not very clear".
The reservation by France to article S.b and 16. l.d deals with the joint exercise
of parental authority. These are provisions on the common responsibility of men
and women in the upbringing and development of their children(article S.b) and
the same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status
in matters relating to their children(article 16.l.d), in both cases stressing that the
interests of the children are the primordial consideration. France states that joint
parental authority can not be deduced from the Convention in cases which French
national legislation provides for single parent authority. It is doubtful whether the
Convention has a mandatory system of joint parental authority, it does not
literally say so. The idea of a common responsibility, and the same rights and
responsibilities as a parent do not seem to contradict the possibility of single
parent authority in cases where this is to the benefit of the child. Bearing the
interests of the child in mind the distribution of parental authority should however
not be discriminatory for women, measured by the standard laid down in article 1
CEDAW. The nature of the French declaration will in fact depend on the criteria
involved in the attribution of parental authority in French domestic legislation. If
the interests of the child and equal opportunities for women to obtain single
parental authority are guaranteed, the statement is an interpretative declaration
rather than a reservation*''.
- article 7 -
Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain have made a reservation to article 7.b, dealing
with the participation in the formulation of government policy and the right to
hold public office". They seek to maintain a male priority system in the suc-
cession to the throne**. The Convention cannot be considered to change basic
constitutional rules, like the ones on succession to the throne in monarchies, for
the internal organization of a state belongs to the "rfo/wfl/'/M" resfrw". Leaving
53. About article 5 CEDAW:Cook, Women's Convention at 669; Lijnzaad. Het kussen van
een kikker at 7. General Recommendations 3 (sixth session. 1987) and 6 (seventh
session. 1988) do not contain specific guidelines for the implementation of article 5.
54. Cf. the "distinguishing" approach of the European Commission on Human Rights in the
Belilos case, discussed in Chapter 3, par.4.1.2 supra.
55. Cook, Ethnische culturen at 52; Cook, Women's Convention at 680, 692-693; Sullivan,
op.cit. note 64 at 822.
56. Cf. supra the United Kingdom reservation to article 1, and the New Zealand (Cook
Islands) reservation to articles 2.f and 5.a.
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aside the question of object and purpose of the treaty in relation to succession,
the reservations will, in practice, only be disadvantageous to a very small number
of women. Moreover, looking at everyday political practice, there is little
difference between states explicitly stating that their hereditary head of state will
always be a man, and states who through their electoral system have so far never
been able to appoint a woman.
In a reservation withdrawn in 1984, France had reserved the right to apply
article 7 in conformity with a provision of its electoral code with respect to
disqualifications for persons who had obtained the French nationality. The other
major group of reservations dealing with article 7 concerns restricting the entry
of women in armed forces. Without mentioning the relevant provision New Zea-
land together with Niue and the Cook Islands entered a reservation dealing with
the recruitment and service in the Armed Force as far as it concerns situations of
armed conflict, and law enforcement forces in situations involving violence or the
threat of violence. Explicitly mentioning article 7.b the Federal Republic of
Germany states that its Constitution prohibits women rendering service involving
the use of arms. And Austria restricts the service of women in armed forces to
the limits established in national legislation. Thailand formulated a strikingly
vague reservation in respect of articles 7 and 10 CEDAW. It reserves its right to
apply national legislation where it concerns national security, maintenance of
public order and service or employment in the military or paramilitary force".
The reservation literally encompasses not only the whole of article 7 but also the
whole of the rather extensive article 10, and stretches beyond the requirements of
precision.
The link between these reservations and the rights laid down in the Convention is
article 7.b where it reads:"., to hold public office and perform all public func-
tions at all levels of government"*. If one could consider participation in the
armed forces a public function, the next question would then be whether this
restriction runs contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention. The fact
that military positions sometimes carry a lot of prestige and add to the dignity of
the official, makes the unavailability of these positions for women discriminatory.
It has been said that as the military sometimes take over political power, the
reservation thus deprives women of the essential right of participation in govern-
ment policy and must therefore be considered contrary to object and purpose".
57. The Thai reservation discussed in par.3.1 infra.
58. Cf. the United Kingdom's reservation to article 1 in respect of the Armed Forces of the
Crown.
59. Cook, Women's Convention at 692-693, and idem, Ethnische culturen at 52:"Men hoeft
alleen maar de frequentie op te merken waarmee hoge militaire officieren politieke
macht verwerven, om te begijpen hoe een dergelijke discriminate van vrouwen hen kan
uitsluiten van volledige dcelname aan invloedrijke sferen van net politieke en openbare
leven".[One only has to notice the frequent seizure of political power by high-ranking
•'' military officers to understand how such discrimination of women excludes them from
complete participation in influential spheres of political and public life.]. Criticizing
Cook's point of view: L.Lijnzaad, Voorbehouden bij Vrouwenverdrag (hereafterVoorbe-
houden), 4 Nemesis 1988, 105-111, note 15 at 110.
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This seems a false argument, for situations of military COH/M </ War cannot be the
standard used to measure political influence of women. As far as these reserva-
tions must be understood to imply protection of women (whether or not inspired
by their procreative function) one might wonder whether such protection is not in
fact paternalistic, contrary to the spirit of the Convention*".
Israel made a reservation dealing with the fact that women can in a number of
cases not be appointed judges in religious courts. The relation with article 7.b is
probably that such courts have a public function.
- article 9 -
Article 9 of the Convention deals with equality in matters of nationality, para-
graph 1 proclaiming equal rights of men and women, and the second paragraph
providing for equality with respect to the nationality of children*'.
Both Iraq and the Republic of Korea indicate that they will not be bound by
article 9, without elaborating on the reasons why. France in its reservation
declares that the application of its national legislation is not precluded by article
9, while the United Kingdom states that, although its Nationality Act does not
allow any discrimination against women, it reserves the right to apply certain
temporary or transitional provisions that may be still in force. Ireland had made
a reservations, withdrawn in 1986, to the effect that it would continue to apply its
legislation on the acquisition of citizenship through marriage. With regard to
article 9.1, Turkey stresses that its nationality law is not in conflict with the
Convention. The reasoning provided in the reservation is striking: "the intent of
those provisions regulating acquisition of citizenship through marriage (articles
5.1, 15 and 17 of the Turkish law on Nationality, EL) is to prevent stateless-
ness". It seems to imply that the idea behind article 9 CEDAW is the prevention
of statelessness, which is a misconception, not only has this never been the aim,
limiting statelessness has in practice been always been discriminatory towards
women'".
States have organized their nationality laws according to simple principles, in
which the nationality of men (be it as husband or father) is of primordial import-
ance. There has been a tendency to promote single nationality couples, that can
be discerned in treaties banning bipatridy and statelessness'"'. This proved to be
60. On maternity protection as a legitimate ground for unequal treatment (articles 4.2,
ll.l .f and 11.2.d CEDAW) see Burrows, op.cit. at 428: Meron, op.cit. at 73 and
Wadstein, op.cit.at 16.
61. Cook. Women's Convention at 693-6%: Wadstein. op.cit. at 9, stresses the fact that
article 9 prescribes that States Via//gra/i/ women equal right with men".
62. Cook, Women's Convention at 696 discussing relevant case law under the CCPR and the
ACHR.
G.R.de Groot, Gelijkheid van man en vrouw in net nationaliteitsrecht, Preadvies
Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking No.25, Deventer 1977 at 68-69.
63. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women. New York 20 February 1957;
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. New York 30 August 1961; Convention
on the reduction of cases of multiple nationality and military obligations in case of
(continued...)
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discriminatory towards women because of the weight attached to the nationality
of the husband and father, which implies relying on the stereotypes that article 5
CEDAW seeks to eradicate. It does not seem possible to reconcile the aim of the
single nationality family with the aims of the Convention. States will thus have to
determine which of the rules prevails and renounce either of the treaties.
The real bone of contention is the issue of equality in respect to the nationality of
children, laid down in article 9.2. Recent authors on nationality law have so far
scarcely discussed this provision", at best merely mentioned that it is an
innovating rule".
Cyprus indicates that it will repeal its reservation concerning article 9.2 once the
relevant law is amended. Jamaica and Jordan simply state that they don't not
consider themselves bound by the provision. Thailand, in a reservation with-
drawn in 1991, and Tunisia reserved their obligations under article 9.2 with a
view to national legislation. Egypt bases its reservation on the fact that as two
nationalities may be prejudicial to the future of the child, children acquire their
father's nationality. Moreover women, on marrying an alien, commonly agree to
their children having their father's nationality, and this does not infringe on the
equality between men and women. As with the Turkish reservation before, it
should be underlined that the object of the Convention has not been to restrict
bipatridy.
As far as article 9.2 is concerned, the question is not only what the practical
consequences of this provision will be**, but whether equal treatment in relation
to the nationality of offspring is of such importance that it is essential to the
Convention's object and purpose. Here in particular, object and purpose demon-
strate their inaccuracy as a yardstick. While the rule laid down in article 9.2 is
well balanced and follows logically from the Convention's notion of equality, it
raises the question of the acceptability of reservations on the fringe of the object
and purpose of a treaty.
- article 10 -
The elimination of discrimination in education implies not only equal access to
the same education, but also demands the elimination of stereotypes in educa-
tional material. Equal opportunities in education are vital for achieving the
Convention's aim, and this rather extensive provision is of great importance.
63.(...continued)
multiple nationality, Strasbourg 6 May 1963 .
G.R. de Groot, Gelijkheid van man en vrouw, at 67-93.
64. G.R. de Groot, Staatsangehorigkeitsrecht im wandcl, "s Gravenhage, 1988 at 29; M.
Tratnik, Het nationaliteitsrecht in de Oosteuropese landen, Deventer, 1989 at 45.
65. Burrows, op.cit. at 434; M.-H.Marescaux, Nationality et Statut Personnel dans les
• ' ^ ' •••"•'• instruments internationaux des Nations Unies, in: M.Venvilghen, Nationality et Statut
Personnel, Bruxelles, 1984; 15-72 at 64-65; H.U.Jessurun d'Oliveira, Nationaliteit, in:
Internationaal Recht en Vrouwen, Zwolle. 1987, 279-291 at 287.
66. Burrows, op.cit. at 434; d'Oliveira, op.cit. at 287.
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Two states have so far made reservations in respect to article 10. Thailand made
a reservation dealing with national security, public order and the military". The
reservation could have been a simple national legislation reservation, had it not
been referring to the link between security interests and the right to education in
article 10, which makes the scope of the reservation very uncertain. An explana-
tion could be that student revolts have created internal political problems.
The United Kingdom in its reservation** refers to the obligation to guarantee
parental choice in education", and the liberty to establish educational institu-
tions™. It is unlikely that the Convention would restrict the rights mentioned,
and a reservation may not be necessary. The British declaration is however
formulated as a reservation, and indicates a priority between different human
rights instruments.
Another reservation of the United Kingdom concerns article 10.c. It underlines
that the central Government has a limited ability to influence educational
methods, as many aspects of teaching are within local control". Furthermore
the reservation excludes the obligation to solely encourage co-education. Whether
the Convention contains such a strict obligation is uncertain, as the article
reads:"...by encouraging coeducation and other types of education which will
help to achieve this aim (that is, the aim of eliminating any stereotyped concept
of the roles of men and women at all levels and in all forms of education)"^. In
view of recent discussions on the advantages of separate education as a way of
strengthening the self-confidence of girls, the interpretation of article lO.c ought
not be too restrictive.
- article 11 -
Article 11 deals with equal treatment in the field of employment. The first
paragraph contains general rules, the second one deals with the prohibition of
discrimination on grounds of marriage and maternity, whereas the third para-
graph contains the obligation to periodically review protective legislation.
Amongst the reservations dealing with article 11, there are a good many dealing
with the protection of women. Wadstein's analysis on the issue of protection
seems quite correct:"(W)ith reference to the need to 'protect motherhood', States
67. The reservation reads:" In all matters which concern national security, maintenance of
public order and service or employment in the military and paramilitary forces, the
Royal Thai Government reserves its right to apply the provisions of the Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, in particular articles 7
and 10. only within the limits established by national laws, regulations and practices."
68. The lay-out of ST/LEG/SER.E/11 almost hides the reservation to article 10. While the
numbers of the articles are underlined in the other reservations made by the United
Kingdom, this is missing as concerns article 1(1. Although one does not know if this is a
precise transcription of the British original, no doubt some editing on the part of the
Secretariat could have improved the legibility of the document.
69. As laid down in article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR and article 13.3 CESCR.
70. As laid down in article 13.4 CESCR.
71. On the same problem see Meron, op.cit. at 69-71.
72. Burrows, op.cit. at 437; Meron, op.cit. at 70.
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Parties still uphold protective legislation stipulating that women are not allowed to
work at night -...- or to carry out dangerous and unhealthy work in certain
branches of the economy ... Such protection ... reflects gender-stereotyping and
implies overemphasis on the reproductive role of women.""
The United Kingdom declares that the content of 11.1. a must be taken to be the
same as that of article 6 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. With regard to the right of equal remuneration Canada, in a declaration
withdrawn in 1992, stated its national practice, and indicated that the object and
purpose of article 11. l.d are a guideline for the further development of policy on
the issue.
Probably the most blunt reservation to article 11 has been made by Mauritius,
which simply states that it does not consider itself bound by provisions 11.1 .b
(the right to the same employment opportunities) and 11.l.d (the right to equal
remuneration for work of equal value). In view of the object and purpose of the
Convention, the compatibility of the reservation of Mauritius is highly question-
able. A similar reservation to article l l . l . b by Thailand has been withdrawn in
1991.
Night work by women, and protective legislation are mentioned by Austria and
Thailand in relation to article 11. Both refer to the prevalence of their national
legislation'''. Malta's reservation to article 11 specifically deals with maternity
protection, mentioning article 4.2 CEDAW and the health and safety of women
and the human foetus.
Ireland in its reservation equates the content of the articles l l . l . b , c and d with
its national legislation to implement the European Community standards on equal
opportunities. Although the reservation seems to indicate the priority of one
treaty over another", it is a plain and simple reservation favouring national
legislation. Another Irish reservation with respect to article 11.1, withdrawn in
1986, also referred to national legislation on the rights of married women in
social security schemes.
The United Kingdom made a long-winded reservation in relation to article 11. It
deals with protection, and in particular favours ILO Convention 45 (Convention
concerning the employment of women on underground work in mines of all
kinds) to articles 11.1 and 4.2 of the Convention'*. Then the reservation deals
with national legislation, not only legislation in force but also future legislation
that will be compatible with the Convention. The problem with this reservation is
not so much that the United Kingdom indicates that it will maintain current
73. Wadstein, op.cit. at 16. Cf. N.Kaufman Hevener, An Analysis of Gender Based Treaty
Law: Contemporary Developments in Historical Perspective, in: 8 HRQ 1986, 70-88 at
73, 82-86: Cook, Women's Convention at 696-698; Meron. op.cit. at 73-77 and the "Note
on the Question of Compatibility between the UN Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women and Certain ILO Conventions on the Protecti-
on of Women" in: 68 ILO Official Bulletin 1985, Ser.A, no.l, 40-42.
74. Hevener, op.cit. at 71.
75. Cf. article 23b CEDAW.
76. Hevener. op.cit. at 71.
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legislation, but the pretentious claim that future legislation will be compatible
with the Convention". Of course, any State Party to the Convention must be
expected to legislate in conformity with the Convention, but who is to decide on
the compatibility of legislation? One could argue that this is within the compet-
ence of the Committee, at any rate a reservation is not a carte blanche for future
legislation. A similar reservation referring to ILO Convention 45 had been made
by New Zealand, and it was withdrawn in 1989.
The second paragraph of article 11 contains in sub-section b, a provision that
urges states to take measure to ensure paid maternity leave. Both Australia and
New Zealand reserve the right not to apply this provision, Australia explicitly
indicating in which parts of the country paid maternity leave is available, thereby
restricting its reservation.
The United Kingdom in respect to article 11.2 states that it reserves the right to
apply any non-discriminatory requirement for a qualifying period of employment
or insurance. As article 11.2 deals with the specific situation of women, matters
such as pregnancy, maternity and the combination of family obligations with
work responsibilities, it is hard to see how a qualifying period could be applied in
a non-discriminatory way. The reservation seems to run contrary to the Conven-
tion's notion of equality™.
- article 13 -
This article provides for the elimination of discrimination in different areas of
economic and social life, and involves matters like family benefits, bank loans as
well as recreational activities.
Ireland indicates that it is considering whether additional legislation governing
access to financial credits is necessary, and makes a reservation for the time
being. Article 13 requests gradual implementation and the Irish reservation
indicates that it has a temporary character. Another Irish reservation dealing with
article 13.a and national legislation on social welfare benefits had been withdrawn
in 1986.
The United Kingdom seems to reserve discriminatory tax legislation, at least as
far as the reservation is concerned, the taxation of married women appears to be
completely dependent on their husbands taxation, not only in respect to the
assessment, but also in relation to the right to appeal". This last element would
77. It reads (twice):This reservation will apply equally to any future legislation which may
modify or replace such legislation on the understanding that the terms of such
legislation will be compatible with the United Kingdom's obligations under the Conven-
tion."
78. Cf. article S.b CEDAW.
79. Although the technicalities of British tax legislation are beyond the scope of this thesis,
it is illustrative to repeat parts of the reservation :"... to continue to apply the income
tax and capital gains tax legislation which:
i) deems for income tax purposes the income of a married women living with her
husband ... to be her husband's income and not to be her income (...); and
(continued...)
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seem to be an implicit reservation to article 15.2 CEDAW, the right to be treated
equally in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals'". It is noteworthy that
the reservation does not even try to uphold the varnish of equality*'. Malta
made similar reservations to article 13: it reserves the right to apply discrimina-
tory tax legislation in which the income of married women is deemed to be the
income of her husband; and it reserved the right to apply discriminatory social
security legislation which makes benefits payable to the husband as head of the
household.
Moreover, Malta made a reservation in respect of articles 13, 15 and 16 that it
would be applying present family and property law until changes in that field had
been concluded.
- article 14 -
The problems of rural women are dealt with in article 14*-. It has been said that
in particular the second paragraph of the article contains programmatic provi-
sions, so that it will be hard to determine whether or not a state fulfils its obliga-
tions. •• ••"• "iw» ann'/j ijfin'iisuji i> *-'u« i&a o; tit*!! i! U ,aaiUi«*i?<ftX|.*fl j h w
France is the only state to have made interpretative declarations with respect to
this provision. The first one deals with article 14.2.c, and holds that women who
qualify have independent rights within the framework of social security. This
would seem to be precisely the Convention's requirement, although it seems
somewhat strange to bring this up in relation with article 14, article 11.1.e being
the general rule on social security. The second declaration deals with the fact that
the services mentioned in article 14.2.h (the enjoyment of adequate living
conditions) need not be free of charge. There is indeed no such implication in the
provision, it merely deals with the elimination of discrimination in the enjoyment
of these living conditions.
- article 15 -
Equality before the law is for certain one of the most vital provisions of the
Convention. Apart from this, article 15 also deals with the right to an identical
79.(...continued)
ii) requires tax in respect of such income and of chargeable gains accruing to such a
**** ^ married woman to be assessed on her husband (...) and consequently (...) restricts to her
husband the right to appeal against any such assessment and to be heard or to be
t'.ni represented at the hearing of such appeal;
fc> jij) ...
i ) f^e fact that the reservation so specifically refers to gender and marital status(cf. article
1 CEDAW) as a decisive clement in tax legislation implies that this is a case of direct
discrimination.
Discussing this same issue in the Lindsay v. United Kingdom case before the European
Commission on Human Rights (9 Eur.H.R.Rep. 1986, 55), RJ.Cook, International
Human Rights Law Concerning Women: Case Notes and Comments, in: 23 VaJTL 1990,
779-818. at 808-809. ;i
Wadstein, op.cit. at 18.
Burrows, op.cit at 446448, Delbriick. op.cit. at 260, Hevener. op.cit. at 75-76.
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legal capacity, the prohibition of contracts restricting women's legal capacity as
well as the right to movement and the right to choose residence and domicile*".
In an interpretative declaration the United Kingdom states that it understands
"legal capacity" as referring merely to the existence of a separate and distinct
legal personality. As this seems to be the ordinary meaning of the term", one
fails to see the necessity of this declaration.
Belgium in its reservation to articles 15.2 and 3, refers to an interim law
providing as a transitional rule that couples could choose to maintain their prior
(and discriminatory) marriage contracts. France made a reservation with respect
to articles 15.2 and 15.3, which was withdrawn in 1986 when the discriminatory
legislation had been amended. 3*rt£^irt*m
Thailand, in a reservation withdrawn in 1991, simply stated that it did not
consider itself bound by article 15.3, the prohibition of contracts restricting the
legal capacity of women. Although there is no obligation to motivate reserva-
tions, this statement demonstrates complete indifference to woman's rights, and
would seem to be distinctly in conflict with the object and purpose of the
Convention. The reservation by Ireland dealing with article 15.3 states that it
would not supplement existing legislation already according identical legal
capacity to women to give effect to this provision. The idea is apparently that
legislation in accordance with article 15.2 (legal capacity) renders article 15.3
superfluous. It would seem correct that if states are obliged to afford identical
legal capacity to women, private parties can a fortiori not restrict legal capacity.
The United Kingdom, on the other hand restricts article 15.3 by stating that only
the discriminatory part of the contract, and not the entire contract, would be
void. Although there may be some merit in this approach from the point of view
of the law of contracts, there is on the other hand much to be said for complete
nullity such as the Convention provides for. It does justice to the fundamental
nature of the right to legal capacity.
The Convention's rule on movement and the right to choose a residence in article
15.4 CEDAW has not had a favourable reception**. Brazil, Jordan, Tunisia
and Turkey all exclude the provision. Ireland made a reservation which was
withdrawn in 1986, after the amendment of the relevant legislation. The Brazilian
and Jordanian reservations are not motivated, whereas Tunisia and Turkey state
that the provision is not compatible with national legislation"'. A question
" Cook, Women's Convention at 699-702; Sullivan, op.cit. at 845. ***'
"«4." " Cf. article 31 VCLT.
85. Wadstein, op.cit. at 19.
86. The Tunisian reservation contains the rather ambiguous formulation "[I]n accordance
with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Tunisian
•••"»• f **= Government emphasizes that the requirements of article 15.4 must not be interpre-
ted in a manner which conflicts with the provisions of the Personal Status Code..".
The provisions of the Vienna Convention to which the reservation refers are somewhat
misty. It might be that Tunisia purported to deliver an "instrument which was made by
one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty" as mentioned in
article 31.2.b of the Vienna Convention, thereby providing a context for the interpreta-
(continued...)
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arising in this respect would be the link between article 15.4 CEDAW and article
12.1 CCPR, also dealing with freedom of movement and the right to choose a
residence".
- article 16 -
The extensive provision on matters relating to marriage, family relations and in
general the personal status of women has been the object of many reserva-
tions'*. Treaty provisions determining the personal life of women, and conse-
quently the life of men, are threatening which may explain the large amount of
reservations". •*>*, rer-dw -58%i:iai /piindt^ foiq?.. ,-SSM. .ateirtw; >J£.ft* 1MU> '. ?~> * 1 «»«;h5i
The United Kingdom remarks that it does not regard the interests of the child as
directly relevant to the elimination of discrimination of women, and indicates that
the interests of the child do not have the same impact in matters of adoption as in
matters of custody*. The British statement need not be considered a reservation,
for the object of the provision was not to lay down rules with an eye to promot-
ing child welfare. However a future clash between women's rights and children's
rights, embodied in the Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child may be possible". Israel indicates in its reservation that the laws of
various religious groups do not conform with the provisions of article 16.
Thailand merely indicates that it does not consider itself bound by article 16.
One of the very basic rights is embodied in article 16.1.a, the right to enter into
marriage. Brazil, without further explaining the reasons why, expressed its
••«*•&»««•
86.(...continued)
.< •. ••if, •'*>" "f '"'* provision in the Tunisian situation. If that was the intention, the Tunisian
approach is bound to fail as the ordinary meaning of article 15.4 CEDAW within its
context, given the object and purpose of the CEDAW can be established beyond doubt,
in accordance with article 31.1 VCLT.
'^7.••"'^ <• Brazil, Jordan and Tunisia are all parties to the CCPR and ought to have made a
• similar reservation in respect to the CCPR provision, as it reads "[E]veryone (this
includes women, EL) lawfully within the territory of a State". However, no such
, , reservations have been made. It is hard to understand that the more general provision
article 12.1 CCPR is compatible with national legislation, whereas the more specific rule
of article 15.4 CEDAW is not.
88. Fourteen states have made reservations to article 16, of these reservations seven (two
' ' withdrawn) aim at article 16.1c (responsibilities and rights during marriage and at its
dissolution), six (two withdrawn) deal with article 16.Id (rights and responsibilities as
parents), five (one withdrawn) deal with article 16.l.f (guardianship) and eight reservati-
ons are aimed at article 16.1.g (personal rights as husband and wife).
89. Burrows, op.cit. at 450-452 presenting the background of this provision and predicting
some of the problems that were to arise; Cook, Women's Convention at 669-670; 702-
•>'5 706; S.Wright, Human rights and Women's rights: an Analysis of the United Nations
' .' Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, in:
Human rights in the twenty-first century: A Global Challenge, K.E.Mahoney and
P.Mahoney eds., Dordrecht 1993, 75-88 at 82-85.
• 90. The reservation reads:"and declares in this connection that the legislation of the United
J:< ,-f >: Kingdom regulating adoption, while giving a principal position to the promotion of the
ii .«> children's welfare, does not give to the child's interests the same paramount place as in
•••'"" issues concerning custody over children."
91. GA Res.44/25,20 November 1989. • , , , . - . . . . '-
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reservation concerning this provision. It should be noted that the Convention
distinguishes between the right to enter into marriage in sub-paragraph a, and the
right to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage with free and full consent in
sub-paragraph b. It is noteworthy that Brazil has recently become a party to the
CCPR, which in articles 23.2 and 3 provides for the right to marry provided that
man and woman are of marriageable age, to found a family and to enter into
marriage with free and full consent. •
The obligation to ensure the same rights and responsibilities during marriage and
upon its dissolution, provided in article 16.1.C, has been excluded by various
states. Without any explanation Brazil, Jordan, the Republic of Korea and
Tunisia merely indicate their reservation to this provision. Korea has since then
withdrawn its reservation, as has France as a consequence of changes in legisla-
tion. Turkey indicates the prevalence of national legislation (the Turkish Civil
Code), whereas Bangladesh does the same stating that the provision conflicts
with Sharia law.
Article 16.1.C CEDAW is matched by article 23.4 CCPR. Tunisia, is a party to
both the CCPR and the Convention, yet it never made a reservation in respect of
article 23.4 CCPR.
The equality of rights between parents, irrespective of their marital status is dealt
with in article 16.1.d, and here again Jordan, the Republic of Korea and
Tunisia made reservations without a clarification as to the necessity of the
reservations. Korea withdrew its reservation in 1991. Turkey again states that
the provision is not compatible with its Civil Code. Both France and Ireland
delve deeper into the substance of the provision. Ireland links article 16.1 .d and
16.1.f on the point of children born out of wedlock, and declares as its under-
standing that the Convention does not necessitate legislative action to accord
equal rights to men in respect of these children. This interpretation seems in line
with the object of the Convention, the burden of single-parent families usually
resting on the mother's shoulders. France makes a reservation in view of its
national legislation, stating that article 16.1 .d does not preclude the application of
article 383 of its Civil Code'-. The advantage of this particular reference to
national legislation, in comparison with the Turkish reservation, is the precision
with which the reserving state restricts the scope of its reservation. The reserva-
tion was withdrawn in 1986
Article 16.1 .e deals in a very general way with equal access to family planning.
Malta indicates that it will not understand this provision as imposing an obliga-
tion to legalize abortion. The Maltese reservation is over-cautious, as the
Women's Convention is generally considered not to contain a right to abortion.
Although the Convention provides for equality with regard to guardianship,
trusteeship and the adoption of children in article 16.l.f, this is subject to the
92. Article 383 CC reads:"L'administration legate est exercee par le pere avec le concours de
la me're dans le cas de I' article 389-1 et. dans les aulres cas, sous le controle du juge,
soit par le pere. soil par le mere, selon les dispositions du chapitre precedent.
La jouissance legale appartient a celui des pere et mere qui a la charge de I'administrati-
on." - i « - a ••Hi"''-* : X ; ; : \ : "••;-.- >& 5*
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interests of the children". Again neither the Republic of Korea nor Tunisia
elaborate on the necessity of their reservation, whereas Turkey refers to the
incompatibility of the provision with national legislation. Korea withdrew its
reservation in 1991. Bangladesh states that it will not be bound by article 16. l.f
because of its incompatibility with Sharia law.
Article 16.1 .g provides for the equality between husband and wife with regard to
personal rights. Brazil, Jordan, Mauritius and the Republic of Korea do not
elaborate on their reservation to this provision, whereas Tunisia and Turkey
prefer to uphold their national legislation. Both France and Luxembourg reserve
their position as regards the right to choose a family name, mentioned in article
16.1.g".
The provision on equality between both spouses in the administration of property,
as laid down in article 16.1 .h, has led to reservations by Brazil and Tunisia. The
latter indicate that the provision must not conflict with the provisions of national
legislation on the acquisition of property through marriage. A reservation by
France dealing with national legislation and article 16.1.h was withdrawn in
1986.
The United Kingdom formulated a rather broad reservation in respect of article
16.1 as a whole, but it would seem that the reservation actually refers at
subparagraph h. The reservation reads:"... shall not be treated as either limiting
the freedom of a person to dispose of his property as he wishes or as giving a
person a right to property the subject of such a limitation". Here, as before, the
lack of information on the Convention and its drafting history make it hard to
sketch the possible impact of the reservation.
- Reservations invoking Sharia law -
A subject that deserves separate attention are the reservations referring to the
overriding importance of Sharia law. Islamic law is often considered to be
discriminatory towards women per se and so far it has been hard to reconcile the
cause of women's rights with Islamic law". The Committee has made an abor-
tive attempt in 1987-1988 to initiate a study into the rights of women under
Islamic law, but this idea has not had a favourable reception, to say the least**.
Four states explicitly invoke Sharia law in their reservations, whereas the
reservations of two other states seem based on the codification of Sharia as
domestic family law". The Libyan reservation is sweeping and far-reaching, it
ov •»-••••
•lifter-..
93kt« '.; Cf.the United Kingdom's declaration with respect to article 16.
94. The Luxembourg reservation is formulated confusingly:The application of paragraph 1
(g) of article 16 of the Convention shall not affect the right to choose the family name
of children."
95. Byrnes, The Work of the Committee at 53-54; Cook, Etnische culturen at 52-53; Jacobs,
: . - i » op.cit. at 81-84; Lijnzaad. Voorbehouden at 107; Sullivan, op.cit. at 834-848.
96. Byrnes, The Work of the Committee at 54-55; Clark, op.cit. at 287-288; Jacobs, op.cit. at
•. ui 85. •;•»>'-j.-ii"-.'-VT-»'JIS9! w n s
97» Reservations by Tunisia and Turkey.
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completely submits accession to the Convention to Sharia law*. The reserva-
tions of Egypt", Iraq"" and Bangladesh"" mention the provisions that
conflict with Sharia law. It is noteworthy that the reservations differ and that
these states hold different opinions on the compatibility of the various provisions
with Sharia law'"-. Iraq simply states that it will not be bound by article 2.f
and 2.g, without providing any reasons for the reservation.
The very least a reserving state should do is indicate with precision which
provisions of the Convention are affected by its reservation"". It can after all
not expect its co-contractants to have a full insight into its national (religious)
laws. The construction used by Bangladesh, Egypt and Iraq in their reservations,
mentioning not only the prevalence of sharia law but also the articles of the
Convention to which the reservations apply, is thus preferable to the generality of
98. The Libyan acceded "subject to the general reservation that such accession cannot
conflict with the laws on personal status derived from Islamic Sharia."
99. The Egyptian reservation reads:
General reservation on article 2
JT, The Arab Republic of Egypt is willing to comply with the content of this article,
provided that such compliance does not run counter to the Islamic Sharia.
In respect of article 16
Reservation to the text of article 16 concerning the equality of men and women in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations during the marriage and upon its
' dissolution, without prejudice to the Islamic Sharia's provisions whereby women are
accorded rights equivalent to those of their spouses so as to ensure a just balance
between them. This is out of respect for the sacrosanct nature of the firm religious
beliefs which govern marital relations in Egypt and which may not be called in question
and in view of the fact that one of the most important bases of these relations is an
" equivalency of rights and duties so as to ensure complementarity which guarantees true
equality between the spouses. The provisions of the Sharia lay down that the husband
Ltfws ' shall pay bridal money to the wife and maintain her fully and shall also make a payment
, - to her upon divorce, whereas the wife retains full rights over her property and is not
obliged to spend anything on her keep. The Sharia therefore restricts the wife's rights to
divorce by making it contingent upon a judges ruling whereas no such restriction is laid
* *•' down in the case of the husband.
Two other reservations dealing with articles 9 and 19 do not mention Sharia.
100. The Iraqi reservation reads:
• »•-• "Approval of and accession to this Convention shall not mean that the Republic of Iraq
' i- is bound by the provisions of article 2, paragraphs (f) and (g), of article 9, paragraphs 1
and 2. nor of article 16 of the Convention. The reservation to this last-mentioned article
shall be without prejudice to the provisions of the Islamic Shariah according women
rights equivalent to the rights of their spouses so as to ensure a just balance between
them."
101. The Bangladeshi reservation reads: " '"*
The Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh does not consider as binding
upon itself the provisions of article 2, 13(a) and 16.1(c) and (f) as they conflict with
Sharia law based on Holy Quran and Sunna."
102. Bangladesh mentions article 2, 13.a, 16.l.c and f; Egypt mentions article 2 and 16; Iraq
only mentions article 16; cf. Clark op.cit. at 300.
103. Byrnes, The Work of the Committee at 53; Clark, op.cit. at 310-312: Cook, Women's
Convention at 655 and supra Chapter 3, par.2.1.2 on the specificity requirement.
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the Libyan statement, or the vagueness of the Tunisian and Turkish referrals to
national legislation.
The reservations invoking sharia law appear to be detrimental to the Convention's
goal of eliminating discrimination, and at the same time they entail problems
related to freedom of religion (and religious law) as well as the question of
cultural relativism in respect of human rights'**. There are different ways of
looking at the problem and some will be explored here. Basically one could
distinguish between an approach based on the law of treaties, which has the
advantage of avoiding the delicate subject of cultural relativity, and an approach
based on human rights law, which may raise questions of conflict of rights. In
the following various lines of argument will be presented. BQ JQO g
1.3.1. Pacta sunt servanda
From the point of view of the law of treaties, the obligation to respect the object
and purpose of the Convention is not necessarily a notion alien to islamic law.
The prohibition of incompatible reservations as laid down in article 28.2
CEDAW and article 19.c VCLT, is the logical correlate of /wicm JTMM/ ser-
wiM</fl'°\ There is no doubt that islamic states are bound by this prohibition. As
Arzt explains, the principle of '.s7)w' in islamic international law is the equivalent
of the /wc/rt JWW/ nrwi/ufa r«/c'"*.
Making reservations is based on treaty interpretation, and anticipating the
consequences of ratification. Should the States Parties have understood the
meaning of the provisions, and have they been able to foresee domestic prob-
lems? If the provisions themselves are not clear, has their content been clear
during the drafting? Whether this is the case can only be established on the basis
of the frrtvrt/tt prr/wra/fl/res.
If the implication of the Convention and its provisions was clear prior to ratifica-
tion, and there is no reason to suspect otherwise, the states must have understood
that they would not only literally be bound by the Convention because of their
ratification, but that it also entailed the obligation not to undermine its object and
purpose. In other words, if the conflicts between Sharia and the Convention were
foreseeable, the islamic states ought to have refrained from ratifying, as they
knew they would not be able to fulfil the obligations contained therein. This is a
logical line of argument based upon the principle of good faith. Yet, it has the
disadvantage of giving up the quest for universality in the form of global ad-
herence. ' '''•'' "'"•'
- . - . - • • , • , . . . , , . * • • ; : « . . .
••• SiOjf.f ' :«!;{ G . '"UsiS 4.S1 « i ' * !
104. Cook. Etnische culluren at S3; Jacobs, op.cit. at 84-85; L.Lijnzaad, Het maken en breken
van intemationaal recht voor vrouwen (hereafter Maken en Breken), Nemesis 1993.6,
211-214.
105. See for a discussion of article 19.c VCLT Chapter 2, par.3.1.2 and par.4.3 supra.
106. D.E.Arzt, The application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States, in: 12
HRQ 1990. 202-230, at 212-213; Jacobs, op.cit. at 83.
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1.3.2. National legislation
Another way of looking at these reservations would be to say that they belong to
the major category of reservations purporting to uphold national legislation"".
Islamic Sharia law is to be understood as national legislation. This does justice to
the rule that an islamic state must comply with, and maintain the divine law, as
states must in general comply with domestic law"*. The difference between the
four States explicitly mentioning Sharia, and Turkey and Tunisia mentioning their
personal status legislation, thus disappears.
Islamic countries are no longer singled out and their reservations are treated as a
standard type of reservation. This approach is less prejudicial and might remove
the emphasis on the religious background of the reservation. It does however not
solve the compatibility question. As such, reservations indicating the prevalence
of national legislation are very undesirable because national law does not in
general have priority over international law"". Reliance on domestic law over
international law leads to insecurity for the co-contractants, and is contrary to the
progressive development of the international protection of human rights.
1.3.3. Conflicting human rights
An approach based on human rights law will lead to the conclusion that reserva-
tions invoking Sharia law point to conflicting norms. In particular, there would
seem to be a conflict between freedom of religion and the equality rule. As
Meron indicates, there are two main areas of conflict, namely the legal status of
women under religious law and religious practices concerning marriage and the
family"". Although he suggests a balancing of interests, the example given is
not particularly convincing and reveals a distinct gender bias. The focal point for
Meron seems to be whether discrimination hampers women's ability to function
in society'". ,". -ibrii »u VMVJ.'KUMJOO !•••"»< .WMV'^SAXHI I»'-vi)tfa
Regretfully Meron misunderstands the nature of women's discrimination and the
fact that its persistence depends if anything on the structure of the family"^.
107. Lijnzaad, Voorbehouden at 107; Sullivan, op.cit. at 807. ' ' >£*?'
108. Jacobs, op.cit. at 82-83; Clark, op.cit. at 317.
'M%ilvi For a discussion of reservations giving prevalence to national legislation see Chapter 3,
I.-. JW;I par.2.1.1 supra.
110.' t». Meron, op.cit. at 77-80 and 155-160.
111. Meron, op.cit. at 159:".. the interests in preserving the privacy of the family and
ijiwf:- respecting, in so far as is possible without eviscerating the Convention, religious
>M3v*. .n freedom suggests that a balancing of the interests involved should be attempted. Thus,
.-•?!•'.•! rc/fgioitf /vflcw'cM HVVAI'/I fAr /amiTy wAicA Amr rWnmv/y /?« jigm/ica/iar /or HWJKVI'J
aAi//ry ro/iwicrio/i as/i(// Au/nan fco/i£5 in soa'e/y [my emphasis, EL] might be permitted
;.; •! ' even though those practices perpetuate stereotyped roles, while practices which impair
women's ability to exercise their rights and foreclose opportunities to function outside
stereotyped roles (...) must not be allowed." Idem at 62-63.
112. Similarly the criticism by Zearfoss. op.cit. at 917-920. At 918-919 she writes:"Yet, if one
cannot legislate against an abusive practice because there is a religious tradition behind
it, the ability to deal with discriminatory abuses is radically weakened. If the internatio-
»-"-*• nal convention is meant to address human rights abuses against women is fettered by
(continued...)
324 CONVENTION ON WOMEN'S DISCRIMINATION
The impact of religiously inspired discrimination within the family is by no
means of lesser importance than overt discrimination in society. Rather, there is a
causal connection between discrimination in the private sphere and the existence
of formalized discrimination in public life.
It would appear that, although balancing seems a reasonable approach, it will in
practice be hard to find an equilibrium that is not prejudicial to the position of
women. Given the fundamental character of freedom of religion and the equality
rule it is neither possible nor acceptable to determine in general which of both
has priority"^.
The ways in which the problem has been dealt with here, merely serve as an
explanation, but do not provide solutions. Sharia being religious law makes it all
the more understandable that States are reluctant to object.
2. REACTIONS OF THE STATES PARTIES
2.1. Objections
The sometimes far-reaching and detrimental reservations to substantive provisions
have met with only a few objections"''. As the reservations are circulated by
the depository of the Convention, all States Parties are able to consider the
reservation and possibly formulate a reaction in the shape of an objection. In fact,
seven States objected. Denmark, Norway, and Finland objected to the reserva-
tion by Libya. The Federal Republic of Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands
and Sweden objected to a great number of reservations'". These four States
showed perseverance and consistency in their objections.
A general pattern of objections can be discerned. All four states objected to
reservations by Bangladesh"", Egypt'", Iraq"*, Jamaica'", Libya'**,
112.(...continued)
concern over religious rights, its potential effectiveness vis-a-vis women will be dimin-
ished it is inappropriate to require that the balancing of women's rights and religious
rights undertaken by the Women's Convention, or to suggest that guarantees of
women's rights must accommodate religious rights instead of the other way around."
113. Sullivan, op.cit. at 821-823.
114. Painting a too optimistic picture. Oeser, Legal questions, at 95:" This matter (reservati-
ons, EL)... aroused the interest of a number of States Parties to the Convention. More
and more objections to certain reservations made by other States Parties to the
Convention were being received."
115. Portugal and Saint Lucia used the inquiry about reservations to the CEDAW by the
Secretary General (A/41/608) to object to a variety of reservations. Both States had
been parties to the CEDAW for some time by then (Portugal ratified on 30 July 1980,
Saint Lucia on 8 October 1982: their statements date respectively from 11 August 1986
and 18 June 1986) and should have objected according to the rules laid down in articles
20.5 and 23.1 of the Vienna Convention. Their objections were superfluous remarks in
the Secretary General's survey.
116. Reservations to articles 2, 13.a. 16.1.c and f.
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Malawi'*, Mauritius'^, the Republic of Korea'* and Thailand'".
Some of the objections are shared by only two of the above mentioned states, the
Federal Republic, the Netherlands and Sweden objected to reservations by
Brazil'^ and Tunisia'", whereas Sweden en Mexico objected to the reserva-
tions of New Zealand on behalf of the Cook Islands''' and West-Germany, the
Netherlands and Mexico objected to the reservations by Turkey'^*. Mexico is
the only state objecting to the reservation made by Cyprus'^. However it
should be stressed that a number of objections were made beyond the time-limit
set by article 20.5 VCLT'*>.
It is important to look at the motivation states provide with their objections. The
Federal Republic stresses that the reservations objected to are incompatible with
the object and purpose of the Convention and in particular contrary to article
28.2. It states that the reservations may not be invoked "in support of a legal
practice which does not pay due regard to the legal status afforded to women and
children in the Federal Republic in conformity with the articles mentioned." This
part of the objection seems to exclude the reciprocity reservations would other-
wise have had in accordance with article 21 VCLT, and also restricts the
territorial impact of the reservations made'".
Mexico in its objections links the invalidity of the reservations to other obliga-
tions incumbent on the reserving states. The reserving states face the reproach of
acting inconsistently with regard to the non-discrimination obligation as laid down
in article 1.3 of the United Nations Charter, articles 2.1 and 3 CCPR and articles
U7.(...continued)
117. Reservations to articles 9.2 and 16.
118. Reservation to articles 2.f and g, 9, 16.
119. Reservation to article 9.2.
120. General reservation with respect to prevalence of Sharia in personal status law.
121. Reservation in respect of traditional customs. The Mexican objection is merely a
communication. It reads:The Government of the United Mexican States hopes that the
process of eradication of traditional customs and practices referred to in the first
reservation of the Republic of Malawi will not be so protracted as to impair fulfilment
of the purpose and intent of the Convention."
The formulation is much weaker than the formulation of the other Mexican objections,
and indeed it might be doubted whether this was an objection at all. The UN Secretariat
listed the statement in the 'notes' section of ST/LEG/SER.E/11.
Cf. Clark, op.cit. note 115 at 299.
122. Reservations to article 11.1 b and d. 16.1.g.
123. Reservations to article 9 and 16.1.C. d, f and g.
124. Reservations to articles 9.2. 15.3 and 16. The Federal Republic of Germany also
objected to the Thai reservations concerning articles 7, 10, and ll.l.b CEDAW.
125. Reservations to articles 15.4, 16.1.a, c, g and h.
126. Reservations to article 9.2, 15.4 and 16.
127. Reservations to articles 2.f and 5.a.
128. Reservations to articles 15.2 and 4: 16.I.e. d. f. and g.
129. The Mexican objection seems rather rash, as the reservation to article 9.2 indicates that
it will be withdrawn once the relevant law is amended.
130. Discussing the objections, Clark, op.cit. at 298-302; about the twelve months rule at 312-
314.
131. Cf. Clark, op.cit. at 319.
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2.2 and 3 ESCR as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights binding
on the basis of customary international law"-. The advantage of the Mexican
objection is that the conduct of states in international treaty relations is measured
by standards they themselves set when ratifying prior treaties'". On the other
hand, the Mexican objection is rather broad and does not distinguish between
reservations contrary to object and purpose, and reservations on the fringe of
object and purpose'**. It is after all conceivable that there are reservations that,
while restricting the Convention's sometimes very detailed anti-discrimination
provisions, do not undermine the core obligations of Convention.
The Swedish objection is of a more legalistic nature'". While the matter of
inconsistency with other human rights obligations is mentioned in much the same
way as Mexico did, the objection furthermore elaborates on the logical and legal
necessity of upholding the Convention's object and purpose"*. The objection
holds that incompatible reservations undermine the credibility of treaty law, as
well as casting doubt on the intentions of the reserving state. This re-articulation
of the obligations following from object and purpose may serve to strengthen
provisions like article 19.c VCLT and article 28.2 CEDAW.
132. The objection reads:The Government of the United Mexican States has studied the
reservations made by .., and had concluded that they should be considered invalid in the
light of article 28, paragraph 2 of the Convention, because they are incompatible with its
object and purpose.
Indeed, these reservations, if implemented, would inevitably result in discrimination
,j,j against women on the basis of sex. which is contrary to all the articles of the Conven-
tion. The principle of equal rights of men and women and non-discrimination on the
basis of sex. which are embodied in the second preambular paragraph and article 1,
paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United Nations, to which .. is a signatory, and in
article 2 and 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, were previously
accepted by the Government of ... when it acceded, on .... to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. The above principles were stated in article 2, paragraph 1 and article 3
' ' of the former Covenant and in article 2, paragraph 2, and article 3 of the latter.
Consequently, it is inconsistent with these contractual obligations previously assumed by
'" ' ... for its Government now to claim that it has reservations, on the same subject , about
•' the 1979 Convention."
133. See supra Chapter 3, par.2.3, The interpretation of human rights instruments: coexisten-
ce and coherence.
134. A case in point would be provisions like article 9.2 (equality in respect of nationality of
children) or article 16.1.g (equality in respect of the right to a family name).
135. Wright, op.cit. at 85 remarks that the objections do not refer to the importance of
article 16 C E D A W as crucial to women in general.
136. The objection reads:" .. the reason why reservations incompatible with the object and
purpose of a treaty are not acceptable is precisely that otherwise they would render a
basic international obligation of a contractual nature meaningless. Incompatible
reservations, ... do not only cast doubt on the commitments of the reserving states to
?«&; i the objects and purposes of this Convention, but moreover, contribute to undermine the
basis of international contractual law. It is the common interest of states that treaties to
*£*'• ' which they have chosen to become parties also are respected, as to object and purpose,
• , by other parties." Cf. Clark, op.cit. at 319.
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Another group of objections has political overtones, rather than concern for the
Convention's content'". Thus token objections to West-Germany's ratification
in respect of West-Berlin, as well as the United Kingdom's ratification in respect
of the Falkland Islands were made by respectively the Soviet Union and Argen-
tina.The Iraqi reservation that it will neither recognize Israel, nor establish
treaty relations with that State, met with an Israeli objection. As far as Israel is
concerned, the fact that the Iraqi reservation has an explicit political character
implies that it is contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty. This reasoning
is hard to follow, the Israeli objection seems to restrict the right only to enter
into treaty relations if a State explicitly wants to do so, in a most dramatic way.
It is unlikely that striving for global adherence is as intimately related to the
object and purpose of the Convention as Israel pretends. The objection is a
curiosity in every respect, as Israel which had not yet ratified the Convention,
maintained that Iraq had acted contrary to the Convention's object and pur-
pose'**.
2.2. State Party meetings"'
The States Parties to the Convention meet every two year and have dealt with
reservations on two occasions'*".
For the third meeting, in February 1986, Canada asked for a "General exchange
of views on the question of reservations" to be put on the agenda''". It is
interesting that the State requesting the inclusion of this agenda item did not
express its concern with reservations in any other way, for instance by object-
ing'*". The States Parties were concerned that some of the reservations made
137. The UN Secretariat choose not to include these political objections in the 'objections'
section of the ST/LECi/SER.E/11 document, it merely presents them in the 'notes'
^ section. Although this might he explained by the limited impact of these political
objections, it is not for the Secretariat to anticipate this in the editing of the document.
138. Israel objected on 12 December 1986, and ratified on 3 October 1991. Other than
political motivation, the objection could only be explained by a sweeping interpretation
of articles 18.1 and 20.5 VCLT.
139. Byrnes, The Work of the Committee nt.197 at 55: Cook, Women's Convention, at 708;
Oeser, Legal questions, op.cit. at 95-96.
140. Unfortunately the Summary Records of the Meeting of the States Parties are not
published, in accordance with the "Rules of Procedure of the Meeting of States Parties
to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women",
CEDAW/SP/4, Annex II, dd.3-6-1982. This is hardly remedied by the publication of a
document entitled "Decisions adopted..", which is a mere summary of decisions, not
reflecting the issues in the discussion between the States Parties.
141. CEDAW/SP/8/Add.l; Clark, op.cit. at 283..
142. In view of the lengthy reply by Canada on the question of incompatible reservations in
A/41/608, the absence of objections is striking. Failure to object within 12 months
implies acceptance of the reservation in accordance with article 20.5 VCLT.
It is, conceivable that Canada had concluded that objections could not be of any use
given the Vienna Convention system on objections as well as the object of human rights
treaties. Indeed the Canadian reply reads:"..the most productive approach to the
(continued...)
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could be incompatible with article 28.2''" and requested the Secretary-General
of the United Nations to seek the views of the States Parties on this matter and to
report upon the issue to the General Assembly''".
The matter was dealt with again in the fourth meeting of the States Parties in
March 1988"", which lead to a meagre declaration in which previous decisions
are recalled, and is taken note of the discussions on the issue in the General
Assembly as well as in the Economic and Social Council''"'. This decision was
the end of the attention of the States Parties meeting for reservations, as neither
the summary report of the fifth meeting'*', nor the sixth meeting'''* contain
any reference to the question of reservations.
A remarkable point to be mentioned is that the obligation for the Secretary-
General in article 28.1 CEDAW to receive and circulate all the reservations to all
States, is at present being covered by issuing the list of reservations, declarations,
objections and withdrawals as a States Parties document''". This seems to
suggest that the reservations are primarily of importance to the States Parties,
which is theoretically indeed the case. However, similar documents relating to
other human rights instruments are issued as Committee documents, which seems
much more in line with the role Committees have in monitoring the scope of
reservations. Issuing the reservations as a Committee document is not necessarily
in conflict with article 28.1, the Secretary-General may be considered to have
fulfilled this duty by publishing the bulky book "Multilateral Treaties Deposited
With the Secretary-General"'*.
2.3. Withdrawal of reservations
Fifteen States have so far already been able to withdraw reservations. Eight
States withdrew their reservations to article 29.1 of the Convention, the provision
on compulsory dispute-settlement by the International Court of Justice. As these
reservations have not been elaborated on previously, this withdrawal will not be
142.(...continued)
question of incompatible reservations would be a multifaceted one: through discussions
between States; through considerations at meetings of States Parties and at meetings of
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), all
with a view to arriving at a belter understanding of the Convention." Apparently
objections are, as far as Canada is concerned, not effective.
143. Although understandable, this formulation is contradictory because it is a double
negation.
144. CEDAW/SP/10, the introductory paragraphs of UN doc.A/41/608 present the back-
grounds.
145. CEDAW/SP/U; see Clark, op.cit. at 288.
146. CEDAW/SP/14.
147. CEDAW/SP/17.
148. CEDAW/SP/1992/4.
149. Cf. CEDAW/SP/13; CEDAW/SP/1992/2. •!*••»**»;
150. ST/LEG/SER.E/.. . published annually.
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dealt with in depth. However, the extension of compulsory dispute settlement
must be considered a positive development.
Canada, France, Ireland, Malawi, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and
Thailand decided to withdraw reservations to substantial provisions of the
Convention. France first withdrew its reservation to article 7'", as new legisla-
tion had changed the law which had earlier necessitated the reservation. Two
years later'", France withdrew its reservations to articles 15.2 and 3, and
16.1.C and h, also because of changes in domestic legislation. It is noteworthy
that when making the reservation France had not indicated its intention to change
existing legislation, the reservations merely refer to national legislation not in
conformity with the Convention. But apparently the reservations were considered
temporary measures necessary to gain time so as to implement changes in
legislation.
The withdrawal of the Irish reservations to articles 9.2, 15, 11.1 and 13.a was
also a consequence of changes in legislation'". In formulating its reservations,
Ireland had already indicated their temporary nature'**. Thus when the necess-
ary legislative changes had taken place, the country withdrew its reservations.
The withdrawal of the reservation by New Zealand, also on behalf of the Cook
Islands and Niue is related to the denunciation of ILO Convention 45 (Employ-
ment of Women in Underground Work in Mines of all Kinds). This ended a
peculiar situation in which New Zealand's reservation referred to Convention 45
which it had already renounced'".
In 1991, three States withdrew reservations. Malawi withdrew its much criticized
reservation dealing with traditional customs. The republic of Korea withdrew it
reservation to articles 16.l.c, 16.1 .d and 16.1.f; whereas Thailand withdrew
reservations to articles 11.1 .b and 15.3. Within a year later Thailand withdrew
the reservation to article 9.2. It should be noted that objections had been made to
the reservations by Malawi, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and New Zealand.
Also in 1992, Canada informed the Secretary General of the withdrawal of its
declaration concerning article l l . l . d
151. The reservation was withdrawn on 26 March 1984, France had ratified the CEDAW on
14 December 1983.
152. The withdrawal took place on 21 July 1990.
153. The withdrawal took place on 19 December 1986, Ireland had acceded to the Conventi-
on on 23 December 1985.
154. The temporariness of the reservations was formulated as "|P|ending the proposed
amendment to the law relating to citizenship, which is in an advanced stage.."(article 9.1)
and "pending the coming into force of the Social Welfare (Amendment)(No.2) Act,
1985.."(articles 11.1 and 13.a).
155. New Zealand ratified the CEDAW on 10 January 1985, renounced ILO Convention 45
before 31 December 1987, and withdrew its reservation on 13 January 1989. Cf.
International Labour Conference, 75th Session 1988, List of Ratifications of Conventi-
ons (as at 31 December 1987), Report III (Part 5), at 36.
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2.4. Consultations in other forums
T As mentioned above, the States Parties refrained from dealing in depth with the
problem as other United Nations organs had already paid attention to reservations
to the Convention.
2.4.1. The Secretary General's survey
In 1986 the General Assembly dealt with the report by the Secretary General,
compiled at the request of the third meeting of the States Parties to the Conven-
tion'". Complying with the request, the views of the States Parties on reserva-
tions that could be considered to fall within the scope of article 28.2 were
invited. Of the 87 States parties at the time, 17 replied. Their reactions focus on
various questions surrounding reservations to human rights treaties'". Some of
the reservations have a limited significance"*, or are based on an incorrect
interpretation of the Convention"', but Sweden warns that a bundle of minor
reservations may have an accumulative effect"". "baSfetJ
The major issue is of course the object and purpose of the Convention, which is
not defined in the Convention itself. A conclusive explanation of the object and
purpose of the Convention by the States Parties could have been hoped for, but
alas. Some states use the petitio principii that the goal of the Convention is the
elimination of all forms of discrimination against women"'' when explaining the
essence of the Convention. h*4iis'.ib-rtiw*
Both Canada"" and Spain'" elaborate on the content of the 'object and
purpose' and the Canadian view in particular seems well-considered. It lists four
factors that are decisive in determining the compatibility of a reservation: i,«--rse_>
- whether the reservation is made to a general provision, such as the
articles 1,2,3 and 24 CEDAW.
• ••*>• vi - the reservation deals with a particularly crucial aspect of equality, for
T i example article 15 CEDAW.
r.-.--.:i - the reservation affects women in a significant facet of national life.
- whether or not the reservation involves the complete provision or is
restricted to specific elements of the provision.'**
156. CEDAW/SP/10; about the survey: Clark, op.cil. at 284-285.
157. A/41/608 and A/41/608/Add. l . !js.wt.-rt.>-
Clark, op.cit. at 284-285; Oeser, Legal questions, at 97 mentions the G D R reaction to
the Secretary General's questions, which surprisingly is not incorporated in the above
mentioned documents. ; ^ •<«« -«
158. A/41/608. Japan at 9. . •'
159. A/41/608, Denmark at 7. «<;,»*- J t r w . * wt?
160. A/41/608, Sweden at 14.
161. A/41/608, Canada at 5 and A/41/608/Add. l , Czechoslovakia at 2. v>tf .?>;
162. A/41/608. Canada at 6. - ,v>='
163. A/41/608, Spain at 13. .»• ;r-.<-,.;! -.utjes..* Jt>vr«.v,T;-(.-!i
164. A/41/608. Canada at 6. 5..,i.c^^t,.%£* . 4 .M ;" •:: : r Jmsi:>:..i tf .& <-*) itBo
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The Canadian point is well taken, it has the advantage of separating essential
norms from detailed provisions on the fringe of the Convention's object and
purpose.
States give two reasons for the importance of preserving the Convention's object
and purpose. There is the 'legalistic' argument that undermining the object and
purpose of the Convention casts doubt on the State Party's intentions, and
moreover frustrates the law of treaties'*'. Denmark and Sweden quite aptly
state that there is no reason to apply less stringent treaty law requirements to a
convention against discrimination against women, than to other international
treaties'**.
There is also a more 'substantive' argument, namely that the rules laid down in
the Convention are basically a repetition of principles already enshrined in other
documents'". In other words, making a reservation to such provisions in the
Convention does not change these other obligations.
The fact that some of the obligations contained in the Convention can be imple-
mented progressively has led to a group of transitional reservations. Japan finds
this acceptable in view of the different levels of development'*". Turkey
stresses that the Convention is a dynamic process to attain a common ideal'*',
Sweden states that these reservations should not have been necessary'™, and
Denmark emphasizes the need for rapid implementation'".
As far as the reservations referring to national legislation are concerned, they are
not a case for much concern. Spain believes that national legislation must be
assumed to be in conformity with the Convention'^, and Turkey stresses that
these reservations are 'of a practical nature and mindful of the social and
administratice order"". Saint Lucia argues that the reservations invoking
national legislation may conflict with the laws of other States Parties'™, and
that reservations are only acceptable if the dispute settlement provision of article
29.1 CEDAW is accepted'". "» r -l i^i . : « ^ ;ff'trf>
The States seem to agree that it is beyond the power of the Committee to
proclaim the incompatibility of a reservation in any way. Yet, whether the
incompatibility of a reservation would compel States Parties to object is another
165. A/41/608, Federal Republic of Germany at 8. Sweden at 15.
166. A/41/608, Denmark at 7, Sweden at 15.
167. A/41/608, Canada at 5; Mexico at 10: and A/41/608/Add.l, Czechoslovakia at 2.
168. A/41/608, Japan at 9; and elaborating on the issue of comparative compliance Cook,
op.cit. at 680-683.
169. A/41/608, Turkey at 16. A
170. A/41/608, Sweden at 15. ' ^
171. A/41/608, Denmark at 7. * "*
172. A/41/608, Spain at 12.
173. Needless to say the elimination of discrimination against women is not necessarily
practical, nor is the maintenance of social and administrative order necessarily without
discriminatory implications.
174. This is very hard to imagine in as much as human rights treaties are referred to.
175. A/41/608. Saint Lucia at 12. . , , ..wli,- , „ ,. . • : •« .
332 CONVENTION ON WOMEN'S DISCRIMINATION
matter. Mexico and Sweden say so, and the Federal Republic of Germany im-
plies it by stating that it is not in a position to accept those reservations'™. As
Sweden puts it: "It is tempting for States to accede to "high status conventions"
such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women. But if they do so and at the same time make a number of reservations,
or one incompatible reservations, other States should object to such a misapplica-
tion. "
Not only do States explain their point of view on the incompatibility issue, they
also suggest ways of remedying the problem. There seems to be consensus on the
need to encourage states to withdraw their reservations'". Assuming that states
make reservations because they are not thoroughly aware of the obligations
implied in the Convention's provisions, Canada suggest that the Committee
should speedily embark on making general recommendations, as provided in
article 21.1 of the Convention, to elaborate on the obligations contained in the
substantive provisions. Guidelines are in particular necessary for article 9, 11, 15
and 16, which are the object of many of the reservations. Another option, as
suggested by Sweden, would be to review article 28.2, in accordance with article
26.1 of the CEDAW, so as to either indicate provisions to which reservations are
prohibited or provide for a system comparable to the CERD system™.
Two states'" mistakenly use the inquiry by the Secretary General as an oppor-
tunity to object to a wide range of reservations, but to no avail, as objections
have to fulfil the requirements of the Vienna Convention. And the most surpris-
ing statement is that of France, which explicitly indicates that there are no
problems as "..none of these reservations seem to be incompatible with the object
and purpose of the Convention""".
2.4.2. Discussions in the Third Committee (General Assembly)
On the basis of article 21 CEDAW, the Committee reports annually to the
General Assembly of the United Nations. The Third Committee of the General
Assembly then deals with the report and attaches its conclusions in the form of a
resolution'*'. The matter of reservations has also been dealt with.
During the fortieth Session (1985) a few states expressed an opinion on reserva-
tions to the Women's Convention. Both Norway'"- and Finland'" indicated
their concern and said that the reservations were incompatible. Mexico'*''
shared this concern. This led to the adoption of a Resolution requesting the
lijh A/41/608. Federal Republic of Germany at 8: Mexico at 10: Sweden at 14.
177. A/41/608, Canada at 7; Denmark at 8: Sweden at 15.
M t About article 20.2 CERD see Chapter 4, par.1.2 supra; similarly Clark, op.cit. at 298.
1795 Portugal and Saint Lucia.
« B A/41/608 at 8.
181. On the Third CommitteeiD.W.Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, London,
1982. 4th Ed. at 54-56.
182. A/C.3/40/SR.25, par.21.
UK A/C.3/40/SR.26, par.6.
fMi A/C.3/40/SR.34, par.7. !•
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Secretary General to compile the views of the States Parties on the issue of
reservations'".
The Secretary General's survey of the views of States on the issue of reservations
was published in 1986. Consequently States were better informed on the matter,
and during the forty-first session, reservations were dealt with again. A large
number of States expressed their concern about the reservations made'**, and it
is suggested that States do not fully understand the nature of the obligations
contained in the Convention'". Although the Convention's supervisory Com-
mittee has a role to play in respect of the reservations, it is by no means
empowered to make a final judgment on the validity of reservations'**. Nor can
the Third Committee deal with the legality of the reservations'"''. Japan and
Austria express the view that countries making a sincere effort should not be
discouraged from participation"" and Egypt states that it would not have been
able to ratify the Convention had it not been possible to make reservations'". It
is suggested that states should reconsider their reservations with a view to with-
drawal'^.
1987 is the year of the Convention Committee's rather unfortunate steps concern-
ing women's rights in Islam'". This is reflected in the discussions in the Third
Committee in which the connection between reservations and Islamic law arises.
Certain countries repeat their concern'** and indicate that the matter will be
dealt with by the States Parties at their 1988 meeting'**.
The Islamic states participate in the discussion with vigour, saying amongst
others that the Committee had made inappropriate, presumptuous and biased
observations on the subject of women and Islamic law'*'. Iraq as well as Egypt
stressed the sovereign right of States to choose their political, economic and
social system without the interference of others'". Both Indonesia and Tunisia
take a moderate stance on the matter, saying that the reservations and the
185. Ecosoc RES. 1986/4.
186. Australia, A/C.3/41/SR.24, par.17; Congo. A/C.3/4I/SR.27, par.15: Greece, A/C.3/41/-
SR.27. par.38; Burundi, A/C.3/41/SR.29. par.53: Nicaragua, A/C.3/41/SR.30, par.29.
Burundi's participation in the discussion and its concern about the reservations are quite
surprising, Burundi was at the time not a party to the Convention, it ratified in 1992.
187. Sweden, A/C.3/41/SR.25, par.103; Burundi, A/C.3/41/SR.29, par.53.
188. Australia, A/C.3/41/SR.24, par.17.
189. Venezuela, A/C.3/41/SR.25, par.98.
190. Japan, A/C.3/41/SR.25, par 106; Austria, A/C.3/41/SR.28, par.47.
191. Egypt, A/C.3/41/SR.29, par.36.
192. Sweden, A/C.3/41/SR.25, par.103; Yugoslavia, A/C.3/41/SR.26, par.21.
193. Byrnes, The Work of the Committee at 54-55; Clark, op.cit. at 283-284.
194. Sweden, A/C.3/42/SR.25, par.33; Yugoslavia, A/C.3/42/SR.26, par.28 and Greece,
A/C.3/42/SR.28, par.31.
195. China, A/C.3/42/SR.26, par. 19 and Yugoslavia par.28.
196. Bangladesh, A/C.3/42/SR.22, par.43.
197. Egypt, A/C.3/42/SR.26, par.9; Iraq, A/C.3/42/SR.29, par.29 and Turkey, A/C.3/42/SR.-
30, par. 12.
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discussion thereof would help the Committee to find ways and means of adapting
the Convention so that it became an acceptable instrument''*.
The expenses of the Committee and the quality of the servicing are the main item
dealt with in the 1988 session of the Third Committee. By then, Finland, on
behalf of the Nordic countries, is the only one mentioning the issue of reserva-
tions'", the issue had apparently lost momentum.
**•
2.4.3. A role for the International Court of Justice?
A possible solution for the problem of incompatible reservations to the Women's
Convention has been the suggestion to put the issue before the International Court
of Justice. The first, and perhaps the most logical way to do this would be to
raise the question of compatibility as a problem of interpretation and application
under article 29 CEDAW^°°. In that particular case, an issue would be brought
before the Court by two States Parties to the Convention who differ as regards
the compatibility of a reservation made by one of them. This would hypothetical-
ly be a situation in which a reserving State responds to an objection stressing the
incompatibility of its reservation. Not only is this unusual, it is very unlikely that
this situation would arise. The fact that the objecting states have never indicated
that treaty-relations were absent, leads to a lack of interest on the part of reserv-
ing States to contradict the views of an objecting State that the reservation is
contrary to "object and purpose". Moreover, a substantial number of States have
made reservations to article 29, which restricts the possibility of using this
provision as a way to a judicial settlement of the question of incompatibility.
Another development in the discussion has been the suggestion to put the same
question before the Court, in the shape of a request for an Advisory Opinion.
The way to an Advisory Opinion would be either via the Commission on the
Status of Women to the Economic and Social Council that has the authority to
request an Advisory Opinion'*', or via the Subcommission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and the Commission on Human
Rights to ECOSOC. A number of authors""- have advocated this solution but,
to my mind, is a dangerous development that must be discouraged*".
Drawing a parallel with the advisory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court
under article 64 ACHR^*, Cook suggests that the advisory jurisdiction of the
198. Indonesia. A/C.3/42/SR.24. par.43: Tunisia, A/C.3/42/SR.25. par 14.
It is noteworthy that though Indonesia as an islamic country speaks out against the
Committee's approach to the "women's rights and Islam issue", it did not itself make
"*'- any substantive reservations to the CEDAW.
199. A/C.3/43/SR.27, par.50.
200. Byrnes, The Work of the Committee at 55-56: Cook, Women's Convention, at 709;
Lijnzaad, Voorbehouden at 108.
201. Article 96.2 Charter jo. GA Res.89(I), 11 December 1946.
202. Cook. Women's Convention at 710-712; Jacobs, op.cit. at 86.
203. Lijnzaad, Maken en breken at 212-214. . •'>-
204. For a discussion see Chapter 3, par.4.2 supra.
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International Court of Justice will lead to similarly positive solutions*". It
should however be kept in mind that the task of the American Court is explicitly
laid down in the American Convention and is explicitly related to the interpreta-
tion of the ACHR and other human rights instruments. This is a singular situation
which is in no way comparable to the advisory competence of the ICJ. Cook
suggests that the whole issue of an Advisory Opinion is only a matter of the
political will to use the available procedure to clarify the object and purpose of
the Convention.
To my mind, she disregards the fundamental question whether or not this is a
wise strategy. The possibility of asking an Advisory Opinion should not be used
if an analysis beforehand would lead to the conclusion that this is a risky path.
My impression is that this would be the case. In answering the question how to
apply the contemporary rules on reservations, and in particular the object and
purpose rule, to human rights instruments, the International Court will not use an
approach fundamentally different from the contemporary law of treaties. Why
would the Court apply other rules than the existing ones in which States are the
sole judges of object and purpose, a system in which incompatible reservations
can be accepted. Even if much depends on the way in which the request for an
Advisory Opinion will be formulated, the Court will not be very explicit about
the substantive content of "object and purpose" of the Convention. If the request
were specifically to deal with the compatibility of sharia reservations the pros-
pects would be even more grim. In conclusion, I fail to see why the Court would
be more flexible that the Office for Legal Affairs-** with respect to determining
compatibility.
The danger is that a conservative and restrictive interpretation of article 28
CEDAW will be more detrimental to the achievement of the Convention's goals
than leaving the matter undecided, as it is now. Such an Opinion would ruin the
<ic</u/f of the Women's Convention, and limit the cautious steps that the Commit-
tee has been taking, and may take in the future. In fact, if an Opinion were
given, stressing the VCLT system in which States individually determine com-
patibility, this would be a great set back for the way in which the supervisory
bodies in the field of treaty-based human rights protection are "getting a grip" on
the reservations, hesitant though this may be. No Advisory Opinion is better than
a conservative Opinion. As long as the odds are that the outcome of such a
request might be detrimental to the achievement of the goals of the Convention,
the whole idea had better be dropped.
205. Cook, Women's Convention at 711.
206. For the advice to the CERD Committee see UN Juridical Yearbook 1976, (ST/LEG/-
SER.C/14) at 219-221. discussed in Chapter 4. par. 1.2 supra: for the advice to the
CEDAW Committee see A/39/45 Volume II Annex II. discussed par. 1.2 supra.
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3. PRACTICE OF THE COMMITTEE
The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women is the only supervisory committee to have dealt with the issue of reserva-
tions by means of General Recommendations^".
In 1987, in General Recommendation 4**, the Committee expressed its concern
about the significant number of reservations that appeared to be incompatible with
the object and purpose of the Convention. It welcomed the decision of the States
Parties to consider the reservations at their next meeting, and it suggested that the
reserving States consider a withdrawal of the reservations. As we have see supra,
the discussions about reservations in the meeting of the States Parties did not lead
to any significant steps*".
In the eleventh session, Recommendation 20 was issued^'". It recommended
that in connection with the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, States
Parties should raise the question of the validity and legal effects of reservations to
the Women's Convention in relation to reservations to other human rights
instruments; suggested a reconsideration of reservations with a view to streng-
thening the implementation of human rights instruments; and suggested consider-
ing the introduction of a procedure on reservation comparable to that of other
human rights instruments.
General Recommendation 20 is a remarkable document because it outlines the
issues that are of primary importance with respect to reservations, in the eyes of
the Committee. The explicit link between the reservations to the Women's
Convention and to other human rights instruments is a step towards an integrated
approach based upon the assumption that States should not have conflicting
human rights obligations, and seems based upon the coherence of human rights
law. I am less impressed in respect of the introduction of a procedure on
reservations comparable to other human rights treaties. In general it would seem
that so far, few adequate procedures to deal with (supposedly) incompatible
reservations have been designed. Indeed it is not to be hoped that the Committee
was actually pointing at a procedure comparable to article 20 CERD, as had been
suggested in earlier discussions^".
3.1. Reporting procedure, article 18 CEDAW
AUSTRALIA
Reservations
"The Government of Australia states that maternity leave pay is provided in respect of
most women employed by the Commonwealth Government and the Government of
New South Wales and Victoria. Unpaid maternity leave is provided in respect of all
other women employed in the State of New South Wales and elsewhere to women
207. Article 21 CEDAW.
208. General Recommendation 4, sixth session 1987.
209. See par.2.2 supra.
210. General Recommendation 20, eleventh session 1992.
211. Cf. the suggestion by Sweden in the Secretary General's survey, see par. 2.4.1 supra.
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employed under Federal and some State industrial awards. Social Security benefits
subject to income tests are available to women who are sole parents.
The Government of Australia advises that it is not at present in a position to take the
measures required by article 11(2) to introduce maternity leave with pay or with
comparable social benefits throughout Australia.
The Government of Australia advises that it does not accept the application of the
Convention in so far as it would require alteration of Defence Force policy which
excludes women from combat and combat-related duties. The Government of Australia
is reviewing this policy so as to more closely define "combat" and "combat-related
duties."
Declaration
"Australia has a Federal Constitutional System in which Legislative, Executive and
Judicial Powers are shared or distributed between the Commonwealth and the Constitu-
ent States. The implementation of the Treaty throughout Australia will be effected by
the Commonwealth Slate and Territory Authorities having regard to their respective
constitutional powers and arrangements concerning their exercise."
The Australian initial report sums up the reservations made-'-. The reservation
with respect to the provision on paid maternity leave is elaborated upon, and the
availability of unpaid maternity leave as well as the relevant legislation in the
different Australian states is indicated.
In her introduction the representative repeats Australia's position with respect to
maternity leave, and indicates that progress has been made in women's participa-
tion in the Defence force-". The Committee wonders whether the federal struc-
ture is the main obstacle to withdrawing the reservation to article 11, and asks if
the reservation does not in fact endorse the absence of paid maternity leave in the
private sector'*. Another member of the Committee asks if the reservation to
article 11.2.b is an indirect way of population control-".
In reply, the representative elaborates on the consequences of the Australian
federal system, and indicates that a complaint procedure was available in cases in
which it was thought that unpaid maternity leave was discriminatory-". The
country would consider withdrawal in the future, and the reservation was at any
rate not a means of population control-".
The second periodic report by Australia was due in 1988 and was received in
1992. Consequently the report was not considered in the eleventh session of the
Committee. The report-'* elaborated upon the reasons for maintaining the
reservation with respect to article 11.2.b and the right to paid maternity leave. It
is indicated that Australia had also declined to ratify ILO Convention 103 on
Maternity Protection (Revised) 1952, which a government body had considered to
212. CEDAW/C/5/Add.4O.
213. CEDAW/C/SR. 114, par. 15 (Australia).
214. CEDAW/C/SR. 114.
215. CEDAW/C/SR. 114, par.84 (Ukeje).
216. CEDAW/C/SR. 118, par.73, 81, 82 and 139.
217. About the Australian report: A.C.Byrnes, Australia and the Convention on Discriminati-
on against Women, in: 62 ALJ 1988, 478-479; Zearfoss, op.cit. at 921.
218. CEDAW/C/AUL/2.
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be unsuitable for ratification, because inter alia, of the potential cost implica-
tions*". Australia had ratified ILO Convention 156 on Equal Employment
Opportunities. Entitlements to paid maternity leave varied greatly and were
absent in a number of States. Studies were being undertaken on the feasibility of
introducing paid maternity leave.
The third report was due in 1992, but has not yet been submitted^".
AUSTRIA
"Austria reserves its right to apply the provision of article 7(b), as far as service in the
armed forces is concerned, and the provision of article 11, as far as night work of
women and special protection of working women is concerned, within the limits
established by national legislation."
In its initial report, Austria mentions its reservations to articles 7 and 11**'. It
states that the reservation with respect to night work for women was inspired by
ILO Conventions 4 (Night work by Women) and 89 (Night work by Women in
Industry), and that it is within the scope of article 11.2.d of the Convention
which deals with pregnancy protection.
The Committee inquired about the necessity to make the reservation concerning
women in the armed forces, and asked if the reservation could be withdrawn^.
They wonder whether the prohibition on night work would not hamper the
employment opportunities of women.
In its reply, Austria urges the Committee to leave the reservations aloner". In
fact it does not feel obliged under article 18 of the Convention to report on the
provisions to which it reserved its position. This tierce standpoint is mitigated by
the fact that Austria itself does explicitly mention the reservations made. In the
following, Austria argues that while women are employed in administrative
functions in the military, there are objectively justifiable reason for the reserva-
tion. And as concerns night work of women, the Committee would surely not
demand that Austria renounce a convention drafted under the aegis of an interna-
tional organization related to the United Nations.
BANGLADESH
The Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh does not consider as binding
upon itself the provisions of articles 2, 13(a) and 16.1(c) and (f) as they conflict with
Sharia law based on Holy Quran and Sunna."
In its initial report Bangladesh indicates that it implements article 13 with the
exclusion of paragraph a, and article 16 paragraphs l.c and F \ It implements
219. CEDAW/C/AUL/2, par.59-86.
220. CEDAW/C/1993/2.
221. CEDAW/C/5/Add.l7.
222. CEDAW/C/SR^l.
223. CEDAW/C/SR^5.
224. CEDAW/C/5/Add.34.
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article 3 bearing in mind its reservation to article 2, which approach seems to
extend the scope of the original reservation.
It is especially the reservation to article 2 that the Committee is concerned
abouP*. Committee members ask not only for the reservation to be withdrawn,
but indicate that a reservation to such a vital provision casts doubt on Bangla-
desh's adherence to the Convention. Moreover, the fact that equality is laid down
in the Constitution makes the Committee wonder why a reservation is necessary.
Finally it is suggested that Bangladesh indicates what the exact problems are with
the implementation of article 2 CEDAW, so that the Committee will gain some
insight in the scope of the reservation.
The Bangladeshi representative indicates that she understood the Committee to
have held that there were no differences between the Bangladesh Constitution and
the Convention, and states that the reservation will not stand in the way of the
improvement of the status of women in her country^'.
The second periodic report of Bangladesh was dealt with in the twelfth session in
1993-'.
BELGIUM
Article 7
The application of article 7 shall not affect the validity of the provisions of the Constitu-
tion as laid down in article 60, which reserves for men the exercise or royal powers, and
in article 58, which reserves for the sons of the King or. where there are none, for
Belgian princes of the branch of the royal family in line to the throne, the function of et
o/5?c/o senators as from the age of 18 years, with entitlement to vote as from the age of
25 years.
Article 15. paragraphs 2 and 3
The application of article 15, paragraphs 2 and 3. shall nol affect the validity of the
interim provisions enacted for couples married before the entry into force of the Act of
14 July 1976 concerning the reciprocal rights and duties of husbands and wives and their
marriage contracts, in cases where, in accordance with the option available to them
under the Act, they have declared that they are maintaining //i /oro their prior marriage
contracts.
In its initial report Belgium wholeheartedly acknowledges the discrimination
against female members of the royal family due to its Constitution and the
reservation to article 7^*.
A Committee member inquires about the extent of Royal powers and the impact
of the reservation, and another member wants to know how the female members
of the Royal Family feel about the reservation--^.
225. CEDAW/C/SR.96, par.63 (Guan Minquian), 54 (Wadstein). 68 (Forde), 76 (Oeser), 79
(Ilic), 83 (Pilataxi de Arenas), 84 (Akamatsu), 86 (Laiou-Antoniou), 89 (El-Tallawy), 93
(Salema), 96 (Ukeje), 99 (Evatt), 101 (Caron).
226. CEDAW/C/SR.99, par.9 (Bangladesh); about the discussion on the report of Bangla-
desh see Clark, op.cit. at 287-288.
227. CEDAW/C/13/Add.3O,
228. CEDAW/C/5/Add.53.
229. CEDAW/C/SR.143, par.19 (Akamatsu), par.57 (Pilataxi de Arenas).
340 CONVENTION ON WOMEN'S DISCRIMINATION
No answer is given to this last question, the representative merely states that the
reservations to article 15.2 and 3 have elapsed whereas the reservation to article
7 involving hereditary royal powers remains.
The second periodic report of Belgium was due in 1990, but had not been
received by the end of 1992*°.
BRAZIL » * ni
"The Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil hereby expresses its reservations
c.. to article 15, paragraph 4 and to article 16, paragraphs 1 (a), (g) and (h) of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
The initial report by Brazil was due in 1985; and the second periodic report in
1989. So far no reports have been received by the Committee^", j .
CANADA
Statement
•.:; *Vr The Government of Canada states that the competent legislative authorities within
vKx- Canada have addressed the concept of equal pay referred to in article 11 (1) (d) by
i...• legislation which requires the establishment of rates of remuneration without discrimina-
,, .. tion on the basis of sex. The competent legislative authorities within Canada will
continue to implement the object and purpose of article 11 (I) (d) and to that end have
.•/: developed, and where appropriate will continue to develop, additional legislative and
* other measures."[withdrawn 28-5-1992)
* i •_ >'-' • .
Canada's initial report elaborates on the existing situation with respect to equal
pay. It gives an empirical overview of the situation, but does not mention
relevant legislation, nor does it explain the need for the declaration^-. In his
introduction the representative indicates that the right to equal remuneration was
laid down in legislation at various levels. The Canadian statement indicated that it
would make a continuous effort to implement article 11.1 .cl through legislative
and other measures-".
Committee members are interested in the precise content of Canada's efforts with
respect to equal pay^*. The answer of the representative is not particularly
enlightening, as it deals with the concepts of equal pay for work of comparable
value, work of equal value and equivalent work^'.
The second periodic report of Canada contains information gathered per province
and territory^*. The general section indicated that a difference in earnings
between men and women continued to exist, without specifically mentioning the
equal pay issue^". Some of the provinces and territories mention relevant
230. CEDAW/C/1993/2. •#*
231. CEDAW/C/1993/2.
2S2/ ,. CEDAW/C/5/Add.l6.
2»"''"•• CEDAW/C/SR.48, par.30 (Canada). *»-
234. CEDAW/C/SR.48, par.61 (Wadstein), 71 (Peytcheva), 75 (Biryukova).
235. CEDAW/C/SR.54, par.62 (Canada).
236. CEDAW/C/13/Add.ll/Part I; and Part II.
237. CEDAW/C/13/Add.lI/Part I, par.129-132. ' ' ^ ' *'-"»"! - ^ *<^ ' ^ * « ^ - - vj.i
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legislation and policies dealing with the issue of equal pay, but not all of
them**.
In her introduction, the Canadian representative mentions that several provinces
had adopted new legislation with respect to equal pay for work of equal
value"". While questions are asked about equal pay***, the matter of the
reservation is not dealt with. •*
The third periodic report of Canada was submitted after the withdrawal of the
declaration concerning article ll.l.d-*'. As with the previous reports, no
mention of the declaration can be found, and it is unclear why Canada withdrew
the declaration.
CYPRUS
The Government of the Republic of Cyprus wishes to enter a reservation concerning the
granting to women of equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their
children, mentioned in article 9 paragraph 2 of the Convention.
This reservation is to be withdrawn upon amendment of the relevant law.
The initial report by Cyprus was due in 1986 and the second periodic report in
1990. By the end of 1992 neither had been received-''-.
EGYPT ^
In respect of article 9
Reservation to the text of article 9. paragraph 2, concerning the granting to women of
equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children, without prejudice
to the acquisition by a child born of a marriage of the nationality of his father. This is
in order to prevent a child's acquisition of two nationalities where his parents arc of
different nationalities, since this may be prejudicial to his future. It is clear that the
child's acquisition of his father's nationality is the procedure most suitable for the child
and that this does not infringe upon the principle of equality between men and women,
since it is customary for a woman to agree, upon marrying an alien, that her children
shall be of the father's nationality.
In respect of article 16
Reservation of the text of article 16 concerning the equality of men and women in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations during the marriage and upon its
dissolution, without prejudice to the islamic Sharia's provisions whereby women are
accorded rights equivalent to those of their spouses so as to ensure a just balance
ijji' dj* between them. This is out of respect for the sacrosanct nature of the firm religious
beliefs which govern marital relations in Egypt and which may not be called in question
, and in view of the fact that one of the most important bases of these relations is an
"'** * equivalency of rights and duties so as to ensure complementarity which guarantees true
B- *'***• equality between the spouses. The provisions of the Sharia lay down that the husband
shall pay bridal money to the wife and maintain her fully and shall also make a payment
238. CEDAW/C/13/Add.lI/Part I, par.246 (Manitoba), par.285-288 (New Brunswick),
par.410 (Ontario); par.516-517 (Quebec); par.602 (Northwest Territories); par.652-654
(Yukon).
239. CEDAW/C/SR.167, par.43-49 (Canada). j * £
240. CEDAW/C/SR.167, par.85 (Evatt). , ^
241. CEDAW/C/CAN/3. ci.,-;T.;.l; - >;;
242. CEDAW/C/1993/2. ri » * , .; ,«S
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to her upon divorce, whereas the wife retains full rights over her property and is not
obliged to spend anything on her keep. The Sharia therefore restricts the wife's rights to
divorce by making it contingent on a judge's ruling, whereas no such restriction is laid
down in the case of her husband.
General reservation on article 2
The Arab Republic of Egypt is willing to comply with the content of this article,
provided that such compliance does not run counter to the Islamic Sharia.
The Egyptian reservations were the first ones to be dealt with by the Commit-
tee^'. Egypt had mentioned in its report the reservations to article 9, 16 and
29, apparently omitting its sweeping reservation to article 2. The report said that
the practice related to the nationality of children (article 9.2) did not affect the
principle of equality, and stated that the reservation concerning article 16 had
been inspired by religious law which provided for "real equality" rather than
formal equality-**.
Although one of the Committee members considers it commendable that Egypt
ratified despite the reservations made*''*, other members are rather concerned
about the reservations. The issue of equivalence and harmony (Egypt's statement
on "real equality") as opposed to formal equality points to a conceptual prob-
lem***. It is suggested that Egypt should withdraw the reservations, or at least
provide insight into the question which legal system (domestic law, sharia or the
Convention) prevails. The focal points of the discussion are the reservations to
article 9 and 16. Only one Committee member notices that the reservation to
article 2, which is not covered in the report, touches on the very heart of the
Convention-'".
The representative of Egypt consequently elaborates on the background of the
reservations to articles 9 and 16"'*'. It appears that the Convention is nothing
new, as Sharia law already guaranteed equal rights to women. She attempts to
give an overview of rules of islamic law within the scope of the Convention.
Understandably this is a fragmentary picture as her remarks are mainly a reaction
to the questions of the Committee members. The precise impact of Sharia law on
the Convention remains, at any rate, obscure.
Egypt's second periodic report qualifies the reservation to article 9 with respect
to the nationality of children-'". The explanation on the development of Per-
sonal law in Egypt is closely related to the reservation to article 16 although the
report does not elaborate on the reservation itself.
In his introduction to the second report, the Egyptian representative stresses the
differences in the possibilities to attain de iure and de facto equality. The latter is
243. CEDAW/C/5/Add.lO; CEDAW/C/5/Add.lO/Amend.l. > -£
244. CEDAW/C/5/Add.lOat 3. -1
245. CEDAW/C/SR.35, par.26 (Ilic). '>
246. Cook, Etnische culturen at 50-52; Sullivan op.cit. at 843-845 and Jacobs, op.cit. at 82-83.
247. CEDAW/C/SR.35, par. 13 (Nordenfelt); SR.39 par.15 (Nordenfelt).
248. CEDAW/C/SR.39, par. 17 (Egypt).
249. CEDAW/C/13/Add.2.
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difficult, given the prominence of group identity, and cultural and religious
law^°. States have a sovereign right to enter reservations and it reflects their
honesty if they do. It was better to accede with reservations than not to accede at
all, and Egypt's reservations were due to factors such as its heritage, religion and
legal system"'. The reservation with respect to article 9.2 was currently under
discussion. Discussing article 2 CEDAW, the representative states that this
provision is in conformity with Egyptian law^". This is a remarkable statement,
not only does it turn the issue of conformity upside down (national legislation
should be in conformity with the convention, after all), it also appears to make
the reservation to article 2 superfluous. The representative does not mention the
reservation to article 16.
In their response Committee-members welcome the reconsideration of the
reservation to article 9^* but regret the continued existence of the reservations
to articles 2 and 16^*. Committee member Tallawy suggests that as Egyptian
law excluded discrimination, the reservation to article 2 should not exist; whereas
the reservation to article 16 could be withdrawn as there was no conflict with
Islamic law^\ Committee member Diallo Soumare indicated that men had
interpreted the Islamic doctrine incorrectly leading to the oppression of women in
the name of Islam-"'*. In his reply the Egyptian representative does not address
the issue of reservations-".
The third periodic report of Egypt was due in 1990, but had not been received by
the end of 1992-*.
FRANCE . *»*
Declarations
The Government of the French Republic declares that the preamble to the Convention -
in particular the eleventh preambular paragraph - contains debatable elements which are
definitely out of place in this text.
The Government of the French Republic declares that the term "family education" in
article 5 (b) of the Convention must be interpreted as meaning public education
concerning the family and that, in any event, article 5 will be applied subject to respect
for article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 8 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.
The Government of the French Republic declares that no provision of the Convention
. must be interpreted as prevailing over provisions of French legislation which are more
favourable to women than to men.
250. CEDAW/C/SR.164, par.41-44 (Egypt).
251. CEDAW/C/SR.164, par.47-48 (Egypt).
252. CEDAW/C/SR.164, par.49 (Egypt).
253. CEDAW/C/SR.164, par.75 (Evatt), 79 (Oeser), 81 (Tallawy); SR.165, par.9 (Akamatsu).
254. CEDAW/C/SR.164, par.81 (Tallawy).
255. It should be noted that Ambassador Tallawy is herself Egyptian.
256. CEDAW/C/SR.165, par.4 (Diallo Soumare).
257. CEDAW/C/SR.165, par.10-17 (Egypt).
258. CEDAW/C/1993/2.
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Reservations ' ' ";.'"..
Article 5(b) and 16.1(d1
1) The Government of the French Republic declares that article 5(b) and article 16,
paragraph l(d), must not be interpreted as implying joint exercise of parental authority
in situations in which French legislation allows of such exercise by only one parent.
2) The Government of the French Republic declares that article 16, paragraph l(d), of
the Convention must not preclude the application of article 383 of the Civil Code,
[withdrawn 21-7-1986].
Article 7
The Government of the French Republic declares that article 7 must not preclude the
""* application of the second paragraph of article LO 128 of the electoral code [withdrawn
9$ 26-3-1984]
tili-- Article 14
1. The Government of the French Republic declares that article 14, paragraph 2(c),
should be interpreted as guaranteeing that women who fulfil the conditions relating to
family or employment required by French legislation for personal participation shall
'** acquire their own rights within the framework of social security.
2. The Government of the French Republic declares that article 14, paragraph 2(h), of
• .j-, the Convention should not be interpreted as implying the actual provision, free of
ijjl, charge, of the services mentioned in that paragraph.
• Article 15.2 and 15.3; article 16.1(c), Kht
The Government of the French Republic declares that article 15 paragraphs 2 and 3,
and article 16 paragraphs l(c) and l(h), of the Convention must not preclude the
application of the provisions of Book Three, Part V, chapter II of the Civil Code
>;•$•>*£* [withdrawn 21-7-1986]
Article 16.1(g)
The Government of the French Republic enters a reservation concerning the right to
choose a family name mentioned in article 16. paragraph l(g). of the Convention.
Cur<<-'.•* • * > « *
In its initial report France merely mentions the reservations it withdrew^'.
The Committee welcomes the withdrawal of reservations but is at the same time
eager to know when the remaining reservations will be withdrawn^. They
inquire whether a discussion concerning withdrawal is taking place in the
Government**', and wonder about the remaining reservations which are suppos-
ed to uphold legislation favourable to women, an aim already covered by article 4
of the Convention"*".
France in its reply states that the reservations to articles 14.2.c and h, 16.1 .d and
5.b are technical reservations, which are being reconsidered in the light of draft
legislation concerning parental authority. The reservation to article 16.1 .g was
under review and the reservation to article 29 was of secondary importance-".
The second periodic report of France-" was discussed in the Committee's
twelfth session in 1993. The report mentions the reservations that were with-
2S9. CEDAW/C/5/Add.33, CEDAW/C/5/Add.33/Amend.l.
jftg}.. CEDAW/C/SR.93, par.37 (Caron), 42 (Escobar), 43 (Evatt), 47 (Forde); SR.94, par.31
3^ste.i.- (Akamatsu).
J i L CEDAW/C/SR.94 par.31.
362. CEDAW/C/SR.93 par.52.
263. CEDAW/C/SR.95, pars.4-7 (France); about the French constitutional reservations see
•*,,jjj Clark, op.c i t . at 311-312.
354- CEDAW/C/FRA/2.
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drawn, as well as the remaining reservations^. It does not provide much
background information on the reasons for making reservations. The reservations
concerning articles 14.2.c and 14.2.h are labelled "technical reservations". With
respect to article 14, the report elaborates on the different legal forms in which
women farmers may organize their work^*. It is indicated that the retention of
the mother's primacy with respect to parental authority over children born out of
wedlock is the reason for maintaining the reservation to article 16.1 .d. The report
quotes an opinion poll revealing that the transmission of the fathers name was
widely accepted, by way of reason for the reservation to article 16.1 .g.
GERMANY-"
Declaration
The right of peoples to self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations and in the International Covenants of 19 December 1966. applies to all peoples
and not only to those living "under alien and colonial domination and foreign occupa-
tion". All peoples thus have the inalienable right freely to determine their political
status and freely to pursue their economic, social and cultural development. The Federal
Republic of Germany would be unable to recognize as legally valid an interpretation of
the right to self-determination which contradicts the unequivocal wording of the Charter
of the United Nations and of the two International Covenants of 19 December 1966 on
Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It will interpret
the 11th paragraph of the Preamble accordingly.
Reservation
Article 7 (b) will not be applied to the extent that it contradicts the second sentence of
Article 12.a (4) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Pursuant to this
provision of the Constitution, women may on no account render service involving the
use of arms.
The initial report by the Federal Republic of Germany merely repeats its reserva-
tion to article 7 with respect to the use of arms by women-**. Although the
German representative does not mention the reservation in the introduction,
Committee members ask whether Germany intends to withdraw the reserva-
tion"". In her reply the representative stated that the reservation was based
upon a prohibition in the Basic Law that women could under no circumstances
bear arms. This provision was supported by the majority of women, and it did
not constitute a limitation to the equality principle-'".
The second periodic report of Germany was due in 1990, but had not been
received by the end of 1992^".
265. CEDAW/C/FRA/2, par.52-53.
266. CEDAW/C/FRA/2/Rev.l at 89.
267. These are the reservations originally made by the Federal Republic of Germany, the
reservations by the German Democratic Republic dealt with article 29.1, see CE-
DAW/SP/13.
268. CEDAW/C/5/Add J9 at 29; CEDAW/C/5/Add.59/Amend. 1.
269. CEDAW/C/SR/152, par.16 (Pilataxi de Arenas), par.17 (Diallo Soumare), par.21
(Novikova).
270. CEDAW/C/SR.157, par.55 (Germany).
271. CEDAW/C/1993/2.
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IRAQ
1. Approval of and accession to this Convention to this Convention shall not mean that
the republic of Iraq is bound by the provisions of article 2, paragraphs (f) and (g), of
article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2, nor of article 16 of the Convention. The reservation to this
last-mentioned article shall be without prejudice to the provisions of the Islamic Shariah
according women rights equivalent to the rights of their spouses so as to ensure a just
balance between them.
2. This approval in no way implies recognition of or entry into any relations with Israel.
Iraq's initial report"^ was scheduled to be reviewed in the Committee's twelfth
session in 1993. The report indicates that the reservations to articles 2.f and 2.g
have been made because it believes that the goals laid down in these provisions
will be attained gradually, and legislative shocks are undesirable"". The
reservation to article 9 has its roots in the consideration that one-nationality
families and non-dual nationalities contribute to the unity of the family™. With
respect tot article 16 the reservation is motivated by Iraq's commitment to its
cultural and jurisprudential heritage as embodied in Islamic Sharia, and by the
concern that Iraq meets its obligations both under the convention and islamic
law™.
Iraq's second periodic report was due in 1991, but has not yet been submitted.
IRELAND
Article 9.1
Pending the proposed amendment to the law relating to citizenship, which is in an
s advanced stage. Ireland reserves the right to retain (he provisions in its existing law
concerning the acquisition of citizenship upon marriage, [withdrawn 19-12-1986]
Articles 13.(h^ and (c)
The question of supplementing the guarantee of equality contained in the Irish Consti-
tution which special legislation governing access to financial credit and other services
and recreational activities, where these are provided by private persons, organisations or
enterprises is under consideration. For the time being Ireland reserves the right to
regard its existing law and measures in this area as appropriate for the attainment in
Ireland of the objectives of the Convention.
Article 15.3
With regard to paragraph 3 of this article, Ireland reserves the right not to supplement
the existing provisions in Irish law which accord women a legal capacity identical to that
of men with further legislation governing the validity of any contract or other private
instrument freely entered into by a woman.
Article 15.4
With regard to paragraph 4 of this article, Ireland observes the equal rights of women
relating to the free movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence;
pending the proposed amendment of the law of domicile, which is in an advanced stage,
it reserves the right to retain the existing law. [withdrawn 19-12-1986]
Articles 16.1(d) and (0
Ireland is of the view that the attainment in Ireland of the objectives of the Convention
does not necessitate the extension to men of rights identical to those accorded by law to
272. CEDAW/C/5/Add.66/Rev.l.
273. CEDAW/C/5/Add.66/Rev.l at 9.
274. CEDAW/C/5/Add.66/Rev.l at 14-15.
275. CEDAW/C/5/Add.66/Rev.l at 31.
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women in respect of the guardianship, adoption and custody of children born out of
wedlock and reserves the right to implement the Convention subject to that understand-
ing.
Articles 11.1 and 13(a)
Ireland reserves the right to regard the Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act, 1974 and the
Employment Equality Act 1977 and other measures taken in implementation of the
European Economic Community standards concerning employment opportunities and
pay as sufficient implementation of articles 11, l(b), (c) and (d).
Ireland reserves the right for the time being to maintain provisions of Irish legislation in
the area of social security which are more favourable to women than men (...)•
Articles 11.1 and 13(a)
... and pending the coming into force of the Social Welfare (Amendment)(No.2) Act
1985, to apply special condition to the entitlement of married women to certain social
security schemes, [withdraw 19-12-1986]
The initial report of Ireland deals extensively with the reservations made,
including the reservations already withdrawn™. Ireland is congratulated on its
prompt withdrawal of reservations, and is urged to withdraw the remaining ones
as well.
The reply of the Irish representative is quite extensive. He states that articles
13.b and c are already guaranteed under the Constitution, whereas the reservation
to article 15 seems to be more like an interpretative declaration and the Govern-
ment may consider withdrawing it. This is not the case with the reservations
concerning article 16, it is not intended to withdraw these. Finally the matter of
wage discrimination (a reservation to articles 11. and 13.a) may also be recon-
sidered-".
Ireland's second periodic report was due in 1991, but had not been received by
the end of 1992=™.
ISRAEL
"1. The State of Israel hereby expresses its reservation with regard to article 7(b) of the
Convention concerning the appointment of women to serve as judges of religious courts
where this is prohibited by the laws of any of the religious communities in Israel.
Otherwise, the said article is fully implemented in Israel, in view of the fact that women
take a prominent part in all aspect of public life.
"2. The State of Israel hereby expresses its reservation with regard to article 16 of the
Convention, to the extent that the laws on personal status which are binding on the
various religious communities in Israel do not conform with the provisions of that
article."
Israel's initial report was due in 1992, but has not yet been received*".
JAMAICA
The Government of Jamaica does not consider itself bound by the provisions of article
9, paragraph 2, of the Convention.
276. CEDAW/C/5/Add.47.
277. CEDAW/C/SR.140, par.39 (Ireland).
278. CEDAW/C/1993/2.
279. CEDAW/C/1993/2.
348 CONVENTION ON WOMEN'S DISCRIMINATION
The initial report of Jamaica indicates that nationality law is not in conformity
with the Convention, but that legislation to change this, and withdraw the
reservation to article 9.2, is on the way"*".
Apart from urging Jamaica to withdraw its reservation to article 9.2, a member
of the Committee wonders whether the Government used the reservation as a way
of regulating population growth^'. The representative does not answer this
particular question, stating neutrally that Jamaica is committed to make the
necessary changes^.
Jamaica's second periodic report was due in 1989, but had not been received by
the Committee by the end of 1992^.
JORDAN
1. Reservation with respect to article 9, paragraph 2;
2. Reservation with respect to article 15. paragraph 4 (a wife's residence with her
husband);
3. A reservation to the wording of article 16, paragraph (1) (c). relating to the rights
arising upon the dissolution of marriage with regard to maintenance and compensation;
4. A reservation to the wording of article 16, paragraph (1) (d) and (g).
As Jordan ratified in 1992, its initial report would only be due in 1993.
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHERIYA
Subject to the general reservation that such accession cannot conflict with the laws on
personal status derived from the Islamic Sharia.
The initial report of Libya has been received by the Committee but has not been
considered yet-**. In spite of the statement that the Holy Quran considers both
sexes as equal in rights, the reports contains references to notoriously different
rights, in particular with respect to articles 2, 11, and 16 CEDAW. The reserva-
tion is however not mentioned in either report.
LUXEMBOURG
(a) The application of article 7 shall not affect the validity of the article of our Constitu-
.. •>( tion concerning the hereditary transmission of the crown of the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg in accordance with the family compact of the house of Nassau of 30 June
1783. maintained by article 71 of the Treaty of Vienna of 9 June 1815 and expressly
maintained by article 1 of the Treaty of London of 11 May 1867.
(b) The application of paragraph 1 (g) of article 16 of the Convention shall not affect
the right to choose the family name of children.
The initial report by Luxembourg was due in 1990 but had not been received by
the end of 1992**.
280. CEDAW/C/5/Add.38.
281. CEDAW/C/SR.116, par.21 (Oeser).
282. CEDAW/C/SR.120, par.37 (Jamaica).
283. CEDAW/C/1993/2.
284. CEDAW/C/LIB/1 and CEDAW/C/LIB/1/Add.l.
285. CEDAW/C/1993/2.
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MALAWI
Owing to the deep-rooted nature of some traditional customs and practices of
Malawians, the Government of the Republic of Malawi shall not for the time being,
consider itself bound by such of the provisions of the Convention as require immediate
eradication of such traditional customs and practices, [withdrawn 24-10-1991]
The Malawi initial report clarifies its reservation dealing with traditional customs
and practices. The reservation is apparently a transient declaration, Malawi
indicates that it intends to withdraw it in due time and thinks that the necessary
changes will he an evolutionary process^*. The reservation does not indicate
the provisions it deals with but the report clarifies this, addressing the reservation
when reporting on articles 2, 5 and 16 in relation to polygamous marriages.
Malawi uses the opportunity to reflect on the Mexican declaration to its reserva-
tion^.
The representative of Malawi indicated in her introduction that the reservations
had been withdrawn and that legislation had been amended accordingly^**.
Malawi is congratulated by different members of the Committee on the with-
drawal of its reservation^'. In reply to a question whether the withdrawal of
the reservation also meant that the elimination of the practices referred to, the
representative indicates that this is not the case. The government had decided to
play a conscious role in ensuring their speedy elimination^*.
The second periodic report of Malawi was due in 1992, but had not been
recieved by the end of the year".
MALTA
Article 11
The Government of Malta interprets paragraph 1 of article II. in the light of provisions
of paragraph 2 of article 4, as not precluding prohibitions, restrictions, or conditions on
the employment of women in certain areas, or the work done by them, where this is
considered necessary or desirable to protect the health and safety of women or the
human foetus, including such prohibitions, restrictions or conditions imposed in
consequence of other international obligations of Malta.
Article 13
(i) The Government of Malta reserves the right, notwithstanding anything in the
Convention, to continue to apply its tax legislation which deems, in certain circum-
stances, the income of a married woman to be the income of her husband and taxable
as such.
(ii) The Government of Malta reserves the right to continue to apply its social security
legislation which in certain circumstances makes certain benefits payable to the head of
the household which is, by such legislation, presumed to be the husband.
286. CEDAW/C/5/Add.58 at 4, 9; CEDAW/C/5/Add.58/Amend.l.
287. CEDAW/C/5/Add.58 at 4.
288. CEDAW/C/SR.154, par.15 (Malawi). It should be noted thai this statement was made
on 23 January 1990, whereas ST/LEG/SER.E/11 lists 24 October 1991 (almost two
years later) as the date of withdrawal.
289. CEDAW/C/SR.154, par.17 (Evatt), 19 (Diallo Soumare), 22 (Ukeje); 26 (Corti).
290. CEDAW/C/SR.158, par.52 (Malawi).
291. CEDAW/C/1993/2.
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Articles 13. 15. 16
While the Government of Malta is committed to remove, in as far as possible, all
aspects of family and property law which may be considered as discriminatory to
females, it reserves the right to continue to apply present legislation in that regard until
such time as the law is reformed and during such transitory period until those laws are
completely superseded.
Article 16
The Government of Malta does not consider itself bound by sub-paragraph (e) of
paragraph (1) of Article 16 in so far as the same may be interpreted as imposing an
obligation on Malta to legalise abortion.
Malta's initial report was due in 1992, but it had not yet been received by the
end of that year'".
MAURITIUS
The Government of Mauritius does not consider itself bound by sub-paragraph (b) and
(d) of paragraph 1 of article 11 and sub-paragraph (g) of paragraph 1 of article 16.
By the end of 1992 the combined initial and second report of Mauritius^ had
been received by the Committee, but had not yet been considered.
The report mentions the reservations to article l l . l . b and l l . l . d without
elaborating on the precise situation in which the reservations apply. The reserva-
tion to article 16.l.g is not mentioned, and the need for this reservation is not
directly apparent in the report.
MEXICO ••••'* lAVif « ^ i ^ - i i v ^ v w f - H t'w- C « .
Upon signature
Declaration
In signing arf re/«WK/i«H the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, which the General Assembly opened for signature by States on
18 December 1979, the Government of the United Mexican States wishes to place on
record that it is doing so on the understanding that the provisions of the said Conven-
tion, which agree in all essentials with the provisions of Mexican legislation, will be
applied in Mexico in accordance with the modalities and procedures prescribed by
Mexican legislation and that the granting of material benefits in pursuance of the
Convention will be as generous as the resources available to the Mexican State permit.
Though the Mexican initial report does not deal with reservations the discussion
with the Committee was somewhat confusing^'. An apparently uninformed
member of the Committee asked whether Mexico made any reservation^.
Given the fact that the Mexican reservation was made upon signature, but not
confirmed subsequently, the answer should have been that it did not do so^*.
"-SMS- **••• CEDAW/C/1993/2. - .&
'*- CEDAW/C/MAR/l-2. >
CEDAW/C/5/Add.2.
-i CEDAW/C/SR.13, par.16 (Oeser).
296. In accordance with article 23.2 VCLT; the reservation is however mentioned in ST/-
s;, LEG/SER.E/11. .i ACIHP
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Yet, the Mexican representative stated that Mexico expressed on ratification that
it would implement the Convention in accordance with national legislation^".
He expressly indicates a reservation dealing with article 10.c (elimination of
stereotyped roles in education) because of its financial implications. This reserva-
tion must have been mentioned erroneously as it is not on file with the Secretary
General of the United Nations, the depositary of the Convention.
The second periodic report by Mexico does not mention the declaration, or the
non-existing reservation to article 10.c, although it must be mentioned that the
report is not very specific about the implementation of this provision dealing with
the elimination of stereotypes in education^*. The non-existent reservation dealt
with before, is not mentioned in the discussions^".
The third report mentions a great number of educational plans, but does not
adress the issue of stereotypes or a reservation in that respect"". It has not yet
been considered by the Committee.
NETHERLANDS
During the preparatory of the present Convention and in the course of debates on it in
the General Assembly the position of the Government of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands was that it was not desirable to introduce political considerations such as those
contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the preamble in a legal instrument of this nature.
Moreover, the considerations are not directly related to the achievement of total
equality between men and women. The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
considers that it must recall its objections to the said paragraphs in the preamble at this
occasion.
The Netherlands report*' has been received by the end of 1992, but had not
yet been considered by the Committee. The report merely mentions that initially
the Bill on the ratification of the Women's convention contained reservations, but
that these were deleted in the later stage of the procedure"-.
NEW ZEALAND
The Government of New Zealand, the Government of the Cook Islands and the
Government of Niue reserve the right not to apply the provisions of Article 11 (2) (b).
The Government of New Zealand, the Government of the Cook Islands and the
Government of Niue reserve the right not to apply the provisions of the Convention in
so far as they are inconsistent with policies relating to recruitment into or service in
(a) the Armed Forces which reflect either directly or indirectly the fact that members of
such forces are required to serve on armed forces aircraft or vessels and in situations
involving armed combat or
(b) the law enforcement forces which reflect either directly or indirectly the fact that
members of such forces are required to serve in situations involving violence or threat
of violence.
297. CEDAW/C/SR.17, par.50 (Mexico). STf
298. CEDAW/C/13/Add.lO; CEDAW/C/13/Add.lO/Amd.l. ••>
299. CEDAW/C/SR.163.
300. CEDAW/C/MEX/3.
301. CEDAW/C/NET/1. •:
302. CEDAW/C/NET/1, par.151.
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The Government of the Cook Islands reserves the right not to apply Article 2(f) and
Article 5(a) to the extent that the customs governing the inheritance of certain Cook
Islands chief titles may be inconsistent with those provisions.
The Government of New Zealand, the Government of the Cook Islands and the
Government of Niue reserve the right, to the Convention is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Employment of Women on Underground Work in Mines of all Kinds
(ILO Convention No 14S) which was ratified by the Government of New Zealand on 29
March 1938, to apply the provisions of the latter, [withdrawn 13-1-1989]
A clear listing of reservations is to be found in the initial report of New Zea-
land*". The matter of maternity leave is dealt with, and the government
announces changes that will bring about paternity leave. Although this might be a
positive development it should be noted that its reservation deals with unpaid
maternity leave'*'. The reservation by the Cook Islands concerning the chiefly
titles is merely mentioned in the additional report on Niue and the Cook
Islands*".
While one member of the Committee does not seem to be aware of the reserva-
tions made by New Zealand, three other members urge it to withdraw the
reservations*". Asked when the withdrawal of reservations could be expected,
the representative states that this will depend on future legislative changes*".
The second periodic report of New Zealand which was due in 1990, had not been
received by the end of 1992**
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The Government of the Republic of Korea, having examined the said Convention,
hereby ratifies the Convention considering itself not bound by the provisions of Article
9 and sub-paragraph (g) of paragraph 1 of Article 16 of the Convention.
[Reservations to article 16.1(c), l(d) and l(f) withdrawn 15-3-1991]
Korea in its initial report merely mentions that the patriarchal system remains in
effect, and that, as a consequence, family law still contains some tradition bound
provisions*".
In their discussion the Committee members stress that article 9 and 16 are
essential to the Convention's object and purpose, and the reservations are therefor
incompatible"". They wonder whether legislative changes are to be expected so
that the reservations can be withdrawn'".
303. CEDAW/C/5/Add.41.
304. Wadstein, op.cit. at 14.
305. CEDAW/C/5/Add.41/Amend.l.
306. CEDAW/C/SR.105, pars. 9 (Wadstein), 14 (Guan), 18 (Ukeje).
307. CEDAW/C/SR.109.
308. CEDAW/C/1993/2.
309. CEDAW/C/5/Add.lS.
310. CEDAW/C/SR.87, par.22 (Wadstein), 23 (Caron), 25 (Sinegiorgis), 40 (Akamatsu), 48
(Corti), 67 (Gonzalez Martinez), 72 (Evatt), 76 (Veliz de Villavilla).
311. However, see about the intention to withdraw the reservation to article 9 CEDAW in
CCPR/C/SR.1154, par.22 (Korea).
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In her reply the representative notices the frequency with which the Committee
asked about the reservations"*. Her Government not only found that the
Convention's provisions concerned conflicted with Korean legislation, but
considerable social resistance would have to be overcome before legislative
changes could take place.
SPAIN
The ratification of the Convention by Spain shall not affect the constitutional provisions
concerning succession to the Spanish crown.
The single reservation by Spain concerning the succession to the throne has not
been dealt with in the initial report'", but a Committee member points out that
withdrawal would be wise as 'discrimination at the level of the Head of State
clearly had an influence throughout the entire social system'"''.
The second periodic report of Spain contains an impressive amount of charts, but
does not refer to the reservation dealing with succession to the throne'". In
reply to questions raised by the Committee the Spanish representative indicates
that the reservation was limited and did not affect the goals of the Convention.
Moreover a Constitutional amendment would be necessary to withdraw the
reservation.'"
THAILAND
Declaration
The Royal Thai Government wishes to express its understanding that the purposes of
the Convention are to eliminate discrimination against women and to accord to every
person, men and women alike, equality before the law. and are in accordance with the
principles prescribed by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand.
Reservations
In all matters which concern national security, maintenance of public order and service
or employment in the military or paramilitary forces, the Royal Thai Government
reserves its right to apply the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination against Women, in particular articles 7 and 10, only within the
limits established by national laws, regulations and practices.
With regard to article 9, paragraph 2, [...] the Royal Thai government considers that the
application of the said provisions shall be subject tot the limits and criteria established
by national law, regulations and practices.|wilhdrawn 26-10-1992)
[Reservations to article 11, paragraph 1 (b) and article 15.3 withdrawn 25-1-1991]
Thailand in its initial report indicates to which provisions reservations have been
made"'. It remarks that the international principles are subject to national law
and practice and ensuring consistency between both will be a constant challenge.
The reservation to article l l . l . b has been made because of the "sensitive nature
312. CEDAW/C/SR.91 par.28 (Republic of Korea).
313. CEDAW/C/5/Add.3O; CEDAW/C/5/Add.30/Amend.l.
314. CEDAW/C/SR.89, par. 58 (Evatt).
315. CEDAW/C/13/Add.l9/Amend.l.
316. CEDAW/C/SR.199, par.12.
317. CEDAW/C/5/Add.51.
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of equal opportunities for men and women in regard to employment". As
concerns article 16, Thailand not only states that it made a reservation and is
consequently not bound by the provision, it also list further so-called anomalies
that are being thought about.
In her presentation the Thai representative mentions the reservations, indicating
that they should be understood in their socio-cultural, economic and political
setting"'. Mobilization of the public opinion would be needed. She then gives
an overview of the seven reservations indicating the contemporary thoughts about
them. The reservation to article 7 was motivated by the exclusion of women from
the army and from key administrative posts but there was an interest in amending
these patriarchal laws. Similarly, there was an interest in changing the situation
underlying the reservation to article 9.2, which was motivated by the paternalistic
structure of society and the fear of refugees and illegal immigrants gaining the
Thai nationality through marriage. The representative announced the forthcoming
withdrawal of the reservations to article l l . l . b and 15.3"*, and clarifies that
the reservation to article 16 was being remedied by a step-by-step approach
towards the practices incompatible with the Convention. It would appear that the
representative was implicitly referring to bigamy in this respect.
The prospect of the withdrawal of the reservations is welcomed by the Com-
mittee^" and the wish is expressed that the other reservations would also be
withdrawn'-'. The issue of the compatibility of the reservations is raised'^
and the exact scope of the reservation to article 10 is questioned''". Similarly,
Committee member Akamatsu expresses concern about the reservations to article
11.1 .c, d, e, and f that would be maintained by Thailand'-''.
In the reply Thailand indicates that it had chosen to make reservations and wait
with their withdrawal until compatibility is achieved'-'. With respect to the
issue of compatibility it is unclear to Thailand who is to determine that: the States
or an independent body. The Thai reservations had been accepted by some states
but rejected by others. Thailand would appreciate the view of an independent
body such as the Committee'-*. The representative then reviews all the reserva-
tions once again, and adds that concern for national security played an important
CEDAW/C/SR.156, par.59-66.
This statement was made on 9 February 199<), the reservations were withdrawn on 25
January 1991, almost a year later.
32a CEDAW/C/SR.156, par.70 (Evatt), 71 (Bernard), 72 (Sinegiorgis); SR.157, par.5
txii/JSr (Akamatsu), 8 (Ilic), 49 (Akamatsu).
32L CEDAW/C/SR.156, par.71 (Bernard), 73 (Pilataxi de Arenas), 74 (Gonzalez Martinez),
75 (Oeser), 76 (Laoui-Antoniou), 77 (Ukeje), 78 (Schopp-Schilling), 79 (Tallawy);
SR.157, par.5 (Akamatsu), 7 (Walla-Tchangai), 10 (Corti).
322. CEDAW/C/SR.156, par.79(Tallawy); SR.157, par.5 (Akamatsu), 50 (Pilataxi de Arenas),
51 (Akamatsu). , . ,
323. CEDAW/C/SR.157, par.39 (Akamatsu). •> : , , *
324. CEDAW/C/SR.157, par.42. f; ?.»•
325. CEDAW/C/SR.157, par.79-83 (Thailand). , . . „ - . - . . . . . . - ,-.rJ! ;» . ^ i a :
326. CEDAW/C/SR. 160, par.81 (Thailand). itW^?\j\WA'H:,; '"ir
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role in the formulation of reservations'". This last remark prompts reactions
from the Committee who fail to see the link between security and women's
rights"*, the representative promises to bring this matter to the attention of the
government^.
Thailand's second periodic report was due in 1990, but had not been received by
the Committee by the end of 1992'"
TUNISIA
General declaration r
The Tunisian Government declares that it shall not take any organization or legislative
,,; , . ^ i . . decision in conformity with the requirements of this Convention where such a decision
would conflict with the provisions of chapter I of the Tunisian Constitution.
Reservation concerning article 9. paragraph 2:
The Tunisian Government expresses its reservation with regard tot the provisions in
i- > • article 9, paragraph 2 of the Convention, which must not conflict with the provisions of
,j *x >< chapter VI of the Tunisian Nationality code.
„ ^ , , Reservation concerning article 16, paragraphs (c). (d). (0. (g). and (h):
The Tunisian Government considers itself not bound by article 16, paragraphs (c), (d)
and (f) of the Convention and declares that paragraphs (g) and (h) of that article must
' ' not conflict with the provisions of the Personal Status Code concerning the granting of
.n>i* ,ii' family names to children and the acquisition of property through inheritance.
i ,- i Declaration concerning article 15. paragraph 4:
j ;f [, In accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
dated 23 May 1969, the Tunisian Government emphasizes that the requirements of
article 15, paragraph 4, of the Convention on the Elimination of AH forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women, and particularly that part relating to the right of women tot
choose their residence and domicile, must not be interpreted in a manner which
conflicts with the provisions of the Personal Status code on this subject, as set forth in
chapters 23 and 61 of the Code.
The initial report of Tunisia was due in 1986, but had not been received by the
end of 1992"'.
- ? -' - . - . ; . . • * ', , ; , i " " •
TURKEY • "' ' ' '
Reservation ••- « . /-v • ". - . - • : - . • , ,-.
"Reservations of the Government of the Republic of Turkey with regard to the articles
" ' ' of the Convention dealing with family relations which are not completely compatible
with the provisions of the Turkish Civil Code, in particular, article 15, paragraphs 2 and
'^ , 4, and article 16, paragraphs l(c), (d), (f) and (g)."
j ' Declaration . . " " . . _ . .
"Article 9, paragraph 1 of the Convention is not in conflict with the provisions of article
5, paragraph 1 and article 15 and 17 of the Turkish Law on Nationality, relating to the
acquisition of citizenship, since the intent of those provisions regulating acquisition of
citizenship through marriage is to prevent statelessness."
'•*§2f>"»'"- CEDAW/C/SR.160, par.83 (Thailand). Who would have thought that women's rights
were a security issue?
328. CEDAW/C/SR.160, par.lll (Gonzalez Martinez), 114 (Schopp-Schilling). f.
329. CEDAW/C/SR.160, par. 116 (Thailand). '«?*
^SiS "••' CEDAW/C/1993/2.
331. CEDAW/C/1993/2.
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The initial report of Turkey is rather succinct about the reservations made. It
states that legislation is in conformity with article 9 of the Convention, and the
text on articles 15 and 16 seems to suggest the possibility of a rapid withdrawal
of the reservations to article 15.2, 15.4 as well as 16. I.e. The amendment to the
Turkish report does mention the reservations to article 15 and 16, and seeks to
clarify their origins in Turkish domestic law'". It is indicated that the reserva-
tions to article 15.2, 15.4 and 16.1 would be withdrawn when amending the Civil
Law would be completed'". Moreover the report indicates that other states
have also made reservations to the same provisions; and that Mexico and
Germany had objected to the Turkish reservations'**.
The intended withdrawal of the reservations is confirmed by the representative in
the introduction, together with the indication that the withdrawal would take place
before the second periodic report would be submitted'".
In their discussion the Committee seeks clarification of the reasons for making
the reservations"*, in relation to Turkey's views on ideal equality as opposed to
equality in practice. In particular Committee member Pilataxi de Arenas stresses
that a withdrawal of reservations should be based on substantive consider-
ations'". A general wish for all the reservations to be withdrawn in expressed.
In her reply the Turkish representative indicates that there is no distinction
between mother and father with respect to the nationality of the child (article 9.2
CEDAW)"*, which seems to make the declaration distinctly redundant. Fur-
thermore it is indicated that the reservations to articles 15 and 16 were studied
with a view to withdrawing them before the second periodic report was due.
The second periodic report of Turkey was due in 1991, but had not been received
by the end of 1992"'.
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
"A. On behalf of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
"(a) The United Kingdom understands the main purpose of the Convention, in the light
of the definition contained in Article I. to be the reduction, in accordance with its
terms, of discrimination against women, and does not therefore regard the Convention
as imposing any requirement to repeal or modify any existing laws, regulations, customs
or practices which provide for women to be treated more favourably than men, whether
temporarily or in the longer term; the United Kingdom's undertakings under Article 4,
paragraph 1. and other provisions of the Convention are to be construed accordingly,
"(b) The United Kingdom reserves the right to regard the provisions of the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975, the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, the
Employment Act 1980, the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976, the
332. CEDAW/C/5/Add.46/Amend.l.
333. CEDAW/C/5/Add.46/Amend.l at 18.
334. CEDAW/C/5/Add.46/Amend.l at 19.
335. CEDAW/C/SR.161, par. 16 (Turkey).
336. CEDAW/C/SR.161, par.18 (Fenger-Moller), 20 (Oeser), 27 (Gonzalez Martinez), 28
(Schopp-Schilling), 91 (Pilataxi de Arenas), 95 (Gonzalez Martinez).
337. CEDAW/C/SR.161, par.91 (Pilataxi de Arenas).
338. CEDAW/C/SR.165, par.36 (Turkey).
339. CEDAW/C/1993/2; the announced withdrawal of reservations has not taken place
either.
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Industrial Relations (No. 2) (Northern Ireland Order 1976, the Industrial Relations
(Northern Ireland) Order 1982, the Equal Pay Act 1970 (as amended) and the Equal
Pay Act (Northern Ireland) 1970 (as amended), including the exceptions and exemptions
contained in any of these Acts and Orders, as constituting appropriate measures for the
practical realisation of the objectives of the Convention in the social and economic
circumstances of the United Kingdom, and to continue to apply these provisions
accordingly, this reservation will apply equally to any future legislation which may
modify or replace the above Acts and Orders on the understanding that the terms of
such legislation will be compatible with the United Kingdom's obligations under the
Convention.
"(c) In the light of the definition contained in Article 1, the United Kingdom's ratifica-
tion is subject to the understanding that none of its obligations under the Convention
shall be treated as extending to the succession to, or possession and enjoyment of, the
Throne, the peerage, titles of honour, social precedence or armorial bearings, or as
extending to the affairs of religious denominations or orders or to the admission into or
service in the Armed Forces of the Crown.
"(d) The United Kingdom reserves the right to continue to apply such immigration
legislation governing entry into, stay in, and departure from, the United Kingdom as it
may deem necessary from time to time and, accordingly, its acceptance of Article 15 (4)
and of the other provisions of the Convention is subject to the provisions of any such
legislation as regards persons not at the time having the right under the law of the
United Kingdom to enter and remain in the United Kingdom.
"Article I
With reference to the provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and other appli-
cable legislation, the United Kingdom's acceptance of Article 1 is subject to the
reservation that the phrase "irrespective of their marital status" shall not be taken to
render discriminatory any difference of treatment accorded to single persons as against
married persons, so long as there is equality of treatment as between married men and
married women and as between single men and single women.
"Article 2
In the light of the substantial progress already achieved in the United Kingdom in
promoting the progressive elimination of discrimination against women, the United
Kingdom reserves the right, without prejudice to the other reservations made by the
United Kingdom, to give effect to paragraphs (f) and (g) by keeping under review such
of its laws and regulations as may still embody significant differences in treatment
between men and women with a view to making changes to those laws and regulations
when to do so would be compatible with essential and overriding considerations of
economic policy, in relation to forms of discrimination more precisely prohibited by
other provisions of the Convention, the obligations under this Article must (in the case
of the United Kingdom) be read in conjunction with the other reservations and
declarations made in respect of those provisions including the declarations and reserva-
tions of the United Kingdom contained in paragraphs (a) - (d) above.
"With regard to paragraphs (f) and (g) of this Article the United Kingdom reserves the
right to continue to apply its law relating to sexual offenses and prostitution; this
reservation will apply equally to any future law which may modify or replace it.
"Article 9
The British Nationality Act 1981,f which was brought into force with effect from January
1983, is based on principles which do not allow of any discrimination against women
within the meaning of Article 1 as regards acquisition, change or retention of their
nationality or as regards the nationality of their children. The United Kingdom's
acceptance of Article 9 shall not, however, be taken to invalidate the continuation of
certain temporary or transitional provisions which will continue in force beyond that
date.
T h e United Kingdom reserves the right to take such steps as may be necessary to
comply with its obligations under Article 2 of the First Protocol to the Convention for
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the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Paris on 20
March 1952 and it obligations under paragraph 3 of Article 13 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights opened for signature at New York
on 19 December 1966, to the extent that the said provisions preserve the freedom of
parental choice in respect of the education of children; and reserves also the right not to
take any measures which may conflict with its obligation under paragraph 4 of Article 13
of the said Covenant not to interfere with the liberty of individuals and bodies to
establish and direct educational institutions, subject to the observation of certain
principles and standards.
"Moreover, the United Kingdom can only accept the obligations under paragraph (c) of
Article 10 within the limits of the statutory powers of central Government, in the light
of the fact that the teaching curriculum, the provision of textbooks and teaching
methods are reserved for local control and are not subject to central Government
direction: moreover, the acceptance of the objective of encouraging co-education is
without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom also to encourage other types of
education.
"Article U
The United Kingdom interprets the "right to work" referred to in paragraph l (a ) as a
reference to the "right to work" as defined in other human rights instruments to which
the United Kingdom is a party, notably Article 6 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 19 December 1966.
T h e United Kingdom interprets paragraph 1 of Article 11, in the light of the provisions
of paragraph 2 of Article 4, as not precluding prohibitions, restrictions of conditions on
the employment of women in certain areas, or on the work done by them, where this is
considered necessary or desirable to protect the health and safety of women or the
human foetus, including such prohibitions, restrictions or conditions imposed in
consequence of other international obligations of the United Kingdom; the United
, . Kingdom declares that, in the event of a conflict between obligations under the present
Convention and its obligations under the Convention concerning the employment of
• women on underground work in mines of all kinds (ILO Convention No. 45), the provi-
sions of the last mentioned Convention shall prevail.
T h e United Kingdom reserves the right to apply all United Kingdom legislation and
the rules of pension schemes affecting retirement pensions, survivor's benefits and other
<!.iis *5 benefits in relation to death or retirement (including retirement on grounds of redun-
• • dancy), whether or not derived from a Social Security scheme.
T h i s reservation will apply equally to any future legislation which may modify or
.,, replace such legislation, or the rules of pension schemes, on the understanding that the
..*> terms of such legislation will be compatible with the United Kingdom's obligations
under the Convention.
T h e United Kingdom reserves the right to apply the following provisions of United
-evfcsav Kingdom legislation concerning the benefits specified:
a) social security benefits for persons engaged in caring for a severely disabled person
adj , j . - i under section 37 of the Social Security Act 1975 and section 37 of the Social Security
ajii (Northern Ireland) Act 1975:
b) increases of benefits for adult dependants under section 44 to 47, 49 and 66 of the
Social Security Act 1975 and under sections 44 to 47. 49 and 66 of the Social Security
< % » B C I (Northern Ireland) Act 1975;
$&,;.-.• c) retirement pensions and survivor's benefits under the Social Security Acts 1975 to
•:&*> fc 1982 and the Social Security (Northern Ireland) Acts 1975 to 1982;
cV-it'ijji' d) family income supplements under the Family Income Supplements Act 1970 and the
1<V Family Income Supplements Act (Northern Ireland) Acts 1971.
»,-.,- T h i s reservation will apply equally to any future legislation which may modify or
replace any of the provisions specified in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) above, on the
.ijLisijj;.. understand that the terms of such legislation will be compatible with the United
) , . ' • > ! Kingdom's obligations under the Convention.
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The United Kingdom reserves the right to apply any non-discriminatory requirement for
a qualifying period of employment or insurance for the application of the provisions
contained in Article 11(2).
"Article 13
The United Kingdom reserves the right, notwithstanding the obligations undertaken in
Article 13, or any other relevant article of the Convention, to continue to apply the
income tax and capital gains tax legislation which:
i) deems for income tax purposes the income of a married woman living with her
husband in a year, or part of a year, of assessment to be her husband's income and not
to be her income (subject to the right of the husband and the wife to elect jointly that
the wife's earned income shall be charged to income tax as if she were a single woman
with no other income); and
ii) requires tax in respect of such income and of chargeable gains accruing to such a
married woman to be assessed on her husband (subject to the right of either of them to
apply for separate assessment) and consequently (if no such application is made)
restricts to her husband the right to appeal against any such assessment and to be heard
or to be represented at the hearing of any such appeal; and
iii) entitles a man who has his wife living with him, or whose wife is wholly maintained
by him, during the year of assessment to a deduction from his total income of an
amount larger than that to which an individual in any other case is entitled and entitles
and individual whose total income includes any earned income of his wife to have that
deduction increased by the amount of that earned income or by an amount specified in
the legislation whichever is the less.
"Article 15 '
In relation to Article 15, paragraph 2. the United Kingdom understands the term "legal
capacity" as referring merely to the existence of a separate and distinct legal personality.
"In relation to Article 15, paragraph 3, the United Kingdom understands the intention
of this provision to be that only those terms or elements of a contract or other private
instrument which are discriminatory in the sense described are to be deemed null and
void, but not necessarily the contract or instrument as a whole.
"Article 16
As regards sub-paragraph l(f) of Article 16, the United Kingdom does not regard the
reference to the paramountcy of the interests of the children as being directly relevant
to the elimination of discrimination against women, and declares in this connection that
the legislation of the United Kingdom regulating adoption, while giving a principal
position to the promotion of the children's welfare, does not give to the child's interests
the same paramount place as in issues concerning custody over children.
"The United Kingdom's acceptance of paragraph 1 of Article 16 shall not be treated as
either limiting the freedom of a person to dispose of his property as he wishes or as
giving a person a right to property the subject of such a limitation."
"B. On behalf of the Isle of Man, the British Virgin Islands, the Falkland Islands, South
Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and the Turks and C'aicos Islands:
[Same reservations as the one made on behalf of the United Kingdom under paragraphs
Afa). (c), and (d) except that in the of case d) it applies to the territories and their
laws).]
Article 1
[Same reservation as the one made in respect of the United Kingdom except with
regard to the absence of a reference to United Kingdom legislation.]
Article 2
[Same reservation as the one made in respect of the United Kingdom except that
reference is made to the laws of the territories, and not the laws of the United King-
dom.] ' •••"*
Article 9 * ^
ISame reservation as the one made in respect of the United Kingdom)
Article 11
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ISame reservation as those made in respect of the United Kingdom except that a
reference is made to the laws of the territories, and not to the laws of the United
Kingdom.]
"Also, as far as the territories are concerned, the specific benefits listed and which may
be applied under the provisions of these territories' legislation are as follows:
a) social security benefits for persons engaged in caring for a severely disabled person;
b) increases of benefit for adult dependants;
c) retirement pensions and survivors' benefits;
d) family income supplements.
"This reservation will apply equally to any future legislation which may modify or
n\ replace any of the provisions specified in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) above, on the
understanding that the terms of such legislation will be compatible with the United
c fix;: Kingdom's obligations under the Convention.
O; "The United Kingdom reserves the right to apply any non-discriminatory requirement
C. for a qualifying period of employment or insurance for the application of the provisions
< : • • contained in Article 11(2)."
Article 13. 15 and 16
fc- ISame reservations as those made on behalf the United Kingdoml
The initial report of the United Kingdom repeats most of its reservations without
providing further insight into their background"", although with respect to the
reservation to article 9 it elaborates on relevant case-law from the European
Court of Human Rights. It considers existing UK sex discrimination legislation as
constituting appropriate measures for the practical realization of the objectives of
the Convention. In discussing the reservation to article 13, concerning discrimina-
tion in taxation, there is a certain amount of self-criticism as the United Kingdom
indicates that another, less discriminatory system of taxation would also be
possible.
In her introduction the United Kingdom representative mentions that a number of
reservations had been made which was a sign of how serious the government
took the Convention*". She indicates that discriminatory tax legislation would
be abolished by April 1990 which would enable the United Kingdom to partially
withdraw the reservation to article 13*-. It is indicated that certain prohibitions
on various kinds of work are being removed, such as in the off-shore industry
and in mining, which would lead to the withdrawal of another reservation.
In their reaction the Committee appreciates the intended withdrawal of the
reservations*", but expresses its concern about the large number of reservations
made, as well as about their scope*". The Committee inquired about the
intention to withdraw the remaining reservations*" and the question was raised
whether the reservations to the Convention were matched by reservations to the
340. CEDAW/C/5/Add.52 (25-9-1987).
341. CEDAW/C/SR.155, par.50-53 (United Kingdom)
$(PU j,- By the end of 1992 no withdrawals by the United Kingdom had been received by the
T t v • depository (ST/LEG/SER.E/11).
343L CEDAW/C/SR.155, par.59 (Evatt), par.60 (Bernard).
344. CEDAW/C/SR.155, par.59 (Evatt), 69 (Tallawy), 70 (Pilataxi de Arenas), 76 (Oeser), 95
(Escobar), 114 (Guan Minquian).
345. CEDAW/C/SR.155, par.59 (Evatt), 60 (Bernard), 64 (Walla Tchangai), 65 (llic), 66
(Diallo Soumare), 82 (Ukeje), 83 (Gonzalez Martinez), 85 (Sinegiorgis).
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*"*. Another issue raised is the fact that
some reservations claim the conformity of existing legislation with the Conven-
tion. If this is the case, no reservation needed to have been made*". It is
unclear whether the reservations were not in fact explanations***, and the
reference to considerations of economic policy in the reservation to article 2 is
questioned*".
In her reply to the Committee the representative indicates that the reservations
had been declarations of the United Kingdom's understanding of the purpose of
the Convention. It felt that some of the provisions had been drafted hastily and
were rather imprecise, and the reservations indicated that a number of provisions
could not be implemented immediately upon ratification"". With respect to the
question about the coherence of the Convention and the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights it was indicated that the reservations to both instruments differed
because of their different scope, and it was again stressed that the Convention
was unfortunately not as precise as it might be"'. On answering questions with
respect to prostitution, it is indicated that proposals to make legislation gender-
neutral were pending. The fact that this could lead to the withdrawal of reserva-
tions is however not mentioned"-.
The second periodic report by the United Kingdom"' had not been discussed
by the end of 1992. In a paragraph called "Reservations", the report discusses the
policy with respect to reservations^. The paragraph appears to be a reflection
on the discussion with the Committee concerning the initial report. The remark
by the representative that the United Kingdom was considering changes in the
areas where reservations had been made is repeated, without actually indicating
that such reflections had already led to the withdrawal, or even intended with-
drawal, of reservations. The reservations concerning tax legislation (article 13
CEDAW), ILO Convention 45 (article 11.1 CEDAW) and family income supple-
ments legislation (article 11 CEDAW) are singled out. It is indicated that the
United kingdom denounced ILO Convention 45, and that a conflict, which is
what the reservation refers to, will therefore not arise. While the report indicates
in each of these three cases that the relevant legislation had been changed, there
is no indication that the reservations might be withdrawn"'. Finally it is
repeated that the large number of reservations are merely a reflection of the
importance attached to the Convention by the United Kingdom, which will keep
the reservation under review. It should be noted that this presentation, in spite of
346. CEDAW/C/SR.155, par.65 (Ilic), 83 (Gonzalez Martinez).
347. CEDAW/C/SR.155, par.69 (Tallawy).
348. CEDAW/C/SR.155, par.71 (Pilataxi de Arenas).
349. CEDAW/C/SR.155, par.72 (Schopp-Schilling), 77 (Laoiu-Antoniou).
350. CEDAW/C/SR.159, par.2-3 (United Kingdom).
351. CEDAW/C/SR.159, par.5 (United Kingdom).
352. CEDAW/C/SR.159, par.41 (United Kingdom).
353. CEDAW/C/UK/2, CEDAW/C/UK/2/Amend.l.
354. CEDAW/C/UK/2, par.12-17.
355. And indeed, the relevant reservations are still mentioned in ST/LEG/SER.E/11.
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the merits it has by focusing specifically on reservations, only mentions a few of
the numerous reservations. It is therefore somewhat deceptive.
Looking at the discussing of the individual provisions in the second periodic
report it is noticeable that the report does not discuss the implementation of
article 1 CEDAW, and begins with article 2. Given the fact that a number of
reservations specifically mention article 1, this approach is somewhat concealing.
A discussion of the reservations to articles 9, 10, 11, 15 or 16 is absent.
4. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING RESERVATIONS TO THE
CONVENTION
In an article about reservations to human rights treaties, Shelton has suggested
that it is no coincidence that a large number of reservations to human rights
treaties are detrimental to the status of women"'. And indeed, the number of
reservations to the Women's Convention is perhaps not really surprising.
Byrnes distinguishes four separate problems, namely the nature and scope of the
reservations, the permissibility of certain reservations, the manner in which their
validity is determined as well as the implications of reservations for the obliga-
tions of the States Parties'". These elements are of vital importance, yet the list
is probably incomplete. From an activist point of view, other important issues
would be the withdrawal of reservations as well as the restriction of their impact.
These issues will be dealt with in the following, focusing on the role of the States
as well as the role of the Committee.
4.1. The reservations
An important issue when looking at the reservations is the determination of their
scope, and their possible impact on the obligations incumbent on the States
Parties. Different groups of reservations can be distinguished.
Some reservations underline the State Party's intention to £/w/w«//y //n/>/?/Nen/ a
provision of the Convention**". This may be superfluous given the fact that the
Convention in many of its provisions already implies gradual implementation. In
that case the reserving state merely repeats what is already provided for, and
according to article 2.l.d VCLT does not even make a reservation"'. It
however depends on the firmness of the statement, as it may well be that gradual
356. Shelton, op.cit. at 227.
357. Byrnes, The Work of the Committee, at 52.
358. Reservation by Australia in respect of article 11.2 ('not at present'), and concerning
combat duties in the armed forces (the Government., is reviewing this policy*), a
reservation by Cyprus in respect of article 9.2 ('shall be withdrawn'), a reservation by
Ireland in respect of articles 13.b and c ('for the time being'), and the general reservati-
on by Malawi ("for the time being").
359. Article 2.l.d VCLT reads:"., whereby it purports to m/wdf or /o /?jo<///y r/ic /<^a/ e/fec/ o/
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implementation is completely excluded, which leads to a genuine reservation. It
also depends on the nature of the provision that reservation is attached to, if this
is a core provision even a reservation indicating gradual implementation may be
incompatible.
Of course the focal point in any discussion about reservations to the Convention
is its object and purpose. It must be noticed that though 'object and purpose' has
become a catch phrase, it is a negative obligation. The rule is that reservations
should not be contrary to the object and purpose of a treaty, there is no obliga-
tion for them to be in conformity with object and purpose. This may seem a twist
of words but it is not without importance. One of the consequences of object and
purpose as a negative obligation is that theoretically there is no need to determine
its material content, it is mainly necessary to see whether a reservation is
contrary to a but vaguely determined object and purpose.
The value of the prohibition of reservations contrary to object and purpose will
depends on the selection made between fringe reservations and more serious
ones. Whatever object and purpose is, it they must be assumed to be the raison
d'etre of the Convention. This implies that it is quite possible that reservations
are made that do not touch upon the object and purpose, but remain on the
fringe. Although these reservations restrict the legal effect of provisions of the
treaty, not every reservation will be as harmful as the reservations contrary to
object and purpose. A clear example of an acceptable approach with respect to
disparities between national legislation and the Convention were the reservations
to article 9.1, 11.1, 13.a and 15.4 by Ireland, that indicated that reservations had
been made because of these differences, and indeed withdrew the reservations
when domestic legislation had been changed.
For practical purposes it is useful to split up the "object and purpose" rule into
two separate rules, namely the obligation not to undermine the treaty qua treaty
and the obligation not to undermine the content of the treaty. From this perspec-
tive the vast amount of reservations to the Convention becomes slightly transpar-
ent.
The first rule is the obligation not to obstruct the treaty law side of the Conven-
tion. Acting in contravention of general rules of treaty law is contrary to the
object and purpose of any treaty. The group of reservations that, because of their
impact on the formal aspects of the Convention, are contrary to the object and
purpose of the Convention, consists of two different kinds of reservations.
Firstly, there are the general reservations that do not indicate the provision at
which they are aimed*". General and unrestricted reservations entail much
uncertainty about the extent to which a State making such reservations will be
bound by the obligations contained in the treaty. They are contrary to the very
idea of /ex jcri/tffl, the importance of explicit and written agreements. Apart from
360. The reservation by Libya, and the reservation by Malawi that has been withdrawn in
1991.
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that, these reservations cast doubt on the State Party's intention to comply with
the object and purpose of the Convention.
Secondly, there is a large group of reservations indicating the prevalence of
national legislation in favour of the Convention. Here again, States do not
provide certainty about their obligations towards their co-contractants. This
uncertainty arises because the reserving state may change its national legislation
at will, which leads to incertitude about the obligations agreed upon. Reservations
emphasizing the predominance of religious law or traditional custom belong to
the same category. They leave compliance with the treaty to the reserving State's
discretion, it will depend on the obligatory value of other legal and social
systems.
The second rule sees to the content of the Convention and prohibits acting
contrary to the intended substantive rules. This group of reservations consists of
reservations contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty in as much as its
content is concerned. As stated above, given the fact that the 'object and purpose'
rule is formulated as a negative rule there is no obligation, much less an option to
determine the object and purpose of the Convention in any objective way. Apart
from an authoritative statement by the States Parties or an interpretation on the
basis of article 29 CEDAW, it will be up to the Committee to indicate what is
and what is not contrary to the object and purpose. Theory and practice indicate
that the articles 2, 9, 11, 15 and 16 of the Convention are understood as core-
provisions. Moreover, the exclusion of the Convention's frequent reference to the
progressive elimination of discrimination is also widely considered to be incom-
patible with the very object of the Convention.
4.2. The role of States ..;-•.,....«- iias"' bsri DOiishijtsi -ftysreub f.-*ti\«
Looking at the attitude of States towards reservations to the Convention and the
impact of reservations on its implementation, one cannot but be struck by the
atmosphere of inertia. The States Parties frequently express the intention to
withdraw reservations, but usually fail to do so'*'.
A reason for the small number of objecting states may be the fact that objections
have become a feeble weapon in the Vienna Convention-system, and are useless
in respect of reservations to human rights treaties'*-. Four states objected
frequently to reservations made, and did so with persistence. Yet the withdrawal
of reservations objected to by these four states demonstrates a limited success.
The reservations withdrawn by Thailand and Korea had been objected to by four
states, three states objected to the reservation of Malawi, and two states objected
to the reservation of New Zealand. This does not show that objections will
361. For instance the possible withdrawal of the Australian reservation with respect to
maternity leave (CEDAW/C/SR.118; CEDAW/C/AUL/20; the Korean reservation to
article 9 (CCPR/C/SR.1154, par.22): the Belgian reservation with respect to the exercise
' • * > " of royal powers, mentioned in the press.
362. See Chapter 2, par.3.2.2 supra. <->>
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always lead to withdrawals, but withdrawals may have been influenced by
objections. Moreover the four objecting States demonstrated a shared opinion as
to the incompatibility of certain reservations. On the other hand it is not too bold
to suspect that states have simply not been attentive enough to make objections
within the time-limit set by article 20.5 VCLT.
It has been suggested that a distinct element of opportunism plays a role in
decisions to object*", and attention has been given to the relation between the
reserving state and the objecting state. Thus the absence of objections on the part
of Mexico to the reservations by Brazil could be explained by their regional
relations, which were absent between the other objecting States and Brazil. While
political considerations may indeed play a role in deciding to object, it may not
be completely fair to denounce an objecting State for the failure to object when
the complete failure on the part of other states is much more visible, if not more
detrimental.
r
The difference between the limited number of objections and the explicitness of
the replies in the Secretary General's survey is remarkable'^. Yet, though the
survey shows that the responding states have quite strong ideas on the matter of
incompatible reservations, all that glitters is not gold. Of the 89 States Parties to
the Convention at the time, only 17 States replied. Of these, three replies did not
address the precise questions, two states mistakenly used the survey to object to
reservations already made, and France stated that it did not consider any of the
reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. Only
eleven States sent a meaningful reply.
The reservations issue was barely dealt with in the bi-annual meeting of the
States Parties. They left the matter to be discussed in the General Assembly. That
discussion, in the Third Committee, in fact only took place during the forty-first
session, in 1986. In the following sessions the States were occupied with other
aspects of the Convention, and reservations have received little or no attention.
No doubt the ill-fated approach of the Committee towards the issue of women's
rights in Islam, froze the willingness of the States Parties and their options with
regard to the Sharia'h reservations. In fact, rather than opening the issue for
debate, the atmosphere hardened and the reservations issue became non-negoti-
able'".
•'•;-.-..-><-iSe*-.
363. Jacobs, op.cit. at 85.
364. A/41/608 and A/41/608/Add.l. dealt with supra par.2.3.1 at..
365. Clark, op.cit. at 289.
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4.3. The role or the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women
Given the fact that States are irresolute, the role of the Committee could of great
importance. Yet, it would appear that the Committee has so far not been able to
get a grip on the reservations issue.
From a practical point of view, some simple improvements may have a positive
impact on the reservations issue. For instance, the knowledge of reservations to
the Convention ought to increase. The ignorance of Committee-members is some-
times striking'**. They should have more insight into the reservations made,
and also about aspects of the law of treaties, as this lies at the very basis of
thorough supervision. Though this is a personal responsibility, the insight of the
Committee members could be enhanced by the issue of a yearly update of the
document entitled "Reservations, declarations, notifications and objections
relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women""'. At the moment this is a States Parties document, clearly it
ought to be a Committee document.
The Committee's major task is to consider the reports of States Parties on the
implementation of the Convention. The reporting by the States Parties does not
always give an adequate presentation of either the reservations made**, or the
actual impact of the reservations. It is understandable that States would rather
disguise their reservations than explicitly mention them, although a few states set
good examples by stating all their reservations at the beginning of their
reports'**.
Fortunately, the nihilist point of view taken by Austria, the idea that reservations
need not be reported on, has not caught on"°. The articles 17, 18 and 20
CEDAW are the basis of the Committee's authority to deal with the reservations.
The obligations to report on reservations would seem to be the mirror image of
the Committee's competence. Moreover, article 18.2 explicitly deals with
reporting about "..factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment of
obligations under the present Convention."
The "General Guidelines regarding the form and the content of the reports
received from States Parties under article 18 of the Convention"'" do not
contain rules as to whether and how states should report on their reservations, it
focuses basically on information concerning domestic implementation. It would
be useful to amend the Guidelines and add a rule on indicating the reservations
366. CEDAW/C/SR.13 par.16; CEDAW/C/SR.135 par.83. 85.
367. CEDAW/SP/1992/2; 1 November 1991.
368. Cf.the second periodical report of the United Kingdom, CEDAW/C/UK/2, discussed
supra at...
369. CEDAW/C/5/Add.4O (Australia). CEDAW/C/5/Add.41 (New Zealand), CEDAW/-
C/5/AddJl (Thailand), CEDAW/C/5/Add.52 (United Kingdom).
370. CEDAW/C/SR.5S, and supra para.3.1.
371. CEDAW/C/7 (11-8-1983), on the Guidelines see: Wadstein. op.cit. at 7-8.
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" as well as a guideline providing that the reservation should be dealt
with when reporting on the individual provisions of the Convention™. This
would force States to reconsider their reservations each time a report is drafted,
and at the same time provide the Committee with more detailed information.
The Committee is the only supervisory organ that dealt with the question of
reservations by way of general recommendations. As such it is interesting that
this path has been chosen, but too little has been achieved it seems. The general
recommendations contain suggestions for the reserving State, and it would seem
that a stricter approach might require a more specific approach to the way in
which States report about the reservations made, and about the reasons for
maintaining the reservations. This could be included in a general comment on the
structure of periodic reports, but could also be included in the guidelines on
reporting.
A better knowledge of the reservations as well as stricter guidelines may improve
the Committee's handling of the reservation issue, but this will probably not be
enough. As Byrnes quite aptly states, ultimately "the important questions are tac-
tical ones: how to encourage the withdrawal of existing reservations, limit the
number and extent of new ones and monitor closely the impact of those presently
in force.""'' Much will depend on the way in which the problem will be dealt
with.
Reservations are clearly a matter of concern to the Committee, at least they are
frequently mentioned. It is within the competence of the Committee, as laid down
in articles 17, 18 and 20, to discuss the reservations made. This is a general
competence, and consequently the Committee can legitimately inquire about the
Convention, including the provisions to which reservations have been made.
Moreover, such questioning is a way of stimulating the progressive implementa-
tion of the Convention by the reserving states. Committee members appear par-
ticularly conscious of article 28.2, and their questioning revolves around the
compatibility issue. The incompatibility of reservations is suggested in discussions
with the States Parties'".
The withdrawal of reservations is frequently suggested, so often that it seems a
mere formality"'. States will in general reply that the matter is under consider-
ation, and the Committee would only seem to achieve its goals by repeating the
question when considering successive reports by the same State.
372. This could be incorporated into Part I sub a), which requires States to report on the
"actual, general, social, economic, political and legal framework", to which reservations
no doubt belong.
373. This could be incorporated into Part II sub a), which deals with "[T]he constitutional,
legislative and administrative provisions..".
374. Byrnes, op.cit. at 52.
375. CEDAW/C/SR.35 par.13: SR.39 par.15; SR.87 passim; SR.96 passim.
376. CEDAW/C/SR.35; SR^l; SR.93 and 94; SR.%: SR.105: SR.135.
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Too much emphasis on the prohibition in article 28.2 may not be wise. Obvi-
ously, "object and purpose" are not the same as literally every single provision of
the Convention. The provision does not prohibit reservations in general, it merely
prohibits the ones contrary to core obligations. It might be suggested that the
Committee would sketch some outlines, and indicate which are obligations are the
Convention's ra/jo/i rf'efre. The Committee appears to be concerned about arti-
cles 9, 15 and 16, while the reservations to article 2 are surprisingly not in the
focus of the attention'".
Discussions of the reservations need not be restricted to the compatibility issue,
but may also deal with other aspects of reservations, including reservations to
non-core obligations. It should be remembered that a great number of seemingly
unimportant reservations by one State can have an equally devastating impact on
the integrity of the Convention.
In the course of time Committee members have engaged in more profound ques-
tioning, exploring other ways of getting a grip on the issue of reservations.
Rather than mentioning the incompatibility of reservations or requesting their
withdrawal, the Committee seems to have embarked on a constructive dialogue
with the States Parties'^. The strategy, if there is one, would seem to consist
of two elements: a more profound approach to withdrawal and an attempt to
narrow broadly formulated reservations.
Rather than demanding that a reservation be withdrawn, the Committee has
sometimes sought to find out what kept the State from withdrawing its reserva-
tion-"'. An approach aimed at gradual withdrawal of reservations would seem
to be in harmony with the Convention's notion of gradual implementation.
Moreover, it has the advantage of increasing insight into the origins of the
reservation, and forces the reserving state to report on the progress made in the
implementation of the Convention.
A similar line of argument holds true for the group of broad reservations'*'.
These reservations leave the author state great freedom to interpret their own
reservation. The Committee has shown a tendency to ask reserving states to be
explicit about their actual reservation, thus narrowing the scope of the reserva-
tion'*'. The requirement, in article 23.4 VCLT, of a formulation in writing for
the withdrawal of a reservation, would seem to be rebutted by the fact that such
377. Such as reservations made by Bangladesh. Egypt, and Iraq.
378. Byrnes. The Work of the Committee at 52-53 is much more positive about the Commit-
tee's performance in the field of reservations, i doubt if whether "the Committee has
co/jiwfcm/y encouraged the States to review and withdraw their reservations".
379. For example, the discussion of the reports by Austria (CEDAW/C/SR.51); France
(CEDAW/C/SR.93,94); Korea (CEDAW/C/SR.91); Turkey (CEDAW/C/SR.161);
United Kingdom (CEDAW/C/SR.155).
380. Byrnes, The Work of the Committee at 53.
381. cf. CEDAW/C/SR.96 par.99 at 15 (Evatt):".. suggested that the Bangladesh Govern-
ment study the terms of article 2 further with a view to including in future reports its
comments on the legislative or other structures which, in its view, prevented it from
fully implementing article 2."
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statements are public and are moreover published in the Committee's summary
records. It must be assumed that States who publicly restrict the scope of their
reservations, for instance in the discussions with the Committee, thus unilaterally
limit the scope of their reservation in a legally binding way.
Only occasionally has the Committee asked about the compatibility of reserva-
tions when compared to the obligations under other human rights instruments-
**\ As has been explained before, I feel that this is a avenue which might
provide better opportunities for monitoring the reservations; and it could thus be
suggested to the Committee that this is a strategy to be explored and elaborated
upon in the future'*'.
In sum, the Committee may be hesitantly on the way to developing ways of
reducing the substantial impact of reservations. It should be kept in mind that this
is a judgment based on the Committee's performance with respect to the initial
reports. The second periodic reports should give the Committee ample oppor-
tunity to improve its dealing with reservations to the Convention. Yet if anyone,
apart from the States Parties, has the opportunity to do anything about the
problem it is the Committee and much will depend on its perseverance.
4.4. Prospects
The responses to the survey, the few objections, the few withdrawals and the
attitude of the States Parties as well as the discussions in the Third Committee
paint an equally gloomy picture of the prospects of the Convention. Byrnes has
indicated that so far the Committee's approach consists of four elements'*'.
Although the task of the Committee is by no means an easy one, it would seem
that the Committee might try and venture other avenues so as to limit the impact
of the reservations. It may find ways of doing its very necessary work by using
international law in a creative way. To Byrnes' list could be added elements
based on the law of treaties, as a way of strengthening the supervision and
reducing the impact of reservations. The Committee has not yet reached the
limits of legal imagination.
382. Cf. the questions by Committee-members Ilic and Gonzalez Martinez (CEDAW/C/SR.-
155, par.65 and 83) to the United Kingdom with respect to reservations to CEDAW and
their coherence with obligations under the CCPR.
383. See supra Chapter 3, par.2.3, The interpretation of human rights instruments: coexisten-
ce and coherence.
384. Byrnes, The Work of the Committee at 52-53:"As well as questioning States on the
extent to which women enjoy equality in the areas covered by reservations and exhorting
them to withdraw reservations the Committee considers unnecessary, the CEDAW (that
is the Committee, EL) has consistently encouraged States to review and withdraw their
reservations. The Committee has also sought to determine how reservations to individu-
al articles undermine a State Party's ability to fulfil the obligations it has accepted under
other articles of the Convention, while endeavouring to establish the practical impact of
broad sweeping reservations on the implementation of individual articles of the
Convention".
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At present two suggestions are at hand that might be turned to the Convention's
advantage. First of all there is the possibility mentioned in article 23.b CEDA.W
the availability of better protection in other international conventions. As fo^g
been pointed out States occasionally follow an inconsistent policy when
reservations. In such cases, when provisions more conducive to the
of equality are available elsewhere, article 23.b provides an opportunity for
ignoring the reservation made, albeit not erprerarr verZ>/.r. In that case (he
Committee will assume that the State intended to act in consistence with Prior
obligations, thus limiting the effect of the reservation'".
A further strategy would be to put more emphasis on general rules of i n t e n -
tional law. States are presumed to act in accordance with international law wj,gjj
concluding international agreements. This entails obligations such as the dut^, (<-,
be explicit about obligations and the prohibition to unilaterally alter pacta. As
demonstrated above, this could restrict the impact of excessively broad resei-va_
tions, and reservations invoking domestic law.
In conclusion it might be said that the reporting procedure and the monitoring
the implementation of the Convention by the Committee are not without
pects, but very much will depend on the Committee's ability to act flexible
creatively. As indicated, the Committee has opportunities to improve its grip
the reservations within the limits of international law.
: i ' . f!O -".' f•..-:£? t<~ *
385. Cook, Women's Convention at 709-711.
7. RESERVATIONS TO THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
i AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
i TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
1.1. Content of the Convention
The Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, (henceforth: CAT) was adopted by Resolution 39/46 of the
General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1984'. It was opened
for signature on 4 February 1985, and entered into force on 26 June 1987 when
twenty States ratified the Convention". The Convention consists of three parts,
dealing with substantive law (part I), supervision (part II), and final clauses (part
III).
In Part I torture is defined in article l ' as 'any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confes-
sion, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed, or intimidat-
ing or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination
of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity'. It should be noted that the Convention does not give a defini-
tion of 'other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"*. States are
obliged to take measures to prevent torture, and neither exceptional circumstances
nor superior orders can serve as justification for torture. Torture shall be a
criminal offence, and the Convention lays down rules of penal law and extradi-
tion law to that effect, the most important of which is universal jurisdiction for
1. GA Res. 39/46. On the origins of the Convention see: J.H.Burgers and H.Danelius, The
{:.,r United Nations Convention against Torture, Dordrecht. 1988. 5-110; Z.Haquani. La
.;;»' Convention des Nations Unies contre la Torture, in:90 RGDIP 1986, 127-170 at 131-139;
.y, N.Lemer, The U.N.Convention on Torture, in: 16 IsrYbHR 1986, 126-142 at 127-129;
R.Marx. Die Konvention der Vereinte Nationen gegen Folter und andere grausame,
unmenschliche oder erniedrigende Behandlung oder Strafe, in: 18 ZfRechtspolitik 1986,
81-85 at 81-82; M.E.Tardu. The United Nations Convention against Torture and other
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. in:56 Nordic JIL 1987, 303-321
passim. • <5
2. Article 27.1 CAT.
3. Burgers and Danelius. op.cit. at 122 point out that article 1 CAT gives a description of
torture rather than a legal definition.
4. Haquani. op.cit. at 141; J.Donnelly, The emerging international regime against torture,
,_,, in:33 NILR 1986, 1-23 at 2-3; Lerner, op.cit. at 131; Marx, op.cit. at 82 and Tardu op.cil.
at 309-311.
372 "•"' CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
acts of torture. The Convention furthermore contains rules aimed at prevention of
torture, such as the duty to educate and inform law-enforcement personnel and to
systematically review interrogation rules. Alleged victims of torture have a right
of complaint, and the legal system of a State Party should provide for compensa-
tion for victims of torture.
Part II sets up the Convention's implementation system, which is by and large
based on the systems created by the Convention against Racial Discrimination and
the Convention on Civil and Political Rights. There is a Committee against
Torture (hereinafter: the Committee) consisting of ten independent experts. The
expenses of Committee members' as well as the expenses incurred in connection
with meetings of the States Parties and the Committee itself will be the responsi-
bility of the States Parties, according to articles 17.7. and 18.5*. This is an
unusual system compared to other UN human rights instruments. The work of the
Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion against Women is completely financed by the United Nations, whereas the
expenses of the members of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination are borne by the States Parties, and the remainder is paid for by the
UN. It must be assumed that the United Nations financial problems have led to
this regulation of the costs of the supervision of the Convention'.
States Parties shall submit a report to the Committee on the measures taken to
implement the Convention (article 19). Article 21 provides for interstate com-
plaints in an optional procedure, which has entered into force in accordance with
paragraph 2*. The individual complaints procedure of article 22 is also optional,
and has entered into force in accordance with article 22.8'. A new and innova-
tive procedure in the Convention is the Committee's option to start a confidential
inquiry once it receives reliable information containing well-founded indications
that torture is systematically practised in the territory of a State Party (article 20).
While this provision appears to be mandatory, it is possible to opt out according
to article 28, which indicates that reservations may be made'". Jsrf? oi v/«i a-JtS
5. cf. article 8.6 CERD.
6. On the issue of expenses of the Committee see: Burgers and Danelius, op.cit. at 154-155
>•*'!' (art.17.7) and 156 (art.18.5); M.Coccia, A Controversial Declaration on the UN
u ; i. Convention against Torture (hereafter: Controversial Declaration), in: 1 EJIL 1990, 314-
:0f I r 327 at 317; L.Lijnzaad, Nederlands hezwaar hij DDR-voorbehoud ten aanzien van VN-
:• Folteringverdrag (hereafter: Nederlands bezwaar), in: 14 NJCM 1989. 504-509 at 505;
M.Mohr, The German Democratic Republic's Declaration on the Ami- Torture
convention and its consequences: an Attempt at Evaluation, in: 1 EJIL 1990, 328-335 at
: 328-331.
TLJf-< • Tardu op.cit at 316.
8. By the end of 1992 (ST/LEG/SER.E/11, 31-12-1992) 30 States had recognized the
Committee's competence in this field.
9; By the end of 1992 (ST/LEG/SER.E/11, 31-12-1992) 29 States had recognized the
Committee's competence in this field.
lft, •<• By the end of 1992 (ST/LEG/SER.E/11. 31-12-1992) 11 States had made reservations
*.-v according to article 28.1, thus excluding article 20; four States have already withdrawn
these reservations. . .i^v*. ;<*
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Part III contains the final clauses. It deals with ratification, entry into force,,
amendments, dispute-settlement and denunciation. There is no general reserva-
tions clause, but in articles 28.2 and 30.3 the Convention explicitly mentions the
possibility of making reservations to specified provisions. ^
The general opinion of the Convention seems to be that although the substantive
provisions are satisfactory, the Convention lacks strength in the sphere of
implementation. Criticism has especially been directed at the fact that reporting is
the only compulsory supervision procedure, while both interstate complaints and
individual complaints procedures are optional, and the confidential inquiry
procedure can be opted out of".
1.2. The law applicable to reservations £
Mentioning reservations in two instances, articles 28.2 and 30.3, the Convention
contains a dual system of law applicable to reservations. Firstly there are the
rules of the Convention itself. Article 28 indicates the option of declaring that a
State does not recognize the Committee's competence as laid down in article 20,
the confidential inquiry based on indications that torture is systematically prac-
tised. According to the second paragraph of article 28 the reservation to article
20 can be withdrawn by simply notifying the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. Article 30 deals with dispute settlement and provides for a procedure in
which a conflict about interpretation or application may be unilaterally submitted
to arbitration, and, if no agreement can be reached within six months, may be
referred to the International Court of Justice by one of the Parties. Paragraph 2
provides for reservations and indicates that such a reservation will apply
reciprocally. Paragraph 3 states that reservations may be withdrawn at any time
by simple notification.
The Convention thus only provides explicit rules on reservations relating to
articles 20 jo. 28 and article 30. With respect to those provisions the rules are
clear, but what about reservations to other rules in the Convention? As the
Convention does not mention that these reservations are the only reservations that
may be made, it would appear that the system as laid down in article 19.b VCLT
is not applicable'-. This leads to the applicability of article 19.c VCLT, and its
11. Haquani, op.at. at 130:"Le resultat obtenu est relativement satisfaisant pour ce qui
concerne les mesures de protections preconisees, mais timide quant aux moyens de
controle prevus pour son application sur le plan international."; and Marx, op.cit. at
84:"Angesichts des erheblichen Defizits an effcktiven Bestimmungen des Kontrollverfah-
rens ist von einem Inkrafttreten der Konvention gegen Folter ohne hin kaum ein
Fortschritt in der Entwicklung des Folterschutzes zu erwarten."
12. According to article 19.b the treaty should indicate that on/y 5/>cc<yic</ raovaHo/w may
be made.
But compare the views expressed by Committee-member Voyame who suggests in
,'~ CAT/C/SR.40, par.36-38 (reservations by Chile) and in CAT/C/SR.126, par.53
"'" (reservations by New Zealand) that article 19.b VCLT is applicable.
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notion of "object and purpose" being the guiding principle with respect to
reservations to the Convention".
A subsequent question would then be what the "object and purpose" is, as a con-
crete yardstick is necessary to apply this criterion. In establishing "object and
purpose" it is necessary to keep in mind that the prohibition of torture is a rule of
/«j cogmy. It is a pre-existing rule, and it would make little sense to consider it
part of the core-obligation under the Convention. The importance of the Conven-
tion is that it facilitates the prosecution and extradition of the offenders who
committed torture, and creates an international supervisory mechanism to enforce
the pre-existing prohibition of torture. From this perspective it is easy to see that
the GDR's reservation was contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention,
as it sought to undermine what can actually be considered to be the contribution
the Convention made to existing human rights law'''.
1.3. Reservations and declarations
Thus far" 71 States have ratified the Convention. Of these 48 ratified without
making reservations'*, 9 states ratified with a reservation to article 20 and 9
states made reservations to 30". As the Convention explicitly allows reserva-
tions to articles 20 and 30, these will not further be dealt with. The other
reservations and declarations dealing with substantive rights and the supervisory
system will be discussed below.
- article 1 -
Article 1 CAT defines torture. Both Luxembourg and the Netherlands have
made declarations interpreting "lawful sanctions" mentioned in article 1 CAT as
requiring lawfulness not only under national law but also under international law.
Burgers and Danelius state that the second sentence of the first paragraph of
article 1 is, and has been controversial during the drafting'". The requirement of
lawful sanctions might imply lawful merely according to national law, but could
also mean in accordance with both national and international law. Even if the
meaning of this provision was not agreed upon during the drafting of the Conven-
tion, Marx" seems to be right in arguing that "lawful sanctions" must imply
13. For a detailed analysis of article 19.c VCLT see Chapter 2. par.3.1.2 supra.
14. Coccia, Controversial Declaration, at 320-325: and G.Gomig, M.Ney, Die Erklarungen
der DDR zur UN-Antifolterkonvention aus volkerrechtlicher Sicht. in: 43 Juristenzeitu-
ng 1988. 1048-1053 at 1050-1051; expressing a contrary opinion: Mohr, op.cit. at 332-333.
15. ST/LEG/SER.E/11,31-12-1992.
16. Although Austria, Ecuador. Luxembourg and the Netherlands ratified making interpre-
tative declarations relating to articles 5 and 15(Austria), article 5(Ecuador) and article
l(Luxembourg and the Netherlands). See below for an analysis of these declarations.
17. Two State have withdrawn a reservation to article 20; seven States have withdrawn
reservations to article 30 CAT.
18. Burgers and Danelius, op.cit. at 121-122.
19. Marx, op.cit. at 84.
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compatibility with both international and national law. His reasoning is based on
the guarantee provided in paragraph 2 of article 1, and on the duty to interpret a
treaty in accordance with its object and purpose, as laid down in article 31 of the
Vienna Convention^". In view of this, the Luxembourg and Netherlands declar-
ations are interpretative declarations, merely aimed at clarifying the provision.
They repeat what is already laid down in the treaty itself and in the law of
treaties in general.
In a declaration Chile states that it will apply the Inter-American Convention to
Prevent and Punish Torture in cases where its provisions are incompatible with
those of the Convention. At first sight it is very unlikely that two conventions
aimed at combating torture could contain provisions incompatible with one
another. And even if they did, the Convention provides in article 1.2 that the
international instrument or national legislation that gives the individual the better
protection will prevail .
The Chilean declaration lays down a different priority rule: the per se application
of the Inter-American Convention regardless of the quality of protection afforded
in the Convention. Thus the declaration is in fact a reservation to article 1.2.
- article 2 -
Article 2.3 prohibits invoking a superior order as a justification for torture. This
rule of law, based on principle IV of the so-called Nuremberg principles*' is by
now so self-evident that authors on the Convention devote little attention to this
provision". Chile stated in a reservation, subsequently withdrawn^, that it
would only apply article 2.3 if the order aiming at acts referred to in article 1,
was not insisted upon by the superior officer when challenged. The reservations
read:
"To article 2, paragraph 3, in so far as it modifies the principle of 'obedience upon
reiteration' contained in Chilean domestic law. The Government of Chile will apply the
provisions of that international norm to subordinate personnel governed by the Code of
Military Justice, provided that the order patently intended to lead to perpetration of the
acts referred to in article 1 is not insisted on by the superior officer after being
challenged by his subordinate."
In other words, if the subordinate questions the order and the superior officer
withdraws it, but the act of torture is still perpetrated, Chile would apply article
2.3. The Chilean reservation is problematic, both theoretically and from the point
of view of the prohibition of torture. First of all it implied that Chilean subordi-
nates are self-confident and assertive and do have some basic insight into the
prohibition of torture. These are the people that might be expected to challenge
an "order patently intended to lead to perpetration of the acts referred to in article
1". One wonders why Chile assumed that subordinates challenging torture, not
20. Arguing similarly Tardu, op.cit. at 307-309.
21. The Principles of Law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the
Judgment of that Tribunal, GA Res.95/I.
22. Burgers and Danelius, op.cit. at 124; Tardu, op.cit. at 311-312.
23. Reservation withdrawn on 7 September 1990.
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insisted on by superior officers, would still commit this offence. Not only is this
an unusual assumption, it is also questionable whether this would be a situation of
superior order. If the superior officer does not insist, article 2.3 by its own terms
seems inapplicable. Thus the Chilean reservation appeared to extend article 2.3 to
situations going well beyond the ordinary meaning of the rule.
At the same time the Chilean reservation excluded article 2.3 CAT in situations
for which it was drafted. The reservation read:"...w/// fl/v?/y the provisions...
r^ov;V/c</ that the order...is wor /ranrfa/ on by the superior officer"[my italics,
EL]. On the contrary, if the order was insisted upon when challenged, Chile
would not apply article 2.3. It would appear that in that case a superior order
could be invoked as justification.
Apart from these problems the reservation posed various other questions. What is
exactly meant by "obedience upon reiteration", and what about (para-) military or
police personnel not governed by the Code of Military Justice? It hardly needs
stressing that this reservation ran contrary to the object and purpose of the
Convention for it intends to modify the Chilean duty to incriminate torture in
national law. Thus the reservation is contrary to prevalent customary law, it met
with many objections and was withdrawn within two years.
- article 3 -
Article 3 CAT contains the prohibition on expelling, returning or extraditing a
person to a country where there is reason to believe that this person might be in
danger of being tortured. This provision is based on article 33 of the Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees-'', and influenced by case law within the
framework of the European Convention on Human Rights^. It should be noted
that the wording of article 3 is especially precise, requiring "..substantial grounds
for believing that a person ivowW be in danger of being subjected to torture.."
Obviously it will depend on the facts of a case whether such a danger exists'*.
Chile however made a reservation to this provision stating that it is discretionary
and subjective.
In a declaration the Federal Republic of Germany indicates that it considers that
the Convention exclusively establishes State obligations in respect of article 3,
and that moreover German legislation is in accordance with the Convention. The
earlier part of the declaration is perhaps surprising given the fact that the
provision specifically reads "No State shall..". The gist of the declaration seems
to be that an individual will not be able to rely upon article 3 CAT in case of an
extradition.
- article 5 -
Article 5 deals with establishing jurisdiction. States Parties shall establish
jurisdiction when the offenses are committed in territory under their jurisdiction
24. Tardu, op.cit. at 313.
25. Burgers and Danelius, op.cit. at 125.
26. Burgers and Danelius, op.cit. at 127.
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(article 5.1.a), when the alleged offender is a national (article S.l.b) or when the
victim is a national if the State considers that appropriate (article S.l.c). Austria
declared that it would only establish jurisdiction on the grounds of article 5.1.c if
prosecution on grounds of articles 5.1.a or 5.1.b was not to be expected. As arti-
cle 5.1 contains no obligation to establish jurisdiction, but reminds states of the
possibility to do so"', the Austrian declaration is not a reservation. Whether it is
an interpretative declaration remains to be seen as its aim is not to clarify the
provision but rather to indicate if and when Austria will avail itself of jurisdiction
based on article 5.I.e.
Ecuador made a declaration stating that it would not extradite its nationals. The
declaration implies that a State wanting to establish jurisdiction on the grounds of
articles 5.1.a or 5.1.C would not be able to obtain the extradition of an alleged
offender of Ecuadoran nationality present in Ecuador. Likewise article 8 CAT,
containing provisions about torture as an extraditable offence, will not be
applicable with respect to Ecuadoran nationals. The declaration does not exclude
or modify Ecuador's obligations under the Convention, as the Convention
contains a system in which states either establish jurisdiction and prosecute, or
extradite^. Since according to the Ecuadoran declaration the option of extradi-
tion of nationals does not exist, it will be obliged to establish jurisdiction accord-
ing to articles 5.1 and 5.2^.
- article 8 -
Article 8 makes torture, attempts to commit torture and complicity or partici-
pation in torture extraditable offenses. The declaration of Ecuador in respect of
article 8 has been dealt with supra.
- article 14 -
Article 14 deals with the right to compensation for acts of torture. New Zealand
declared that it reserved the right to award compensation at the discretion of the
Attorney-General. As the provision speaks of an enforceable right to compensa-
tion, this must be understood as a reservation.
- article 15 -
The inadmissibility of evidence resulting from torture is dealt with in article 15
CAT.
Austria states that it will regard article 15 CAT as the legal basis for the
exclusion of evidence resulting from torture. Some authors* think that article 15
requires a change in national procedural legislation, but basically international
27. Burgers and Danelius, op.cit. at 132; it reads:" if the State considers it appropriate".
28. Burgers and Danelius. op.cit. at 131:"..the present Convention is also based on the
principle "a«f rfedere <JM/ /wmre"; in other words, the country where the suspected
offender happens to be shall either extradite him for the purpose of prosecution or
proceed against him on the basis of its own criminal law."
29. Burgers and Danelius, op.cit. at 132-133.
30. Donnelly, op.cit. at 4; Tardu, op.cit. at 314.
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law contains no rules as to how states should fulfil their treaty obligations. The
Austrian declaration, although addressed at the other states parties, deals with the
domestic application of article IS. It implies that Austria is not going to change
its procedural law, for it considers article 15 to be directly applicable. As such,
the declaration provides the states parties with useful, although superfluous,
information. Thus it is neither an interpretative declaration nor a reservation.
- articles 17 and 18 -
The articles 17 and 18 lay down the financing of the supervision of the Conven-
tion.
The German Democratic Republic made a declaration relating to articles 17.7
and 18.5 when ratifying the Convention, which was withdrawn within three
years. Although the dissolution of the GDR has resolved the problems created by
this reservation it was such a singular reservation that it will be dealt with, in
spite of its disappearance.
The GDR's reservation read:
The German Democratic Republic declares that it will bear its share only of those
expenses in accordance with article 17. paragraph 7 and article 18, paragraph 5 of the
convention arising from activities under the competence of the Committee as recognized
by the German Democratic Republic."
Articles 17 and 18 CAT indicate that the expenses for supervision will be paid
for by the states parties to the Convention. In its declaration East Germany stated
that it would only bear its share of the expenses for activities of the Committee as
recognized by the GDR. It is important to note that the GDR had not made
declarations according to article 21 (Inter-State complaints) nor to article 22
(Individual complaints), and had excluded the Committee's competence to hold a
confidential inquiry based on article 20 through a reservation in accordance with
to article 28. The only supervisory procedure binding on the GDR was the
reporting procedure according to article 19. Apparently the GDR intended to pay
only its share of the expenses incurred in this procedure.
As has been discussed above, the supervision of the Convention will vary
according to the declarations and reservations made by a State Party. In spite of
the fact that States Parties may choose to submit to supervisory procedures other
than reporting, this has not lead to a system in which the financial contributions
for the work of the Committee depend on the choices made by the individual
States. The provisions about the expenses are formulated in clear and unambigu-
ous language, and leave no doubt about the fact that all States Parties should be
responsible for all the expenses incurred".
Moreover, in a very general way, reference could be made to the Advisory
Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations'-. Although this Opinion
31. Cf. article 31.1 VCLT: "ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty".
32. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17 paragraph 2 of the Charter)
Advisory Opinion 20 July 1962; ICJ Rep. 1962. 151-181.
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deals with questions relating to the financing of UN Peace Keeping operations,
there is a certain similarity between this problem and the GDR's reservations.
The functioning of the Committee is a collective interest, whatever supervisory
procedure is used. Similarly, peacekeeping is a collective action under the
Charter, based upon the authority of the General Assembly. In discussing article
17.2 Charter", the Court concluded that, as the Charter does not qualify
"expenses", this means all the expenses*. Discussing the expenses in the
context of the Charter, the Court does not find any other limitation of the
meaning of article 17.2 Charter either.
The close resemblance between article 17.2 Charter and articles 17.1 and 18.5
CAT is striking. In the latter case the Convention merely mentions "expenses"
without qualifying the origins of the expenses. By omitting a reference to the
relation between the expenses and the supervisory procedures selected, it stands
to reason that the Advisory Opinion could be applied by analogy". Consequently,
"the expenses of the Committee" are the amounts paid out to defray the costs of
carrying out the purposes of the Committee, that is executing its supervisory
task'*.
As the declaration intended to restrict the GDR's obligations under the Conven-
tion, it definitely was a reservation". In fact, the GDR publicly acknowledged
this during the first meeting of the States Parties'*. It must be emphasized that
as a result of the GDR's reservation a great deal of confusion could arise
concerning the financing of the Convention. The reservation is a rupture in a
system in which it is assumed that the collective of States Parties paid for all the
expenses". A system such as the one proposed in the East-German reservation
would involve some complicated arithmetic**.
33. Article 17.2 Charter reads:The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the
Members as apportioned by the General Assembly".
34. The Advisory Opinion reads:"Since no such qualification is expressed in the text of the
Charter, it could be read in. only if such qualification must necessarily be implied from
the provisions of the Charter as a whole, or from some particular provision thereof
which makes it unavoidable to do so in order to give effect to the Charter"; ICJ
Rep. 1962 at 159.
35. This view will clearly be unacceptable to Mohr, who argues op.cil. at 333, that "under
customary law -which is ultimately reflected in the German Democratic Republic's
declaration - a state need be responsible only for the costs accepted by it".
36. Cf. Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep.1962 at 179.
37. Coccia, Controversial Declaration, at 318-319; Gornig/Ney, op.cit. at 1050.
38. CAT/SP/SR.1 para.59, the GDR representative speaks of "the reservation by the
German Democratic Republic to the effect that it would not fund the activities with
which it was not in agreement..".However, Mohr, op.cit. at 330-331, suggest that it is a
mere interpretative declaration as it repeats an understanding of these provisions
expressed during the drafting.
39. CAT/SP/4 and CAT/SP/SR.1 para.54:"..proportionately on the basis of the United
Nations scale of assessment..", and see Burgers and Danelius, op.cit. at 112-113.
40. About the problems with the assessment of the contributions as a consequence of the
GDR's declaration see: Coccia, Controversial Declaration at 325-327; lid wards, op.cit. at
391-393; Gornig/Ney op.cit. at 1052; Lijnzaad. Nederlands bezwaar at 507-508.
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2. REACTIONS OF THE STATES PARTIES
2.1. Objections
The Convention against Torture is remarkable for the number of objections
made, and the fact that the objections appear to have led to the withdrawal of
reservations. As this has not occurred under the other instruments we have
considered, it is useful to look at these objections in greater detail. An explana-
tion of the surprising amount of objections might be the fact that, whereas States
may not take an interest in a variety of detailed reservations to the other human
rights treaties, they are indeed concerned about torture. The seriousness of the
acts that the Convention seeks to prohibit may prompt a more active objections
policy. The objections focus on both contentious reservations, the reservation by
Chile to articles 2.3 and 3 CAT and the German Democratic Republic's reser-
vation concerning articles 17.7 and 18.5.
On the other hand, a cynic might suggest that neither Chile not the German
Democratic Republic were States of great importance at the time of the objec-
tions. Thus States could object without the objections having any serious conse-
quences for their international relations. Moreover, with respect to the GDR's
reservation, States had a clear interest in the assessment of the Committee's
expenses.
Sixteen States have objected to the GDR's reservation concerning the financing of
the Committee's work'". The objections differ a lot, and show a wide variety of
reasons for objecting. Four different reactions can be distinguished''-. Italy,
Greece and Spain based their objections on the fact that the GDR's reservation is
contrary to article 19.b VCLT". In view of the drafting history of the provi-
sion, it must be considered a misinterpretation of article 19.b VCLT to assume
that the Convention would not allow other reservations than the ones specified in
the Convention itself, as it does not explicitly say so**.
A second group of States plainly states that the reservation is unacceptable,
without clarifying the legal aspects of their position*'. States are not obliged to
41. The United Kingdom made a declaration which cannot be considered an objection.
42. Edwards, op.cit. at 384-385.
43. Cocci a. Controversial Declaration at 315, 320; Mohr, op.cit. at 332; similarly suggesting
the applicability of article 19.b VCLT Meron, Humanitarian norms at 23.
44. See Chapter 2, par.3.1.1 supra on the implications of article 19.b VCLT; and para. 1.2
supra on the law applicable to reservations to the CAT.
45. Austria:"..cannot alter or modify, in any respect, the obligations arising from the
Convention for all the States Parties thereto.."
Denmark:"..the said declaration has no legal basis in the Convention or in international
treaty law."
Netherlands:"..it would also affect the obligations of the other Slates Parties which
would have to pay additionally in order to ensure the proper functioning of the
fjf. «-i,"jf> Committee against Torture. For this reason the reservation is not acceptable.."
(continued...)
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provide reasons for the reservations they make, or for the objections, but these
are somewhat peculiar'". The Austrian contention is strange in view of the fact
that reservations by their very nature alter or modify obligations arising from a
treaty, as indicated amongst others by article 2.l.d VCLT. One wonders what is
meant by the assumption by Denmark that there is no legal basis for the GDR's
reservation in the Convention, as reservations to these provisions are not pro-
hibited. The Norwegian statement, also adhered to by Finland, that the reserva-
tion is without legal effect can only be understood if Norway is of the opinion
that reservations contrary to object and purpose of the treaty are void'". The
Netherlands consideration that the East-German reservation will increase the
financial obligations for other States Parties seems to be based on down-to-earth
bookkeepers' logic**.
A third group of States consider the reservation contrary to article 19.c, or
formulate their objection in similar terms'". These objections rely on the rule
laid down in article 19.c VCLT, the prohibition of reservations incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty.
Finally there is the peculiar declaration made by the United Kingdom*. It
reads:
"... It does not regard the said declaration of the German Democratic Republic as
affecting in any way the obligations of the German Democratic Republic as a State
Party to the Convention (including the obligations to meet its share of the expenses of
the Committee on Torture as apportioned by the first meeting of the States Parties held
on 26 November 1987 or any subsequent such meetings) and do not accordingly raise
objections to it. It reserves the rights of the United Kingdom in their entirety in the
event that the said declaration should at any future time be claimed to affect the
obligations of the German Democratic Republic as aforesaid".
Although the declaration expressly states that it is not an objection, it appears to
be a conditional objection. In fact the declaration bears a striking resemblance to
what has been said before about interpretative declarations that might be con-
verted into reservations". The United Kingdom declaration is complicated to
say the least. It assumes that the GDR's reservation has no implications for the
GDR's obligations under the Convention. However, would this be the case, then
45.(...continued)
Norway:"..cannot accept this declaration entered by the German Democratic Republic.
The Government of Norway considers that any such declaration is without legal effect,
and cannot in any manner diminish the obligation of a government to contribute to the
costs of the Committee.."
46. See Chapter 2, par.3.2.2 supra.
47. See Chapter 2, par.3.1.2 supra.
48. Lijnzaad, Nederlands Bezwaar, at 507-508.
49. Canada and Sweden specifically indicate that the reservations are contrary to art.l9.c,
whereas Australia, France, New Zealand and Portugal mention "object and purpose",
Luxembourg "purpose and goal" and Switzerland "purpose and aims".
50. Cf. Coccia, Controversial Declaration, note 9 at 316, 318.
51. See Chapter 2, par.5.
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they claim the right to reconsider their position. This creates uncertainty about
the treaty relations between the United Kingdom and the GDR until the United
Kingdom determines its position. On the other hand, it could follow from article
20.5 VCLT that the United Kingdom has accepted the reservation tacitly after a
year of silence. It all depends on the interpretation of the declaration. Obviously,
the United Kingdom has not been able to determine whether it dealt with a
reservation or a (non-binding) declaration. It therefore made this ambivalent
declaration, implying a more or less conditional objection. ,jc;j
It should be noted that two States objected within a year after the reservation was
entered by the GDR, and another six States objected within a year of their own
ratification. This implies that seven States objected, but were outside the time-
limit set by article 20.5 VCLT'-. This did not lead to problems, as none of the
States precluded the convention's entry into force on the basis of their objections.
Seven States explicitly indicate that although they objected, the Convention would
enter into force between them and the GDR". According to article 20.4.b
VCLT it is not necessary to state this, and it may safely be assumed that the
Convention will enter into force between all the objecting States and the GDR.
The interesting question remains as to what is actually going to enter into force.
What is the legal regime created by the mishmash of the CAT, the GDR reserva-
tion and the objections?
The reservation has not only modified the GDR's obligations according to articles
17.7 and 18.5, but has thoroughly changed financial obligations of all States
Parties. The reservation will modify the Convention between states accepting the
reservation and the GDR. This implies that neither the GDR nor the accepting
state will be obliged vw-^-vw one another to contribute towards the Committee's
expenses to any further extent than the procedures binding on such a State Party,
which follows from article 21.1 VCLT. Between objecting states** not opposing
entry into force of the Convention and the GDR, articles 17.7 and 18.5 do not
apply according to article 21.3 VCLT. Thus, although the Convention enters into
force there will not be any obligation whatsoever between these states to contrib-
ute to the expenses of the Committee against Torture. In the relations between the
other states parties, whether they accept the GDR's reservation or not, the
Convention will enter into force with the obligation to pay for all the Commit-
tee's expenses irrespective of the supervisory mechanisms binding on the State
Party, which follows from article 21.2 VCLT. To summarize: the reservation
and the objections have led to triangular system of financial obligations". There
is no doubt that this could lead to a complex discussion when estimating the
Committee's budget and apportioning each State Party's share. ;
52. ' • Austr ia . Canada, Denmark . Norway, Spain and Switzerland reacted too late. *'••
53. Denmark, France, Greece, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal and Switzerland.
54. As the GDR ratified on 9-12-1989 these can now. according to article 20.5 of the Vienna
Convention only be states that express objections at ratification.
55. On this issue:Lijnzaad, Nederlands bezwaar, at 507-508; Gornig/Ney, op.cit. at 1052.
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Another issue also requires attention. Basically reservations and objections only
modify or restrict the obligations of States Parties v/.y-fl-v/'s' one another. Indeed it
says so in article 21.2 VCLT: no inter se modification between the other States
Parties. But looking at the budgetary problem facing the Committee against
Torture it would appear that in this case there are going to be modifications in
the obligations facing the other States Parties. For whatever their treaty obliga-
tions based on the reciprocity of the reservation, there will be an increase of
obligations for the simple reason that the functioning of the Committee would
otherwise be hampered. The GDR's reservations not only modify the GDR's
position, but at the same time necessitate the other States Parties assuming
obligations beyond the ones laid down in the Convention or following from treaty
law in general. This peculiar consequence is pointed out by both Austria and the
Netherlands in their objections'''.
Thus the GDR's reservation undermines the validity of the assumption laid down
in article 21.2 VCLT. The problem is not so much whether article 21.2 is an
imperative rule of treaty law, but the reservation is peculiar in undermining the
assumption underlying an established rule of the law on reservations. The articles
17.7 and 18.5 CAT lay down the financial basis for the functioning of the
Committee against Torture. These are not obligations between the States Parties
and the Committee but, between the States Parties as a collective obligation.
Providing for the expenses of the Committee is a responsibility bearing on the
collective of States Parties to the Convention, which is more or less indicated by
the way in which both provisions are formulated ("States Parties shall be respon-
sible.."). The functioning of the Committee is a collective interest, and this
implies that in case one of the members of the collective limits its contribution,
the other members will have to increase their contributions so as to maintain
supervision by the Committee. Although from the point of view of the law of
treaties they are not obliged to do so, they will be inclined to provide additional
funds that make up for the restriction affecting the community interest. This is
based on policy considerations rather than legal obligations.
The concept of the functioning of the Committee as a collective interest is based
upon the existence of the supervisory system which is in itself a core element of
the Convention". The fact that the financing of the Committee is a collective
obligation does unfortunately not imply that reservations could be ignored, as the
1'-
*: * ; , <
56. Austria:"..cannot alter or modify, in any respect, the obligations arising from that
Convention for a// Sraf« farr/re thereto."[my italics, EL]
:*'.•• Netherlands:"..!! would also affect the obligations of //if oz/icr 5/<i/« /VirriM which would
have to pay additionally in order to ensure the proper functioning on the Committee
against Torture."[my italics, EL]
57. Coccia. Controversial Declaration, at 322-324: Gornig/Ney. op.cit. at 1051.
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Netherlands and Norway seem to assume**. The law of treaties is inflexible, a
reservation does modify the obligations of the reserving state.
An even greater number of States objected to the reservation by Chile on the
issue of superior order. Fourteen states indicated that they considered the Chilean
reservations to articles 2.3 and 3 CAT incompatible with the object and purpose
of the Convention, but added that the objection would not preclude entry into
force of the Convention between Chile and the objecting State". The other six
states that object also indicate incompatibility as the ground for their objections
but add different consequences. The United Kingdom indicates it is unable to
accept the reservation, Bulgaria considers itself not bound by the reservation,
Czechoslovakia states the reservation is invalid, Canada considers it inadmiss-
ible, and Austria and Australia indicate that the reservation cannot alter the
obligations under the Convention. ;!v '?•'.• t-.aufiiw*' f:'.tj?«V" :^n ?'WOD st!f audl'
The group of objecting States shows an increased variety of objectors. Apart
from the European Communities'", the Nordic countries, Australia, New
Zealand and Canada; Eastern European States express objections to substantive
reservations, which is by all means a novelty. Without wanting to deny the right
of objecting to any State, it might be suggested that the objections by Turkey are
somewhat unexpected, and may be more of a reaction to the discussions about the
Turkish conditional acceptance of article 25 ECHR, similarly including a
"privileged" position for the military*'.
2.2. State Party meetings
The first meeting of the States Parties was held in Geneva on 26 November
1987*-. It dealt with the election of the Committee and other organizational
matters. The responsibility of the States Parties for the financing of the Commit-
tee's activities was on the agenda*', and it was decided that the expenses should
be apportioned on the bases of the UN scale of assessments". The declaration
58. The Netherlands objection:" Thus, the assessment of the financial contributions of the
States Parties to be made under article 17, paragraph 7 and article 18, paragraph 5,
•'"•'• must be drawn up in disregard of the declaration of the German Democratic Republic."
•'if' The Norwegian objection:"., and cannot in any manner diminish the obligation of a
government to contribute to the costs of the Committee against Torture in conformity
with the provisions of the Conventions."
59. Similar objections by Denmark, Finland, France. Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.
60. Belgium . Germany and Ireland had not ratified the Convention and could thus not
object.
61. See about the Turkish declaration: S.Tomuschat. Turkey's declaration under article 25
of the European Convention on Human Rights, in: Fortschritt im Bewusstsein der
Grund- und Menschenrechte (Festschrift Ermacora), Kehl 1988, 119-139.
62. CAT/SP/1; Coccia, Controversial Declaration, at 317; Lijnzaad, Nederlands bezwaar, at
506-507.
63. CAT/SP/4
64. CAT/SP/SR.1 par.54-55;; about the assessment see Mohr. op.cit. at 331-332.. " .C?
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by the GDR was brought up at the meeting, and various representatives spoke on
their government's views. According to Sweden the Convention provided no
grounds for restricting the joint responsibility of States Parties for the Commit-
tee's expenses", Canada found the declaration to be inconsistent with the spirit
of the Convention", whereas Switzerland thought it not to be in accordance
with the intent of the Convention*". The GDR, acknowledging that the declar-
ation was a reservation'", maintained that it was in conformity with the Conven-
tion.
The issue of the GDR reservation was not discussed at all during the second
meeting of the States Parties in 1989". The estimates provided by the Secretary
General did not take into account the reservation, even though the Committee
was already dealing with individual complaints at that time"'. A reason for not
taking into account the reservation might have been the fact that the GDR had
paid more than it was due to for the period 1987-1989, and had in fact built up a
credit against its 1990 assessment.
By the time of the third meeting of the States Parties, the GDR had withdrawn its
reservation, and soon afterwards acceded to the federal Republic of Germany. In
1992 a Conference of the States Parties was held to discuss the initiative of
Australia to change the financing of the Committee through an amendment to
articles 17.7 and 18.5 CAT, which would lead to funding from UN resources
upon terms and conditions to be decided upon by the General Assembly".
=**•" "•* • . ' ; • < ! " r n 3 F ^ ! • ; . : , • * •> t . A '
2.3. Withdrawal of reservations 8 -.'.•1.&
Within the relatively short existence of the Convention against Torture a remark-
able number of reservations have been withdrawn. Not only did the reservations
by Chile and the GDR disappear'-, other reservations restricting supervisory
procedures were also withdrawn. - ft
With respect to the withdrawal of the confusing reservation by the GDR, it might
be suggested that not only the number of objections, and the insistence of the
Committee have contributed; but the changes in the political situation in the GDR
prior to its dissolution may also have led to a change of mind for the responsible
politicians.
The withdrawal of the Chilean reservation should also be attributed to political
changes in the country, where a civilian government was just coming to
i ' ! ' ' : . ! i i , i ? , ( I ' ? . " • ; . , : ; . J J • ' £ [ • • - • • - - • • • . , ; , i . ; - . - ? . f > . v ; , - ; \ ' . • ; « ; • f i t . • :«? * * • > • . •
65. CAT/SP/SR.1 para.56. «s*. ; • -V . ; . ; r. , co* i a^ , , ~
66. CAT/SP/SR.1 para.57 Sfieif-J '
67. CAT/SP/SR.l para.58. A •-. -.,.-
68. CAT/SP/SR.l para.59:"..in his view the reservation by the German Democratic
Republic".
69. CAT/SP/SR.2. - ^ • >- .-=.-~»w*v
70. CAT/SP/8, at 5-8.
71. CAT/SP/12: 13.
72. All the German Democratic Republic's reservation has been withdrawn, and declara-
tions under articles 21 and 22 CAT had been made on 13 September 1990, before the
dissolution of that State.
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power", and apparently wanted to change its human rights record. In particular
it may be relevant that the reservation seemed to aim specifically at the position
of the military involved in torture practices'''.
Though somewhat less visible, the withdrawal of two reservations to article 20
CAT", and of seven reservations under article 30 CAT" should be mentioned,
as these withdrawals contributed to expanding the Convention's supervisory
system.
2.4. Other consultations
When discussing the progress of international human rights law in the Third
Committee of the General Assembly, several representatives mentioned the
GDR's reservation. Speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries in 1987, the
representative of Norway expressed the hope that the State concerned would
reconsider its declaration". In a general way the representative of Canada
expressed her government's concern that reservations might run contrary to the
objective and intention of a Convention, be it in respect of substance or financ-
ing™.
3. PRACTICE OF THE COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE
3.1. Reporting procedure, article 19 CAT
AUSTRIA
"1. Austria will establish its jurisdiction in accordance with article 5 of the Convention
irrespective of the laws applying to the place where the offence occurred, but in respect
of paragraph l(c) only if prosecution by a Stale having jurisdiction under paragraph l(a)
or paragraph l(b) is not to be expected.
"2. Austria regards article 15 as the legal basis for the inadmissibility provided for
therein of the use of statements which are established to have been made as a result of
torture."
In its second session the Committee had before it the report of Austria which
mentions the declarations made". A Committee member asked why Austria
made the reservations, as the articles referred to are in fact applied'*'. The
73. Aylwin won the elections on 14 December 1989; and was sworn in on 10 March 1990.
74. LJ.LeBlanc. Reservations to Human Rights Treaties (hereafter: Reservations), Paper
prepared for the Thirty-Fourth Annual Convention of the International Studies
Association, March 23-27. 1993 Acapulco Mexico, at 23-24.
Withdrawals by Hungary and USSR.
Withdrawals by Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia. Guatemala, Hungary,
Ukrainian SSR and USSR.
77. A/C.3/42/SR.42 par. 14.
78. A/C.3/42/SR.43 par. 10.
79. CAT/C/5/Add.lO para.25 (article 5) and para.49 (article 15).
80. CAT/C/SR.18 para.13 (Gil Lavedra).
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Austrian reply is in both cases that the statement is interpretative. The Austrian
representative elaborated on the domestic legal backgrounds of the statement
concerning article 5*', and as regards the declaration regarding article 15 it
established the inadmissibility of evidence obtained under torture as a legal
principle directly applicable by criminal courts*^.
A supplementary report was due in 1992 but has not yet been received.
CHILE
T o article 2, paragraph 3, in so far as it modifies the principle of "obedience upon
reiteration* contained in Chilean domestic law. The Government of Chile will apply the
provisions of that international norm to subordinate personnel governed by the Code of
Military Justice, provided that the order patently intended to lead to perpetration of the
acts referred to in article 1 is not insisted on by the superior officer after being
challenged by his subordinate."[withdrawn 7 September 1990]
"Article 3, by reason of the discretionary and subjective nature of the terms in which it
is drafted."(withdrawn 7 September 1990]
The Government of Chile declares that in ils relations with American Slates that are
Parties to the Inter-American Convention to Prevenl and Punish Torture, it will apply
that Convention in cases were its provisions are incompatible with those of the present
Convention."
The initial report by Chile mentions the reservations made in the introduction and
than elaborates on the reasons underlying the reservations". The report indicates
that in general Chilean legislation is in keeping with the rule in article 2.3 CAT.
The duty of obedience only applies when the order is lawful, but it must be
understood that it is not simple to apply such notions in real life. Subordinates
may question the legality of an order, but if the order is maintained the obligation
of obedience will prevail. However this will exempt the subordinate from
criminal responsibility*''. Similarly the report elaborates on the content of the
reservation to article 3 CAT, Chilean legislation is in general in conformity with
the spirit of the provision**.
In its discussion of the initial report the Committee is highly critical about the
reservations made. Committee members ask about the factual situations that
would fall under the scope of the reservations to article 2.3 CAT*'; and wonder
what is meant by the phrase that article 3 was drafted in a discretionary and
subjective manner*'. It is suggested that the reservations be withdrawn**, and
that the three reservations are incompatible*'.
In its reply Chile indicates that the reservations had been made for reasons of
substance, for procedural reasons, and because of the replacement of the Govern-
81. CAT/C/SR.19 para.7-8 (Austria).
82. CAT/C/SR.19 para.15 (Austria).
83. CAT/C/7/Add.2.
84. CAT/C/7/Add.2; par.54-61.
85. CAT/C/7/Add.2, par.62-74.
86. CAT/C/SR.40, par.10 (Burns); par.26 (Khitrin), par.30 (Mikhailov).
87. CAT/C/SR.40, par. 11 (Burns); par.31 (Mikhailov), par.38 (Voyame).
88. CAT/C/SR.40, par.27 (Khitrin).
89. CAT/C/SR.40. par.36-38 (Voyame).
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ment at the time. Reservations were not final and could be withdrawn"*. The
representative then explains the principle of considered obedience in Chilean
law", and states that the reservation to article 3 was made because it is
improper to pass judgement on the internal affairs of a Stated The prevalence
of the Inter-American Convention was based upon a regional agreement to that
effect but it was a hypothetical case".
In their reactions. Committee members in particular welcome the remark that
reservations can be withdrawn**.
It had been agreed that Chile would submit an additional report within a year,
and in that period the change of government took place, as well as the withdrawal
of the reservation". The additional report, submitted by the new democratic
government of Chile, is unusual to say the least**. It gives an historical over-
view of the torture practices of the Pinochet regime, and discusses the inaccur-
acies of the earlier report in a paragraph called "Main falsehoods". Moreover the
arguments provided earlier to justify the reservations made are heavily criticized.
The Committee reacted positively to the changes in Chile, including the with-
drawal of the reservations". On the request of the Committee additional infor-
mation is provided with respect to the implementation of articles 2.3 and 3
CAT*. While it seems implied in the Chilean statement that all reservations had
been withdrawn, it would appear that the reservation dealing with the co-exist-
ence of the Inter-American convention and the CAT was not withdrawn". iarii
ECUADOR
ti,!ii.> Ecuador declares that, in accordance with the provisions of article 42 of its Political
Constitution, it will not permit extradition of its nationals.
The initial report by Ecuador was rather brief"", and the State was conse-
quently asked to provide more and more detailed information. The two additional
reports do not deal with the declaration made referring to the Constitution'"',
even if one of the reports contains an explanation of the relevant provision'"^.
The questions raised by the Committee merely deal with an explanation of the
constitutional provision, rather than discussing it as a possible reservation"".
t
90. CAT/C/SR.41, par.5 and par.44 (Chile).
91. CAT/C/SR.41, par.6 (Chile).
92. CAT/C/SR.41, par.7 (Chile). "***
93. CAT/C/SR.41, par.8 (Chile).
94. CAT/C/SR.41, par.36 (Khitrin), par.39 (Voyame).
95. CAT/C/7/Add.9.
96. CAT/C/SR.77 par.21 (Diaz Palacios).
97. CAT/C/SR.77, par.30 (Burns), par.33 (Chanet).
98. CAT/C/SR.77, par.33 (Chanet); CAT/C/SR.78, par.7-8 (Chile).
99. ST/LEG/SER.E/11 at 182.
100. CAT/C/7/Add.7andCAT/C/SR.61.
101. CAT/C/7/Add.ll; CAT/C/7/Add.l3.
102. CAT/C/7/Add.l3 at 16-17 about article 42 of the Political Constitution.
103. CAT/C/SR.90/Add.l par.20 (Ecuador).
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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Article 3
This provision prohibits (he transfer of a person directly to a State where this person is
exposed to a concrete danger of being subjected to torture. In the opinion of the
J - • • " ' • Federal Republic of Germany, article 3 as well as the other provisions of the Conven-
tion exclusively establish State obligations that are met by the Federal Republic of
Germany in conformity with the provisions of its domestic law which is in accordance
with the Convention.
The German report does not specifically mention the declaration made with
respect to article 3 in relation to German extradition legislation. It does however
contain an extensive elaboration about the relevant legislation"", and the issue
is briefly referred to by the German representative in his introduction"".
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
The German Democratic Republic declares that it will bear its share only of those
expenses in accordance with article 17, paragraph 7 and article 18, paragraph 5 of the
•*&-if - ^ convention arising from activities under the competence of the Committee as recognized
by the German Democratic Republic."|withdrawn 13 September 1990]
The initial report by the German Democratic Republic is rather brief and merely
deals with the substantive provisions of the Convention, and thus the implementa-
tion of articles 2 to 16 is discussed'"*. The issue of the reservations made is
equally absent from the discussion of the Committee"".
Given the far-reaching nature of the reservations, it is striking that they are not
mentioned. An explanation might be that the Provision Guidelines on report-
ing"* did not explicitly refer to the issue of reservations and deliberately
focused on the domestic situation. On the other hand, reservations could be dealt
with under the rather general heading "Information of a general nature".
LUXEMBOURG
Interpretative declaration
Article 1
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg hereby declares that the only "lawful sanctions" that
#3vf ::->'• recognizes within the meaning of article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention are those
which are accepted by both national law and international law.
The initial report of Luxembourg explains that the declaration had been made to
stress that this would be the right interpretation of the provision"", which is not
defined <yr/>rm7.y w?r&/.y in the Convention itself. In response a Committee
104. CAT/C/12/Add.l, par.36-44.
105. CAT/C/SR.128, par 10 (Germany).
106. CAT/C/5/Add.l3.
107. CAT/C/SR.30, CAT/C/SR.31.
108. Provisional guidelines regarding the form and content of initial reports to be submitted
by States parties under article 19 of the Convention; see: A/43/46 at 43-44.
109. CAT/C/5/Add.29, par.8.
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member raised the issue how Luxembourg struck a balance between international
and internal law"°, but the matter was not dealt with any further.
NETHERLANDS
Interpretative declaration with respect to article 1:
"It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands that the
term "lawful sanctions" in article 1, paragraph 1, must be understood as referring to
those sanctions which are lawful not only under national law but also under interna-
tional law."
The declaration is mentioned in the initial report by the Netherlands'", but a
Committee member mentions that the point of view expressed would seem to go
without saying"". She also asks why the Netherlands did not enter a reservation
with respect to article 5.1.c CAT, as the report indicates that this provision
would not be implemented by the Netherlands. The Netherlands reply that it was
felt that the provision provided the opportunity to establish jurisdiction if appro-
priate, which was not the case"''. The declaration was not discussed when the
Committee dealt with the reports of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba"''.
NEW ZEALAND
The Government of New Zealand reserves the right to award compensation to torture
victims referred to in article 14 of the Convention Against Torture only at the discretion
of the Attorney-General of New Zealand."
The initial report of New Zealand gives an elaborate presentation of the domestic
system with respect to the settlement of claims for compensation for personal
injury and indicates how the compensation issue covered by the reservation has
been dealt with in order to fit into the existing system"'.
In their discussion of the report of New Zealand, Committee members frequently
ask what is precisely meant by the phrase "at the discretion of the Attorney
General"'". It is also suggested that the reservation is incompatible because of
the fact that the Convention indicated which specified reservations might be
made'".
New Zealand replies that the rule of object and purpose applied and that New
Zealand had not acted contrary to that rule"*. However, the Committee in its
conclusions on the report specifically mentions the reservation to article 14 CAT,
110. CAT/C/SR.107, par.16 (Sorensen).
111. CAT/C/9/Add.l, par.6.
112. CAT/C/SR.46, par.88 (Chanet).
113. CAT/C/SR.47, par.57 (Netherlands).
114. CAT/C/9/Add.2; CAT/C/9/Add.3; CAT/C/SR.63-64.
115. CAT/C/12/Add.2 at 35-37.
116. CAT/C/SR.126, par.25 (El Ibrashi), par.34 (Gil Lavedra), par.40 (Sorensen), par.53
(Voyame).
117. CAT/C/SR.126, par.53 (Voyame), assuming that the Convention against Torture uses
: a the article 19.b VCLT system.
118. CAT/C/SR. 127, par.3 (New Zealand).
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and suggests that New Zealand will review its reservations to ensure full compli-
ance with the Convention'".
3.2. Individual complaints, article 22 CAT
The individual complaints dealt with by the Committee against Torture so far
have not touched upon the issue of reservations. The majority of claims were
made against non-reserving States. A claim against Austria in which article 15
CAT was invoked, was declared inadmissible under article 22.5.a CAT'*".
4. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE RESERVATIONS TO THE
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
In giving an opinion about the reservations to the Convention, one could easily be
tempted to agree that reservations have only been a marginal problem. Looking
back at the genesis of the "object and purpose" notion, I have earlier argued that
this concept was influenced by the single-mindedness of the Genocide conven-
tion'^'. The clear goal of the Genocide Convention explains why "object and
purpose" became the yardstick with respect to compatibility. The limited number
of reservations, and indeed the large number of objections can probably be
explained by the fact that the Convention against Torture is an instrument
codifying a rule of /w.v cogmv, thereby being a treaty with a "single purpose"
comparable to the Genocide Convention.
4.1. The reservations
Looking at the limited number of reservations that have been made to the
Convention against Torture, the reservations of Chile and the GDR call for
special attention.
The Chilean reservations to articles 2.3 and 3 did undermine core provisions of
the Convention. Not only was the reservation rather complex, if not contradic-
tory, it ran against the prohibition of relying on superior orders as an excuse for
torture. It is however doubtful whether there would have been any other way to
improve the quality of protection against torture in Chile other than the with-
drawal of the reservations by the author State.
The reservation entered by the GDR regarding the financing of the work of the
Committee against Torture has no parallel in human rights law. From the point of
view of treaty law it raises number of intriguing questions about the treaty
relations established on the basis of this reservation. Considering the Committee's
financial fundament a collective obligation clarifies why the reservation would, in
119. CAT/C/SR.127/Add.2, par.2
120. W.J. v. Austria; Communication 5/1990, Decision on Admissibility 20 November 1990
(A/46/46 at 73-74).
121. About the single-mindedness of the Genocide Convention see Chapter 3, par.2 supra.
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spite of article 21.2 VCLT, also lead to a change of the relations, and indeed
financial obligations, between the other states parties.
Other reservations have a more limited effect and frequently indicate which
option a state has chosen in case the Convention opens the possibility for
different ways of implementation.
CT
The role of States *l
The wide variety of objections made to the GDR's reservation shows that States
are at a loss with the rules of the law of treaties. It is striking that two states
refer to a provision of the Vienna Convention (articles 19.b) that is clearly not
applicable. Other objections demonstrate the inadequacy of article 19.c VCLT as
a yardstick, assuming that reservations contrary to object and purpose should be
ignored. And the objections correctly stating a breach of article 19.c merely
prove the impotence of the objecting states for lack of other possibilities of
action. The fact that states are not at ease with objections as an instrument of
treaty law shines through the various formulations. And it must be admitted, even
though states object they do not seem to achieve anything at all.
It is remarkable that the issue of the financing of the Committee that the GDR's
reservations dealt with, has not explicitly been on the agenda of the States
Parties. It must be assumed that this organ would specifically be interested in the
issue, but it has barely been mentioned. On the other hand, this may be the
consequence of the wise step not to take the reservation into account when
producing the list with the contributions due by the States Parties. This could
have been a risky approach, because the GDR could legitimately bring up its
position with respect to the financing of the two procedures it had not accepted.
However, it never did.
There have been equally impressive numbers of objections to the Chilean
reservation. A total of twenty States objected to the reservation, three more than
to the GDR's reservation. By and large the objecting States indicate that the
reservations are incompatible and therefore invalid, although no one excludes
entry into force. This would seem to indicate that the States that earlier referred
to article 19.b VCLT in their objections, had by then come to the conclusion that
article 19.c VCLT was the relevant provision. ; 'k» fit; /fKfuni
In spite of the objections, the only thing that could really change anything about
the incompatible reservations would be their withdrawal. And indeed the two,
most notorious reservations have been withdrawn, the GDR's reservation was
withdrawn a few days before the accession of the German Democratic Republic
to the Federal Republic of Germany'-. Chile's reservation was withdrawn
within two years after it had been made. It has been argued that both these
The reservations were withdrawn on 13 September 1990; the German Democratic
en-; Republic ceased to exist on 3 October 1990. •'?<">
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withdrawals are the direct consequences of a change in the political situation in
the reserving State'^. Be this as it may, taking this as the only explanation
would seem to ignore that the objections may have had any effect. Again, this
does not mean that the objections lead to the withdrawals, but they may have
influence the decision to withdraw.
4.3. The role of the Committee against Torture
Given the fact that very few far-reaching reservations have been made, there
would not seem to be a lot of analytical remarks to be made about the practice of
the Committee. Yet a few remarks must be made.
In its discussion about the reservations of Chile, the Committee is, as it should
be, rather critical. Given the nature of the reservations this was to be expected.
Yet, it is to be regretted that the discussion of the declaration by Ecuador was not
very thorough: in particular, the Committee might have been expected to raise
the question of whether the declaration should be read as a reservation. The
discussion, later on, of the New Zealand reservation with respect to compensation
is an example of more agile way of questioning: the Committee wanted to know
what the precise extent of the reservation was, and suggested that the reservation
be withdrawn. Clearly, the Committee had to find a way to address the issue of
reservations and declarations at the beginning of its work. In the discussion with
New Zealand the question of the compatibility of the reservation was asked, and
it would be useful if the Committee would retain the liberty to inquire into the
compatibility of a reservation. Even if Committee-member Voyame remains of
the opinion that article I9.b VCLT is applicable with respect to reservations to
the Convention against Torture'-*.
The fact that the GDR's report did not even mention its far-reaching reservations,
indicates the need to require reporting about reservations in the "Guidelines on
reporting". The absence of a reference to reservations may be understandable,
given the fact that the emphasis is on substantive provisions. Yet the financial
reservations potentially posed a great threat to the Convention and should at least
be mentioned in the report.
Another interesting development is the fact that Committee-member Chanet asks
a state party (the Netherlands) why it did not make a reservation'^. While
restricting the amount of reservations is in general desirable, Chanet's approach
seems to be inspired by the desire to be clear about the obligations accepted
under the Convention. As the state suggested that it had liberty in establishing
jurisdiction, which is a misinterpretation of the Convention, there is a point in
this line of questioning.
123. LeBlanc, Reservations at 23-24. -
124. CAT/C/SR.40, par.36-38 (Chile); CAT/C/SR.126, par.53 (New Zealand).
125. CAT/C/SR.46, par.88.
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Since the withdrawal of the Chilean reservation and the withdrawal of the GDR's
declarations with respect to the financing of the Committee the issue of reserva-
tions to the Convention against Torture has lost much of its urgency.
9dT .€>
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8. RESTORING THE RUINS, CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the, by now almost forgotten, socialist theory of international law, and its
version of the law of treaties in particular, it has been suggested that reservations
represented the interests of the ruling class in the reserving State'. Nowadays
socialist legal doctrine has slipped into oblivion, and is not considered a relevant
doctrine in the theory of international law anymore. In this case, however, I
would like to suggest that Gubin's view is a particularly useful insight that may
clarify a number of reservations made. In general it could be suggested that in a
number of states, the political elite takes care of its own interests when in power.
This does not necessarily have to coincide with the interests of human rights
protection. The interests of males as society's privileged class may, for instance,
account for the majority of the reservations to the Women's Convention. In fact,
Shelton suggests that it is no coincidence that when looking at the substantive
scope of the reservations to human rights treaties, the most fundamental ones aim
at the least respected groups in society, such as aliens, prisoners and women'.
To put it cynically, reservations are used to kick the weakest out of the system of
human rights protection. Looking at it from this point of view, demonstrates that
the reservations issue is not only a question of the adequate functioning of human
rights law, but it also underlines that distinct moral issues are involved.
When discussing reservations one of the first questions is whose problem they
are. Looking at the large number of reservations made, one would suspect that
they are no problem at all, at any rate few objections were made, and few
reservations have been withdrawn. We might be looking at a hypothetical
problem, in which very few people other than the author take an interest. I have
however never felt that this was a mere technical problem of international law,
but rather a hidden impediment to the full implementation of human rights
instruments. If this book has focused the attention on the importance of the
problem, and has illustrated its origins, that will hopefully be a step on the path
to a reduction of the detrimental impact of reservations. Given the multifarious
aspects of this subject, before embarking on a discussion of the results of this
enquiry into the law on reservations, the remark must be that there is doubtlessly
more to be said than is possible at present. Issues such as the possibilities of
developing the law of treaties into a set of rules that will facilitate the creation of
Gubin as quoted by Gottling. op.cit. at IS:*., zeigt nicht die verschiedene Losungsmog-
lichkeiten fiir das problem von widerstreitenden Interessen der vertragswilligen Staaten,
sondern erklart die Entstehung der Vorbehalte politisch im sinne des marxistisch-
leninistische Ideologic mit der Entstehung der Interessengegensatze der Staaten".
And Schweisfurth, op.cit. at 258:"Wie ein internationaler Vertrag im ganzcn. so diene
auch ein Vorbehalt jeweils direkt oder indirekt den Interessen der herrschenden Klasse
des den Vorbehalt erkliirenden Staates. Nach den Vorstellungen des sowjetischen
Theorie sind die Vorbehalte kapitalistischer Staaten meist ein Ausdruck der zwischen
diesen Staaten bestehenden Widerspruche und Machtkampfc."
Shelton, op.cit. at 226-227. -., .-. .
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international rules stressing the common interest, rather than the individual and
reciprocal interest of States; or a further investigation of ways to strengthen the
role of the supervisory organs in the field of human rights law, present them-
selves. In that respect this study has merely highlighted disparities arising with
respect to a very specific issue, the question of reservations to human rights
treaties.
There is a growing interest in the problem of reservations to human rights
treaties. Reservations to the Women's Convention put the issue on the interna-
tional agenda, the reservations by the German Democratic Republic and by Chile
to the Convention against Torture triggered a large number of objections, and as
a consequence of questions by Austria the Human Rights Committee is at present
considering a general comment with respect to reservations. The 1993 World
Conference on Human Rights dealt with the issue of reservations', and it is to be
hoped that all these events are the beginning of genuine concern and ensuing
action with respect to reservations to human right instruments.
boa
1. SOME ESSENTIAL ISSUES
Prior to embarking on a detailed critique of the rules of law and the practice with
respect to human rights treaties, it is useful to consider a number of rather
general, yet essential issues that influence the practice, and thereby also influence
possible solutions to the problem of incompatible reservations.
1.1. ' The universality debate • : »:^ >
From the point of view of human rights protection, a fundamental issue is the
dilemma between the integrity of human rights obligations and the universality of
such obligations. The emphasis on the integrity of human rights obligations
stresses the interdependence of the obligations, thereby implying that a pick-and-
choose system undermines the authority of commitments in the field of human
rights, and leads to a lower standard of protection. The issue at stake is the
quality of protection, even if this would be at the expense of the universal scope
of the obligations. The universality perspective, on the other hand, stresses the
importance of a world-wide commitment to human rights, even if this implies
allowing for certain differences between the States. The important goal is for all
states to be bound, if necessary at the expense of the level of protection.
Universality and integrity are important goals, but seem to be interrelated in a
unfriendly balance, in which achieving the one is necessarily at the expense of
the other. Taking universality and integrity to be abstract values will not lead to
greater insight into ways in which the problems concerning incompatible reserva-
tions may be solved.
3. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action; A/Conf. 157/23, Part II. A par.5
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The fact should be taken into account that the implementation of a human rights
instrument will take place at the domestic level, which may in itself influence the
integral application of the treaty. The precise impact of reservations will not be
exactly visible, the consequences of the limitation of the obligations under the
human rights instrument will be hidden by domestic legislation. Even if no
reservations were made, the universal adherence to a treaty might still detract
attention from the fact that the universal rules may be substantially less universal
when implemented at national level.
With respect to universality it should be kept in mind, that while adhering to the
goals of universality a great number of different views exist as to what is
precisely meant by universality. The aim of universality has great promotional
value, and this aspect may have monopolized the discussion. However, uncer-
tainty about the actual meaning of universality has turned it into a notion that is
somewhat manipulative.
While it is tempting to look at universality in a purely arithmetical way, this
might be very delusive as there is the risk of losing sight of fundamental flaws in
human rights protection behind abstract figures. On the basis of the numbers of
ratifications in relation to the reservations made, it could be assumed that
reservations are a reasonable option to increase ratification. The fact that an
impressive number of States have ratified the four human rights instruments
discussed in the foregoing would seem to illustrate that reservations may be a
practicable tool to facilitate ratification. Yet, this approach clearly ignores the
scope of reservations and their impact on the human rights protection.
1.2. The lack of correlation between the law of treaties and human rights
law
* •*• i<
Throughout this book two different angles have been used to study the problem
of reservations, the law of treaties perspective and the human rights law perspec-
tive. As has transpired, there is a general problem of correlation between the law
of treaties and human rights law. Both fields of international law have a different
orientation, and a different structure. It may not be possible to solve these
structural problems within the near future, yet it is important to be aware of this
as one of the origins of the problem of reservations to human rights treaties.
The general assumption is that the law of treaties purely regards the creation of
rules of international law as laid down in treaties. It governs the creation of /ear
«T7/;M, its rules are merely instrumental and thereby supposedly neutral. The law
of treaties does have no other aim than facilitating the creation of /et j-cri/tfa\
The law of treaties developed as customary law, based upon international prac-
tice, and is nothing more than the States found necessary to create. As such, it
does not have any inherent aspirations of its own.
4. See however Charlesworth et. al, op.cit. at 915.
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When the law of treaties was codified by the Vienna Conference, the bulk of the
rules were traditional rules, and only a few rules were progressive development
of the law of treaties. The rules on reservations in the Vienna Convention were
partially based upon the Court's Advisory Opinion on the Genocide Convention,
and partially based upon the exigencies of treaty-making in a rapidly expanding
world. The twelve month rule for the acceptance of reservations in article 20.5
VCLT is a clear example of this tendency. One might have suspected that the
latter consideration would have led to a law of treaties that is sufficiently flexible,
if not agile, to include the needs and necessities of present day law making, for
instance within the United Nations. Yet, while the Vienna Convention appears to
live up to the needs of multilateral treaty-making, it in fact does not. The concept
of a multilateral treaty used by the Vienna Convention is not based upon genuine-
ly multilateral relations, but upon a bundle of bi-iateral relations that add up to
being a multilateral treaty. A basically bilateral system is used to realize multilat-
eral interests. As Higgins describes it, the core problem is that the law of treaties
is inappropriate for solving the new challenges in international law, the aim of
creating obligations other than strictly reciprocal obligations'.
A clear example of the inability of the present law of treaties to cope with the
fundamentally different relations springing from a multilateral treaty are the
problems created by the GDR's reservations to the Torture Convention's financ-
ing. The German Democratic Republic intended to restrict its obligation to
contribute to financing the work of the Committee to those supervisory pro-
cedures that it had accepted. These reservations entered into force, even though a
substantial number of objections were made. As has been demonstrated, the result
of the reservations would have been a confusing bundle of financial obligations,
in which as a result of the reservation the obligations of the other States Parties
would probably have been increased. It is a rare example that clearly demon-
strates the inadequacy of the rules, in particular with respect to building a
universal system of human rights protection.
The fact that the law of treaties does not provide for the creation of genuinely
multilateral instruments and still uses largely the method that was developed with
respect to reciprocal treaties is misleading; it gives us a wrong idea about the
balance of obligations between the contracting States. While it may not be
possible to change the Vienna Convention or adapt the law of treaties to the
changing needs of the international legislative process, it is a necessity that will
have to be kept in mind for future developments in the law of treaties. Unless a
mechanism is developed that adequately addresses the common interest of the
international community rather than the reciprocal interest of States, or the
consequences of the indifference of States, there will not be fundamental changes
in this field.
A second, and related issue is the way in which international law functions, and
the importance of interest as a mechanism stimulating compliance. One has to
, 5 . Higgins, MLR at 11-17. • • • • , • • • . . > ^ •>
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realize that the law of treaties is still very much geared towards a traditional,
some would say old-fashioned, model of implementation. The fulfilment of inter-
national obligations largely depends on the benefits a state expects. Implementa-
tion is encouraged by co-contracting states who emphasize fulfilment of obliga-
tions, because this is in their interest. The interrelation of rights and obligations
for all parties to a treaty is thus a mechanism that enhances the fulfilment of
obligations. Substantive reciprocity provides the necessary dynamics for imple-
mentation monitored by the States Parties themselves.
As we have seen the States Parties to a human rights treaty have an interest in
the fulfilment of obligations under such a treaty, but this may be a mere legal
interest. The absence of interrelated obligations leads to a declining interest in the
implementation of a treaty, treaty relations underlying human rights obligations
are to a certain extent a legal construction, rather than an realistic and genuine
obligation. Human rights obligations have to be implemented between the States
Parties and the individuals under their jurisdiction, whereas a "traditional" treaty
leads to obligations carried out at the international level. This leads to a lack of
interest in the implementation of an instrument, and in particular a lack of
interest in (objecting to) reservations. The absence of the <fo MA dra mechanism
thus explains the small number of objections and withdrawals. There does not
appear to be an incentive to push a reserving State to withdraw its reservations by
objecting.
Another consequence of the absence of a vital balance between the obligations of
the States Parties is the appearance of declarations of an uncertain nature*.
Opaque declarations are made that might be reservations, but might also not be
reservations. Similarly, vague declarations are made with respect to reservations
which might or might not be objections^. This lack of clarity is, to my mind, the
consequence of the absence of interest on the part of the other States Parties. In
view of this indifference, it does not matter much how a reservation is formu-
lated, neither does it matter that there is little certainty about the exact legal
effect of such statements. Certainty about the legal effect is important when
actual interests are at stake, it matters little when theoretical interests, such as the
interests of States Parties to a human rights treaty in the correct implementation
of the instrument by other States, are the core of the obligation.
A third problem is related to the dynamic nature of human rights law. Not only
has there been a continuous increase in human rights documents since the second
In a discussion about the United Kingdom's initial report to the CEDAW Committee
(CEDAW/C/6/Add.52), the representative indicated that the reservation (it was
explicitly labelled "reservations" by the United Kingdom) was meant as an explana-
tion(CEDAW/C/SR.159), probably implying that the legal effect would be that of an
interpretative declaration.
See the statements (objections?) with an uncertain legal effect by the Netherlands to the
Australian reservation to the CCPR and by Germany to the French reservation to the
CCPR. discussed supra at Chapter 5. par.2.1: and the United Kingdom to the GDR
reservation to the CAT, discussed supra at Chapter 7, par.2.1.
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World War, within the scope of the different treaties there is also an inherent
tendency to expand and refine the protection offered by an instrument. This takes
place through the practice of the supervisory Committees under the reporting
procedure, and in the case of the HRC, also under the Optional Protocol. The
general comments formulated by the Committees are also an important means of
clarifying and refining the protection afforded by a human rights instrument.
These dynamic tendencies lead to some interesting questions with respect to
reservations. Subsequent interpretation by a supervisory Committee may turn an
interpretative declaration into a reservation, when the interpretation is not
accepted by the Committee. On the other hand, an interpretative declaration may
become extinct when the interpretation is accepted. The issue is more compli-
cated when States ratifying some time after the entry into force, through their
reservations maintain an interpretation that has not been accepted by the Commit-
tee in an earlier comment*. This poses the question whether reservations could
and should be used to hamper the progressive development of human rights law,
or whether States ratifying at a later date could opt out of the <(c</«/.v. It is again a
consequence of the differences between the law of treaties which is relatively
static, and the dynamic potential of human rights law.
1.3. Reservations are not necessarily "wrong" >
In discussing the issue of reservations to human rights treaties, one has to realize
that reservations may be inevitable to a certain extent. Even if the emphasis in
this book has been on incompatible reservations, thereby creating the impression
that reservations are always wrong, it should be stressed that in a number of
cases reservations are a necessary and acceptable accommodation mechanism.
Reservations are to a certain extent the price to be paid for the drafting of human
rights instruments in the United Nations, the price for striving for universality.
The fact that much of the drafting takes places on the basis of consensus makes it
clear that occasionally States may not want to disagree with the final result, in
spite of disagreeing about a particular provision. Reservations are a reaction to
drafting based upon the political wishes of the majority, and reservations are then
an understandable solution. Somewhat differently, states may use reservations to
redress imprecise drafting, when for political reasons the compromise formulation
is ambiguous and a State Party wants to limit the extent of its obligations
explicitly.
Another reason for making reservations may be to indicate in what way problems
of conflicting rights will be solved. These may be conflicting international
obligations, or conflicts between national and international law. As compared to
other fields of international law, the national dimension is of great importance
with respect to human rights. This may again be a reason for the large number of
reservations that have been made. They shield the national situation against the
Cf. the reservations by the United States and Switzerland with respect to article 26
CCPR. discussed in Chapter 5, par.1.3 supra.
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exigencies of human rights law. It can have distinct advantages for the reserving
State to indicate this, rather than being silent about it, in which case supervisory
organs might be tempted to interfere. Thus some States claim that reservations
reflect honesty, suggesting that it is uncalled for to be treated as though they
were breaching their obligations under a treaty'. The question is whether the
scope of this "honesty" should have had a far-reaching impact on the protection
guaranteed under the human rights instrument.
Human rights instruments deal with a variety of rights, which should lead to a
more or less uniform human rights protection around the world, in spite of the
fact that the situation in the ratifying states differs to a great extent. The variety
in human rights situations, societies, cultures and economic situations between the
States Parties to a human rights instrument may illustrate the need for some
differentiation in the obligations undertaken. On the other hand the question
would be how far such considerations should restrict the impact of a treaty. In
particular with respect to the supposed cultural relativity of human rights, there is
reason to suspect that limitations on human rights based upon notions of culture
and religion may have an adverse effect for particular groups in society'".
Thus, while reservations may be an acceptable and practical accommodation
mechanism, each time a determination will have to be made as to whether the
reservation is a simple accommodation, or has a much wider scope. These are
precisely the margins that will have to be judged using the "object and purpose"
criterium. As much as honesty is to be praised, it will still be limited by what is
permissible under the compatibility rule, which by its nature distinguishes
between core and non-core obligations. Accommodation is acceptable with
respect to non-core obligations, but it is not with respect to core obligations.
, - \ . » '.v- ••!" *< •«• : . - f > r . : < - f T
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As has been described before, I am of the opinion that the Advisory Opinion in
the Genocide case is, in retrospect, rather unfortunate. The clarity with which the
majority proclaimed "object and purpose" as a yardstick, made it look too
simple". "Object and purpose" was to be the magic formula that would sort out
all possible problems with respect to reservations. To my mind the ingenuity with
which the majority sought to combine the different requirements of integrity and
universality has blinded lawyers to the disadvantages of the criterion. While the
"object and purpose" rule may have appeared to bridge the gap between the
formal law of treaties and the focus on substantive rights in human rights law, the
9. \ Cf. the statements by Egypt (CEDAW/C/SR.I64) and the United Kingdom (CEDAW/-
"' '"• C/SR.155) in their discussions with the CEDAW Committee.
10. See about cultural relativity: R.E.Howard. Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for
Community, in: 15 HRQ 1993, 315-338; Jacobs, op.cit. at 81-87: and Lijnzaad, Maken en
, .-it ,n Breken, at 211-214.
tjf-: h,f The Advisory Opinion reads:The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit both
the freedom of making reservations and that of objecting to them"; I d Rep.1951 at 24.
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notion never had that effect. "Object and purpose" is a multi-purpose rule, a
catch phrase. It is as self-evident as it is opaque.
It is interesting to note that, when re-reading the joint dissent in the Genocide
case the majority of the problems dealt with before have been predicted. The
dissenting judges underlined that it would be hard to establish the "object and
purpose", and that an individual determination of "object and purpose" by the
States Parties would lead to confusion. Their conclusion that the "object and
purpose" rule designed by their colleagues was not a reliable means of solving
the problems'-, is still valid today when looking at the problems that have arisen
in practice as discussed in the previous chapters.
On the other hand, finding that the joint dissent was written with more foresight
and vision than the majority opinion, does not mean that I would rather adhere to
the solution chosen by the jointly dissenting judges. Not only do I feel that the
emphasis on the integrity of the treaty would be unduly restrictive. While the
majority opinion is quite unfortunate in retrospect, neither of the dissenting
opinions is acceptable from the point for view of combining the notions of
integrity and universality of human rights law. Looking back, this may be
analyzed as the result of a Court that stuck to a limited opinion on what interna-
tional law could achieve in the field of treaty-based human rights protection. The
views expressed seem to suggest that few other possibilities for solving the
problem of reservations are available, other than the ones suggested by the
judges. This however should be understood as a view at the time of the Opinion,
and the situation has changed since then. The development of supervision since
the nineteen fifties has brought perspectives that were not available at the moment
of the Genocide case.
The fact that none of the three opinions in the Genocide case gives adequate
solutions illustrates, with hindsight, the complexity of the problem of reservations
to human rights treaties, and the sheer impossibility of combining universality
and integrity through the law of treaties. It would seem that there is no perfect
solution, feasible solutions should be looked for.
3. THE VIENNA CONVENTION RULES
After these general remarks, we will have a look at the provisions of the Vienna
Convention that are directly related to the issue of reservations to human rights
treaties. An article-by-article overview will highlight the major difficulties.
12. The joint dissent, ICJ Rep. 1951 at 46, reads: "We regret, therefore, that we do not find
in the new rule (that is the "object and purpose" rule, EL] that has been proposed any
reliable means of solving the problems to which reservations to this convention have
'•• given and may continue to give rise, nor any means that are likely to produce final and
consistent results".
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- article 2.1.d -
Commonly understood to be the definition of 'reservation' (it is in fact just a
paragraph in the provision on "use of terms" in the Vienna Convention) this
provision has led to a certain amount of inflation. The original idea was that the
provision would provide guidance in case the status of a declaration was uncer-
tain. In practice the focus on the substance of the declaration, emphasized by the
"however phrased or named" formula has got a hold of the rule. This has led to
almost ignoring the labelling of a statement by the reserving State itself. Rather
than being a tool for distinguishing in cases of doubt, the rule in article 2. l.d has
become the guiding principle itself.
The Opinion of the European Commission on Human Rights in the Belilos case,
stressing that the original distinction made by the reserving State should deter-
mine the legal effect of interpretative declarations, seems to have found little
acclaim. The importance of this case should be highlighted, especially so because
of the increasing number of interpretative declarations. It provides a general rule
to distinguish between the legal effects of reservations and interpretative declar-
ations. The Commission's Opinion stressed the responsibility that States have for
being clear about the intended legal effect of their declaration or reservation. The
Opinion is a warning against the inflatory use of article 2.l.d VCLT, but the
warning does not seem to have been heard.
- article 19 -
Few remarks are necessary to underline the problems created by article 19.c and
the "object and purpose" rule laid down therein, as this has been the essential
question in the foregoing. Within the law of treaties with its overriding formal
character, the rule is unusual because of its emphasis on substance. It is that
aspect through which a connection between the law of treaties and human rights
law could have been established.
An obligation implied in the object and purpose rule is that it necessarily leads to
distinguishing between the core and the non-core obligations in the treaty. If
reservations contrary to the object and purpose are prohibited, this implies that
reservations not detrimental to object ad purpose are permitted. This process of
distinguishing is necessary if article 19.c VCLT is to have any meaning at all, yet
it is a process that appears to be complicated and occasionally subjective. This
will in particular be the case when distinguishing between core and non-core
human rights. Thus far, there has been little theory as to how this process should
take place, and it is indeed a matter to which further study should be devoted.
No formal mechanisms of protecting "object and purpose" are available to ensure
that the obligation be fulfilled. "Object and purpose" is a rule without safeguards.
This does not necessarily mean that the rule would therefore not be a rule of
international law. Enforcement is in general not one of the stronger aspects of
international law. If the "object and purpose" rule is a weak rule, a solution
could be to look for mechanisms that might stimulate abiding by the rule. This
would mean looking for elements that might increase the interest the States
Parties have in the reservations made, turning it from a theoretical interest into
an actual interest. It must be admitted that this is to a large extent a theoretical
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construction, as it is hard to see how this could be done. In general it might well
be that the stewardship required by the object and purpose rule is based upon an
image of the functioning of the international legal practice that is not in conform-
ity with its present nature.
It should be noted though, that article 19.c VCLT itself is not the problem, rather
the failure to formulate more precise reservations clauses as suggested under
articles 19.a and 19.b is the original problem. It seems hardly feasible to include
mechanisms monitoring object and purpose into the existing system, unless the
supervisory organs take up this task. Thus, the choice should be to turn to a
down-to-earth mechanism for the admissibility of reservations, for instance a
system suggested by article 19.a and 19.b of the Vienna Convention. Preventing
problems caused by the application of article 19.c should take place during the
drafting. If clauses like article 19.a and 19.b VCLT were used more frequently,
the "object and purpose" could stay the residual solution it was meant to be, and
be interpreted for use in a particular treaty through either an explicit prohibition
or an explicit allowance of certain reservations.
- article 20.4.a -
This provision clearly demonstrates that the Vienna Convention considers treaties
to be a bundle of bilateral relations and operates on the assumption that this is
what is meant by a multilateral treaty. The provision indicates the basically
reciprocal relations resulting from the ratification.
- article 20.4.b -
The limited effect of objections is laid down in this provision. Objections no
longer prevent a State from becoming a party to a treaty, and rarely stimulate the
withdrawal of reservations. With hindsight, it could be suggested that the limited
number of objections might be the direct consequence of the futility of objections,
as indicated by article 20.4.b. If a reservation is totally unacceptable, it will not
only be necessary to object, but the exclusion of treaty relations will only take
place when this is explicitly indicated. This is why the Vienna Convention is said
to favour reservations.
On the other hand, as I have argued in chapter two, this two-fold reaction to
unacceptable reservations may be beneficial when it concerns human rights
treaties. As demonstrated, the system distinguishes between approval of a
reservation and the establishment of treaty relations. The issue of disapproval
could be dealt with by objecting to a reservation. Whether a reservation is
considered to be so detrimental that treaty relations should be excluded is a
separate issue. With respect to human rights treaties. States may want to take the
first step, and may express objections to underline the incompatibility of a
reservation. However, given the absence of a direct interest to the objecting state,
and in view of the importance of bringing reserving States into a Convention's
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supervisory mechanism, there will be little reason to exclude treaty relations,
which makes the second step unnecessary".
- article 20.5 -
With some cynicism, one might say that this provision has been a great success.
The method of tacit acceptance has made the establishment of treaty relations on
the basis of reservations much easier, and has greatly contributed to facilitating
the increase in membership to treaties. It is also through this provision that States
acquiesce in the existence of incompatible reservations. Tacit acceptance does not
look like acceptance, but technically it is.
The time limit set for the tacit acceptance, and consequently the limit within
which objections should be made, may be too short. Frequently objecting states
express their objections after the twelve months period; being too late to prevent
them taking effect should they want to'''. Taking into account the time required
for the processing of reservations in a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the time
involved in deciding whether or not to object and subsequently formulating the
objection, twelve months may just not be long enough.
- article 21 -
This provision may again be said to highlight the Vienna Convention's bilateral
approach to reservations. Reservations modify the relations between reserving
and accepting States. Because the majority of reservations are accepted under
article 20.5, the result will ultimately be general acceptance.
Some uncertainty remained about the difference between article 21.1.a and 21.3
about the different legal effects of an accepted reservation and a reservation
objected to. Given the nature of human rights instruments this is of little rel-
evance, as these provisions focus on substantially reciprocal obligations, which
are by and large absent in human rights instruments.
- article 22 -
Article 22 provides a simple procedure for the withdrawal of reservations and
objections. It is hard to see how the Vienna Convention could have facilitated
withdrawal more than it does. In fact the liberal rule with respect to withdrawal
underlines that, with the limited number of reservations to the treaties under
consideration being withdrawn, the failure does not lie within the structure of the
law of treaties but rather with the absence of a stimulus for withdrawal.
13. Imbert, Les Reserves at 1S3.
14. Objections to reservations to the Convention against Torture made by Austria, Canada,
Denmark, Norway, Spain and Sweden were received after the twelve months period, see
Chapter 7, par.2.1 supra.
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4. RESERVATIONS IN PRACTICE
In this paragraph we shall discuss the possibilities of reducing the detrimental
impact of reservations to existing human rights treaties, in particular with respect
to the ones discussed in the foregoing. Byrnes is probably right in writing that
"aWmateiy f/»e i/w/MWTa/if <7««f/o«j are rflrt/ca/ 0/iro"". As far as future practice
on the basis of existing human rights conventions is concerned, suggestions
would have to fit into the existing system, as it is unlikely that substantial
changes would be take place. New additional protocols may have some promo-
tional effect, but it is unlikely that fundamentally different rules could be created
having an ec /MWf/hcfo influence on the reservations already made. <iti iM^XiS,<i**TV
The main actors in this field are the States Parties and the supervisory Com-
mittees. My suggestions will indicate the opportunities both have to favourably
influence the reduction of reservations to human rights instruments. Though from
a formal point of view, it is first of all the obligation of States Parties to react to
incompatible reservations, there are reasons to also take into account the comple-
mentary authority of the supervisory Committees to undertake action with respect
to reservations.
4.1. Role of the States Parties
As far as States Parties are concerned, the message is simple: they should not
make reservations, should object to reservations contrary to object and purpose,
and should withdraw the reservations made'*. While this is a too simplistic
picture painted of solutions to the problem, it is to my mind first and foremost
the task of the States Parties to prevent the existence of incompatible reservations
that hamper the implementation of human rights conventions. The problem is
attributable to the reserving States as well as to the negligence of the other States
Parties.
^ - • . " ' - . . . - • i - ' j i / • • ' < • ••••;_• • - . ••'•,• . . . * • • • . • • • v . , • - • • ; ; . . .- . v - ; i . ' i i ; v H ' " ' H , » ' . •
With respect to the object and purpose rule, it must be repeated that the rule is
only applicable in case a treaty does not contain a reservations clause. Ideally a
treaty should contain a reservations clause specifying what is, and what is not
acceptable.
The object and purpose rule is a rule of customary law, it is a rule with its
foundation in the general principle of good faith. With its emphasis of the
substantive aspects of reservations, the object and purpose rule should be
adequate for considering reservations to human rights treaties. Monitoring of the
15. Byrnes, The work of the Committee, at 52.
16. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (A/Conf. 157/23) Part II, A par.5
reads:The World Conference on Human Rights encourages States to consider limiting
the extent of any reservations they lodge to international human rights instruments,
•"'"' formulate any reservations as precisely and narrowly as possible, ensure that non is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the relevant treaty and regularly review any
reservations with a view to withdrawing them."
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rule should however be improved. As indicated earlier, not only the reserving
states are to blame for the detrimental impact, to my mind the accepting States
are equally responsible for the existence of such reservations. Admittedly the
Vienna Convention favours the acceptance of reservations through its system of
tacit acceptance, but acceptance is merely a presumption that can be rebutted, if
States act within the time-limit indicated by article 20.5 VCLT. It would appear
that States rarely understand their role as a State Party as implying an active
stewardship of the treaty, which may include objecting to incompatible reserva-
tions. While it has been suggested that objections largely depend upon political
expediency", it would seem that this has not been of great importance to the
objecting States. A number of States do take an active approach and object, but
this seems to be restricted to a regionally limited number of States'*. Through
political contacts awareness could be raised as to the possibility and desirability to
consider each and every reservation from the point of view of object and pur-
pose, and if need be, to object to incompatible reservations. It should be stressed
that objections, while appearing to be unfriendly acts, are in fact nothing other
than the expression of legitimate concern about the quality of the international
legal order.
17. Jacobs, op.cit. at 85.
18. An overview of the States that objected to reservations
Australia CERD
^' - ' " ' Austria
i Belgium CERD CCPR <» * V
•*. Bulgaria ' , <. •,,
Canada CERD *.*«•* *i'*--»,-"«S-i- .--.;
Czechoslovakia CERD , _ . *
to the four Conventions:
,, . ,CAT
D e n m a r k
^ F i n l a n d
i*'"*-' F r a n c e - . 1 * -••
: .., • Germany
-<W t^. Greece
" . Italy
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
,-; New Zealand
:• ,'rv Norway
Portugal
Sweden
Switzerland
Spain
•t- Turkey
c United Kingdom
CERD
CERD
CERD
CERD
CERD
CERD
CERD
CERD
CERD
CERD
CERD
CCPR
CCPR
CCPR
CCPR
CCPR
• • ' * ' " • '
CEDAW
CEDAW
CEDAW
CEDAW
CEDAW
CEDAW
CAT
CAT
CAT
CAT
to
CAT
CAT
CAT
CAT
CAT
CAT
CAT
CAT
CAT
CAT
"9;
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With respect to withdrawals, it has been noticed that States rarely withdraw their
reservations. Reservations once made are hard to get rid o f . Here again,
persuasion might be necessary to stress that adherence to the integral treaty is the
standard, and reservations are a sub-optimal situation. A change of opinion on the
acceptability of reservations is necessary, re-emphasizing the necessity to
withdraw.
On the other hand a change may have been taking place in recent years, in which
it appears that States object more frequently, and in which it looks as though a
number of reserving States have on the basis of these objections reconsidered
their reservations and have withdrawn them. This tendency is most notable with
respect to the Convention against Torture and the Women's Convention.
As regards the two most striking reservations to the Convention against Torture,
the reservation concerning the financing of the Committee made by the GDR, and
the reservations by Chile with respect to superior order as a justification for
torture, the impressive number of sixteen and twenty objections respectively have
been made. The objections are somewhat selective, there does seem to be little
regional variety in the group of objecting States. The objections seem to have
been successful: the East German reservation was withdrawn within three and a
half year after it was made, and the Chilean reservations were withdrawn within
two years. On the other hand, political changes in both states may have been
responsible for these withdrawals.
A similar tendency is visible with respect to the Women's Convention. Malawi,
New Zealand, Thailand and the Republic of Korea managed to withdraw their
reservations, to which a number of objections had been made. However, the
objections have not had any impact whatsoever on the reservations invoking
Sharia'h law. Whereas a number of states may have been persuaded by the
objecting states, this was not the case with authors of the Islamic reservations.
Given the origin of these reservations, the absence of any impact of the objec-
tions is hardly surprising. Yet, the foresight that even active States Parties will
not be able to persuade their reserving co-contractants to withdraw these reserva-
tions, indicates that the issue of Sharia'h reservations is not just a complicated
question, but that in dealing with it, the limits of what contemporary international
law can achieve are probably reached. It boils down to the consensual character
of the law of treaties: if there is no intention to withdraw, the reservation will
remain on the books until the twelfth of never. >«, ,r js wi*"^ ¥l?^  *»&• *;
In sum it may be concluded that objecting to supposedly incompatible reserva-
tions is always useful, and indeed necessary. The importance of objections does
not necessarily lie in their immediate effect, as this might be completely absent.
Objections to an incompatible reservation may provide guidance to the super-
visory Committee as to how other States Parties look upon a particular reserva-
tion. Objections expressed unequivocally will contribute to the interpretation of a
:. . . ;„ g
"; A D . . . . . . •.....;*•„-.
19. "i. For example, reservations by the United Kingdom (1969) or Fiji (1973) on the ratifica-
i tion of CERD; or reservations by the United Kingdom (1976) or Trinidad and Tobago
(1978) on the ratification of CCPR. .,,, <>,>>-.
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reservation. Moreover, it is not beyond imagination that objections will eventual-
ly persuade the reserving State to withdraw its reservation. On the other hand,
there is little certainty whether such a withdrawal does indeed lead to the granting
of human rights that had previously been excluded, it is conceivable that with-
drawals will be influenced by political considerations, rather than humanitarian
considerations.
Within the framework of individual treaties there are also some options States
may use to reduce the detrimental impact of reservations. To begin with, the
meetings of the States Parties, held bi-annually primarily to elect the Committee
members, might be used to address the reservations issue in more depth. The
advantage is that the meeting of the States Parties is an existing forum whose
members must be expected to take an interest in the treaty. These meetings are a
regular forum in which the States Parties could expand their purely formal
interest in the election of the Committee towards a more genuine stewardship of
the treaty. It could be a forum to express concern about reservations made, and
for consultations with the reserving States. With respect to the Women's Conven-
tion this has been initiated by Sweden, but without great impact. It is obvious that
states should have a genuine intention to discuss reservations, especially the
reserving states, if this is to have any effect at all. , ••; ^*;t; 'sw^ixis
Another possibility for States to take action with respect to reservations would be
to put a dispute concerning the compatibility of a particular reservation before the
International Court of Justice, on the basis of dispute settlement provisions in
human rights treaties. Theoretically this is possible if States disagree about the
compatibility. However, there are a number of reasons why the merits of such an
approach should be questioned. First of all it is hard to see how such a dispute
should arise in the present situation. Incompatible reservations are tacitly
accepted on the basis of article 20.5 VCLT. To my mind the only possibility
would be the rather hypothetical case in which a State objects to a reservation on
the grounds of incompatibility, and this objection is contradicted by the reserving
State arguing that the reservation is indeed compatible. Up until now, no reserv-
ing state has ever sought to rebut the accusation of incompatibility expressed in
an objection.
It has also been suggested that the expertise of the International Court of Justice
could be employed through the request for an Advisory Opinion on the issue of
compatibility, and more precisely on the question about the "object and purpose"
of the Women's Convention. However attractive, this is a dangerous suggestion
that should not be taken up*\ An Advisory Opinion on the issue of compatibility
may be too detached from the regular practice under the human rights instru-
ments, and as a consequence not be in line with the increasing awareness, and
20. The joint dissent in the Advisory Opinion on the Genocide Convention (ICJ Rep.1951,
£«" at 31) already warned: "Its Opinion is requested as to the existing law and its operation
^! upon reservations.... B«/ rtc COIWY ca/i/io/ overtook //ic /acv f/i<w <7s Opmio/t /way Aave a
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hopefully also increasing agility, of the supervisory Committees to dealing with
reservations. Moreover, given the Vienna Convention rules on reservations, it is
, highly likely that the Court would ratify the existing practice. The contemporary
rules are clear, incompatible reservations can be accepted, and there is little
reason to suppose that the Court should feel otherwise. From that point of view
an Advisory Opinion can do more harm than good.
4.2. Role of the supervisory Committees o?';s
Theoretically the role of the supervisory organs is residual as States should act
upon article 19.c VCLT, yet they may in practice be the primary actors with
respect to reservations.
The position of supervisory organs in the UN system is quite different from the
position of the supervisory organs under the European Convention and the
American Convention. The organs under both regional instruments have a distinct
authority to deal with reservations, be it with respect to individual complaints or
in Advisory Opinions. The rather far-reaching influence on reservations that is
possible in those systems, is understandable in view of the fact that the legal
order created by the regional human rights instruments is tighter and more
coherent than it could be on world-level. Thus, though it is useful to look at the
way in which reservations are dealt with under regional instruments, the situation
is not fully comparable.
The practice of supervisory Committees with respect to reservations has not been
impressive, to say the least. Members of the supervisory organs have always
been reluctant to affirm their authority to deal with reservations, and to elaborate
on the scope of this authority.
As to how this competence to discuss reservations could be established, various
methods have been used. Looking for expert advice, the CERD Committee
turned to the Director of the UN Division on Human Rights, who explained,
after consultation with the Office for Legal Affairs, that the Committee had no
authority to deal with the compatibility question as this was the authority of the
States Parties"'. An almost identical question was put to the Office for Legal
Affairs by the CEDAW Committee, and the reply was identical: the Committee
had no authority to deal with the matter of compatibility^. Apart from the fact
that the Office for Legal Affairs is perhaps not a very liberal legal advisor, this
also shows that this question should not be discussed explicitly.
Some Committee members have dealt with the issue, arguing persuasively that
indeed the Committees have a role to play. In an early discussion about the
British reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion, Committee-member Kapteyn stressed that there was a distinct competence
relating to the determination of the scope of a reservation. Apparently annoyed
21. See: UN Juridical Yearbook 1976; ST/LEG/SER.C/14 at 219-221.
22. A/39/45, Vol.11, Ann.H.
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by the British reluctance to accept a role for the supervisory Committee, he says
that the United Kingdom's interpretation that the exclusive right to determine the
scope of the obligations^ rested with each State party, was both dangerous and
disturbing, and, moreover, would be true only if the United Kingdom had made a
formal reservation and not just an interpretative statement. In the absence of a
formal reservation, it rested with the Committee rather than the United Kingdom
Government to determine whether or not a State party, was fulfilling its obliga-
tions under article 4. Unless and until the interpretation of the scope of those
obligations had been the subject of a decision by the International Court of Justice
under article 22 of the Convention or of an advisory opinion of the Court
requested by the General Assembly, //»<? Co/w«7///<?e, <w //»e guanftan o / f/te
Coww«//ow, vww /w//y fom/jrtew /o /'w/er/w/ <IM</ fl/J/j/v //?<' Coww/i//ow. In so
doing, the Committee had the duty to allow States parties a measure of discretion
so as to enable them to take into account their legal and cultural traditions..?*.
A number of years later, HRC-member Higgins reinforces the view expressed by
Kapteyn in a clear statement when discussing the Austrian questions about the
possible withdrawal of reservations. The frustration about the lack of action on
the part of the States Parties to act as guardian for the human rights instruments
they themselves created, shines through in her remark that although the Commit-
tee theoretically has a secondary role in this respect, it is in practice the only
actor that can deal with the issue of reservations. She says: "77JC c/ftyj/c /xw/f/o/j
//?o/ rpwrwj//'ow.y /o rrai//'e$ were « «vrt//<'r o / Sftw .yovm?/£wry <•//'</ wo/ wortt / o r
/m/wow rig/ito fr«ir/«y, i« W/I/C/J S/rt/fty «/M/M«//V fl£iwrf /o j?/w ew//i//i r/#/j/.y /o
I'/M//WY/IHI/J. T^r rai//7y way //»«/, / o r //if /wos/ /«7/7, S/rt/r.y rf/W HO/ rrco^w/ze f/i«'r
mw/Wfl///y o / /Mtereyto /« //ie /?eM o / //M/wfl/j /7j?/j/.y «//</ _/w/7«/ /o //w/ii7or rw^rva-
f/o/w. 77JP Co/w/«/«ec 5-/io«W j«re/y wo/ /rtfo> /«c co«.v<TVfl//vp w'w //;«/ o 5/n/e
/)ar/y f/}ou/</ /wnJte w/m/ewr rr.vrrvfl//ow // C/JO.VC rtwrf /tor?/ //K' Cow/w/7/pf WOMW rfo
wo/to/wg //" /?<•> Co/w/w///fc rfirf wo/ /rtA'f M/J //i<' ^wwrt/ ^MW/ZOW r^ rracrva//o/w /o
//;<> Cowwflw/, wo ow<' ei?e H»OMW <7O .SO. "-', thereby clearly indicating the speci-
fic and supplementary role of a supervisory organ.
The Committees should not be as indifferent to the question of reservations to the
extent that they have been in the past, and ought to take these examples as a
starting point for strengthening their position in the reservations debate. In the
course of their work, more attention should and could, be paid to the reservations
made, and the impact the reservations have on the implementation of a conven-
tion. This is a role that is based upon the authority of the supervisory organ to
monitor the implementation of the convention. The Committees represent the
common interest of the international community, and are endowed with an
implicit authority to interpret the human rights treaties. Their task is to enhance
the implementation of the convention within all ratifying States. The basis of this
task is the integral treaty. I would think that this is legitimate authority deriving
a , -•- Under article 4 CERD (EL). ;>. ^  <,ir:*
•"J*.^ - '• CERD/C/SR.248 at 15 (Kapteyn). ,*»•.«-;»•<,«, w
25. CCPR/C/SR.1167, par.67 (Higgins). J.',-:»-. - -' ; i .' >: :•• ,,
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from the treaty itself, and complementary to the role States play when accepting
the reservation, or objecting to it. Looking at the inertia displayed by the States
Parties in reacting to incompatible reservations, a more proactive approach by the
Committees must be advocated.
sfi'ifi.•'-?&• • • ' * ?';'f^>Oi- K ; « •*t>t/i,'.'-ii:.:-:- Hfir.v* yj
4.2.1. The reporting procedure
In discussing the possibilities supervisory Committees have to discuss reserva-
tions and restrict their detrimental impact one should keep in mind that this will
be limited by the very nature of the reporting procedure. This process of supervi-
sion, common to all four conventions dealt with, has its disadvantages. There is
an impressive backlog of reports not yet considered and an equally impressive list
of reports not yet received. Supervision is thus hardly ever based upon up-to-date
information. Moreover, the discussion with the government representative can
have major flaws. In practice the representative does not necessarily answer all
questions, replies are frequently based upon pick-and-choose. Consequently
questions about reservations may be put to the State, but need not be
a n s w e r e d - ' . -:••<•,.->*'•* :y»>-i.^ - ;>«,b^:•••&'•}- --stf}' - ^ n a i i S : - •'•>> t » ffew-;;f;ft»f^>^:-;-. . . : .>
As I see it, the supervisory organs have two important tasks with respect to
reservations. First of all, the Committees would be excellently qualified to
identify the potential scope of an interpretative declaration, thereby determining
the legal effect of such a declaration in accordance with article 2.l.d VCLT.
Similarly, they are in a position to distinguish between reservations and interpre-
tative declarations, following the rule laid down in the Belilos opinion of the
European Commission on Human Rights. While these are steps to identify the
legal effect of a particular statement, the second important task for a supervisory
organ is to monitor the scope of a reservation in practice. In particular, this
would seem to be an obligation following from the general nature of the reporting
procedure, seen together with the implied authority of the supervisory organs to
deal with reservations. A Committee should monitor if State practice remains
within the scope of the reservation, and is not extending the legal effect of their
reservation. Reservations should be interpreted narrowly. The "object and
purpose" rule when applied to human rights instruments is another forceful
argument for a restrictive interpretation of reservations.
It is advisable to discuss reservations as matters related to the implementation of
the substantive provisions of a treaty. Focusing on the substantive implications of
reservations is an approach in line with the substantive focus of the "object and
purpose" criterion. In order to get a grip on the reservations made, a Committee
should ask for clarification about the reasons for reservations, and invite States to
26. For example questions by the CERD Committee to the United Kingdom with respect to
its fourth report (CERD/C/SR.348, par.49; SR.349, par.8-19). with respect to the
combined tenth and eleventh report (CERD/C/SR.907. par.32 and par.53-60; SR.908,
par.1-33); or questions by the Human Rights Committee to Austria with respect to its
initial report (CCPR/C/SR.412. par.12-14; SR.413, par.18).
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motivate the reservations made*'. For example, without explicitly raising the
question of whether or not it had any authority, the Human Rights Committee
has, in a number of cases, raised the issue of compatibility in the discussions
about the periodic reports**. Thus reservations are an issue included in the
discussions, and the States Parties have rarely questioned this approach, or the
Committee's authority to raise the issue of reservations in this manner, jr ^ K r.
The transition of reservations from a mere formal indication of a provision
excluded, to an insight in the substance and scope of the reservation is a necess-
ary step to facilitate supervision. In order to turn the clarification of the precise
scope of the reservation into a structural step in the reporting procedure, the
Committees should therefore encourage such clarity by including, in their
guidelines on periodic reporting, the rule that reports should specify what
reservations (and interpretative declarations) have been made, how the reserva-
tions influence the implementation of the obligations and why it was necessary to
make these reservations. This would be a simple rule that has the advantage of
keeping the Committee informed, and at the same time may lead to a reconsider-
ation of the reservations made by the reserving state when compiling the report.
The recent practice of the supervisory organs shows an increasing interest in the
matter of reservations. States are already being questioned about their reserva-
tions during the discussions with a Committee. Consequently, such an explicit
requirement would be a logical development. This rule would formalize the
moment at which information is to be provided. From this perspective, the rule
would not change the existing practice very much.
On the basis of additional information about the reservations the Committees
might try to expand the constructive dialogue with the reserving State, so as to
seek solutions that may facilitate withdrawal of the reservation. This would
perhaps be a novel approach, but a proactive attitude seems necessary if there is
a genuine wish to reduce the detrimental impact of reservations to human rights
treaties.
The constructive dialogue between the State and the Committee would be
enhanced if the Committee would have information about the reservations made,
as well as a plan about how to discuss the reservations issue, making sure that
the States does indeed reply to the Committee's concern. Obviously such infor-
mation is available in such bulky book as "Multilateral treaties deposited with the
27. For example questions by the Human Rights Committee to Austria (CCPR/C/SR.412,
SR.413): questions by the Women's Committee to Bangladesh (CEDAW/C/SR.96) and
to Thailand (CEDAW/C/SR.156).
jfii: However, States can be reluctant to answer, see for instance the discussion between the
Human Rights Committee and the United Kingdom (CCPR/C/SR.857).
28. For example, with respect to the Australian reservation to articles 2.2, 3 and 50
(CCPR/C/SR.401; SR.402); the reservation by Trinidad and Tobago to article 4.2
•'•«• (CCPR/C/SR.555). However, the information is inconclusive, see for instance the
.£*• discussion about the Austrian reservations (CCPR/C/SR.U67), and the Committee's
A reluctance to pronounce on the compatibility issue.
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Secretary General^", published annually by the United Nations, but it could
hardly be called accessible information, and moreover it indicates little about the
impact a reservation will have on the domestic protection of human rights.
If increased attention for reservations during the discussions about the periodic
reports is to have any effect, is the lack of continuity that has transpired in the
practice considered in the previous chapters, needs to be addressed. It is striking
that States may suggest withdrawal of a reservation in one session and remain
completely silent about the withdrawal when the next report is discussed*. The
legal effect of the clarifications provided by the representative of the state in the
discussion with the Committee about the periodic reports must be clarified. This
is relevant when representatives indicate that their State will reconsider the
necessity of maintaining a particular reservation, and particularly relevant when a
representative predicts the withdrawal of a reservation when legislation has been
changed. The question must be raised whether these remarks could in any way
bind the State of the representative.
In answering this question, the starting point should be that the representative acts
on the authority of the state, and thus speaks in an official capacity". It must be
assumed that the discussions about the periodic reports have an ulterior goal,
other than merely fulfilling the formal reporting obligation under the convention.
The reporting system was set up to monitor the implementation of the obliga-
tions, and the constructive dialogue conducted with the state representatives
serves this end. Thus, if a representative indicates that in future his state will
extend its implementation, by withdrawing a reservation, this is not merely
relevant information for the supervisory Committee. It may in fact be a unilateral
obligation to withdraw the reservation in due course, based upon the intention
expressed by the representative to the Committee. To see it otherwise, by
considering the remark about withdrawal a mere suggestion would seem to
29. ST/LEG/SER.E/11. -^:'<*«» ^ *^*!'' *•*>''*".>*«sS>'h
30. For example the withdrawal of the Australian reservation to article 4 CERD, as
promised in the discussion about the first Australian report (CERD/C/SR.330, SR.335),
.. or the withdrawal of the Belgian reservation to articles 2, 3 and 25 CCPR (also to
\ ' article 7 CEDAW) as indicated in CCPR/C/SR.821, par.35, and completely non-existent
' ' in CCPR/C/SR.1143, par.57.
Another example of an intention to withdraw is the statement by Korea on its reserva-
tion to article 9 CEDAW. as mentioned to the Human Rights Committee (CCPR/C/S-
vw*».- R.1154, par.22). It is highly unlikely that this commitment will be noticed by the
Women's Committee.
31. Sometimes there is reason to doubt this. Cf.the much quoted remark by the Philippine
representative at the consideration of the first report on the Women's Convention,
• • t stating thai "their (women's, EL) best weapon was the way in which they dealt with
i ,' Philippine men. For that reason, there was no women's liberation movement, because if
they became involved in that type of confrontation, women would never obtain from
-•?>,;• men what they had been able to obtain from them in the past (CEDAW/C/SR.33,
par.13)-.
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devour the reporting procedure of all significance with respect to the implementa-
tion of a convention'*.
While a failing memory may be attributed to political considerations of a State
representative, such a deficient memory should not hamper the work of a super-
visory organ. It seems necessary that the continuity of the questioning and
thereby the consistency of the reporting procedure are improved. Though this is
foremost a task of the individual members of the supervisory organs, it stands to
reason that the UN Secretariat, servicing the supervisory Committees, has a
distinct role to play in this respect". Improving the institutional memory of the
Committee would, I suspect, contribute to a tighter grip on the reservations issue.
The potential criticism to a more pro-active approach is that reserving states will
claim, and indeed have claimed, that they were fully entitled to make reserva-
tions, and that the reservations have been accepted. In other words, the Commit-
tee should not interfere. The point to be made is that the Committee is not
assuming the authority to judge upon the validity, much less the compatibility, of
a reservation. It is acting as the guardian of the integral treaty, and as such it has
a task in promoting the integral acceptance of a treaty. Full insight into the
reasons for making reservations, and for maintaining them, could lead to a
fruitful discussion with the withdrawal of the reservation as the ulterior aim.
4.2.2. The individual complaints procedure ^rt tej JJ!*?;
With respect to the Optional Protocol to the CCPR, and the individual complaints
brought under articles 14 CERD or article 22 CAT, it should be noted that it is
possible to deal in greater detail with reservations under these procedures, than in
the reporting procedure. The focus can be on the precise impact of reservations
in individual cases, which may thus also provide relevant information to be used
in the reporting procedure. i3to«i-*.i; ¥« «>S;M '< ,*s& ?
The Human Rights Committee is the only supervisory organ to have dealt with
reservations in individual complaints so far. The Optional Protocol gives the
Human Rights Committee the possibility to restrict the scope of a reservation on
the basis of the object and purpose rule, used as an interpretation rule. The
Human Rights Committee should be monitoring whether the proposed scope of a
reservation is not greater than could legitimately be assumed on the basis of the
reservation made. Its practice might serve as a guideline for dealing with
reservations under article 14 CERD, article 22 CAT or a possible Optional
Protocol to the Women's Convention.
However, the way in which the Human Rights Committee has handled reserva-
tions and interpretative declarations under the Optional Protocol has not been
very convincing so far. In order to be able to act with agility under the Optional
Protocol, it is necessary that the HRC has a clear idea as to how and when a
reservation or interpretative declaration should be dealt with in the procedure. In
32. About this question see Lijnzaad, Teleurstellende vrijheid at 19. ;-y
33. Cf. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action; A/Conf. 157/23, Part II.A par.13-16.
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order to restrict the effect of reservations it is essential to understand if and how
the reservations will restrict the scope of protection. Looking at the two stages in
an individual complaints procedure the following would seem to be the right
approach.
In the admissibility stage all clearly defined reservations will lead to non-admissi-
bility if the plaintiff is relying on a provision that has been reserved. These
would in general be reservations that are formulated precisely, and clearly
indicate their scope. In case a state only made interpretative declarations, there
should be a marginal test to see whether the declaration could, within reason, fall
within the scope of article 2.l.d VCLT. If this is the case, and the declaration
should be understood as being a reservation, this would also lead to inadmissibil-
ity of the complaint.
However, if a State has made both reservations and declarations, the Belilos
situation, and a plaintiff relies on a provision with respect to which a declaration
has been made, there is no reason to declare such a complaint inadmissible. In a
Belilos situation the possibility that the interpretative declaration is indeed a
reservation does not exist, which invalidates this argument as a reason for
inadmissibility-'*.
The misinterpretation of the French declaration with respect to article 27 CCPR
as a reservation has led to inadmissibility in the numerous Breton cases, whereas
the Committee should in my opinion have been more precise and should have
applied the distinguishing approach. The way in which the Committee dealt with
the French interpretative declaration, allowed France to subjectively label its
declaration a reservation, whereas the Committee was in fact the one called upon
to establish objectively what the legal effect of the statement was. Understanding
the declaration as a mere interpretative declaration would probably have led to
the conclusion that the rights claimed by the Bretons (the language of roadsigns,
giro-cheques in Breton) were not protected under the Covenant, but that is a
different matter.
If there is any doubt about the compatibility of a particular reservation, this
would also be a valid reason not to dismiss a case, and look at it in greater detail
in the merits stage. Or, to put it differently: the Committee should declare such a
complaint admissible on the assumption that the State never meant to act contrary
to international law, which assumptions merits an in depth consideration in the
second stage". The discussion would then be about the scope of the reservation,
which as we have seen is in practice a matter to be dealt with in the admissibility
stage.
Reservations of which the scope could not be established /W;/M« /flCfV are dealt
with in the merits stage. As we have seen, the case of Diulio Fanalr* is an
example of uncertainty of the scope of the Italian reservation
34. Cf. the Individual Opinion of Committee-member Higgins in cases 220/1987 (T.K. v
France) and 222/1987 (M.K. v. France).
35. See about "object and purpose" as a rule for interpretation Chapter 2. par.4 supra.
36. See Chapter 5, par.3.2 supra.
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whereas the case of Ibrahima Gueye" is an example of uncertainty about the
scope of the French reservation raz/one tew/ranj; both cases were decided in the
stage of the merits.
While the Optional Protocol could be a useful method to challenge the validity of
interpretative declarations as reservations, or to question the scope of reserva-
tions, this all depends on the procedural ingenuity of the claimants. To my mind
the cases of the Breton were badly handled, which may have had an impact
reaching further than merely the question of the French "interpretative declar-
ation" to article 27 CCPR. The declaration has, with the consent of the Commit-
tee, become an established reservation. Thus, while there is a theoretical possibil-
ity for the supervisory organs to reduce the scope of reservations and declarations
in the individual complaints procedure, this requires a great deal of agility and
insight into the law of treaties aspects of the matter.
4.3. The application of the "object and purpose" rule
The interpretation of reservations instantly brings up the question of what the
object and purpose of a particular human rights treaty is. The "object and
purpose" notion can only play a meaningful role if an attempt is made to make its
content operational. "Object and purpose" must be a rule with substance in order
to be of any use. It is necessary to determine the substantive content of the rule.
Apart from the role that legal scholars might play in this respect, it would seem
that the supervisory organs would be in the best position to undertake steps to
make "object and purpose" operational with respect to human rights treaties.
As I see it, it is necessary to distinguish between all the obligations in a conven-
tion and the core obligations, in order to be able to apply the object and purpose
rule. This is in itself an approach which is somewhat unusual in human rights
law, and for which no tools exist. In the third chapter some tentative suggestions
are made for approaches that might be used in this process of distinguishing. It
has been suggested that the relevance of human rights law, and its functioning
within the domestic legal order could be a yardstick; that general requirements of
the law of treaties such as the precision of obligations and the acceptance of
obligations by a federal state might be a criterion; furthermore fundamental rules
of human rights law, such as non-derogable rights and the non-discrimination rule
could be used in determining the core character of an obligation. Finally it was
suggested that considerations concerning the ways and means of implementing
human rights obligations could play a role in this respect. Apart from these four
categories that might facilitate distinguishing between core and non-core obliga-
tions it should be noticed that a number of other reservations are also prohibited,
albeit not under the object and purpose rule. The inadmissibility of reservations
contrary to /us coge/w, or contrary to the Charter of the United Nations is not
based upon the law of treaties, but follows from general international law.
37. See Chapter 5, par.3.2 supra.
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Another avenue that should be explored by the supervisory Committees is that of
the relevance of co-existing human rights instruments. An increasing number of
human rights instruments contains rights covered by different instruments, and, in
a number of cases, reservations have been made with respect to a right in one
treaty whereas a similar right under another treaty has been accepted without
reservation. This, it seems to me, is relevant information for the supervisory
organs. On the basis of their expert knowledge, the obvious question to ask
would be how a reservation should be understood given the fact that the right had
not been restricted under another instrument; or vice versa how a right would be
implemented given the fact that a reservation had been made under another
instrument. In using the coherence approach the underlying assumption is that it
is contrary to the "object and purpose" of any human rights treaty to limit the
scope of another human rights treaty through the use of reservations. The
International Bill of Rights must be understood as a coherent and integral system
of human rights law. Coherence is also the gist of provisions underlining the
priority of the rule affording the best protection'*. The strength of an approach
based upon the coherence of human rights law lies in the fact that reservations
will be judged by the standards set by the reserving States themselves^'. These
are fairly obvious questions, based upon the assumption that States should ideally
have non-conflicting international obligations. Though there is no explicit rule to
that effect, it does not seem far fetched to look upon international human rights
law as a coherent set of rules. On the basis of that coherence, some penetrating
questions might be asked of reserving States that happen to have incongruent
treaty obligations. As indicated earlier this is an approach that may be particular-
ly useful with respect to the reservations to the Women's Convention.
Focusing on the "object and purpose rule", it would seem that a more extensive
interpretation of this rule is needed. While article 19.c VCLT is merely known as
an obligation to be kept when making a reservation, it can also be read as a
presumption and consequently function as a rule used for the interpretation of
reservations. Using the presumption that a reservation is compatible with object
and purpose will lead to a restrictive interpretation of the scope of the reserva-
tion.
38. Such as article 5.2 CCPR or article 23 CEDAW.
39. Cf. the Mexican objections to reservations to the Women's Convention, which elabo-
rates on other related human rights provisions, and concludes:"Consequently, it is
i/icomiuftvi/ H7/A //IMC co/in-acH/a/ o6/i£tf»o/is previously assumn/ by ... /or i'« Goivntmc/fr
/IOH' ro r/ai/n /Aa/if Aas nscrvafioiM; on //ir sa/nc si<6/'«7 <jo<w/r //if 7979 Co/nwifio/i." And
similarly, remarks by CEDAW Committee-member Hie in respect of the initial report by
the United Kingdom: "She would be interested to know whether the United Kingdom
Government had entered reservations to the corresponding articles of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, / / J O , J/N: HV/IO/ /O AMOK- H7I«/KT I/IC con/cnf o/
fAc rcnmwfio/M /o rtc /mcrnario/ia/ Coivna/if Km i/ic «I/HC «/;</, 1//10/, wAy no/." (CEDA-
W/C/SR.155. par.65).
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5. A DRAFT RESERVATIONS CLAUSE
With respect to future human rights instruments, the most obvious advise is that a
reservations clause should be included. This is nothing new, the same suggestion
was made by the General Assembly when discussing reservations to the Genocide
Convention, and it is included in General Assembly Resolution 598(V1). The
foregoing overview of reservations to four UN treaties suggests that a reserva-
tions clause could have prevented the detrimental impact of reservations. In
particular, it is striking that although there was an awareness that it was necess-
ary to include a reservations clause into the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, this eventually did not materialize*. The problems that might be over-
come by not having long discussions about a reservations clause, are likely to
come back like a boomerang once a treaty without a reservations clause is ratified
with reservations. Thus a reservations clause is necessary.
Reservations clauses such as article 20 CERD need not be copied, as practice has
proved that this has not been of much use in practice. The flaw in this provision
is the fact that there is an assumption that States will be active, and will indeed
object to reservations contrary to object and purpose. Had this been the case,
then the provision might have worked, but it appears that the assumption about
the activity of States was wrong to begin with. Moreover the fact that the norm
in article 20 CERD, is a relative norm, implying an ever increasing number of
necessary objections with the increase of the number of States Parties. The
reservations rule in article 28 CEDAW has not been a success either, as it copied
a system that was designed by the Court in the Genocide case, and codified in the
Vienna Convention without actually wondering whether this was a rule that would
adequately protect the object and purpose of the Women's Convention. In sum, if
a future convention would be drafted along the model of the treaties studied, that
is with a similar supervisory structure, the rule on reservations should be
different from the ones discussed above.
After thoroughly criticizing the existing rules on reservations to human rights
treaties, it may be expected from the author that she would present a suggestion
as to how a reservations clause should look like. Given the absence of a tight
supervisory structure, similar to the supervision under the European Convention
or the American Convention, the reservations clause should be simple enough to
be monitored by the depository. This means that the States Parties will have to
indicate which provisions are core obligations to be protected by the reservations
clause, as only an explicit indication makes it possible for the depository to
monitor reservations. A further requirement, to my mind, should be that reserva-
tions are restricted to matters of existing legislation conflicting with the standards
set in the human rights instrument. This should in itself narrow the ambit of the
reservation. And finally, I suggest that reservations will in future be considered
40. GA Res.546 (VI).
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temporary exceptions from the validity of treaty provisions. Reservations once
made remain on the books, and a way to change their continued existence may be
to see reservations as a temporary step. In other words, if a State would like to
maintain a reservation after an initial period of time, it will have to take action on
a regular basis as the reservation will otherwise lapse.
A reservations clause could be formulated like this:
/4.7 - /terervfl/Zo/w /o ar/Zc/e(^ *** are pro/jZoZ/eo".
- /4/ //;e //Vne 0/ j/g/j/'/tg, ra/Z/yZ/ig, or acra/Z/ig, awy State way aec/are
//?a/ // does wo/ co/tv/aYr Z/.S-C//6OM«</ 6y ar/Zrfcfo) ***.
or
/o ar/ZcfcY-s,) ***•
- ,4/ //?<' ///we o/j/gn/Mg, ra///^/«g, or acm/Zwg, awy 5/n/e way aec/are
//?«/ // «Y>ej «o/ comv'aVr Z/se/f DOW/K/ £v flr//c/eA" 0///7/.V Co«ve«//o/j o//ier
//»«/; ar/Zc/eftJ **** o«/y.
- /4w_y 5m/e mfly o«(y /woAre fl rejervn/Zo/j Z^w acco;r/n«ct' wZ//» //ie_/bre-
go/'wg /;<7rngrfl/j/j^, /o //?«• fjr/p«/ ///«/ « /«vv /'// /<«•«' ZJ WO/ /« co/j/br/wZ/y
rejfrva/Zo/i ^/jfl// cow/rtZw n /»ne/"w«/f/we/i/ o///»e /aw concerwerf.
va/Zrf/or
0 / //»<• va/ZrfZ/y 0 / a re^ervrt/Zo;/ i7/«//
wo/{/7«i//o« /o //je rfe/WA'Z/ory, /Aree /WO«//?A- ie^jre ///<' « / 0 /
year* /wrZorf «/ //?
Paragra/7/1 4 (]4./ or A.2). As indicated before, a reservations clause containing
a precise yardstick as to the acceptability of reservations is to be preferred over a
vague provision (such as a rule pointing to object and purpose) or no rules at all.
Thus the rule drawn up in basically modelled on article 19.a and 19.b VCLT. To
my mind both options could be used.
When listing the provisions to which reservations are allowed, or when listing the
provisions to which reservations are explicitly forbidden, States are supposed to
take into account the object and purpose of the treaty. It may be suggested that at
least the non-derogable rights, if the treaty would contain such rights, and the
provisions that establish the supervisory mechanism will be safeguarded by a
reservations clause.
Paragraphs B anrf C. These two provisions are modelled on the rule laid down
in article 64 ECHR, in which the scope of reservations is restricted to defi-
ciencies of existing law, in comparison with the standard set by the European
Convention. The complementary obligation to provide information on the law that
prevents full adherence to the treaty has been of vital importance in case-law with
respect to reservations under the European Convention.
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It has been suggested that the importance of factual information, as stressed by
article 64 ECHR, is directly related to the importance of individual complaints in
the European system. Be this as it may, this information would seem to have a
wider importance. With its focus on human rights in the domestic situation, such
information is equally necessary for the supervisory organs at world-level.
Information about legislation related to reservations will give the supervisory
organs more possibilities of getting a grip on the issue. With such background
information the constructive dialogue between States and supervisory organ may
lead to a more proactive approach of the Committee, in suggesting solutions
leading to the withdrawal of the reservations. In time the supervisory organ may
focus its attention on the factual situation behind the legal situation, and wonder
if new legislation could be enacted in order to withdraw the reservation.
Aira£ra/;Jis Z> am/ £ . One of the disadvantages of the European system has been
that once a reservation is on the books, it hardly ever disappears. This is in
general also the case with respect to UN human rights treaties, although the
periodic discussions with the States Parties provide a possibility to stress the need
for the withdrawal of a reservation. Yet, withdrawals are rare, and even when
States admit that there is no need to maintain a particular reservation, they
remain on the books for failure of the States parties concerned to withdraw.
The (sunset) provision I envisage has the advantage of being simplistic, and
probably useful. It is based on the assumption that a reservation has a limited
validity, which will give the reserving State the opportunity to change its domes-
tic legislation in the meantime. It should be noticed that the advocates of reser-
vations, saying that reservations will bring the reserving State within the ambit of
the treaty which will eventually lead to a withdrawal of the reservation, argue on
the basis of the same assumption. The validity of the reservation can be
extended, or renewed so to say, by notifying the depository of the extension of
the validity. Thus, if no extended validity is notified, the reservation will be
extinct.
This rule bears a similarity with the system of denunciation of ILO Conventions,
in which States may only denounce a Convention after the expiration of ten
years, and if no denunciation is notified it will be bound for another ten years. In
my proposal, no notification means the disappearance of the reservation. This
mechanism is more or less comparable with article 20.5 VCLT, and the rule of
tacit acceptance formulated therein, which as we know has been extremely
successful (sic). The indifference and inertia of States with respect to reservations
is striking, and the rule formulated under E may turn this into an advantage.
6. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Originally, at the very beginning of the study that was to lead to this book, I had
the impression that the gist of the problem of reservations to human rights
treaties was the fact that incompatible reservations ought not to be made, or
should be withdrawn as soon as possible. Some of the reservations ruin the
potential impact of treaty at the very moment of ratification, which is undesirable
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by any means. It hardly needs stressing that this is still my opinion, but looking
back it was also too simplistic a view.
At the conclusion of this book, it would seem that there are more means of
restricting the detrimental impact of reservations than I initially thought. Restor-
ing the ruins created by the incompatible reservations is possible to a certain
extent, but it will largely depend on the agility of the supervisory organs dealing
with reservations. I am not talking about a formal authority for the Committees to
decide upon compatibility, but about the ways in which to restrict the impact of
reservations in the ongoing human rights debate, as takes place with respect to
the four instruments discussed.
A synthesis between the fundamentally different aims and structure of the law of
treaties and human rights law is hard to construct, and this would propably be a
very ambitious goal. At the end of this book, I would like to suggest that taking
reservations to human rights treaties to be temporary measures rather than a
formal and final element in the consent to be bound by a particular treaty, opens
the way to finding proactive strategies of dealing with reservations. The issue of
reservations should be taken up in the dynamic process of human rights evalu-
ation, in which the safeguarding of human rights is continually improved. In
order to be able to respond in a coherent and successful way to reservations made
to UN human rights treaties two things are of primordial importance: the general
rule of the "object and purpose" should be interpreted within the scope of the
individual human rights treaty. In order to turn it into an operational rule, it is
necessary to understand its substantive content. Moreover, the role of the
supervisory Committees should be expanded; rather than merely monitoring the
implementation of the human rights instruments, they should more actively
pursue their implicit role as the guardians of a convention.
While it may look as though incompatible reservations will definitely ruin the
potential impact of a human rights instrument, I have come to the conclusion that
there are mechanisms available within the human rights system to limit the
impact of reservations. Tools to restore such ruins do exist, and it is about time
that this work began.
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SUMMARY IN DUTCH (SAMENVATTING) : J,
Voorbehouden bij VN mensenrechtenverdragen: ratificeren en rulneren?
Dit boek stelt het maken van voorbehouden bij mensenrechtenverdragen, tot
stand gekomen binnen de Verenigde Naties, ter discussie. De vraag is hoe het
international recht reageert op het schijnbaar tegenstrijdige gedrag van staten,
die bij het ratificeren van een verdrag tegelijkertijd de gelding van een deel van
het verdrag uitsluiten. Ratificatie van een verdrag gaat gepaard met het
uitsluiten van de gelding van een of meer bepalingen voor de voorbehoudende
staat.
Voorbehouden treffen vaak vitale bepalingen, zoals de Arabische Republiek
Jemen die de gelding van grondrechten als godsdienstvrijheid, en het recht te
huwen uitsloot bij de ratificatie in 1989 van het Rassendiscriminatieverdrag.
Dat is op z'n minst raadselachtig gedrag, omdat het Rassendiscriminatieverdrag
beoogt mensenrechten zonder onderscheid naar ras te garanderen. Blijkbaar is
dat in Noord Jemen niet het geval. Een vergelijkbaar probleem doet zich voor
bij het voorbehoud van Bangladesh bij het Vrouwenverdrag, waarin deze staat
te kennen geeft het verdrag overeenkomstig het Islamitisch Sharia recht uit te
voeren. Dat leidt direct tot de vraag in hoeverre het verdrag vrouwen in
Bangladesh zal kunnen beschermen tegen vrouwendiscriminatie.
Dit zijn slechts twee voorbeelden die het probleem illustreren: het ratificeren
van een mensenrechtenverdrag suggereert een verbetering in de bescherming
van de rechten van burgers, maar vergaande voorbehouden doen daar aan af.
In gewoon Nederlands gezegd: kan dat zo maar? Daar gaat het hier om.
In dit boek komt het probleem van de voorbehouden op twee verschillende
manieren aan de orde. Allereerst wordt in de hoofdstukken twee en drie
gekeken naar de theoretische, technisch-juridische kant van de zaak. Daarna
volgt in de hoofdstukken vier tot en met zeven een analyse van de praktijk van
vier VN mensenrechtenverdragen.
//er //icorefwc/i frode/; dec/ // j i ja*
Het recht met betrekking tot voorbehouden
De oorsprong van het moderne recht met betrekking tot voorbehouden is te
vinden in het Advies van het Internationaal Cierechtshof over voorbehouden bij
het Genocide verdrag uit 1951. Aan het Hof werd de vraag voorgelegd of het
niet aanvaarden door de overige partijen van een voorbehoud van een ratifice-
rende staat er toe kon leiden dat die laatste staat in relatie tot sommige staten
partij bij het Genocide verdrag werd, maar niet in relatie tot de staten die
bezwaar hadden gemaakt tegen het voorbehoud. De uitspraak van het Hof
komt er op neer dat bij het beoordelen van de rechtmatigheid van een voorbe-
houd, en bij het overwegen van een bezwaar "doel en strekking" van het ver-
drag de maatstaf moeten zijn. Hoewel het Hof z'n antwoord op de vraag
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nadrukkelijk beperkt tot de Genocide Conventie, heeft deze uitspraak grote
gevolgen gehad.
"Doel en strekking" als maatstaf voor het maken van voorbehouden is sindsdien
gezien als de algemeen geldende regel. Zo is dat nooit bedoeld door het Hof
naar ik meen, en bovendien wordt daarmee over het hoofd gezien dat de
vanzelfsprekendheid van deze regel ook te danken is aan het heldere "doel en
strekking" van het Genocide verdrag. Dit verdrag bestrijdt een probleem, in de
latere mensenrechtenverdragen komt een groot aantal problemen aan de orde,
waardoor de onduidelijkheid van "doel en strekking" als onderscheidend
criterium spoedig zichtbaar wordt.
De regels met betrekking tot voorbehouden in het Verdragenverdrag worden
besproken*'. Artikel 2 lid 1 onder d geeft aan dat onder een voorbehoud
wordt verstaan "een eenzijdige verklaring, ongeacht haar bewoording of haar
benaming afgelegd door een Staat wanneer hij een verdrag ondertekent,
bekrachtigt, aanvaardt of goedkeurt of daartoe toetreedt, waarbij hij te kennen
geeft het rechtsgevolg van zekere bepalingen in hun toepassing met betrekking
tot deze Staat uit te sluiten of te wijzigen." Hieruit blijkt dat het beoogde
rechtsgevolg van een verklaring bepaalt of er sprake is van een voorbehoud,
ongeacht het etikct dat daaraan hangt. Met deze formulering is bedoeld de
onduidelijkheid rond de zogeheten interpretatieve verklaringen te weg te
nemen. In de praktijk wordt, onder het mom van interpretatie door verdrags-
partijen, een beperkende uitleg aan een verdrag te geven. Als de intentie van
zo'n verklaring is de reikwijdte van het verdrag te beperken, is er blijkens
artikel 2.1.d dus sprake van een voorbehoud. Omdat dergelijke verklaringen
geen voorbehouden heten is het andere staten evenwel vaak niet duidelijk dat
hierop eventueel door middel van een formed bezwaar zou moeten worden
gereageerd.
Het verdragenrecht kent drie verschillende regimes ten aanzien van voorbehou-
den waarvan artikel 19.c, bedoeld voor verdragen die zelf geen specifieke
bepalingen kennen, grote problemen oplevert. Artikel 19.c geeft de regel uit
het Genocide Advies weer dat voorbehouden niet mogen strijden met "doel en
strekking" van het verdrag. Dit is een regel die door verdragspartijen zelf
gchandhaafd moet worden. Daartoe geeft arlikel 20.5 staten de termijn van een
jaar om bezwaar te maken tegen een voorbehoud. Het maken van bezwaar
heeft in dit systeem slechts tot gevolg dat geen verdragsrelaties worden
aangegaan als dc bezwaar makende staat de wens daartoe uitdrukkelijk te
kennen geeft aldus artikel 20.4.b. Het geen-bericht-goed-bericht systeem in
artikel 20.5 stimuleert de universele gelding van verdragen door zo min
mogelijk beperkingen te verbinden aan de gebondenheid van de voorbehouden-
de staat. Nadeel is dat de regel dat een voorbehoud niet mag strijden met "doel
en strekking" van het verdrag door de verdragspartijen gehandhaafd moet
41. Verdrag van Wenen inzake het Verdragenrecht, 23 mei 1969; Trb.1985,79.
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worden, wat niet direct een gedegen garantie is, temeer niet daar artikel 20.5
de stilzwijgende aanvaarding van voorbehouden als hoofdregel ziet.
Verder wordt ingegaan op de theoretische achtergrond van de "doel en strek-
king" regel. Daarbij komt de relatie met het beginsel van de goede trouw in
verdragsrelaties aan de orde en wordt de vraag gesteld hoe deze regel zich
verhoudt tot het principe er i/iyu/ia no/i onTur /us. Er wordt uitgebreid stil-
gestaan bij reciprociteit als drijvende kracht in het verdragenrecht, en de rol
die reciprociteit speelt bij voorbehouden. Tenslotte komen in dit hoofdstuk
vragen over de inter-temporele toepassing van het verdragenrecht aan de orde.
Voorbehouden bij mensenrechtenverdragen
Hoewel in dit boek de staten die voorbehouden maken doorgaans optreden in
de rol van snoodaard, wil dat niet zeggen dat voorbehouden onder alle omstan-
digheden verwerpelijk zijn. Bij voorbehouden is het afwijken van het verdrag
expliciet, en doorgaans rechtmatig. Staten die zonder voorbehouden ratificeren
maar het verdrag niet implementeren gedragen zich minstens even onjuist, al
zal dat minder zichtbaar zijn.
In dit derde hoofdstuk staat de vraag centraal hoe "doel en strekking" van een
mensenrechtenverdrag bepaald kan worden. Staten geven zelden aan wat de
kern is van het instrument dat tot stand gekomen is, en in dit hoofdstuk wordt
nagegaan hoe "doel en strekking" van een mensenrechtenverdrag te definieren.
Uitgangspunt is dat dit criterium een onderschcid tussen allc normen van het
verdrag en de kernbepalingen beoogd. Om die reden is een uitleg waarin "doel
en strekking" met de gehele normatieve inhoud van het verdrag wordt vereen-
zelvigd niet acceptabel, evenmin als de minimalistische lezing dat slechts de
regels van «« coge/is en bepalingen die tcvens in het Handvest van de Verenig-
de Naties te vinden zijn door de "doel en strekking" regel zullen worden
beschermd.
Bestudering van dit onderwerp leidt tot het voorstellen van een viertal invals-
hoeken die relevant zijn bij het maken van onderschcid tussen kernbepalingen
die op grond van de "doel en strekking" regel beschermd worden, en de overige
bepalingen waar dat niet voor geldt. Het belang van de codificatie van de
rechten van de mens kan mijns inziens worden gezien als een van de relevante
invalshoeken bij de bepaling van "doel en strekking". Dit betekent een beper-
king van het beroep op voorrang voor nationale wetgeving, en grenzen aan het
beperken van de supervisiemechanismen. Omdat het hier gaat om mensen-
rechtenbescherming op verdragsbasis, komt ook aan de verdragsvorm relevan-
tie toe: voorbehouden behoren essentiele regels van het verdragenrecht, zoals
de duidelijkheid van verdragsverplichtingen en de gelding van het verdrag op
alle niveaus in een bondsstaat, niet te ondermijnen. In relatie tot de inhoud van
een mensenrechtenverdrag wordt stil gestaan bij de betekenis van zogeheten
non-derogable rights en van het non-discriminatie beginsel als maatstaven ter
bepalingen van "doel en strekking". Als vierde punt komen de uitvoeringsmoda-
liteiten aan de orde, zoals het verschil tussen resultaatsverplichtingen en
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inspanningsverplichtingen, en de betekenis van /rovour prcf/wafo/ray bij een
dynamische rechtsgebied zoals de rechten van de mens dat zijn.
Na deze poging om "doel en strekking" van een mensenrechten verdrag te
schetsen wordt ingegaan op de mogelijkheden om op deze regel toe te zien.
Van belang voor de toezichthoudende comites is te beseffen dat "doel en
strekking" niet slechts een regel is geadresseerd aan staten die voorbehouden
maken, doch dat deze regel ook kan functioneren als een interpretatieregel.
Het komt er dan op neer dat staten verondersteld worden geen met "doel en
strekking strijdige voorbehouden te hebben gemaakt. Deze veronderstelling van
goede trouw houdt de mogelijkheid in een voorbehoud zeer restrictief uit te
leggen, doel-en-strekking conform te interpreteren. Deze uitleg van artikel 19.c
kan van groot praktisch belang zijn voor de toezichthoudende comites.
Ten onrechte wordt er in de literatuur weinig aandacht besteed aan de onder-
linge samenhang tussen de verschillende mensenrechtenverdragen. Het feit dat
deze verdragen vaak parallelle bepalingen bevatten, kan van groot belang zijn
bij het beperken van de reikwijdte van voorbehouden. Staten zijn dikwijls niet
bijzonder consistent in het maken van voorbehouden en beperken een recht in
het ene verdrag door middel van een voorbehoud, terwijl inhoudelijk dezelfde
bepaling in een ander verdrag niet geclausuleerd is. Voor de toezichthoudende
comites kan dit een uitgangspunt zijn voor een discussie met de voorbehouden-
de staat op basis van de veronderstelling dat staten coherente verdragsverplich-
tingen hebben. Dat betekent concreet dat een gewraakt voorbehoud, dat niet
overeenstemt met inhoudelijke overeenkomende verplichtingen onder een
ander verdrag, op basis van de regel dat aan de beste bescherming van de
rechten van de mens de voorrang toekomt, naar de achtergrond verdwijnt.
Verondersteld mag worden dat door een dergelijke aanpak door de comites
het negatieve effect van een aantal voorbehouden beperkt kan worden.
Bij de ontwikkeling van de rechten van de mens spcclt het streven naar
universele gelding een belangrijke rol. In het Advies over het Genocideverdrag
was de kwestie van universaliteit en integriteit ook aan de orde. Het gaat
hierbij om het idee dat het verstandig is voorbehouden te aanvaarden opdat de
kring van verdragspartijen zo groot mogelijk zal zijn en dus ook de reikwijdte
van de bescherming die een verdrag beoogt te bieden zo groot mogelijk zal
zijn; of juist anderzijds vast te houden aan het integrale verdrag en het hoge
niveau van bescherming daarin. Bij het benadrukken van universaliteit is de
beperking van de bescherming door middel van voorbehouden in zeker zin de
prijs voor de universele gelding van het verdrag.
Hoe juist het streven naar universele gelding van mensenrechtenverdragen op
zichzelf ook mag zijn, een blik op de getallen is onthullend. Het uitermate
liberale beleid met betrekking tot voorbehouden heeft er niet toe geleid dat de
vier verdragen waar de aandacht naar is uitgegaan ook inderdaad universeel
geratificeerd zijn. Het is, met ander woorden twijfelachtig of met inhoudelijke
concessies, inderdaad een grotere participatie bewerkstelligd wordt. „,. .>„.,„,„
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Ook wordt in dit hoofdstuk kort gekeken naar de regels en de praktijk met
betrekking tot voorbehouden bij twee regionale mensenrechten verdragen: het
Europese Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens^ en het Inter-Amcrikaans
Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens^.
Binnen het kader van het EVRM wordt aandacht besteed aan de uitspraken in
de Temeltasch en Belilos zaken. Met name de uitspraak van de Commissie in
de Belilos zaak is mijns inziens van groot belang voor het beoordelen van het
rechtskarakter van interpretatieve verklaringen. In aanvulling op de dcfinitie in
artikel 2 lid 1 onder d Verdragenverdrag is de Commissie van oordeel dat in
het geval een staat zowel voorbehouden als interpretatieve verklaringen heeft
gemaakt, er in het algemeen van uit mag word en gegaan dat dit onderscheid
verbindend is. Deze uitspraak is in feite een herhaling van de regel dat niet ge-
interpreteerd behoeft te worden wat duidelijk is. Deze uitspraak kan een
aanknopingspunt zijn bij de schifting tussen de voorbehouden en interpretatieve
verklaringen waaraan (lang na hun formulering) door de betrokken staat het
karakter van een voorbehoud wordt toegedicht.
Twee Inter-Amerikaanse zaken met betrekking tot voorbehouden worden be-
sproken. De eerste zaak over de gevolgen van voorbehouden wijst op de
wenselijkheid de inwerkingtreding van een verdrag waarbij voorbehouden zijn
gemaakt, niet uit te stellen voor de voorbehoudende staat tot na het verstrijken
van de een-jaars termijn waarin bezwaren kunnen worden gemaakt, als het
betreffende voorbehoud compatibel is. De zaak over de doodstraf in Guate-
mala handelt over voorbehouden bij non-derogable rights. Interpretatie van de
bepaling getroffen door het voorbehoud leidt tot de vaststelling dat hel doel
van de bepaling de beperking van de doodstraf is, terwijl het voorbehoud de
doodstraf uitbreidt. De relevante bepaling is een non-derogable right, wat
volgens het Hof in principe betekent dat het voorbehoud strijdt met "doel en
strekking".
//ef o/idcrzoefc vo/i de /vaM/fc, dee/ ///
Hierna volgt een omvangrijk onderzoek naar de praktijk onder vier verschillen-
de mensenrechtenverdragen die in het kader van de Verenigde Naties tot stand
zijn gekomen: het Rassendiscriminatieverdrag, het Verdrag inzake Burger-
rechten en Politieke Rechten, het Vrouwenverdrag en het Folteringenverdrag.
De keus is op deze verdragen gevallen omdat het VN verdragen zijn en unN
versaliteit van de bescherming van de rechten van de mens het centrale
onderzoeksthema van de projectgroep mensenrechten van de Rijksuniversiteit
Limburg is. De vier verdragen zijn aan de hand van een standaard schema
geanalyseerd, wat een vergelijking mogelijk maakt. Een ander voordeel van
deze standarisering is dat praktijk onder het ene verdrag gebruikt zouden
kunnen worden onder het andere verdrag. Dit is overigens ook een van de
conclusies van dit proefschrift: er wordt door de toezichthoudende organen veel
42. Rome, 4 november 1950; Trb. 1951, 154.
43. San Jose. 22 november 1969.
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te weinig gebruik gemaakt van de ervaringen en ontwikkelingen tussen de
mensenrechtenverdragen onderling, terwijl dat juist voor wat betreft het
bestrijden van verstrekkende voorbehouden van groot belang zou kunnen zijn.
Voorbehouden bij het Rassendiscriminatieverdrag"
Het Rassendiscriminatieverdrag is het oudste verdrag dat in dit boek aan de
orde komt. In 1965 tot stand gekomen bevat het een bepaling met betrekking
tot voorbehouden: artikcl 20 bepaalt dat er geen voorbehouden gemaakt
mogen worden in strijd met "doel en strekking" van het verdrag. Aan de hand
van bezwaren van tweederde van de vcrdragspartijen die drie maanden de tijd
hebben om hun bezwaar te uiten, wordt deze incompatibiliteit vastgesteld. In
het geval tweederde van de verdragspartijen bezwaar maakt, kan de voorbehou-
dende staat het voorbehoud aanpassen dan wel intrekken, of besluiten in het
geheel geen partij worden.
Op het eerste gezicht is dit een bruikbare regel: het verdrag formuleert zelf
een regime dat van toepassing zal zijn op de voorbehouden. Bij nader beschou-
wing is het oordeel minder positief: de regel hanteert een relatief getalscrite-
rium en een tijdlimiet die beide het kritiekloos aanvaarden van voorbehouden
in de hand werken. De termijn van drie maanden lijkt vooral geschreven voor
imaginaire ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken die alle prioriteit kunnen geven
aan een voorbehoud bij het Rassendiscriminatieverdrag. Zelfs de termijn van
een jaar uit artikel 20.5 Verdragenverdrag blijkt, ter vergelijking, in de praktijk
regelmatig overschrcden te worden. Belangrijker is dat de tweederde meerder-
heid een relatief criterium is: het absolute aantal staten dat bezwaar moet
maken opdat incompatibiliteit wordt vastgesteld neemt toe naarmate het aantal
verdragspartijen groeit. Gezien de geringe animo die er in het algemeen
bestaat om bezwaar te maken leidt dit tot de slotsom dat de procedure van
artikel 20 in de praktijk weinig kan betekenen. En inderdaad bleek dit nog
onlangs het geval met een verstrekkend voorbehoud van Jemen, dat bij gebrek
aan voldoende bezwaren verondersteld moet worden compatibel te zijn.
Voorbehouden bij het Verdrag inzake Rurgerrechten en Politieke Rechten***'f»fc
Dit algemene mensenrechtenverdrag kent geen specifieke bepaling met
betrekking tot voorbehouden. Het (eerste) Facultatieve Protocol met betrek-
king tot het individueel klachtrecht evenmin. Daarom zal de regeling van
artikel 19.c Verdragenverdrag van toepassing zijn. Gesuggereerd wordt dat
deze regel met name non-derogable rights en het non-discriminatiebeginsel zal
beschermen. Ook het uitgangspunt dat het verdrag in de nationale rechtsorde
geimplementeerd moet worden mag tot "doel en strekking" gerekend worden.
Het tweede Facultatieve Protocol ter uitbanning van de doodstraf kent in
artikel 2 een bepaling over voorbehouden, waardoor ten aanzien van dit
44. Internationaal Verdrag inzake de Uitbanning van Alle Vormen van Rassendiscriminatie,
7 maart 1966; Trb.1967, 48.
45. Internationaal Verdrag inzake Burgerrechtcn en Politieke Rechlen, 19 december 1966; '•*
Trb.1978. 177.
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Protocol artikel 19.b Verdragenverdrag van toepassing is. Waarschijnlijk
onbewust zegt artikel 6.2, dat eerst stelt dat artikel 1.1 van het tweede Protocol
een non-derogable right is, tegelijkertijd dat voorbehouden toelaatbaar zijn. Dit
betekent dat in dit geval een voorbehoud bij een non-derogable right mogelijk
is, wat onwenselijk geacht moet worden.
Van het individueel klachtrecht onder het facultatieve Protocol is uitgebreid
gebruik gemaakt. In dat verband kwamcn voorbehouden en ook interpretatieve
verklaringen aan de orde. Een analyse van de zaken waarin het Mensenrecht-
encomite zich over voorbehouden boog, wijst uit dat teveel wordt uitgegaan van
de visie van de voorbehoudende staat met voorbijgaan aan dc mogelijkheid dat
het comite zelf een oordeel velt over het rechtsgevolg van een bepaalde
verklaring. Met name in de Bretonsc zaken geeft het comite blijk van een
gebrekkig inzicht in het verdragenrecht en de Belilos jurisprudentie. Bepleit
wordt een helder onderscheid te maken tussen welke vragen in de ontvanke-
lijksfase, en welke vragen bij de inhoudelijke bespreking aan de orde moeten
komen. Concreet betekent dat de suggestie dat het Mensenrechtencomitd
nauwkeuriger zou moeten handelen in gevallen waarin voorbehouden aan de
orde zijn. In de ontvankelijkheidsfase zouden slechts duidelijke voorbehouden
tot niet-ontvankelijk verklaring kunnen leiden. Voorbehouden met een onduide-
lijke reikwijdte (naar tijd, persoon of inhoud) behoren in de volgende fase aan
de orde te komen. Interpretatieve verklaringen kunnen in geval er door
dezelfde staat tevens voorbehouden zijn gemaakt (een Belilos situatie) evenmin
tot niet-ontvankelijkheid leiden.
Voorbehouden bij het Vrouwenverdrag**
Bezorgdheid over de verstrekkcnde gevolgen van voorbehouden bij het Vrou-
wenverdrag heeft aan de basis van dit proefschrift gelegen. Het in 1982 tot
stand gekomen verdrag trad betrekkelijk snel in werking, en een indrukwek-
kend aantal staten ratificeerde. Het aantal voorbehouden is even indruk-
wekkend, sterker nog het lijkt alsof er weinig overblijft van het beschermings-
bereik van het verdrag als de inhoud van de voorbehouden in ogenschouw
wordt genomen.
Het meest in het oog springende probleem zijn de voorbehouden die verwijzen
naar de voorrang van Islamitische Sharia recht. Drie mogelijke juridische
argumentaties worden aangevoerd om een antwoord te geven op deze verstrek-
kende voorbehouden: een verwijzing naar de regel /wefo Jimf senwida en het
contractsbegrip in het Islamitisch recht; het verbod om met een beroep op
nationaal recht voorbij te gaan aan internationaal recht; en het probleem van
de botsende grondrechten, in dit geval de vrijheid van godsdienst en cultuur in
conflict met het recht op vrijwaring van vrouwendiscriminatie.
Het grote aantal verstrekkende voorbehouden heeft in de literatuur tot
discussie geleid over de wijze waarop dit probleem opgelost zou moeten
'•'. -'it-" s i- '. i W'fsTv-J
46. Verdrag inzake de Uitbanning van alle Vormen van Discriminatie van Vrouwen, New
York 18 december 1979; Trb.1991,134.
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worden. Het is, indachtig het Verdragenverdrag, niet aan het comite zich uit te
spreken over de compatibiliteit. Op verzoek van verdragspartijen heeft de
Secretaris Generaal de visies van staten over het probleem van de voorbehou-
den geinventariseerd. Het onderwerp heeft een tijdje op de agenda van de
bijeenkomst van de verdragspartijen gestaan, wat weinig opleverde. De ge-
dachte de vraag over de compatibiliteit voor te leggen aan het Internationaal
Gerechtshof moet als gevaarlijk van de hand gewezen worden. Bepleit wordt
dat het comite het verbod in strijd met "doel en strekking" te handelen opvat
als interpretatieregel wat tot een restrictieve uitleg van vergaande voorbehou-
den moet leiden. Ook moet het comite zich meer bewust zijn van de moge-
lijkheid terug te grijpen op eerdere discussies met verdragspartijen, en aldus
benadrukken dat de toezegging voorbchouden in te zullen trekken verplichtin-
gen schept.
Voorbehouden bij het Folteringenverdrag^ •
Van de bestudeerde verdragen is het Folteringenverdrag het meest recent in
werking getreden. Met het Oostduitse voorbehoud ten aanzicn van de financie-
ring van de supervisiemethoden, kwam een aantal problemen van groot theore-
tisch belang aan het licht. Door de beperking van de betalingsverplichting in de
vorm van een voorbehoud, rees de vraagt of dit niet tegelijkertijd tot een
uitbreiding van de vcrplichtingen voor de overige verdragspartijen zou leiden,
wat niet alleen ongewenst is maar theoretisch ook onmogelijk is. Het Oost-
duitse financieringsvoorbehoud was een opmerkelijk voorbeeld van een van de
weinige gevallen waarin de verdragsverplichtingen onder een mensenrechten-
verdrag in elkaar grijpen in tegenstelling tot de doorgaans afwezige materiele
reciprociteit.
Het Oostduitse voorbehoud, maar ook een verstrekkend Chileens voorbehoud
leidden tot ongekend veel bezwaren, wat aangeeft dat bezwaren nog niet een
definitief vergeten instrument van het verdragenrecht zijn.
Het herstellen van de rulnes
In het slothoofdstuk wordt aangegeven hoe om te gaan met de voorbehouden
opdat die een beperkt negatief effect hebben. Allereerst wordt teruggeblikt op
een aantal essentiele vragen. Zo komen opnieuw de kwestie van de univer-
saliteit, en het feit dat voorbehouden niet onder alle omstandigheden verwerpe-
lijk zijn aan de orde.
Het onderzoek heeft uitgewezen dat een belangrijke oorzaak van het probleem
ligt in de gebrekkige correlatie tussen het verdragenrecht en de mensenrechten.
Beide rechtsgebieden functioneren op basis van verschillende normatieve
systemen, en ook de mechanismen die naleving stimuleren zijn fundamenteel
47. Verdrag tegen Foltering en andere wrede, onmenselijke of onterende behandeling of
bestraffing, 10 december 1984; Trb.1985,69. ,.-,».,,,-;i ,*,-. i ,;T,I.OTJ!. « ,>u. r
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verschillend. Eigen belang als essentiele stimulans voor de handhaving van de
"doel en strekking" regel door verdragspartijen ontbreekt vaak bij mensen-
rechtenverdragen waar de voorbehouden vooral de burgers in de voorbehou-
dende staat zullcn treffen. Niet alleen is het maken van bezwaar daardoor
minder opportuun, ook de praktische betekenis van een bezwaar, zelfs als dat
wederzijdse gebondheid uit zou sluiten, is gering.
Ook de aansluiting tussen het dynamische rechtsgebied van de rechten van de
mens, in dit verband met name de interpretaties, Algemene Commentaren en
uitspraken in de individuele klachtenprocedures, en het statische verdragen-
recht is problematisch. Onlangs kwam dat duidelijk naar voren bij de ratificatie
van het Verdrag inzake Burgerrechten en Politieke Rechten door Zwitserland
en de Verenigde Staten, die door middel van voorbehouden het OC^H/J van het
verdrag beogen uit te sluiten. Dit leidt tot puzzels die vooral aantonen dat het
verdragenrecht een verlegenheidsoplossing is ter verwerkelijking van de rechten
van de mens.
Terugkijkend op de Genocide zaak valt op hoe zeer het minderheidsadvies van
de vier rechters de toekomstige problemen met het vaststellen van "doel en
strekking" juist heeft voorzien. Mijn indruk is dat de relatief simpele vraag in
de Genocide zaak, en het ingenieuze antwoord van het Hof daarop, lange tijd
hebben verhuld dat het "doel en strekking" criterium even vanzelfsprekend als
vaag is. Het geeft in elk geval niet het antwoord op de actuele vragen.
Ten aanzien van de beide hoofdrolspelers staten en toezichthoudende comitds
moet gesteld worden dat deze beide een verantwoordelijkheid hebben voor het
beperken van de ondermijnende gevolgen van voorbehouden. De bevoegdheden
van staten berust op het verdragenrecht, en het is aan diezelfde staten om
deugdelijk voorbehoudsclausules op te nemen. Er van uitgaande dat artikel 19.c
een regeling is voor die gevallen waarin verdragspartijen niet zelf voorzien in
een regeling, is het duidelijk dat een heldere bepaling in het verdrag zelf de
voorkeur verdient. Aan het slot van dit boek wordt een bepaling geformuleerd
voor toekomstige mensenrechtenverdragen, die er van uit gaat dat voorbehoud-
en in principe tijdelijke uitzonderingen op de gelding van het verdrag zijn.
Door de gelding van het voorbehoud in de tijd te begrenzen tenzij een staat
uitdrukkelijk voortdurende gelding voor een vervolg periode wenst, kan wellicht
een afname van het aantal voorbehouden bereikt worden.
Ten aanzien van de rol van toezichthoudende comites is duidelijk dat zij veel
meer zouden kunnen doen dan tot nu toe gebeurt. Door het verbeteren van de
continuiteit in de rapportageprocedure kan voortgebouwd worden op eerder
toezeggingen van staten. Uitgangspunt zou moeten zijn dat de opmerkingen
van de vertegenwoordiger van de staat verplichtend zijn, en aan de staat
toegerekend kunnen worden. Ook het onderwerp van de parallelle verplichtin-
gen onder de verschillende verdragen zou krachtdadiger ter hand moeten
worden genomen. Een overzicht van de verplichtingen en de gemaakte voorbe-
houden kan op eenvoudige wijze als geheugensteun voor de toezichthoudende
comites functioneren. Ook het gebruik van de "doel en strekking" regel als
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interpretatieregel bij het bepalen van de reikwijdte van voorbehouden kan in
principe een positief effect hebben.'
j
Hoewel het uitgangspunt van dit onderzoek een sombere kijk op de mogelijk-
heden ter beperking van de voorbehouden binnen het verdragenrecht was, kom
ik tot de conclusie dat er methoden en strategieen bestaan die binnen de
grenzen van het geldende recht het ondermijnende effect van voorbehouden
kunnen beperken. Wat mij betreft valt er genoeg te doen.
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Ratify and Ruin?
by Liesbeth Lijnzaad
This book deals with the problems created by reservations to four UN Human
Rights Treaties: the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women; and the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment. The focus of the
study is the concepts and mechanisms in international law that are relevant as
regards reservations to Human Rights Treaties, as well as the role of States and
the possibilities supervisory committees have to monitor their impact. UN Human
Rights instruments are studied because little information exists on the impact of
reservations thereto, in contrast with reservations to regional Human Rights
instruments.
After the introduction, the second chapter begins with the Genocide case, and
the development of the law on reservations since then is discussed. The Vienna
Convention rules on reservations are dealt with, as well as the impact of
reciprocity as a dynamic force underlying treaties with respect to the reservation
issue.
The third chapter deals with theoretical aspects of reservations to Human Rights
Treaties. The reasons for making such reservations are discussed, along with the
quantitative impact which they have.
In the second part of the book the four Human Rights Treaties themselves are
studied on the basis of a standardized scheme.
The final chapter considers the possibilities for States and supervisory organs to
reduce the detrimental impact of reservations within the existing framework.
Proposals for better provisions on reservations are made.
